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Abstract  
Food insecurity remains a major challenge in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, despite the 
increased access to improved agricultural technologies and markets in the past few decades.  
Several attempts have been made to understand the factors accounting for the low uptake of 
improved agricultural technologies and smallholder market engagement, and their implications on 
household income, food security and nutrition in the sub-region. Social networks have been 
recognized as playing important roles in influencing household production decisions in many 
developing countries. However, not much has been done, in the empirical literature, on how 
heterogeneities in social learning about both benefits and production techniques of improved 
technologies, social networks structures and smallholder market orientation affect smallholder 
production decisions and welfare.  This study, therefore, contributes to these strands of literature 
by examining the role of social networks on smallholder adoption of improved soybean varieties, 
and the impacts of smallholder adoption and market orientation on household welfare in Northern 
Ghana. Specifically, the study first examines the impacts of peer adoption of two improved and 
competing soybean varieties on smallholders’ adoption decisions of these varieties using spatial 
autoregressive multinomial probit model to account for interdependence across varieties. Second, 
random-effects complementary log-log hazard model was used to investigate the role of social 
learning, network transitivity, centrality and modularity on the diffusion of these improved 
varieties. Third, the study examines the effects of own and peer adoption of the improved varieties 
on household soybean yield, food security and nutrition using the marginal treatment effects. It 
also explores the effects of policies that either increase affordability or access to improved seeds 
on adoption and the outcomes using the policy relevant treatment effects. Finally, the study 
employed an ordered probit selection model to examine the impacts of smallholder market-
xiii 
 
orientation on household food security and nutrition. The results show that a farmer’s adoption 
decision of a given improved variety is positively influenced by the adopting peers of this variety, 
but negatively by the adopting peers of the competing improved variety. Furthermore, when the 
relative share of adopting peers are equal, farmers are more likely to wait and not to switch from 
the old variety. In addition, the results show that both learning about benefits and production 
process are important in accelerating adoption, although the effects of learning about production 
process are higher when sufficient peers adopt the improved varieties. Also, the role of transitivity 
in the learning and diffusion processes is stronger, compared to centrality, although modularity 
tends to slow down the diffusion process, and also constrains the effects of both transitivity and 
centrality. The results further show that own and peer adoption of the improved varieties 
significantly increase smallholder yield and food consumption, and that adoption tend to make less 
endowed households to catchup with more endowed households.  Similarly, policies that increase 
either affordability or accessibility significantly increase adoption, yield and consumption, but 
increasing accessibility appears to deliver somewhat higher food consumption than the 
affordability-oriented policies. The estimates also reveal substantial heterogeneity in consumption 
gains across market orientations and suggest the need for transition targeted and sensitive policies 
in promoting smallholder food security and nutrition through crop commercialization.  Similarly, 
the findings on adoption suggest the need for policymakers to focus promotion efforts on 
demonstrating the relative benefits and production process of improved varieties to farmers. Also, 
interventions, such as self-help groups, farmer field-days and training workshops aimed at 
promoting smallholder interactions, and enhancing exchange can increase the effectiveness of 
social networks in promoting adoption and household welfare.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Trotz des vermehrten Zugangs zu verbesserten Agrartechnologien und Märkten in den letzten 
Jahrzenten, stellt Ernährungssicherung nach wie vor eine große Herausforderung in vielen Teilen 
Sub-Sahara Afrikas dar. Viele Versuche wurden unternommen, die Hintergründe der geringen 
Aufnahme verbesserter Agrartechnologien und Marktteilnahme von Kleinbauern zu verstehen und 
die Implikationen für Haushaltseinkommen, Ernährungssicherung und Ernährungsweise in der 
Subregion zu determinieren. Obwohl die Bedeutung Sozialer Netzwerke für die 
Haushaltsproduktionsentscheidung in Entwicklungsländern bekannt ist, wurde der Einfluss von 
Heterogenität in Sozialem Lernen in Bezug auf Nutzen, Produktionsmethoden verbesserter 
Technologien, Sozialer Netzwerkstrukturen und Marktorientierung, auf Produktionsentscheidung 
und Wohlfahrt der Kleinbauern in der empirischen Literatur bisher weitestgehend vernachlässigt. 
Um diese Lücke schließen, wird in dieser Studie der Einfluss Sozialer Netzwerken auf die 
Adoption verbesserter Sojabohnensorten untersucht und die Auswirkungen von Adoption und 
Marktorientierung auf die Wohlfahrt kleinbäuerlicher Haushalte in Nord-Ghana analysiert. Am 
Beispiel von zwei verbesserten und miteinander konkurrierenden Sojabohnensorten wird zunächst 
untersucht, wie sich die Adoptionsentscheidung der Peer-Gruppe auf die eigene Entscheidung 
auswirkt. Um Interdependenzen zwischen den Sorten zu berücksichtigen wird hierfür ein 
räumlich-autoregressiven Multinomial-Probit Modell verwendet. Anschließend wird anhand eines 
Random-Effects Complementary Log-Log Hazard Modells der Einfluss Sozialen Lernens und der 
Netzwerkcharkteristika Transitivität, Zentralität und Modularität auf die Verbreitung verbesserter 
Sorten untersucht. Schließlich werden anhand marginaler Behandlungseffekte die Auswirkung der 
Adoption verbesserter Sojasorten auf Ertrag, Ernährungssicherung und Ernährungweise der 
Haushalte untersucht. Darüber hinaus werden mittels politikrelevanter Behandlungseffekte die 
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Auswirkungen von Politikmaßnahmen auf Adoption und deren Folgen untersucht, die entweder 
die Erschwinglichkeit oder den Zugang zu verbessertem Saatgut erhöhen. Schließlich werden 
anhand eines Ordered-Probit Selection Modells die Auswirkungen der Marktorientierung von 
Kleinbauern auf deren Ernährungssicherheit und Ernährungsweise untersucht. Die Ergebnisse 
zeigen, dass die Entscheidung der Adoption einer bestimmte verbesserte Sorte durch die Adoption 
ebenjener Sorte durch die Peer Gruppe positiv beeinflusst wird, wohingegen die Aufnahme der 
konkurrierenden Sorte einen negativen Effekt hat. Sind die relativen Gruppengrößen der Peers 
gleich, so warten die Bauern eher ab und werden die ursprünglich angebaute Sorte nicht wechseln. 
Sowohl Lerneffekte bezüglich Gewinn als auch in Bezug auf Produktionsprozesse beschleunigen 
die Adoption, obgleich letztere höher ausfallen, wenn genügend Peers die verbesserten Sorten 
übernommen haben. Die Rolle von Transitivität in den Lern- und Diffusionsprozessen ist stärker 
im Vergleich zu Zentralität, wobei Modularität den Diffusionsprozess abschwächen und die 
Effekte von Transitivität und Zentralität mindern kann. Darüber hinaus kann die eigene wie die 
Adoption durch Peers den Ertrag und Nahrungsmittelverbrauch der Kleinbauern signifikant 
erhöhen und dazu führen, dass weniger gut ausgestattete Haushalte zu besser ausgestatteten 
Haushalten aufschließen können. Gleichermaßen führen Politiken, die entweder die 
Erschwinglichkeit oder den Zugang fördern, zu einem signifikanten Anstieg von Adoption, Ertrag 
und Konsum führen, wobei verbesserter Zugang einen scheinbar höheren Nahrungsmittelkonsum 
begünstig als kostenreduzierende Politiken. Die Schätzungen zeigen eine beträchtliche 
Heterogenität in dem Konsumzuwachs über die Marktausrichtung hinweg und verdeutlichen die 
Notwendigkeit von auf Transition abgezielten, sensiblen Politiken, die durch die 
Kommerzialisierung der Anbauprodukte Ernährungssicherheit und Ernährungsweise fördern. In 
ähnlicher Weise legen die Ergebnisse der Adoption nahe, dass die politischen Entscheidungsträger 
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ihre Werbemaßnahmen darauf konzentrieren müssen, den Landwirten den relativen Nutzen und 
den Produktionsprozess verbesserter Sorten aufzuzeigen. Interventionen, wie Selbsthilfegruppen, 
Landwirtschaftstage und Workshops, die Interaktion und Austausch der Kleinbauern fördern, 
können die adoptions- und wohlfahrtsfördernden Effekte Sozialer Netzwerke zusätzlich 
verbessern. 
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Chapter One 
General Introduction 
1.1 Background  
The role of agriculture in the economic development of countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has 
been widely proclaimed. The sector has been estimated to account for about 61% of aggregate 
employment, 25% of the gross domestic products (GDP), and 9.2% and 13.4% of total exports and 
imports respectively, between 2001 and 2016 (Tralac, 2017). These suggest that agricultural 
transformation and development would constitute a bedrock for the growth and development of 
developing countries particularly in SSA. For instance, it has been argued that the realization of 
the United Nations’ Sustainable Development goal of eradicating extreme poverty, hunger and all 
forms of malnutrition depends on raising the productivity of agriculture, particularly in developing 
countries (United Nation, 2016).  
 
Despite the important role of agriculture in developing countries, agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa 
is faced with several challenges. The most prominent among these is the lack of access to, and 
efficient use of improved technologies and inputs by farmers due to infrastructure limitations and 
decline in state-funding of agriculture following the implementation of structural adjustment 
programs (Markelova et al., 2009). Agriculture in SSA has been characterized by low and 
inefficient use of improved technologies despite the increasing availability and access to improved 
agricultural technologies in Africa (Suri, 2011). In fact, whereas there has been an expansion in 
the use of improved agricultural inputs and technologies in Asian and Latin America, which has 
resulted in increased agricultural productivity and reduced poverty, SSA has lagged behind in the 
use of improved and modern technologies and has, therefore, not been able to reap the productivity 
and welfare benefits of the so-called Green Revolution (Sheahan & Barrett, 2017).   
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The lack of innovation in Africa has been intensified by high cost of dissemination and inadequate 
effective demand for improved technologies (Wiggins & Leturque, 2010). Several propositions, 
including promotion of farmer market engagement and commercialization, and the use of social 
and collective actions have been made in order to enhance smallholder incomes; effective demand 
for and dissemination of information about improved technologies in Africa (Conley & Udry, 
2010; Ecker, 2018). Agriculture marketing and commercialization have been recognized by 
development practitioners and researchers as important mechanisms of addressing smallholder 
production and consumption challenges because of its potential in promoting greater 
specialization, economies of scope, higher productivity and increased income (Bernard et al., 
2008).  
  
The literature has generally categorized agricultural commercialization into output sales and input 
purchases (Wiggins et al., 2011). In terms of output sales, commercialization of farm output can 
lead to increase smallholder income, which may lead to increased smallholder spending on 
consumer goods and production inputs (Ecker, 2018). At the input side, commercialization leads 
to increased access to purchased inputs and use of improved inputs by smallholders (Govereh & 
Jayne, 2003; Ecker, 2018). In spite of the importance of commercialization and agricultural 
marketing, smallholders in Africa face high costs of marketing (i.e., either in buying farm inputs 
or selling of output) due to poor infrastructure, high maintenance costs as well as government and 
markets failures (Govereh & Jayne, 2003; Wiggins et al., 2011).  
 
These challenges and following the recent increase in food insecurity and malnutrition in the sub-
Saharan countries, where agriculture is the mainstay of most economies, motivated key policy 
priorities such as the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programmme (CAADP) 
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and the Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy (ARNS) to call for a rethinking and multidimensional 
approach to agriculture development in Africa (Sheahan & Barrett, 2017; FAO, ECA & AUC, 
2020). Several propositions for promoting the use of improved technologies and agricultural 
marketing have been advanced to include trade and macroeconomic policy reforms, development 
and liberalization of rural financial and capital markets, investment in and development of 
infrastructure and market as well as development of support services (Ariga & Jayne, 2009). In 
addition to conventional view of transformation and marketization of agriculture, contemporary 
thinking also emphasizes the role smallholder social capital, collective action and cooperation for 
agricultural innovations and marketing (Bernard et al., 2008). This thinking is premised on the 
assertion that social capital and networks create and strengthen relationships, which drive actors 
and actions to be interdependent and enhance exchange of information and resources (Smith & 
Christakis, 2008). 
 
Studies have underscored the relevance of social networks in innovation, product and technology 
diffusion (Munshi, 2004; Conley & Udry, 2010), insurance, labor and risk sharing (Fafchamps, 
2011) as well as in marketing of crops (Bernard et al., 2008). This study attempts to provide a 
comprehensive insight into the role of social networks in smallholders’ adoption and diffusion of 
improved technologies, and the implications of adoption of improved technologies and 
smallholder market-orientation on household welfare in northern Ghana.  
 
1.2 Problem setting and motivation 
In developing countries, where the reliance on agriculture is high, enhancement of agricultural 
productivity and income growth through adoption of new and improved innovations, and 
transformation of the sector from subsistence to more productive commercialize sector remains a 
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major developmental concern (Diao et al., 2010). While studies have shown that improved crop 
varieties are responsible for about 50 to 90% of increase in global crop yield (Muange, 2014), 
smallholders in SSA appear constrained in the availability and access to new technologies due to 
lack of physical infrastructure, failure of markets, high cost of dissemination and lack of effective 
demand (Sheahan & Barrett, 2017). In addition, whereas the contribution of agricultural marketing 
to smallholder productivity, incomes, and poverty reduction, has been recognized and documented 
by policies and researchers (Bernard et al., 2008; FAO, ECA & AUC, 2020), its impacts on food 
and nutrition security appear to be inconclusive, especially in SSA (Ogutu et al., 2019). 
 
Several attempts have been made to understand how social networks and groups can be leveraged 
as mechanisms by which smallholder adoption of new technologies can be promoted in order to 
circumvent some of the challenges imposed by information asymmetries and the high cost of 
technology dissemination in developing countries (Bandiera & Rasul, 2006; Conley & Udry, 
2010). Many studies have shown that social networks can promote technology diffusion by 
allowing farmers either to imitate the adoption choices of their network members or to consciously 
learn about the production techniques and the expected benefits of the new technologies from their 
social network members (Bandiera & Rasul, 2006; Conley & Udry, 2010).  
 
However, there is lack of empirical evidence on the role of adoption of competing technologies by 
smallholders’ social network members on their adoption decisions, and the relative dominance of 
these technologies in terms of adoption in smallholders’ social networks.  Previous studies have 
mainly been theoretical, focusing on the use of economic theory to derive normative results and 
predictions of adoption (Arthur, 1989; Kornish, 2006). Yet, smallholders are often faced with the 
adoption decision of several competing technologies, where the decision to adopt a given 
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technology depends not only on the adoption rates of that particular technology by the network 
members but also on the past and future adoption-rates of each of the competing technologies (e.g., 
Katz & Shapiro, 1986; Kornish, 2006). There is therefore the need to empirically examine the 
impacts of social networks on smallholder adoption of multiple and competing improved 
technologies.   
 
The literature also provides a number of explanations on how cropping conditions and benefits 
influence social learning in technology adoption, although the results have been mixed, with some 
authors finding positive impacts of social learning on adoption (Munshi, 2004; Magnan et al., 
2015), while a few find no effects (e.g., Duflo et a., 2011). One possibility of enhancing the 
understanding of adoption in social interaction settings and, perhaps, resolving these seemingly 
contrasting results is to move beyond the implicit assumption that farmers observe the field trials 
of their social network contacts with little friction in the flow of information (BenYishay & 
Mobarak, 2018) to examine the roles of heterogeneities of network structures in social learning 
since these shape the learning process (Jackson et al., 2017).  
 
Social network structures play important roles in shaping the nature of interaction within networks, 
and have been shown to exert overarching effects on many behavioral patterns and other economic 
outcomes (Jackson et al., 2017). Many studies have argued that network structures, such as 
transitivity1 and modularity2, play important roles in social interactions and influence patterns of 
                                                          
1 Transitivity or local cohesiveness/clustering coefficient measures how close the neighborhood of a farmer is to being a complete 
network.  
2 Modularity measures the proportion of links that lie within communities (i.e., components or segments) of a network minus the 
expected value of the same quantity in a network where links were randomly generated. It shows the extent of partition of the entire 
social network into latent groups and such partitioning can condition the flow of information within and across groups (Jackson et 
al., 2017). 
6 
 
behavior (Karlan et al., 2009). For instance, higher transitivity of a farmer’s neighborhood3, and 
low modularity of a network will mean more opportunities for the farmer to learn from peers and 
from different neighborhoods in the network. Such opportunities can lead to reduced cost of 
learning and increase the possibility of diffusion across the network (Jackson et al., 2017). 
However, less is known about the role of these network structures in the social learning process 
and technology adoption. It is therefore significant to understand whether learning about both 
production techniques and benefits, and these network structures influence smallholders timing of 
adoption of improved technologies.     
 
Several studies have evaluated the impact of improved technologies on household welfare 
(Shiferaw et al., 2014; Verkaart et al., 2017). However, not much consideration has been given to 
the impact of improved crop varietal adoption by households and their peers on household food 
and nutrients consumption. In particular, studies that examined the impact of technology adoption 
on performance outcomes tend to focus on crop yield and income related measures (e.g., Verkaart 
et al., 2017; Wossen et al., 2019). Even though a better understanding of the link between adoption 
of improved technology and consumption of food and nutrients is key in helping policy-makers 
design policies to promote food and nutrition security, this has received less attention in the 
literature.  
 
Moreover, the large literature on social interactions has virtually not provided evidence on the 
potential benefits of peer adoption of agricultural technologies on household food and nutrients 
consumption. For instance, in addition to the social learning effects on own productivity, income 
and consumption, peer adoption that leads to increased peer productivity, income and changes in 
                                                          
3 A farmers neighborhood is defined as the individuals the farmer has contacts with in a social network. 
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peer consumption, can also affect household consumption either due to endogenous peer effect, or 
through private cash transfers (De Giorgi et al., 2019). With the exception of a few such as De 
Giorgi et al. (2019) who examined endogenous consumption peer effects, and Charles et al. (2009) 
who analyzed the effects of race on consumption, this has not been done on peer adoption effects. 
Thus, we examine the impact of smallholders’ own and peer adoption of improved technologies 
on yield, food security and nutrition.   
 
Furthermore, in spite of the widespread agreement on the role of commercialization in improving 
food security and nutrition, the empirical evidence on this issue remain scanty, with mixed findings 
(Ogutu et al., 2019; Ochieng et al., 2019). Whereas some argue that income from 
commercialization that leads to substitution of purchased food for own produced food can result 
in increased food consumption, but not nutrients intake (Ogutu et al., 2019), others argue that these 
income gains may lead to preference for higher quality and cost foods and no change in food intake 
(Skoufias et al., 2011).  
 
Moreover, most of these studies have often failed to consider the possible market-orientation of 
smallholders’ crop sales, which may mask the extent and pattern of gains from crop sales, given 
that smallholders’ crop sales are driven by profit and non-profit motives (Pingali & Rosegrant, 
1995; Jacoby & Minten, 2009). In particular, production and marketing decisions of smallholders 
in Africa are often fragmented and characterized by a blend of subsistence, surplus, commercial 
and distress motives, which may have varying implications on the gains from commercialization 
across farmers (Pingali & Rosegrant, 1995). Hence, it is therefore important to evaluate the impact 
of smallholder market-orientation on household food and nutrients consumption.  
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This dissertation attempts to contribute to the literature by filling these research gaps using recent 
data from a survey of 500 farm households in Northern Ghana. The choice of Northern Ghana was 
because agriculture is the main economic activity in the area with about 88% of households relying 
on agriculture in this area (GSS, 2014). In addition, whereas social networks have been identified 
to facilitate exchange of information, credit, labor and land in Ghana (Udry & Conley, 2004) and 
could facilitate technology diffusion and agricultural productivity, the northern regions appear to 
have the highest incidences of poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition. These make the choice 
of the region appropriate in examining the role of social networks, technology adoption and crop 
marketing on household welfare.     
 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
The main objective of this study is to examine the impacts of social networks, improved technology 
adoption and crop commercialization on household welfare of smallholders in the Northern region 
of Ghana. The specific objectives are: 
1. To analyze the impacts of social networks on smallholder adoption of competing improved 
technologies; 
2. To examine the role of social learning and social network structures in the diffusion of 
improved technology among smallholders; 
3. To evaluate the impacts of smallholders’ own and peer adoption of improved technologies 
on household welfare;  
4. To conduct a review of food security and nutrition strategies in sub-Saharan African 
countries, and an empirical analysis of the impact of smallholder market participation on 
household welfare. 
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1.4 Significance of the study 
First, examining the role of social networks in the adoption and diffusion process could provide 
an efficient means of dealing with information asymmetry about the availability, access and 
uncertainties of improved technologies. Such information asymmetry has often limited farmers 
response to improved technologies and contributed to significant heterogeneities in the cost of 
adopting improved technologies in many sub-Saharan countries (Wiggins & Leturque, 2010; Suri, 
2011). Also, information about the influence of social networks in adoption decisions in the 
context of competing technologies will inform policymakers when to promote single or multiple 
improved technologies in a given social setting. This will show the relative adoption of these 
improved varieties in networks (i.e., villages), and whether a full-scale introduction and promotion 
of all improved varieties, as often done by policymakers and stakeholders in Africa, is meritorious.  
 
Second, examining the influence of social networks structures in the adoption and diffusion 
process will inform policymakers about when to leverage social networks in promoting diffusion. 
Information about the role of the density of farmers’ neighborhoods in a network and the overall 
structure of the network will inform policymakers when, and when not, to rely on the use of central 
nodes and extension agents in the diffusion process. For instance, information about the extent of 
partition of farmers’ networks will show whether targeting an influential farmer (as suggested by 
many studies) or promoting extension contacts with few farmers will be effective in facilitating 
diffusion since the extent of information flow will depend on the how dense and segregate the 
social network is (i.e., the village).  
 
This study extends the current frontiers of the analyses of impacts of technology adoption on 
household welfare by considering the impacts of exogenous social interactions on household 
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welfare. Give the sustainability challenges and problems of lack of exit mechanisms of public 
transfer schemes (Holden et al., 2006), understanding the effects of peer adoption on own 
consumption will provide an alternative to policy and other stakeholders in their attempt to 
promote food and nutrition security through food or cash transfer schemes. The study also provides 
insights into the impacts of commercialization by examining such impacts along the lines of farmer 
motivation for commercialization in order to disentangle impacts due to commercialization from 
those due to other sales such as “distress” (Jacoby & Minten, 2009). This will inform policymakers 
on the type of commercialization that matters, in order to develop more informed policies in 
promoting food security, nutrition and agriculture transformation in Africa (Pingali & Rosegrant, 
1995).   
 
1.5 Agriculture in Ghana 
The agriculture sector remains the major source of living for majority of Ghanaians and accounted 
for about 22.2% of Ghana’s GDP in 2017 (GSS, 2018). The sector provides employment for over 
50% of employed people and for about 82.5% of rural households (GSS, 2014) in Ghana. 
Agriculture is predominantly on smallholder basis with about 90% of land holdings being less than 
2 hectares (ha) and accounting for about 80% of the total agricultural output in Ghana (MoFA, 
2017). Also, almost all economic activities and livelihoods of smallholder farmers depend on 
agriculture and related businesses. For instance, over 65% of non-oil manufacturing uses raw 
materials from agriculture in the country, and the sector also accounts for more than 25% of the 
country’s total foreign exchange earnings (World Bank, 2017).  
 
In Ghana, the food crops subsector, which include rice, maize, yams, groundnuts, soybean, cassava 
and plantains, tend to dominate, and accounts for about 70% of the agriculture GDP (MoFA, 2017). 
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Despite the importance of the sector and reported increment in area under farming, the contribution 
of the sector to national GDP has consistently decline to 22.2 in 2017, down from 31.2% in 2005. 
At the same time, the incidence of poverty increased from 39.2% in 2012/13 to 42.7% in 2016/17 
among households engaged in the agricultural sector (GSS, 2018). Low yields of both staple and 
cash crops has partly contributed to the declining performance of agriculture in the country. 
Existing evidence show that Ghana’s yields of cereals are estimated at 1.7 metric tons (MT)/ha, 
which is lower than the regional average of 2.0MT/ha and far less than the national potential yields 
of more than 5.0MT/ha (World Bank, 2017). Also, postharvest losses due to market failures and 
challenges have been estimated at 20 to 30% for cereals and legumes (MoFA, 2007). 
 
Several factors including climate change, market constraints, poor soils, pests and diseases and 
lack of access to, and application of improved inputs have contributed to the low agricultural 
productivity in Ghana (MoFA, 2017). For instance, Ghana has been reported as one of the lowest 
countries in terms of the appropriateness and precision of inputs and fertilizer (e.g., 12kg/ha) 
application, particularly in all of SSA (World Bank, 2017). Furthermore, the low yields and 
declining contribution of the sector to GDP have also been attributed to lack of extension services, 
lack of availability and access to markets and the limited use of information and communication 
technology (ICT) in the sector (MoFA, 2017).  
 
Given these challenges of the agricultural sector, successive governments have sought to promote 
the sector in many ways in order to circumvent the declining productivity and to make the sector 
an engine of growth through increased farm incomes and job creation in the country (World Bank, 
2017). The Food and Agriculture Sector Plans (FASDEP I and II) focused on promoting the 
efficiency of the sector through commodity markets and value chains, application of appropriate 
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technologies and improved environmental sustainability (MoFA 2007). This was followed by the 
Medium-Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan (METASIP 2011-2015) which aimed at 
increasing the role of agriculture in the transformation of the Ghanaian economy. This emphasized 
the need to increase agricultural productivity and food security, creation of decent job and increase 
agricultural competitiveness through mechanization, innovation and technology application; 
promotion of seed and planting material development and promotion of domestic and international 
marketing of commodities (MoFA, 2017).  
 
More recently, the Government of Ghana launched a new program for the agriculture sector under 
the name Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ) with focuses of the promotion of maize, rice, sorghum, 
soybean and vegetables (MoFA, 2017). The PFJ also seeks to engender structural transformation 
of the country through agriculture by increasing availability of food crops, job creation and 
agricultural productivity. Among the major interventions earmarked to achieve this goal are 
increased access to, and adoption of improved inputs and promotion of marketing of both crop 
inputs and outputs through farmer-based organizations and private sector led networks (MoFA, 
2017). The above discussion shows the relevance of improved input adoption and agricultural 
marketing to the sector in Ghana, and the keen consideration given to these two issues by 
successive governments. These, therefore, justifies the need to examine how adoption of improved 
technologies and agricultural marketing can be promoted in order to stimulate national agricultural 
productivity and to enhance household welfare.     
 
1.6 Agricultural commercialization defined 
Most definitions consider commercialization as the production of goods and services for sale as 
opposed to subsistence farming. Strasberg et al. (1999) defined commercialization as the ratio of 
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gross value of all crop sales to gross value of all crop produced multiplied by 100. An obvious 
limitation of this definition is that it narrows commercialization to output market participation (see 
Wiggins et al., 2011). With this definition, there is also the likelihood of treating “distress” sales 
(i.e., sale of crops immediately after harvest due to immediate cash needs) of a farmer as 
commercialization (Leavy & Poulton, 2007). Other authors have indicated that mainly focusing 
on the crop output market may not be an appropriate indicator of commercialization, and therefore 
advocated for the consideration of input market participation (Leavy & Poulton, 2007; Wiggins et 
al., 2011). For instance, Leavy and Poulton (2007) defined input commercialization index as the 
value of inputs acquired from markets divided by agricultural production value. A broader 
definition is the Integration into the Cash Economy (ICE), which measures the ratio of value of 
goods and services acquired through cash transaction and total income (von Braun & Kennedy, 
1994).  
 
However, the concept of agricultural commercialization mean more than just involvement in 
market transactions but also takes into consideration the motive of the farmer (Leavy & Poulton, 
2007). Pingale and Rosegrant (1995) categorized farmer commercialization into three namely: 
subsistence motive which is characterized by the use of own inputs and produces principally with 
the objective of food self-sufficiency; semi-commercial motive which is also characterized by the 
use of own and purchased inputs and produces with an objective of selling some surplus. The final 
category is the commercial motive, which is characterized by the use of mainly purchased inputs 
and with the objective of producing for profit. Finally, FAO (1989) defines agricultural 
commercialization by also categorizing farmers into subsistence-oriented if the farmer sells less 
than 25% of the harvest; surplus-oriented if the farmer sells between 25 and 50% of the harvest, 
and commercial-oriented if the farmer sells at least 50% of the harvest. Given the lack of unified 
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definition, Wiggins et al. (2011) suggest that the choice of definition should depend on the 
objective of the study.  
 
1.7 Agricultural commercialization in Ghana 
Commercialization of agriculture is considered as an important strategy in Ghana’s current 
agricultural policy frameworks and national development plans as these emphasize the relevance 
of moving from a subsistence-based small-holder system to a market-oriented production (MoFA, 
2015; MoFA, 2017). Despite the importance of agricultural commercialization, the average 
marketed surplus of crops is considered low in Ghana. For instance, IFAD-IFPRI (2011) estimated 
the average marketed surplus ratio as 33% in Ghana. However, the extent of agricultural 
commercialization varies depending on the crop or livestock type and agroecological zone. GSS 
(2014) reported that cocoa was the crop with highest value sold in the forest and coastal zones 
accounting for 45% and 24% respectively, whereas yam and maize, representing 59% of sales, 
were the most important in terms of value of crop sales in the savannah zone. The low national 
average marketed surplus and the variations across crops has also been attributed to low crop 
productivity and poor market conditions (IFAD-IFPRI, 2011).  
 
These have led to the pursuit of specific programs and interventions by government with the aim 
of increasing farmers’ market engagements. The Commercial Development for Farmer-Based 
Organization (CDFO) aspect of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), and the Ghana 
Commercial Agriculture Project (GCAP) are specific cases in point, which encouraged 
smallholder market-orientation and also trained and provided them with credit to enhance their 
production and sales of farm produce. In particular, the Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project 
(GCAP) was initiated by the Government of Ghana to promote integrated commercialization along 
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selected value chains of rice, maize, fruits and vegetables, and soybean (MoFA, 2015). Following 
this and other recent policy interventions such as the PFJ, soybean has become an integral crop in 
northern Ghana being promoted by most governmental and non-governmental parties [such as the 
USAID Feed the Future program, Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), the 
Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement project (Advance I and II) and Ghana 
Greenfield Investment Program among others] (Gage et al., 2012). 
 
1.8 Soybean in Ghana  
Soybean (Glycine max, L) is a commercial crop that has the potential of primarily increasing farm 
incomes and also improving nutritional status of farmers and other consumers in Ghana. The crop 
also provides feed to support livestock rearing and fish, and raw materials for agribusinesses in the 
country (CSIR-SARI, 2013). Production and promotion of soybean in Ghana witnessed significant 
increase in the past two decades. Figure 1.1 show that annual domestic production of soybean 
increased over four folds from 39,000MT in 2005 to a peak of 170,000MT in 2017, an increase 
that is mainly due to increased intervention in the subsector by the government of Ghana and other 
development partners (such as USAID ADVANCE4) and expansion in the amount of area 
cultivated.  
 
For instance, the area of land cultivated to the crop witnessed a sustained increase from as low as 
45,000 hectares (ha) in 2005 to about 101,000ha in 2017. In addition, the soybean market in Ghana 
is rapidly growing with an estimated annual demand of about 150,000 MT, which is mainly driven 
by the local poultry industry. The increasing demand has led to an increase in national annual 
                                                          
4 ADVANCE refers to the Feed the Future Ghana Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement Project funded by 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 
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wholesale price of soybean from about 0.36 USD/Kg in 2008 to over 0.6 USD/Kg in 2015 (MoFA-
SRID, 2015).   
 
 
          Figure 1.1 Area cultivated and domestic production of soybean 
           
          Source: FAOSTAT, 2019. 
 
 
In relation to other legumes (i.e., groundnut and cowpea), soybean appear to have lower 
susceptibility to pests and diseases, better shelf life and larger leaf biomass that is important for 
soil fertility (CSIR-SARI, 2013). Climatic conditions in Ghana and in particular, northern Ghana, 
are considered suitable for its cultivation because of the mean temperature requirement of 20oC to 
30oC by the crop for successful cultivation (CSIR-SARI ,2013). Despite the advantages of soybean 
over the other grain legumes, the crop still lags behind these other legumes in terms of area 
cultivated and domestic production nationally. Whereas the area cultivated to groundnut and 
cowpea were estimated at 394,000ha and 159,000ha, respectively, the area cultivated to soybean 
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was estimated at 90,000ha in 2018. Similarly, the national production of groundnut and cowpea 
were estimated at 521,000Mt and 215,000Mt, while the production of soybean was estimated at 
152,000Mt in 2018 (FOASTAT, 2019).   
 
Also, soybean output in Ghana has been argued as being low with about 46.7% of its attainable 
output produced annually. In addition, the average yield of soybean yield has been estimated at 
1.68MT/ha which is far less than the potential yields of 3.10MT/ha (MoFA-SRID, 2015). This has 
been attributed to a number of production constraints, including lack of extension and training to 
ensure good handling, care and storage of soybean seeds; inadequate breeder and foundation seed 
supply; reliance on rain-fed, manual and rudimentary production systems and lack of awareness 
and use of improved seed varieties (CSIR-SARI, 2013). For instance, access to improved seeds 
and other inputs has been estimated at 23% and 9% respectively (SIL, 2015). 
 
Given this low access and use of improved varieties, the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) and Savannah Agricultural Research Institute (SARI) have over the years 
developed and introduced a number of improved seed varieties and other innovations such as 
inoculant to promote the cultivation and output of the crop. Initially, two varieties, Anidaso and 
Bengbie were released in 1992, but were not well received by farmers. Consequently, seven other 
varieties were introduced from 2003 and only two of these (namely Jenguma and Afayak) are still 
in cultivation today, in addition to the traditional variety (Salintuya). These improved varieties 
have been reported to have higher yield potential of over 2.0 MT/ha, resistant to pod-shattering, 
mature in about 35 days earlier compared to the traditional variety and resistant to other 
agricultural stress such as pests, diseases, low phosphorous soil and climatic variabilities (CSIR-
SARI, 2013).  
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However, the use of these improved varieties and other technologies are still described as being 
far from desired. For instance, studies on the rate of soybean adoption in Ghana have shown that, 
despite the high penetration of soybean production, the use of improved seeds has been low and 
estimated as ranging between 16% and 33% of soybean farmers (SIL, 2015). Moreover, available 
evidence shows that 35% of soybean producers use inoculum, 32% apply phosphorous and 4% 
use mechanical planters (SIL, 2015). The low adoption of improved technologies in the midst of 
increased availability of improved soybean planting technologies, and the high yield and market 
potential of the crop present an interesting and suitable context to investigate the drivers and 
impacts of adoption of improved soybean technologies on household welfare in the area.   
 
1.9 Farmer social networks in Ghana 
Farmer-based associations and social networks have been integral parts of socio-economic 
arrangements and policies to promote smallholder technology adoption and agricultural marketing 
in developing countries (Conley & Udry, 2010). This is because social capital has been shown to 
have several effects on production, investment and marketing decisions (Udry & Conley, 2004; 
Karlan et al., 2009). In Ghana, Udry and Conley (2004) identified four main types of social 
networks, namely information, credit, labor and land networks, that tend to influence smallholder 
production decisions. Information networks present opportunity for smallholders to learn about 
new innovations and technologies from peers. Credit networks involve the exchange of financial 
resources between peers, and enable smallholders mitigate or overcome the constraints of credit 
in the production process. The third network effect is labor transactions networks where 
smallholder in a network tend to exchanged labor during farm operations and finally, land 
transaction network which presents an opportunity to redistribute and increase access to land by 
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land constraint farmers. These aspects were taken into consideration in this study in defining social 
network links given their influence on learning opportunities and on various productive resources.   
 
1.10 Study area and data collection 
Soybean is mainly produced in Northern, Upper West, Volta and Upper East regions of Ghana 
with the Northern region, which is the study area, accounting for more than half of the total area 
cultivated to the crop (65.72%) and the national output (72%) of the crop (Gage et al., 2012). The 
Northern region is the largest region in terms of land mass in Ghana and occupies about 70,384 
square kilometers of land. Geographically, it is bounded by Upper West and Upper East regions 
to the north, Brong Ahafo and Volta regions to the south (see Figure 1.2), Togo to the east and 
Côte d’Ivoire to the west. The region has a total population of 2,479,461 with 69.7% being rural. 
The total number of households in the region is 318,119 and the average household size in the 
region of 7.7 persons is higher than the national average of 4.4 persons. The literacy level in the 
region is very low with only 37.5% of persons who are 11 years and older can read and write a 
simple statement with understanding in at least English or a Ghanaian language (GSS, 2013). 
Administratively, the region has 26 districts.  
 
Agriculture is the mainstay of the region, engaging about 74% of employed persons and 93% of 
rural households in the area (GSS, 2013; GSS, 2018). The main crops cultivated include yam, 
maize, millet, guinea corn, rice, groundnuts, beans, soybean and cowpea (GSS, 2013). 
Unfortunately, the incidence of poverty and extreme poverty are not only high in the region but 
have increase from 50.4% and 22.8% to 61.1% and 30.7%, respectively, between 2012/13 and 
2016/17 (GSS, 2018). 
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  Figure 1.2 Map of study area 
  Source: Regional and district map of Ghana, 2017. 
 
Food insecurity and malnutrition have also been the highest in the area compared to the rest of the 
country, with an average of 18% of households being severely food insecure. The prominent 
causes of food insecurity and malnutrition in this area include inadequate rains, poor soils, 
structural constraints and lack of improved inputs, which have often led to low agricultural outputs, 
fluctuation in food prices and seasonal constraints in accessing food (WFP & GSS, 2012). 
 
In order to investigate smallholder adoption of improved soybean variety and crop 
commercialization as well as their impact of household welfare, cross-sectional household survey 
was conducted in five districts in the Northern region between June and September 2017. A 
random sample of 500 farm households was drawn in three stages. In the first step, five (5) soybean 
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producing districts was purposively selected based on their intensity of soybean production. Next, 
a list of soybean producing villages in each district was obtained from MoFA district offices, and 
used to randomly sample 8 villages in Savelugu-Nanton, 6 in Gushegu, 5 in Tolon, 4 in Karaga 
and 2 in Kumbungu districts, in proportion to the number of households engaged in agriculture in 
each district (GSS, 2014).  In the third stage, listing of households in each village was conducted 
and a randomly sample of 20 households was selected for interview in each village using a 
structured questionnaire. In order to obtain village level information, focus group discussion with 
4 to 6 village and farmer group leaders was conducted in each village. (see Appendix for the 
questionnaire and the discussion guide).  
 
1.11 Structure of thesis  
The dissertation is organized into six chapters including chapter one as the general introduction. 
Chapters two to five consist of journal articles. Specifically, chapter two examines the impacts of 
social network members’ adoption of competing improved soybean varieties on smallholder 
adoption decisions of these varieties and the relative dominance of these varieties in the social 
networks. Chapter three explores the influence of social learning about production techniques and 
benefits of new technologies, as well as the effects of social network structures: transitivity and 
modularity on diffusion of the improved soybean varieties. Chapter four evaluates the impact of 
smallholders’ own and peer adoption of the improved varieties on soybean yields, food security 
and nutrition. An analysis of the impact of smallholder market-orientation is presented in Chapter 
five. Chapter six presents summary, conclusions and policy implications of the study. 
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Abstract 
In this study, we use a unique and detailed dataset to examine the impact of social networks, 
conditional on contextual and individual confounders, on farmers’ adoption of competing 
improved soybean varieties in Ghana. Based on the contagion conceptual framework, we employ 
a spatial autoregressive multinomial probit model to examine how neighbors’ varietal and cross 
varietal adoption of improved varieties, affect a farmer’s adoption decision in the social network. 
Our results show that adoption decisions in a network tend to converge on one variety, such that 
beyond a threshold of adopting neighbors of that improved variety, the cross-varietal effects tend 
to lose significance in the network. We also find evidence that farmers are not more likely to adopt 
either of the improved variety compared to farmers with no neighbors who have adopted the 
improved varieties, if the shares of adopting neighbors of the improved varieties are equal. The 
findings demonstrate the significance of neighborhood effects in the adoption of competing 
technologies. 
Keywords: Social network; Technology adoption; Cross-varietal effect; Threshold; Spatial model 
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2.1 Introduction 
In developing countries where the reliance on agriculture is high, enhancement of agricultural 
productivity and income growth through the adoption of new and improved innovations are widely 
accepted as quite significant. Studies have shown that improved crop varieties are responsible for 
about 50% to 90% of increase in world crop yield per ha (Muange, 2014). Unfortunately, adoption 
of improved varieties and other forms of new technologies remain quite low, especially among 
smallholders in sub-Saharan Africa (Muange, 2014). Walker et al. (2014) argue that out of 20 main 
crops grown by farmers in Africa, improved varieties account for only about 35% of the area 
cultivated to these crops, which underscores the significance of understanding the determinants of 
technology adoption for research and policy.  
 
Modern technologies have often been introduced with the normative anticipation that such 
technologies will do well, as they allow peers to learn from each other, thereby displaying 
increasing returns as more people adopt (Arthur, 1989). Beyond this, many empirical studies have 
shown the importance of social networks in the adoption and diffusion of new agricultural 
technologies (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 
2010; Beaman and Dillon, 2018; BenYishay and Mobarak, 2018). Unfortunately, there is lack of 
empirical evidence on the role of adoption of competing technologies by agents’ neighbors on their 
adoption decisions, and the relative dominance of these technologies in terms of adoption in 
agents’ social networks.  Previous studies on this front have mainly been theoretical, focusing on 
the use of economic theory to derive normative results, predicting adoption and characterizing 
equilibrium conditions of adoption (Arthur, 1989; Kornish, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2011). 
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In this article, we investigate the case where farmers are faced with the adoption decision of three 
technologies. The farmer’s adoption of a given technology depends not only on the adoption-rate 
of this particular technology, but also on the adoption-rate of competing technologies available in 
the farmer’s network (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1986). This study, to the best of our knowledge, 
provides the first empirical assessment of farmers’ adoption decisions in a multiple competing 
technology setting, where a farmer’s adoption behavior is influenced by that of adopting neighbors 
of all available improved technologies. This type of investigation is important for the following 
reasons: First, this analysis reflects the situation farmers face in contemporary economic, socio-
political and technological environment, where similar and/or different technologies for the same 
purpose are developed (Dorfman, 1996). Second, and perhaps more important in the context of 
social network externalities, is that a farmers’ decision about a given technology depends on the 
past and future adoption-rates of each of the competing technologies (e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1986; 
Kornish, 2006). The higher the adoption-rate of a particular technology, the higher are the 
complementary network externalities for this technology. For instance, a technology incompatible 
with other available technologies may become dominant, i.e., in the sense of a standard, so that 
previous investments in any other technology may become completely obsolete and their future 
net benefits tend to zero. 
  
To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a simple contagion model to show that farmers’ 
adoption decisions of a given variety depend on the adoption decisions of network neighbors who 
are adopters of that variety and neighbors who are adopters of the other varieties.  Our model setup 
is related to other works on technology adoption and consumer market shares (Arthur, 1989; 
Kornish, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2011). However, as an extension of these previous frameworks, 
we allow the status quo technology to affect farmers’ adoption decisions rather than assuming it is 
30 
 
an obsolete option with its value normalized to zero. This makes the adoption of the traditional 
variety in a farmer’s neighborhood an argument in the value function of farmers’ adoption 
decisions in our framework.  We then employ spatial econometric techniques similar to Lee (2007), 
Lin (2010) and Bramoullé et al. (2009) to examine the impacts of social networks on farmers’ 
adoption decisions of two improved soybean varieties in Ghana, using unique and detailed 
observational data. 
 
Our results show that a farmer’s likelihood of adopting an improved variety is lower than the 
proportion of adopting neighbors of that variety when the proportion is below a given threshold. 
However, the likelihood of adoption becomes higher than the proportion of adopting neighbors 
when the share of neighbors adopting that variety is above this threshold. We also find that a 
farmer’s adoption decision of a given improved variety is positively influenced by the adopting 
neighbors of this variety, but negatively by the adopting neighbors of the competing improved 
variety. This is consistent with contagion effects, where the behaviors of one’s peers change the 
likelihood that one engages in those behaviors. We also observe that when the relative share of 
adopting neighbors are equal, farmers are not more likely to adopt any of the improved varieties 
compared to farmers without adopting neighbors of the improved varieties. This finding offers 
additional explanation of the differences in adoption rates of competing technologies and why 
some technologies may become dominant, while others end up as subordinates, or even 
nonexistent in some circumstances. 
 
Our analysis is novel in the following respects. First, by incorporating endogenous effects, 
contextual effects and unobserved correlated fixed effects, we are able to delineate the effects due 
to behavioral decisions, average neighbors’ characteristics and those due to unobserved common 
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characteristics. The consideration of all three effects is highly important, as their unbundling helps 
in teasing out the effects of behavioral decisions, which is the most important aspect of these 
network effects in designing and targeting innovation policies more effectively (Manski, 1993 
p.533). Second, we examine cross-variety dependence in the mean part of the model to show how 
farmers’ adoption of the improved varieties are related to their neighbors’ adoption decisions. With 
this, we are able to circumvent the interpretation problem of the estimated parameters that is 
usually associated with the approach of capturing interdependence among alternatives in the 
variance-covariance structure5 (Autant-Bernard et al., 2008; LeSage and Pace, 2009; Wang et al., 
2014).  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the context and data. In 
Section 2.3, we present the theoretical framework that we use to guide the empirical analysis. We 
present the empirical framework and estimation in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, we report and 
discuss the results, and then conclude in Section 2.6. 
 
2.2 Context and data 
2.2.1 Context 
Soybean is a crop that is mainly cultivated in the northern part of Ghana (Northern, Upper East 
and Upper West regions), with the Northern region accounting for 65.72% of the total area 
cultivated to the crop in Ghana. It is a commercial crop that has the potential to raise farmers’ 
incomes and improve their nutritional status. It is also a versatile crop that supports livestock 
                                                          
5 Typically, in order to identify the multinomial probit model, the first diagonal element of the covariance matrix is 
set to unity, which makes the interpretation of the dependence among alternatives problematic when captured in the 
variance-covariance structure (Autant-Bernard et al., 2008; Chakir and Parent, 2009). 
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rearing, fisheries and provides raw materials for local industries. However, it has not yet been fully 
accepted by farmers, because of the perceived cropping and handling difficulties (Plahar, 2006). 
Also, available evidence suggests that average yields are as low as 0.8MT/ha, even though there 
is the potential to achieve yields as high as 2.5MT/ha, with improved varieties of seeds and proper 
agronomic practices (Gage et al., 2012).   
 
In lieu of this, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and Savannah Agricultural 
Research Institute (SARI) have over the years developed and introduced a number of innovations 
including improved seed varieties and inoculant to promote the cultivation and output of the crop. 
Two of the improved varieties (namely Jenguma and Afayak) are currently in cultivation, in 
addition to the traditional variety (Salintuya). These improved varieties were first introduced to 
farmers at demonstration sites in the various districts by SARI, and following adoption of some 
farmers, seeds were subsequently made available to these farmers and to extension offices of the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) to promote farmers’ access to the seeds and information 
about planting (CSIR-SARI, 2013). These avenues remain the main sources of information about 
the cultivation and yield potentials of these varieties. 
 
The improved varieties have higher yield potential of over 2.0 MT/ha, resistant to pod-shattering, 
earliness in maturity (i.e., about 35 days less compared to the traditional variety) and resistant to 
other agricultural stress such as pests, diseases, low phosphorous soil and climatic variabilities 
(CSIR-SARI, 2013). In addition, planting the improved varieties does not require any special 
complementary inputs that are different from the inputs required by the traditional variety. These 
notwithstanding, studies show that the use of improved soy seed is quite low, with estimates 
ranging between 16% and 33% (SIL, 2015) of soybean farmers. The indigenous, late maturing and 
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shattering variety is still in wide use, and CGIAR (2009) reported that this variety constituted more 
than 50% of all soybean varieties under cultivation in Ghana. 
 
Table 2.1 provides information on farmers’ awareness and subjective perception of the costs and 
expected benefits of adopting the improved varieties. Panel A shows that whereas about 64% and 
60% of farmers know about Jenguma and Afayak respectively, the proportion of adopters are 42% 
and 26%, respectively. The potential setbacks to adoption identified in the literature are lack of 
information about the production techniques and benefits of new technologies, credit constraints 
and market6 constraints (Zeller et al., 1998; Croppenstedt et al., 2003; Beaman et al., 2020). Panel 
A of Table 2.1 further reports the reasons why farmers adopted the improved varieties. The most 
frequent reason given in each case is agronomic and climate resistance of Jenguma and high 
yielding advantage of Afayak. The second most frequent reason indicated is the perceived high 
yielding potential of Jenguma and agronomic and climatic resistance of Afayak. For non-adopters, 
the top reasons for not adopting the improved varieties are due to inadequate information about 
the production and agronomic requirements of the improved varieties, and that these improved 
varieties are not high yielding compared to the traditional varieties7.  
 
In order to assess the extent to which non-adopters are informed about the yields of the improved 
varieties, panel B shows the estimated change in yields between each of the improved varieties 
                                                          
6 The high and excess demand for soybean over its supply, especially by the poultry sector, in Ghana (Plahar, 2006), and the high 
integration of the soybean market into the international market (Goldsmith, 2017), suggest that the degree of marketability of 
soybean may not be the main barrier to adoption given that all three varieties face similar market conditions. In addition, Table 
2.A1 in the appendix shows no systematic difference in market access across farmers’ adoption status.  
7 Discussions with MoFA officials and village level key informants revealed that some farmers hold the perception that the 
traditional variety grows well and will provide good yield with good management and timely harvest (see also SIL, 2015).  
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and the traditional variety based on computation from the sample and estimates of non-adopting 
farmers. 
 
     Table 2.1 Awareness and main reasons for adoption or non-adoption of the 
improved varieties 
 % 
Panel A  
Know about Jenguma 64.4 
Know about Afayak 59.8 
  
Why adopted Jenguma  
Agronomic and climatic advantages 74.6 
High yielding 66.8 
High marketability  42.1 
Less labor demanding 38.6 
Easy to cultivate   8.4 
  
Why adopted Afayak  
High yielding 67.2 
Agronomic and climatic advantages 62.4 
High marketability  44.0 
Less labor demanding 36.8 
Easy to cultivate 11.2 
  
Why non-adopters did not adopt  
Do not know the production and agronomic requirements  76.0 
I feel it is not high yielding 34.0 
Credit constraints 21.0 
Poor prices and market 21.0 
Need for other food crops   4.0 
  
Panel B  
Estimated yield difference between:  
Jenguma and Salintuya from average yields of the sample$ 67.1 
Afayak and Salintuya from average yields of the sample 58.8 
Jenguma and Salintuya estimated by non-adopters   4.9 
Afayak and Salintuya estimated by non-adopters   4.2 
Notes: The table consist of two panels. Panel A presents descriptive statistics of farmers’ awareness and farmers’ reasons 
for adoption and non-adoption. Panel B presents descriptive statistics of estimated yield difference between each of the 
improved varieties and the traditional variety by official sources, computation using average yield of the sampled farmers 
and by non-adopters. The official estimates suggest much higher yield potentials of Jenguma and Afayak of 2.8Mt/ha and 
2.4Mt/ha, respectively, compared to the yield potential of the traditional variety is 1.0Mt/ha (CSIR-SARI, 2013). 
 
35 
 
There are substantial differences between the change in yields (on average) obtained by adopters 
and the estimates (5%) reported by non-adopters. The reported differences suggest that despite the 
existence of the improved varieties for some time, and the promotion of the improved variety by 
SARI and MoFA through the existing extension system, non-adopters seem to have different 
information and perceptions about the production processes and expected benefits of the improved 
varieties compared to adopters. This differential access to information among adopters and non-
adopters, and failure of several improved varieties to be accepted by farmers suggest the need to 
understand what could possibly explain farmers’ adoption of a particular variety in a context of 
multiple improved varieties. This will be useful in the formulation of hypotheses that explain the 
underlying drivers of varieties emerging as dominant or marginal in the farmers’ villages (social 
networks).    
 
2.2.2 Data  
Social networks 
The data used in this study were collected from 483 farm households across 5 districts in 25 
villages in the Northern region of Ghana, between July and September 2017. The survey design 
employed a multistage random sampling technique to first purposively select soybean growing 
districts, based on intensity of soybean production8 and then randomly selecting villages and 
households, proportionate to the number of households in each district. Finally, random matching 
within sample was used, whereby in each village (i.e., a village represents a social network or 
group), 20 farm households were randomly selected and each household was matched with 5 other 
farm households also randomly drawn from the village sample. For each match, conditioned on 
                                                          
8 This was done in consultation with the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) Regional and Districts Offices and 
Resilience in Northern Ghana (RING)   
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knowing the matched household, detailed information about the relationship between them were 
elicited. For determining existing links in the network, we used both social and locational 
indicators in the definition of a farmer’s neighbors (Banerjee et al., 2013). Table 2.2 presents these 
social and locational dimensions of social network contacts. The farmer knows on average 3.13 of 
the 5 farmers randomly matched to him9. Also, the average farmer has 1.77 agricultural 
information contacts, 2.17 relatives, 1.18 friends, and exchanged labor with 1.73 of the known 
matched farmers. The farmer, on average, has ever visited 2.18 of the contacts, and has 0.87 or 
0.67 of the contacts as farm or residential neighbors, respectively.   
Table 2.2 Social network information  
Network connections and information Mean S.D. Min Max 
Number of random matched known 3.13 1.15 0 5 
Conditional on knowing the matched:     
Social dimension of contact     
     Number of agricultural information contacts 1.77 1.79 0 5 
     Number of neighbors who are relatives 2.17 1.67 0 5 
     Number of neighbors who are friends 1.18 1.56 0 5 
     Number of neighbors with same religion 0.64 1.07 0 5 
     Number of neighbors ever exchanged labour  1.73 1.86 0 5 
     Number of neighbors ever exchanged credit 0.69 1.35 0 5 
     Number of neighbors ever exchanged land 0.33 0.95 0 5 
Locational dimension of contact     
     Number ever visited 2.18 1.64 0 5 
     Number of farm neighbors  0.87 1.20 0 5 
     Number of residential neighbors 0.67 0.96 0 5 
Social links (Social ties)     
     Number of social contacts 3.12 1.25 0 5 
     Degree* 3.73 1.51 1 8 
     Network transitivity 0.46 0.09 0.18 0.60 
     Proportion of Jenguma adopters in neighborhood (unconditional)** 0.42 0.36 0 1 
     Proportion of Afayak adopters in neighborhood (unconditional)** 0.29 0.31 0 1 
Notes: SD denotes standard deviation and Min and Max are minimum and maximum values respectively.  
*The farmer i’s average degree is higher than the number of his/her social ties due to the fact that the number of social ties took 
into consideration only directed contacts (from farmer i to farmer j) based on the social and locational dimensions of contacts. The 
degree on the other hand is based on undirected relationships where the existence of a link between farmer i and farmer j was 
defined as either by i, or by j, or both mentioned having any of these contacts with the other farmer.  
** The unconditional implies that the proportion of adopting neighbors (j’s) of each variety does not condition on the 
variety adopted by the farmer (i).   
                                                          
9 We use the masculine gender because majority (60%) of the farmers in the sample are males. 
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We define the farmer’s neighbors as those among the 5 farmers randomly assigned to him/her, that 
he/she shares any of these social and locational contacts with (i.e. the union of these contacts). 
When we take the union of these social and locational contact dimensions, an average farmer has 
3.12 social ties (Table 2.2). We use the social and locational contacts to construct our social 
network matrix with entries, 𝑤𝑖𝑗, being equal to one if the respondent 𝑖 had any of these 
relationships with a matched farmer 𝑗 (i.e., 𝑖 and 𝑗 are neighbors), and zero otherwise (i.e., 𝑖 and 𝑗 
are not neighbors). The resulting social network matrix, 𝑊, is a 483 x 483 block-diagonal matrix, 
along villages networks. Based on the matrix, 𝑊, the average farmer has 3.73 neighbors in the 
social network and a maximum of 8 neighbors as indicative by the term degree in Table 2.2 (see 
Figure A.1 for networks). The table also shows that an average farmer has 42% and 29% adopting 
network members of Jenguma and Afayak varieties, respectively. 
 
Descriptive statistics  
We also elicited detailed information on the household and farm level characteristics. Table 2.3 
shows definition, measurement and descriptive statistics of variables for the surveyed households 
and of their neighbors. Majority of farmers in the sample are males. The average education attained 
by the surveyed farmers is low, about 1.11 years, but with an average experience of about 12.7 
years of farming. In addition, the majority (55%) of the farmers and (56%) of their neighbors ever 
had contact with extension agents, while only 28% of farmers and 30% of their neighbors ever had 
contact with research and non-governmental organization. 
 
Table 2.3, further shows that majority of the farmers and their neighbors, 55%, are credit-
constrained. The proportion of credit constrained farmers are significantly lower for Jenguma 
producers (Table 2.A1, panel B), and as noted in Section 2.2.1, suggest that access to credit could 
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affect farmers decisions to adopt this variety. In our analysis such differences in access to credit 
are controlled for by using household credit constraints (Table 2.3). Households were classified as 
credit-constrained, if they obtained credit, but expressed interest in borrowing more at pertaining 
interest rates, and if there was no credit available to them through formal and informal lenders.  
 
Furthermore, about 42% and 26% of the households were adopters of Jenguma and Afayak, 
respectively, whereas 32% cultivated Salintuya. Table 2.3 also shows a strong association between 
a farmer’s adoption of an improved variety and the proportion of farmers’ neighbors who adopted 
that variety. In particular, farmers who adopted Jenguma have up to 88% of their neighbors also 
adopting Jenguma. At the same time, about 82% of neighbors of Afayak adopters are themselves 
adopters of Afayak, while farmers who are cultivating the traditional variety have about 85% of 
their neighbors also producing the traditional variety. This indicates the possibility of farmers 
exchanging information about soybean, and/or imitation by copying their neighbors’ cultivation 
choices.  
 
2.3 Theoretical framework 
In order to motivate our discussion on how local correlations in social networks affect adoption 
decisions in our context of multiple and competing technologies, we present a theory of contagion, 
which is based on the linear threshold model (Granovetter, 1978; Morris, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 
2011)10. In our study, the technology under consideration is soybean varieties, where two (i.e., 
Jenguma and Afayak) of these are improved and Salintuya is the traditional variety. Thus, we 
model adoption as the outcome of optimizing behavior of agents, based on the frameworks 
presented in Arthur (1989) and Kornish (2006).
                                                          
10 The reader is referred to Beaman et al. (2020) for a discussion on the merits of the linear threshold model. 
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Table 2.3 Variable description, measurement and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Own (X) 
Characteristics  
 Neighbors (WX) 
Characteristics 
  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Independent variables      
Age Age of farmer (years) 44.002 12.007  43.929 7.151 
Gender 1 if male; 0 otherwise   0.596  0.491    0.581 0.333 
Education No. of years in school   1.112  3.077    1.105 1.810 
Experience No. of years in farming 12.677  2.718  12.708 2.006 
Household Household size (No. of members)   5.725  2.090    5.722 1.477 
Landholding Total land size of household (in hectares)   2.597  1.556    2.626 1.120 
Credit 1 if farmer indicated did not obtain sufficient credit or not successful in 
applying for credit; 0 otherwise 
  0.554  0.497    0.554 0.344 
Risk Risk of food insecurity (No. of months household was food inadequate)   0.948  1.387    0.925 0.942 
Extension 1 if ever had extension contact; 0 otherwise   0.546  0.924    0.563 0.687 
NGO/Res. 1 if ever had contact with non-governmental/research organization; 0 otherwise   0.284  0.451    0.295 0.332 
Association No. of village-based associations a farmer is a member   1.091  1.285    1.081 0.898 
Electronic 1 if own phone, radio and/or television; 0 otherwise   0.817  0.386    0.821 0.264 
Soil quality 4=fertile; 3=moderately fertile; 2=less fertile; and 1=infertile   2.962  0.972    2.965 0.688 
Price Soybean price in GHS/kg   1.055  0.188    1.062 0.135 
       
Dependent variable      
Jenguma Adopters of Jenguma variety (1 if adopted Jenguma; 0 otherwise)   0.418  0.494    0.878+ 0.214 
Afayak Adopters of Afayak variety (1 if adopted Afayak; 0 otherwise)   0.258  0.438    0.815+ 0.238 
Salintuya Adopters of Salintuya variety (1 if adopted Salintuya; 0 otherwise)   0.322  0.468    0.849+ 0.263 
 
Instruments       
Village born 1 if farmer was born in village   0.696  0.461    
Authority 1 if any parent of the farmer had an authority in village   0.130  0.337    
ExtDistance Distance to the extension office (in kilometers)   9.890  9.140    
RNDistance  Distance to the nearest agric. research or non-governmental organization (in 
Kilometers) 
14.561 11.797    
FinDistance Distance to the nearest financial institution (in kilometers)   9.256  6.884    
Notes: SD denotes standard deviation. “+” implies that the proportion of adopting neighbors (j’s) of each variety is conditional on the farmer (i) adopting that 
variety. That is why the proportion of adopting neighbors of each variety in this table is higher than the unconditional proportions in Table 2.2.    
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The main insights in these frameworks are that agents are confronted with the situation of having 
to choose among competing technologies, of which one is a status quo (default) technology. Also, 
adoption decisions are based on the relative and absolute number of adopting and non-adopting 
neighbors and the expected net benefits from adopting these technologies. We define a set of 
farmers  1, ,m M   in a network represented by an undirected graph  ,g m E , where E  is a 
set of edges ( , )i j that represent the connectivity between farmers i  and j . We also define the 
neighborhood of a farmer i m  as    [ | , ]iN g i i j E  . That is,  iN g  consists of the set of the 
neighbors of farmer i  and   i id N g  denotes the number of farmers that form part of the 
neighborhood.  
 
Farmer i  sets out using a traditional variety, 0, and has the choice of adopting any of the two new 
improved varieties, denoted as 1 and 2 , from the set  1,2V   or retaining the traditional variety. 
These new varieties compete for adoption and are assumed not to be sponsored or strategically 
manipulated (Arthur, 1989). We further assume that farmer i  faces one-time cost of adopting 
variety 1  or 2 , denoted by 1 0iC   and 
2 0iC  , respectively. The farmer’s infinite horizon net 
benefit function is given by  1 2, , 0i i id d d  , where 
1 2
i i id d d   indicates the number of 
neighbors that have adopted none of the improved varieties, with 1
id  representing the number of 
neighbors that have adopted variety 1 and 2
id  the number of neighbors that have adopted variety 
2. The farmer’s decision problem is to maximize the expected net benefit from adoption, by 
selecting the strategy that offers the highest payoffs. The alternative strategies are characterized 
by payoff from (i) adopting variety 1, (ii) adopting 2  and (iii) from maintaining the traditional 
variety 0. Let us denote the one-period discount factor by  .  
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We define the probability that the next potential adopter has preference for variety 1 as  1 i ih d d  
and for variety 2  as  2i ih d d .  Both of these functions are increasing with the shares, 
1 /i id d  and 
2 /i id d , of 1 and 2  adopting neighbors, respectively. Moreover, the conditional probability  1ip d  
that a farmer adopts variety 1, given that he/she has preference for variety 1, is an increasing 
function of the number of adopting neighbors of variety 1  1id .  The complement of  1ip d , given 
by   11 ip d , indicates the probability that the farmer does not adopt variety 1. Similarly, the 
conditional probability of adopting variety 2  for a potential user is  2ip d , given that he/she has 
preference for variety 2 . Thus, as an example, the term    1 1 i i ip d h d d  indicates the conditional 
probability of adopting variety 1, given the preference for variety 1 multiplied by the probability 
of having these preferences for variety 1. Likewise, one can formulate the probabilities for 
adopting variety 2 and for non-adopting variety 1 or 2. Based on these formulations, the farmer’s 
decision problem can be formulated as  
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Following equation (1 ), we express the expected net benefits from adopting variety 1, when there 
are 1
id  adopters of variety 1 and 
2
id  adopters of variety 2 as 
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(2)              
1 1
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2, , 1 1 1 , ,i ii i i i i i i i i
i i
d d
d d d q d h p d h p d d d d
d d
  
     
                    
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i i
d d
h p d d d d h p d d d d
d d
 
     
            
      
      
where  1 1iq d  is the periodic benefit of adopting 1, which is a function of the neighbors that have 
already adopted variety 1. The term  1 1 2, ,i i id d d  accounts for the immediate and discounted 
future stream of payoffs, if the farmer does not adopt, and of the discounted stream of future 
payoffs, if the farmer adopts variety 1 or variety 2. Similarly, we express the expected net benefit 
from adopting variety 2, when there are 1
id  adopters of variety 1 and 
2
id  adopters of variety 2 as, 
(3)              
1 1
1 2 1 2 22 2 12 2, , 1 1 1 , ,i ii i i i i i i i i
i i
d d
d d d q d h p d h p d d d d
d d
  
     
                    
 
       
1 1
1 1 2 22 1 22 1, 1, 1 1, , 1 .i ii i i i i i i i
i i
d d
h p d d d d h p d d d d
d d
 
     
            
      
 
The functions 1(.)q , 2(.)q  may contain network-dependent and network-independent elements. In 
order to express network dependence, it can be seen that the agent’s expected net benefits from 
adopting a particular variety are increasing with the number of adopting neighbors of that variety. 
 
Based on observational data, we next explore the nature of  .p   .h  for both varieties, which are 
shown in Figures 2.1A and 2.1B. We observe that both the proportions of adopting neighbors of 
each improved variety relative to the neighborhood (i.e., 1 2,i i i id d d d , indicated by the dashed 
line), and the difference in the share of adopting neighbors of the two improved varieties (i.e., 
1 2( )i i id d d , indicated by the solid line), are important for influencing a farmer’s adoption 
decision (Figure 2.1). This distinction is important because the first measure takes into account the 
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number of non-adopting farmers of the two improved varieties, while the second measure focuses 
exclusively on the difference in adoption of the two improved varieties. In respect of the 
proportions of adopters of the improved varieties in the neighborhood, the curve exhibits an S-
shaped function for the conditional probability of adoption  .p , given the probability of the 
preference  .h  for a variety, as a function of the share of neighbors that have adopted this variety. 
Thus, when the proportion of adopting neighbors of an improved variety is low, the probability of 
a farmer adopting this variety is lower than the proportion of the neighbors who have already 
adopted it. However, the likelihood of adopting an improved variety is higher than the proportion 
of adopting neighbors of this variety, when the proportion of adopting neighbors of this variety is 
high. 
 
Moreover, the solid line, which is based on the difference in the share of adopters of the two 
improved varieties, shows stronger effect on adoption than the share of adopters of these varieties 
in relation to the whole neighborhood (dashed line). It lies above the dashed line for most part, and 
is consistently higher than the 45-degree line in both figures. This suggests that farmers give 
significant consideration to the difference in the share of adopting neighbors of the improved 
varieties when making adoption decisions. The S-shaped function and the importance of the 
difference in relative adoption of the improved varieties by farmer’s neighbors implies that the 
adoption process will result in one of the varieties becoming “dominant”, while the other varieties 
become “subordinates” in the network. Thus, the neighborhood becomes increasingly ‘locked-in’ 
on the dominant variety, where a farmer’s likelihood of adopting that variety is higher, if adoption 
pushes that variety ahead of the other improved variety in relative and absolute numbers and in 
expected net benefits. Thus, we deduce the following hypotheses;  
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  A. Adoption of Jenguma (v=1)                              B. Adoption of Afayak (v=2)  
Figure 2.1 Association between own and neighbors’ adoption of Jenguma and Afayak 
 
Notes: The dashed line represents the probability of adoption given the probability of the preference for Jenguma or Afayak (in Fig. 
2.1A or 2.1B respectively). In Figures 2.1A and 2.1B, it represents the mapping of the proportion of adopting neighbors of Jenguma 
and Afayak (i.e., the horizontal axis) to the probability of adopting Jenguma and Afayak, respectively (i.e., the vertical axis). The 
point of intersection of this line and the identity function (i.e., the 45-degree line) shows the threshold. The solid line, on the other 
hand, focuses exclusively on the difference in share of adopting neighbors of the two improved varieties. In Figure 2.1A, it 
represents the mapping of the difference in the share of adopting neighbors of Jenguma and Afayak [i.e., (Jenguma minus Afayak) 
/ all neighbors] to the probability of adopting Jenguma. In Figure 2.1B, it shows the mapping of the difference in the share of 
adopting neighbors of Afayak and Jenguma [i.e., (Afayak minus Jenguma) / all neighbors] to the probability of adopting. The short 
vertical lines on the two curves denote 95 percent confidence intervals.  
 
Hypothesis 1. For a given neighborhood  iN g  of farmer i , adoption will not occur as long as 
the number of adopters 1
id  or 
2
id  relative to all neighbors   iN g  remains below an absolute 
threshold denoted by  1,2  i id N g . 
Hypothesis 2. For a given neighborhood  iN g  of farmer i , there exist a relative threshold 
 1,2ˆ  i id N g  where the probability of adoption of variety 1 or 2 is equal to the share of adopters 
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 1,2  .i id N g If this share of adopters is below the relative threshold, the farmer is less likely to 
adopt, and if it is above the threshold the farmer is more likely to adopt.    
Hypothesis 3. Adoption in a given neighborhood  iN g  of farmer i  will converge towards a 
single dominant variety (1 or 2) if the proportion of adopters of this particular variety leads to a 
higher adoption probability than the proportion of the non-adopting neighbors of the variety. If 
the relative shares of adopters of the improved varieties are equal, the farmers are not more likely 
to adopt either the improved variety.  
2.4. Empirical framework  
In 2.4.1, we first present the base model and then discuss the identification concerns and strategies 
we use in the empirical analysis. We next discuss the empirical estimation in 2.4.2, and then the 
computation of marginal effects for the control variables in 2.4.3. 
 
2.4.1 The model and identification 
The studies of social interaction models have generally focused on the delineation of the effects of 
individual or group interactions on individual or group behavior and socio-economic outcomes 
(Blume et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2010). Three types of behavioral effects have been identified in the 
literature that can arise from social interactions. These are the endogenous effects, 
exogenous/contextual effects and correlated effects (Manski, 1993; Moffitt, 2001). To motivate 
our discussion on these effects, consider the following linear regression   
 (4)    0 1 2| ,|i iig d ig d igY E Y g X E X g        
 
where 
igY  is the outcome of individual i  in group g ,  igX  is a vector of characteristics of i  from 
group g , with 1  as the associated parameter estimates,  and ig  are innovations. The 
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neighborhood mean outcome and characteristics are captured by the terms  |
id
E Y g  and  |
id
E X g
, respectively. The parameter 0   denotes the endogenous network effect, whereas 2  defines the 
contextual effects. Manski (1993) showed that specification (4), called the linear-in-means model, 
suffers from the “reflection problem”, which is the difficulty in differentiating between 
endogenous (behavioral) and exogenous (contextual) factors, since expressing the endogenous 
effects  |
id
E Y g  as the average behavior or outcome of the group makes it a linear function of the 
mean characteristic of the group   |
id
E X g  in model (4). This shrouds what each of the two effects 
are, and the inherent implications associated with each becomes misleading, as they have been 
identified to have effects different in nature and in policy conclusions (Manski, 1993; Lin, 2010).   
 
Another important confounder of the behavioural effects is the argument by Moffitt (2001) that 
unobserved factors in 
ig , noted earlier as correlated effects, may also be a source of correlation 
among individuals in a given group (see also Manski, 1993; Calvo-Armengol et al., 2009; Lee et 
al., 2010). Moffitt (2001) distinguished between correlations due to similarities or preferences that 
drive a group of individuals to group together, and those that are attributable to similar 
environmental characteristics, suggesting that any social impact could be a reflection of omitted 
variables, or spurious effect. Accordingly, we use a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model, where the 
disturbance in equation (4) is decomposed into network-fixed effects, 
g , (which defines 
unobserved characteristics that are similar for all network members) and innovations, 
ig , to 
account for endogenous, contextual and group fixed effects in the group interaction setting as 
follows 
 (5) 
0 1 2 0 ,kg kg kg kg kg kg mg g kgY W Y X W X l          
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where  1, ,g G   and G  is the number of groups (villages) in the sample, gm  is the number of 
members in the g th group and 
1
G
gg
k m

  is the total number of observations. The term  kgY  is a 
vector of adoption decisions, 
kgX  is a matrix of characteristics for the gm  individuals in group g
, 
kgW  is a non-stochastic k k  network weights matrix with zero diagonal elements, which also 
captures the group network structure, 
gm
l is an 
gm  vector of ones, with the coefficients 0g  
capturing group fixed effects and 
kg ’s are assumed to be i.i.d, with Var( kg ) 
2
0 gm
I .  
 
Studies by Bramoullé et al., (2009), Calvo-Armengol et al., (2009) and Lee et al., (2010) 
demonstrate that the SAR model in our setting is identified by accounting for group fixed-effects, 
because 
kgW  could have any arbitrary structure, thereby making the interaction patterns 
sufficiently different across networks, due to the different structure of each network’s weight 
matrix. Given that we define networks at the village level, we account for group fixed-effects by 
controlling for village dummies of all the 25 sampled villages. The intuition is that farmers in the 
same village face similar environmental and institutional conditions and thus, the inclusion of these 
village fixed-effects is expected to account for any unobserved conditions that may affect the 
behavior and outcomes of farmers in the same village/network (Lee, 2007).  
 
Whereas the network fixed-effects can account for correlated unobservables at the group level, 
these do not account for the issue of endogenous network formation or correlated unobservables 
between individuals in the same group, which may result in endogeneity problems (Moffitt, 2001). 
To account for this, we use the control function approach suggested by Brock and Durlauf (2001) 
to control for the potential endogeneity of neighbors’ adoption, using farmers’ birth status (i.e., 
whether the farmer was born in the village) and the authority of farmers’ parents (i.e., whether any 
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of the farmer’s parents ever had an authority in the traditional chieftaincy structure in the village) 
as instruments (see Table 2.2). 
 
The reasoning behind the use of farmers’ birth status as an instrument is that farmers who are born 
in the village are expected to have deeply rooted and well-connected social ties with other members 
of the village because of the social bond that have evolved overtime. Also, the remote nature of 
these villages tends to reduce the incentive of non-natives to move and settle in these village, 
making the issue of out-migration more likely than in-migration in these settings. Thus, farmers 
who were born in the village are expected to have more social connections and links with other 
village members than those who were not born in the village. However, we do not expect a farmers’ 
birth status in the village to directly affect his decision to adopt any of the improved varieties 
except through his interactions with the farmers that he has social ties with, suggesting the 
instrument is fairly exogenous to the farmers adoption decisions.  
 
The second instrument is the authority of farmers’ parents in the traditional chieftaincy structure 
in the village. We believe this is a relevant instrument because the traditional authority of the 
parents affects the farmer by increasing the farmer’s contact with people who contact the parents 
through him, and may increase the popularity of the farmer in the village. These are expected to 
increase the social connections of the farmer compared to a farmer without such royal privileges. 
However, the traditional authority of the parents does not directly affect the farmers adoption, 
since this is not directly related to adoption decisions, and that authorities in the traditional system 
are mostly predetermined by lineage in these areas. One issue that might threaten the use of this 
as an instrument is when privileges due to parents’ authority lead to increase access to production 
opportunities and resources which affect adoption through access to land, other resources and 
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information. For this reason, we control for household landholding, credit, and other information 
sources on farming in all specifications. 
  
We then use these instruments together with a set of other control variables to estimate a first-stage 
conditional edge independence model of network formation (Fafchmaps and Gubert, 2007), 
retrieve the predicted residuals and insert them into our adoption equations (5) as control functions 
to account for endogeneity of neighbors’ adoption. The inclusion of the residuals controls for the 
endogeneity of peer adoption by accounting for the correlation between the endogenous peer 
effects and the unobservables that affect farmers’ adoption decisions (Wooldridge 2015). The first-
stage network formation model and the estimates are shown in Appendix B.      
 
2.4.2 Empirical Estimation: Spatial Autoregressive Multinomial Probit 
Our theoretical framework shows how a farmer’s decision to adopt a given variety is based on the 
expected net benefit from adopting that variety, the proportion of adopters of each of the varieties 
in the neighborhood, as well as the expected benefits from adopting other varieties in equations 
(2) and (3). Based on equations (2) and (3), and the motivation for identification of network effects 
in subsection 2.4.1, as well as the fact that the empirical analysis aims at examining the adoption 
of two improved soybean varieties (Jenguma and Afayak) in relation to a conventional variety 
(Salintuya), we specify farmers’ adoption decisions in a spatial autoregressive multinomial probit 
model.   
 
The spatial autoregressive multinomial probit (SAR MNP) model is based on the random utility 
framework, which is expressed as a system of seemingly unrelated regression models, with each 
latent choice considered as an equation (LeSage and Pace, 2009; Wang et al., 2014). Thus, we 
denote the model as 1kV   vector of outcomes  
'
* * *
,1 ,, ,  i i VY Y Y  , where each of the 
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 *' *' *' *'1 2, , ,i nY Y Y Y   elements is expressed as a continuous SAR model. Given this formulation 
and following equations (2) and (3), we express our estimation model as: 
 (6) * * *, 1 ,1 2 ,2 1, 2, 0, ,gkg V kg kg kg kg kg V kg kg V m g V kg VY W Y W Y X W X l           , 
 
where  1,2V   represents the varieties, 1  and 2  are the endogenous effects of variety 1 and 2, 
respectively, on the adoption of all varieties. For example, in the equation of variety 2, 1  is the 
cross effect of variety 1 and 
2  is the own effect of variety 2. The vector X , like the 1kV   matrix, 
is stacked based on the respective observed choices V , where X  represents a 1 r  vector of 
explanatory variables associated with each choice.  
 
The observed response values of Y  are such that iY V , if 
*
,i VY   * *,1 , max , , 0i i VY Y   , and 0 if 
*
, 0i VY  , 1,2V  . The stacked  V  observations also require the network weight matrix to be re-
casted in order to generate the interaction lags of 
*
,i VY  and to ensure conformability. This involves 
repeating each row of the k k  weight matrix V  times to yield a matrix expressed as;  VI W W 
, where VI  is a V V  identity matrix. Typically, the error terms  
'
1 , ,i Vi     and 𝑖
′ =
( 1
′ , 2
′ , … , 𝑛
′ ) has a covariance matrix as kI  , with 
2
1    , 12 21   , 
2
2   . This is the cross-
variety covariance which is assumed to be identical and independent across individuals, but not 
varieties. However, modeling the cross-variety dependence in the mean part of the model implies 
restricting  VI  , as suggested by LeSage and Pace (2009).  
 
The challenges to the estimation of equation (6) are the issues of the multidimensional integrals, 
correlations in the error terms and the complexity of the spatial dependence (Kelejian and Prucha, 
1999; Fleming, 2004). We use the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling, as it is mostly 
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applied in such settings, where the higher dimensional integrals are re-specified into sequence of 
draws with sometimes known conditional distribution (Wang et al., 2014). If 
*
,i VY  were observable, 
the likelihood function of the model could be expressed as 
   
'1/2
* * *
,
1
( | , , Σ) exp
2
k Vp Y I W HY X HY X    
 
       
 
, with the posterior 
distribution given as          * *, , Σ | | ,  , Σ Σp Y p Y            , where 
,( )k VH I W   . However, since 
*
,i VY  is not observable, we apply Bayesian estimation approach 
to elicit the conditional posterior distributions  *| , , Σp Y   and *( | ,  , Σ)p Y R . The entire 
Bayesian estimation approach is presented in the Appendix C. 
 
2.4.3 Marginal effects 
Given the estimates of the SAR equation (6), the marginal effect of a variable x  on a given variety 
v  can be calculated as a series of   1V X   k k  matrices, where 1V   is the total number of 
varieties, which is 3 in our case; X  is the total number of variables and k  is the sample size (483). 
The direct effects, representing the effect of a given covariate x  on the probability of farmer i  
adopting this variety, is evaluated as the mean of the diagonal elements of the sociomatrix. The 
total effect is computed as the mean of this entire matrix and then the direct effect subtracted to 
obtain the indirect effect of this covariate. The indirect effects show the spillover effects and 
represent the effect(s) of an individual’s ( i ’s) covariate x  on the probability of i ’s neighbors 
adopting a given variety (see Wang et al., 2014). The difference in the probability of adoption 
among varieties is the change from the original probabilities at the initial value of the covariates 
to the new probabilities, given a standard deviation change in the variables.  
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2.5 Empirical results 
We present the empirical results in this section, where subsection 5.1 shows the aggregate effects 
of adopting neighbors of each improved variety on adoption. In 5.2, we discuss the distribution 
effect of adopting neighbors of each improved variety, whereas in 5.3, we consider network effects 
in terms of the difference in the shares of adopting neighbors of each improved variety. Finally, 
we discuss the effects of other controls and robustness in subsections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. 
 
2.5.1 Effects of absolute number of adopting neighbors 
The Bayesian estimates of the parameters and diagnostics of the spatial autoregressive multinomial 
probit model for adoption of improved soybean varieties are reported in Tables 2.4 to 2.7.  As 
shown by the Geweke diagnostics in Table 2.4, all the variables have test statistics lower than the 
critical value of 2.71. This suggests that these parameters meet the convergence test criterion and 
the Markov chain of the Gibbs sampler draws attained an equilibrium state. Comparing estimates 
in Table 2.5 with those in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.A2 in the Appendix, obtained without 
accounting for group fixed effects, show marked differences. The higher deviance information 
criteria (DIC11) and the lower Log-likelihoods for the model without group fixed effects (DIC of 
1,212 and -1,009 in Table 2.A2) suggest the models with group fixed effects are best fit, and thus 
we account for group fixed effects in all specifications. The estimates of the residuals of the 
network formation model are generally not statistically significant in all specifications (see e.g., 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5), suggesting that the results are not driven by endogenous network formation 
or other correlated unobservables between individuals in the same group.   
 
                                                          
11 The DIC is a goodness-of-fit measure proposed by Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) for Bayesian models comparison and 
is given as the sum of the effective number of parameters and the expectation of the deviance. Models with smaller 
DIC are preferred to models with larger DIC. 
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Table 2.4 SAR MNP estimates based on the absolute number of adopters (influence 
of non-adopting neighbors is not taken into account) 
Variables  Jenguma Afayak 
Estimates SD Estimates SD 
Endogenous effects     
    No. Neighbadopt_Jenguma       0.095 [0.095]*** 0.013    -0.028 [0.028]*** 0.010 
    No. Neighbadopt_Afayak     -0.019 [0.019]** 0.009     0.147 [0.146]*** 
 
0.007 
Own characteristics:    
    Age      3.40E-04 [0.345] 0.001     0.001 [0.399] 0.001 
    Gender     -0.028 [0.001] 0.024     0.023 [0.001] 0.027 
    Education      0.004 [0.028]* 0.002     0.014 [0.023]*** 0.005 
    Experience     -0.011 [0.004]*** 0.004    -0.015 [0.014]*** 0.003 
    Household      0.003 [0.011] 0.005    -0.011 [0.015]** 0.005 
    Landholding      0.066 [0.004]*** 0.006     0.022 [0.011]*** 0.008 
    Credit     -0.190 [0.066]** 0.089     0.017 [0.022] 0.032 
    Risk      0.004 [0.191] 0.008    -0.003 [0.017] 0.008 
    Extension      0.061 [0.004]** 0.024     0.114 [0.003]*** 0.021 
    NGO/Res      0.002 [0.061] 0.067     0.061 [0.114]** 0.033 
    Association     -0.050 [0.002]*** 0.011     0.020 [0.062]** 0.010 
    Electronic      0.013 [0.051] 0.025    -0.028 [0.020] 0.027 
    Soil quality      0.068 [0.014]*** 0.012    -0.010 [0.029]  0.011 
    Price     -0.163 [0.068]** 0.081    -0.103 [0.010] 0.084 
Contextual effects:    
    Age      0.061 [0.167] 0.064     0.088 [0.102]* 0.063 
    Gender      3.40E-04 [0.063] 0.001     0.001 [0.089]** 0.001 
    Education      0.011 [0.001] 0.011     0.002 [0.001] 0.014 
    Experience     -0.002 [0.011] 0.002    -0.006 [0.002]** 0.003 
    Household     -0.002 [0.002] 0.002    -0.001 [0.006] 0.002 
    Landholding      0.001 [0.002] 0.002     0.007 [0.001]** 0.003 
    Credit     -0.013 [0.001]*** 0.003     0.003 [0.008] 0.004 
    Risk      0.066 [0.013]*** 0.017     0.029 [0.003]* 0.017 
    Extension      0.001 [0.067] 0.004     0.001 [0.029] 0.004 
    NGO/Res      0.005 [0.002] 0.009     0.011 [0.001] 0.009 
    Association     -0.049 [0.005]*** 0.014    -0.037 [0.011]** 0.019 
    Electronic     -0.010 [0.049]** 0.005     0.003 [0.037] 0.005 
    Soil quality      0.026 [0.011]* 0.016    -0.019 [0.003] 0.015 
    Price     -0.007 [0.026] 0.006    -0.001 [0.019] 0.005 
Residliquid     -0.069 [0.007]* 0.040    -0.055 [0.001] 0.046 
Residextens      0.044 [0.070] 0.054     0.017 [0.055] 0.017 
ResidNGO      0.003 [0.045] 0.016    -0.009 [0.017] 0.015 
Link formation residual      0.019 [0.003] 0.042    -0.015 [0.009] 0.021 
Constant      0.341 [0.038]** 0.182     0.399 [0.048]*** 0.136 
Network Fes         Yes        Yes  
Notes: Pseudo-R2 = 0.8207; DIC = 2,794.90; Mean Log-likelihood = -2,329.10; n = 483; # of draws = 5000 and burnin = 2000. 
Figures in square brackets are Geweke diagnostics test of convergence and it is a Z-test of the null of equality between means of 
the first 20% and last 50% of the sample draws. The chi-squared statistics are reported and large values of the statistic imply 
rejection of the null of convergence (i.e., equal means). SD denotes standard deviation. In this case, the endogenous and cross 
variety effects indicate the effects of an increase in the number of adopters of each variety on the probability of adoption. The 
asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present estimates of endogenous own and cross varietal effects on adoption of 
Jenguma and Afayak, using the absolute numbers of adopting neighbors and the proportion of 
adopting neighbors as measures of endogenous effects, respectively as in equations (2) and (3) in 
the theoretical framework, and equation (6) in the empirical framework. The endogenous own 
varietal effects examine the effects of having Jenguma or Afayak adopting neighbors on adoption 
of Jenguma or Afayak, respectively, while the endogenous cross varietal effects consider the 
effects of having Afayak or Jenguma adopting neighbors on the adoption of Jenguma or Afayak, 
respectively. In terms of absolute numbers in own effects, respondents with adopting neighbors of 
Jenguma or Afayak are 9.5 or 14.7 percentage points more likely to adopt Jenguma or Afayak, 
respectively, compared to farmers with no adopting neighbors of the improved varieties. Also, 
having neighbors adopting cross variety (i.e., Afayak or Jenguma) are 1.9 or 2.8 percentage points 
less likely to adopt Jenguma or Afayak, respectively, compared to farmers without adopting 
neighbors of any of the improved varieties. These effects are all statistically significant at least at 
the 5% level. 
 
Given that farmers could be more concerned with the proportion and not the absolute number of 
adopters in their network, as it gives an indication of the skewness of the neighborhood in terms 
of adoption, we present in Table 2.5 the estimates of these endogenous effects in terms of 
proportion of neighbors adopting a particular variety in the farmer’s neighborhood. The effects are 
similar to the effects in Table 2.4 in terms of direction and significance levels of these effects, but 
differ in the magnitude of the coefficient. In particular, a farmer with higher proportion of his 
neighbors in the network adopting Jenguma or Afayak is 23.1 or 34 percentage points more likely 
to adopt Jenguma or Afayak than those with no adopting neighbors of Jenguma or Afayak, 
respectively.   
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Table 2.5 SAR MNP estimates based on the proportion of adopters in farmer’s 
neighborhood (influence of non-adopting neighbors is taken into account)  
Variables  Jenguma Afayak 
Estimates SD Estimates SD 
Endogenous effects     
    Prop. Neighbadopt_Jenguma    0.231*** 0.024  -0.053*** 0.017 
    Prop. Neighbadopt_Afayak  -0.052*** 0.018   0.340*** 0.016 
Own characteristics:    
    Age   7.6E-5 0.001   0.001 0.001 
    Gender  -0.029 0.022   0.016 0.024 
    Education   0.002 0.002   0.014*** 0.004 
    Experience  -0.011*** 0.004  -0.013*** 0.003 
    Household   0.003 0.004  -0.009** 0.005 
    Landholding   0.057*** 0.006   0.022*** 0.007 
    Credit  -0.142* 0.084   0.013 0.028 
    Risk   0.001 0.008  -0.003 0.007 
    Extension   0.050** 0.022   0.100*** 0.019 
    NGO/Res   0.039 0.063   0.057** 0.031 
    Association  -0.043*** 0.011   0.017** 0.010 
    Electronic   0.015 0.023  -0.019 0.025 
    Soil quality   0.062*** 0.011  -0.011 0.010 
    Price  -0.155** 0.075  -0.083 0.075 
Contextual effects:    
    Age   0.138 0.118   0.118 0.110 
    Gender   0.001 0.001   0.002** 0.001 
    Education   0.017 0.021   0.004 0.027 
    Experience  -0.001 0.003  -0.012** 0.005 
    Household  -0.002 0.003   2.0E-4 0.003 
    Landholding   0.001 0.005   0.013** 0.005 
    Credit  -0.020*** 0.006   0.001 0.007 
    Risk   0.138*** 0.031   0.040* 0.030 
    Extension   0.005 0.008   0.003 0.008 
    NGO/Res   0.014 0.016   0.024* 0.018 
    Association  -0.077*** 0.027  -0.069** 0.032 
    Electronic  -0.018** 0.009   0.012 0.010 
    Soil quality   0.063** 0.026  -0.012 0.026 
    Price  -0.019** 0.011  -0.001 0.010 
Residliquid   0.021 0.051   0.021* 0.016 
Residextens    0.006 0.014  -0.010 0.013 
ResidNGO   0.001 0.039  -0.020 0.018 
Constant   0.356** 0.171   0.319** 0.127 
Link formation residual   0.029 0.052  -0.051 0.059 
Network Fes    Yes     Yes  
Notes: Pseudo-R2 = 0.8390; DIC = 1,171.30; Mean Log-likelihood = -976.07; n = 483; # of draws = 5000 and burnin = 2000. SD 
denotes standard deviation. The estimates were obtained from the standardized social weight matrix. Thus, the endogenous and 
cross variety effects indicate the effects of an increase in the proportion of adopters of each variety on the probability of adoption. 
The Prop. Neighbadopt_Jenguma is the own effect of Jenguma under the Jenguma equation but shows the cross-variety effect of 
Jenguma in the Afayak equation. Likewise, the Prop. Neighbadopt_Afayak, is the own effect of Afayak under the Afayak equation 
but also shows the cross-variety effect of Afayak in the Jenguma equation. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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The cross-varietal effects are also negative, suggesting that the likelihood of adopting a given 
variety, say Jenguma, by a farmer declines by 5.2 percentage points when a proportion of his 
neighbors adopts the other variety, i.e., Afayak, in the neighborhood, compared to a farmer without 
adopting neighbors of the improved variety. These findings generally suggest contagion effects, 
where farmers adopt the behavior of their neighbors in the network. The endogenous own and 
cross variety effects taken together imply substitutability between the new varieties. This 
corroborates the argument by Niehaus (2011) that an agent’s marginal valuation of the knowledge 
obtained from different neighbors is evaluated in relative terms if different kinds of knowledge is 
substitutable in the social learning process.  
 
2.5.2 Effects of the relative number of adopting neighbors 
In our theoretical model, the choice of agents between these new varieties depends on meeting a 
lower limit id  and a threshold in terms of adopting neighbors of each variety 
ˆ
id , as formulated in 
hypothesis (1) and (2). However, the number of adopters that needs to be attained before a 
significant relationship between the share of adopters of one variety versus the other and the 
likelihood of adoption is not quite obvious. To shed some light on this, we consider three ranges 
of adopting neighbors of each variety. The results are presented in Table 2.6, where we report 
estimates of specifications that include quartiles of Jenguma adopting neighbors only in columns 
(1-3), Afayak adopting neighbors only in columns (4-6) and both Jenguma and Afayak adopting 
neighbors in columns (7-9).    
 
When we compare the estimates in columns (1-6) to those in columns (7-9), we see the estimates 
are relatively similar in direction and even in magnitudes in most of the cases. The results show 
that the likelihood of switching from the traditional variety (Salintuya) is higher when a proportion 
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of a farmer’s neighbors adopt any of the new varieties. Specifically, a farmer is more likely to 
switch from Salintuya by at least about 12 or 5 percentage points to Jenguma or Afayak when at 
most a quarter of the neighbors adopts either Jenguma or Afayak, respectively, compared to those 
with no neighbor adopting either of these new varieties (i.e., the reference case), albeit not 
statistically significant for Afayak adopting neighbors (col. 7). Also, the likelihood is even higher 
when the share of adopters of Jenguma (Afayak) consists of the second and third quartiles of 
adopters in the farmer’s neighborhood, with probabilities of switching from Salintuya being at 
least 24.1(7.7) and 34.1(19.9) percentage points more than those with no adopting neighbors of 
these varieties, respectively. This inclination of switching from Salintuya, is expected in cases 
where the traditional variety is relatively inferior, given the growing and environmental 
conditions12.  
 
We now turn to the adoption of Jenguma and Afayak (Table 2.6). The likelihood of adopting 
Jenguma or Afayak when only a quarter of a farmer’s neighbors adopt Jenguma or Afayak, 
respectively, declines with the coefficient of Afayak being statistically significant at 5 percent 
significance level. Thus, having at most a quarter of neighbors adopting Jenguma or Afayak is not 
sufficient to persuade the farmer to adopt that variety, and in fact this significantly reduces the 
likelihood of adopting Afayak by 11 percentage points (cols. 6 and 9). However, in terms of cross 
varietal effects, a farmer with only a quarter of the neighbors adopting Afayak (in cols. 5 and 8) is 
about 10-13 percentage points more likely than those with no adopting neighbors of Afayak to 
adopt Jenguma.  
 
                                                          
12 This is also the case in our study setting because of the high susceptibility of the traditional variety to environmental 
stress, which is quite unfavorable for this variety.  
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Table 2.6 SAR MNP estimates of distribution in proportion of adopter in farmer’s neighborhood 
Prop. of adopting 
neighbors 
(1) 
Salintuya 
(2) 
Jenguma 
(3) 
Afayak 
 (4) 
Salintuya 
(5) 
Jenguma 
(6) 
Afayak 
 (7) 
Salintuya 
(8) 
Jenguma 
(9) 
Afayak 
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
    3rd Quartile_Jenguma -0.341*** 
(0.016) 
 0.314 *** 
(0.059) 
-0.062** 
(0.029) 
     -0.527*** 
(0.056) 
 0.321 *** 
(0.063) 
-0.002 
(0.028) 
    2nd Quartile_Jenguma  -0.241*** 
(0.042) 
 0.153*** 
(0.041) 
-0.045* 
(0.031) 
     -0.290*** 
(0.043) 
 0.144*** 
(0.045) 
 0.012 
(0.032) 
    1st Quartile_Jenguma -0.134*** 
(0.037) 
-0.032 
(0.036) 
0.107** 
(0.039) 
     -0.119*** 
(0.042) 
-0.032 
(0.038) 
 0.139*** 
(0.038) 
    3rd Quartile Afayak     -0.199*** 
(0.043) 
-0.066** 
(0.031) 
 0.533*** 
(0.062) 
 -0.521*** 
(0.056) 
-0.048*  
(0.031) 
 0.536*** 
(0.061) 
    2nd Quartile Afayak     -0.077** 
(0.037) 
-0.037 
(0.031) 
 0.252*** 
(0.044) 
 -0.235*** 
(0.045) 
-0.013 
(0.032) 
 0.231*** 
(0.047) 
    1st Quartile Afayak      0.021 
(0.047) 
 0.100** 
(0.042) 
-0.110** 
(0.043) 
 -0.050 
(0.046) 
 0.126*** 
(0.039) 
-0.114** 
(0.043) 
            
Own characteristics   Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes 
Contextual effects   Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes 
Network Fes   Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes 
Link formation residual   Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes 
Constant  0.307*** 
(0.131) 
 0.318** 
(0.157) 
 0.387*** 
(0.118) 
  0.249** 
(0.132) 
 0.442*** 
(0.159) 
 0.218** 
(0.111) 
  0.452*** 
(0.131) 
 0.258*** 
(0.167) 
 0.294*** 
(0.114) 
Pseudo R2  0.8660     0.8363      0.8712   
DIC  1,269.3      999.3     1,125.8   
Mean Log-likelihood -1,057.7     -832.7     -938.2   
Notes: n = 483; # of draws = 5000 and burnin = 2000. SD denotes standard deviation. The estimates in this table were also obtained from the standardized social weight matrix. The 
quartiles denote the distribution of adopting neighbors of each improved variety. Columns (1-3) present estimates of specification where we include only the quartiles of adopting 
neighbors of Jenguma in the model, while columns (4-6) present estimates where we include only the quartiles of adopting neighbors of Afayak. Columns (7-9) report estimates of 
specification that include both quartiles of Jenguma and Afayak adopting neighbors. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd quartiles were defined as having a proportion of adopting neighbors of an 
improved variety falling in 0.0 to 0.25, 0.26 to 0.75 and 0.76 to 1.0, respectively. The estimates show that having adopting neighbors of an improved variety (e.g., Jenguma) in the 
1st quartile reduces the likelihood of adopting the traditional (Salintuya) and that improved variety (i.e., Jenguma), but increases the likelihood of adopting the other improved variety 
(i.e., Afayak). However, having adopting neighbors of Jenguma in the 2nd and 3rd quartiles increases the likelihood of adopting Jenguma but reduces the likelihood of adopting the 
other improved (i.e., Afayak) and the traditional varieties. The values in the parenthesis are standard deviations. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively.  
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Similarly, a farmer with only a quarter of the neighbors adopting Jenguma (in cols. 3 and 9) is 
about 11-14 percentage points more likely than those with no adopting neighbors of Jenguma 
to adopt Afayak. These effects are statistically significant, but the difference in their magnitudes 
across varieties is not significantly different from zero (p>0.3). We also observe that the 
probability of adopting a variety increases as the share of adopting neighbors increases and 
enters the 2nd and 3rd quartiles. Still in Table 2.6, a farmer is about 15 and 31 percentage points 
more likely to adopt Jenguma, when the proportion of his neighbors adopting Jenguma is 
within the 2nd and 3rd quartiles, respectively, compared to a farmer without Jenguma adopting 
neighbor (cols. 2 and 8).   
 
For Afayak, a farmer with 2nd or 3rd quartile of Afayak adopting neighbors is at least 23 and 53 
percentage points more likely than a farmer without Afayak adopting neighbors, to adopt 
Afayak (cols. 6 and 9). These effects are statistically significantly different from zero (p<0.01). 
Also, the effects of the 3rd quartile are significantly higher than the 2nd quartile effects for each 
of the two varieties (p<0.01).  Finally, we also find that the cross-variety effects lose their 
significance or become negative as more neighbors adopt a particular improved variety. For 
instance, in the case of Jenguma or Afayak, the cross-variety effects are generally negative for 
the 2nd and 3rd quartiles of adopting neighbors of Afayak or Jenguma, respectively, (cols. 8 and 
9).   
 
These estimates suggest self-reinforcement in the adoption process, as shown in the theoretical 
model and in Figures 2.1A and 2.1B, where a farmer is less likely to adopt a given variety when 
the proportion of adopting neighbors of that variety is low (i.e., less than an absolute threshold) 
and more likely, as the proportion of adopting neighbors increases (see also Kornish 2006). 
The figures further reveal that for a low share of adopting neighbors, the mapping of the share 
of adopters into probability is below the identity function, but above the threshold, the 
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probability lies above the identity function. The observation in the first quartile of the share of 
adopters in a farmer’s neighborhood is consistent with our first hypothesis of the need to exceed 
an absolute threshold and to meet the relative threshold in terms of adoption shares of the 
improved varieties. This is clearly seen in Figures 2.1A and 2.1B, where this relative threshold 
is marked by the points of intersection between the dashed line and the 45-degree line, and thus 
confirming our second hypothesis formulated previously. 
 
Finally, this also confirms the third hypothesis that adoption behavior in respect of the two 
improved varieties, converges towards the variety that leads in meeting the lower limit and 
persists in its lead, if the proportion of adopting neighbors of this variety translates to a higher 
adoption probability than the proportion of the adopting neighbors of the competing variety13.  
Such skewed conditions could lead to a “lock-in” on the lead variety in the neighborhood and 
in the network. This result is consistent with the argument of Arthur (1989) that customers’ 
choice of technologies among competing technologies, in a market, will lock-in on the 
technology that by chance and historical events leads in terms of adoption by neighbors, and 
that this could continue to the extent that reversal of such pattern of adoption will be impossible 
even with policy intervention. 
    
2.5.3 Relative share of adopting neighbors of varieties 
Our theoretical model suggests that the expected net benefits (reduction in costs and increase 
in potential gains) from adopting the improved variety with more adopting neighbors will be 
higher than the improved variety with lower adopting neighbors, because of the reduced risk 
and uncertainty that comes with higher rates of adoption among neighbors. In this section, we 
estimate the effects of the difference in the share of neighbors adopting Jenguma and Afayak 
                                                          
13 Our interpretation of the convergence process need to be taken with caution as this is a snap shot of adoption 
behavior in these social networks (villages) and not overtime. This is a potential area of future empirical research 
to examine dynamics and the equilibria state of adoption in these networks overtime.  
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on the likelihood of adopting these two varieties, and present the results in Table 2.7. This 
analysis is also significant because it allows us to show the likelihood of adoption when a 
farmer has equal proportion of adopting neighbors of each improved variety in the 
neighborhood.   
 
Table 2.7 SAR MNP estimates of differences in proportion of adopters of 
improved varieties in farmer’s neighborhood 
Difference in adopting 
Neighbors  
(1) 
Salintuya 
(2) 
Jenguma 
(3) 
Afayak 
 (4) 
Salintuya 
(5) 
Jenguma 
(6) 
Afayak 
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
  Very High Jenguma  -0.275*** 
(0.035) 
0.271 *** 
(0.043) 
-0.058** 
(0.025) 
 -0.258*** 
(0.038) 
0.265*** 
(0.046) 
-0.061** 
(0.027) 
  Moderately High Jenguma  -0.005 
(0.036) 
0.047* 
(0.033) 
-0.057** 
(0.032) 
 -0.006 
(0.035) 
0.048* 
(0.033) 
-0.058** 
(0.031) 
  Very High Afayak -0.293*** 
(0.039) 
-0.055** 
(0.028) 
0.451*** 
(0.044) 
 -0.278*** 
(0.040) 
-0.056** 
(0.029) 
0.450*** 
(0.047) 
  Moderately High Afayak  -0.085** 
(0.041) 
-0.021 
(0.035) 
0.142*** 
(0.039) 
 -0.085** 
(0.040) 
-0.015** 
(0.035) 
0.141*** 
(0.039) 
  Equal  0.063 
(0.064) 
-0.019 
(0.056) 
-0.041 
(0.057) 
  
 
  
  Both > 0.25      0.047 
(0.044) 
-0.024 
(0.039) 
-0.003 
(0.041) 
  Both < 0.25      0.057 
(0.050) 
 0.023 
(0.045) 
-0.042 
(0.047) 
        
Own characteristics   Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes 
Contextual effects   Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes 
Network Fes   Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes 
Link formation residual   Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes 
Constant  0.412*** 
(0.128) 
 0247* 
(0.160) 
0.188** 
(0.111) 
  0.391*** 
(0.128) 
 0.239* 
(0.164) 
 0.191* 
(0.109) 
Pseudo R2  0.8647     0.8648   
DIC  1,048.1     1,035.0   
Mean Log-likelihood -873.45    -862.47   
Notes: n = 483; # of draws = 5000 and burnin = 2000. SD denotes standard deviation. The estimates in this table were also 
obtained from the standardized social weight matrix. The very high Jenguma or Afayak denotes when the difference 
between the proportions of Jenguma and Afayak adopters is greater than 0.5 for Jenguma or Afayak, respectively. Also, 
the moderately high Jenguma or Afayak denotes when the difference between the proportions of Jenguma and Afayak 
adopting neighbors is greater than 0 but less than or equal to 0.5 for Jenguma or Afayak, respectively. Equal means the 
proportion of adopting neighbors of Jenguma and Afayak are equal. Both > 0.25 and both < 0.25 denote both the proportion 
of Jenguma and Afayak adopting neighbors are greater and less than 0.25, respectively. The base category is those without 
any adopting neighbors of the improved varieties and consist of 18.6% of the sample. The values in the parenthesis are 
standard deviations. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
We find that the likelihood of adopting improved variety 1 (Jenguma) is higher when the 
difference in the share of adopting neighbors between the two improved varieties, 1 and 2 
(Afayak), is higher for variety 1 than variety 2. This becomes negative for variety 1 when the 
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difference in the share of adopting neighbors is lower for variety 1 than variety 2. Specifically, 
relative to farmers with no adopting neighbors of any of the improved varieties, a farmer’s 
adoption of Jenguma is 5 percentage points more likely, if the share of neighbors adopting 
Jenguma is moderately higher (i.e., 0< difference   0.5) than the share of neighbors adopting 
the other (i.e., Afayak), in the neighborhood (cols. 2 and 5).  
 
Similarly, a farmer’s adoption of Afayak is 14 percentage points more likely, if the share of 
neighbors adopting Afayak is moderately higher than the share of neighbors adopting Jenguma, 
compared to a farmer without adopting neighbors of the improved varieties in the neighborhood 
(cols. 3 and 6). The difference in magnitudes of the coefficients across varieties are statistically 
(weakly) different from zero (p=0.07). We observe similar pattern, and even stronger effects 
in adoption, when the difference in the share of adopters of each variety is very high (i.e., 
difference > 0.5). In particular, a farmer with a very high relative share of neighbors adopting 
Jenguma (Afayak) is 27 (45) percentage points more likely to adopt Jenguma (Afayak) than 
farmers with no adopting neighbors of these new varieties. The effect of Afayak is significantly 
higher than that of Jenguma (p=0.005). 
 
Table 2.7 also shows that, adoption of either of the two improved variety is less likely when 
the share of adopting neighbors of these varieties are equal, although the effects are not 
statistically significant (cols. 1-3). In order to shed more light on what happens when the share 
of adopters of the improved varieties in a farmer’s neighborhood are equal, we examined the 
effects of having both shares of adopting neighbors of the improved varieties being higher than 
0.25 and the effects of having both shares being lower than 0.25. Interestingly, the results (cols. 
4-6) further show a farmer is less likely to adopt any of the improved varieties (and Jenguma), 
if both the shares of adopting neighbors of the improved varieties are higher than 0.25 (lower 
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than 0.25), relative to a farmer without adopting neighbors of the improved varieties, albeit not 
statistically significant in all cases.  
 
Conversely, a farmer is more likely to continue planting the traditional variety (Salintuya) if 
the share of adopters of both improved varieties are higher or lower than 0.25, relative to a 
farmer with no adopting neighbors of any of the improved varieties, although the effects are 
also not statistically significant. These further confirm our hypothesis 3 that farmers are not 
more likely to adopt any of the improved varieties compared to farmers without adopting 
neighbors, if the share of adopters of these improved varieties are equal. However, the 
likelihood of using the traditional variety (Salintya) declines when the difference in share of 
adopting neighbors between the improved varieties becomes higher in favor of any of the 
improved varieties. We also see that the magnitudes of the effects of Afayak adopting neighbors 
is mostly higher than the effects of Jenguma adopting neighbors, although these differences 
are not statistically different (p > 0.1) in all cases.  
 
2.5.4 Effects of other controls 
Following the above discussion on differential impact of social network effects and in the 
interest of brevity, we discuss the effects of covariates by focusing on the comparison of the 
significant variables across the two varieties. Table 2.8 documents the marginal effects of these 
controls for all the three varieties. For each variety, the table presents the direct and indirect 
(spillover) effects of each variable. We find that a standard deviation (SD) increase in education 
covariate of all soybean adopters is estimated to increase Jenguma and Afayak adoption 
probabilities by 0.2 and 1.7 percentage points, while decreasing the probability of using 
Salintuya by 1.2 percentage points. The spillover effects of education of a farmer is estimated 
to increase the probabilities of his neighbors adopting Jenguma and Afayak by 0.1 and 0.4 
percentage points, respectively. The effect of education is higher on the adoption of Afayak 
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compared to Jenguma, and generally emphasizes the importance of human capital in learning 
about new technologies (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010). 
 
Table 2.8 SAR MNP Marginal effects  
Variables Salintuya Jenguma Afayak 
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect 
Own characteristics: 
    Age -0.001 -1.60E-04  8.1E-05  1.70E-05  0.001  1.8E-04 
    Gender -0.029 -0.006 -0.031 -0.006  0.019  0.004 
    Education -0.012 -0.003  0.002  0.001  0.017  0.004 
    Experience  0.032  0.007 -0.012 -0.003 -0.017 -0.004 
    Household   0.005  0.001  0.003  0.001 -0.011 -0.002 
    Landholding -0.019 -0.004  0.061  0.013  0.027  0.006 
    Credit  0.024  0.005 -0.152 -0.032  0.017  0.004 
    Risk -0.003 -0.001  0.001  2.60E-04 -0.004 -0.001 
    Extension -0.085 -0.019  0.054  0.011  0.123  0.029 
    NGO/Res -0.090 -0.020  0.041  0.009  0.070  0.016 
    Association  0.049  0.011 -0.046 -0.009  0.021  0.005 
    Electronic -0.017 -0.004  0.017  0.003 -0.024 -0.005 
    Soil quality -0.067 -0.015  0.067  0.014 -0.014 -0.003 
    Price  0.280  0.063 -0.166 -0.035 -0.102 -0.024 
Contextual effects       
    Age -0.658 -0.149  0.147  0.031  0.144  0.034 
    Gender  0.001  1.60E-04  4.70E-04  1.00E-04  0.003  0.001 
    Education -0.035 -0.007  0.018  0.003  0.005  0.001 
    Experience  0.011  0.003 -0.002 -4.40E-04 -0.015 -0.004 
    Household  0.008  0.002 -0.003 -0.001  2.40E-04  5.90E-05 
    Landholding -0.010 -0.002  0.002  4.40E-04  0.016  0.004 
    Credit  0.021  0.004 -0.022 -0.005  0.001  1.20E-04 
    Risk -0.168 -0.038  0.148  0.031  0.049  0.011 
    Extension -0.002 -0.001  0.006  0.001  0.004  0.001 
    NGO/Res -0.071 -0.016  0.015  0.003  0.030  0.007 
    Association  0.072  0.016 -0.083 -0.017 -0.084 -0.020 
    Electronic  0.027  0.006 -0.019 -0.004  0.015  0.003 
    Soil quality  0.053  0.012  0.067  0.014 -0.015 -0.003 
    Price  0.001 3.90E-04 -0.021 -0.004 -0.002 -3.90E-04 
Notes: Values in bold denote variables that are significant. These are the marginal effects of the other covariates and 
the direct effects of own characteristics indicate the effect of the farmer’s characteristics on his adoption decision 
whereas indirect effects show the effects of the farmer’s characteristics on the neighbors. Likewise, the direct 
contextual effects show the effects of the neighbors on the farmer’s adoption decision and the indirect contextual 
effects are the effects of the neighbors’ covariates on their own adoption decisions.    
 
 
The results further show that the magnitudes of own effects of extension, NGO and research 
agents, and association are significantly different from zero across these varieties and are 
generally in favor of Afayak adoption. Specifically, a SD increase in extension contact increases 
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the direct [spillover] effects of adopting Jenguma and Afayak by a likelihood of 5.4[1.1] and 
12.3[2.9] percentage points, respectively, and decreases the use of Salintuya by 8.5[1.9] 
percentage points. These results are qualitatively similar to the effects of NGO/Research agents 
on adopting Afayak and could be due to the recent field demonstrations and farmer field-days 
carried out by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research, and Savannah Agricultural Research Institute. 
 
These results suggest that exposure to external and other sources of information (see also 
Beaman et al. 2020), and also to public learning are very important in the adoption of new 
technologies, particularly in cases where there is the need to induce adoption beyond a 
threshold required to trigger adoption in the neighborhood. In addition, access to credit and 
soybean seed price appear to significantly reduce the likelihood of adopting Jenguma. For 
instance, a credit constrained farmer is significantly less likely to adopt Jenguma by 15.2[3.2] 
percentage points. At the same time, a cedi increase in soybean seed price reduces a farmer’s 
likelihood of adopting Jenguma by 16.6[3.5] percentage points, but does not significantly affect 
Afayak adoption. Similar effects are observed in the contextual effects where a farmer’s 
probability of adopting Jenguma decreases with increased proportion of credit constrained 
neighbors or in average soybean seed price reported by neighbors.  
 
These suggest that whereas credit constrained and cost of production play important roles in 
affecting adoption of Jenguma these are not significant in the case of influencing the adoption 
of Afayak. This can possibly be due to differences in locational advantages between Afayak and 
Jenguma adopters since Afayak adopters are relatively closer to the district capitals, where most 
financial and credit institutions are located, and also obtain higher selling price from soybean 
sales (Table 2.A1). The other variables of significant difference in the magnitudes of adoption 
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are landholding and soil quality, where the effects on Jenguma adoption are higher than that 
on Afayak.  
 
5.5.5 Robustness  
Given the importance of contextual effects and correlated fixed effects in confounding the 
network effects and the fact that we captured the cross-variety effects in the mean and not in 
the variance-covariance of the equations, we perform robustness to ascertain the sensitivity of 
our estimates to different specifications of our empirical model. We first check to see whether 
it is important to account for contextual effects in order to obtain best model fit and estimates, 
and columns (3-4) in Table 2.A2 in the appendix present estimates of our model without these 
effects. The DIC and the loglikelihood are 1,224 and -1,020. These values are, respectively, 
higher and lower than the DIC and loglikelihhood values obtained for the model which account 
for contextual effects in Table 2.5. We next present estimates where we control for proxies of 
farmer access to markets. This is to assess whether differential market conditions and 
constraints (as shown in panel A of Table 2.A1) faced by farmers could be driving the 
differences in adoption of the improved varieties, which may then confound the observed peer 
adoption effects. The results of this specification are reported in columns (5-6) in Table 2.A2. 
Interestingly, none of these are statistically significant and the peer adoption effects are much 
closer to those observed in Table 2.5. 
 
We further present estimates in columns (7-8) of Table 2.A2, where the cross-varietal effects 
are captured by the variance-covariance structure, instead of the mean part of the model 
(LeSage and Pace 2009). The cross-variety correlations are also negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting that the likelihood of adopting Jenguma (Afayak) is negatively 
correlated with the share of adopting neighbors of Afayak (Jenguma). However, these 
correlations are difficult to interpret because of the identification restriction imposed on the 
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first element of the variance-covariance matrix (Chakir and Parent 2009). The diagnostics (i.e., 
higher DIC of 2,868 and lower log-likelihood of -2,390) also tend to favor the specification 
that captures the cross-varietal effects in the mean part of the equations as in Tables 2.4 to 2.7. 
In addition, all the endogenous estimates have similar patterns as in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 
suggesting that our results are robust to these alternative specifications.   
 
Finally, we present estimates of alternative specification of the network weight matrix in 
columns (9-10) in Table 2.A2 as additional robustness check. This is meant to check whether 
the random matching within sample of the 5 households to each farm household, which 
truncates the number of links, could severely impact the estimates. As such, farmers who knew 
all 5 matched farmers, and/or were neighbors to all 5, who were randomly matched to them 
were dropped in this estimation. The estimates still show evidence of social network effects, 
and without substantial qualitative differences in most of the estimated endogenous effects 
compared with Table 2.5, albeit with attenuation bias in the magnitudes. This suggests that the 
social network effects are quite robust to the altered sociomatrix. This is not surprising, because 
the truncation at 5 matches is not binding in our sample, since only 4.5% of farmers in the 
sample mentioned they knew and/or were neighbors to all randomly matched 5 households (see 
also Liu et al. 2017).  
 
2.6 Conclusions 
We examine the impacts of social networks on the adoption of two improved soybean varieties 
in northern Ghana, using observational data, and find that a farmer’s adoption decision of a 
given improved variety depends on the status of neighbor’s adoption of all varieties in the 
social network. In aggregate terms, a farmer’s adoption decision of a given improved variety 
is positively influenced by the decisions of adopting neighbors of the same variety, but 
negatively by the adopting neighbors of the competing variety. However, the interesting 
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aspects of our findings are: For a given new variety, say Jenguma, the effect of the neighbors’ 
adoption of that variety (i.e., Jenguma) is negative and only becomes positive after at least a 
quarter of the neighbors have adopted this variety. When this limit is passed, the effects of 
cross varietal adoption by neighbors loses its importance, irrespective of the level of adopting 
neighbors of the cross variety in the network. This is suggestive of the existence of thresholds 
for each, even in the adoption of multiple and competing improved technologies, such that 
when a particular variety leads in meeting the threshold in terms of adopting neighbors, there 
is a higher chance that the variety will dominate in the neighborhood or network (i.e., village).  
 
The second aspect is that, when the relative proportion of adopting neighbors of each of the 
new varieties are equal, the farmer is not more likely to adopt either of the improved variety 
compared to farmers without adopting neighbors of the improved varieties. This could be due 
to the fact that, at this stage, farmers are most likely not certain about the expected benefits of 
these new varieties and will therefore less likely to switch. This observation is significant 
because it gives an insight into why traditional varieties still dominate in some villages, as well 
as the persistent use of these traditional varieties, as shown in the literature (CGIAR 2009), 
even though the new varieties are significantly superior in terms of yields and resistance to 
agro-climatic stress. These findings also suggest the importance of social effects, even under 
conditions of multiple and competing improved technology setting. This is further reinforced 
by the effects of education, contact with extension and NGO/Research agents, as well as 
associations, which normally facilitate individual and public learning in adoption of new 
technologies. 
 
Our findings have some implications for policy. First, the result can help explain the differential 
adoption rates of competing technologies and why some technologies become dominant in a 
particular village, while others end up as subordinate or cease to exist in some circumstances. 
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The findings also suggest the need to do a stepwise introduction of improved varieties before 
a full-scale promotion in the villages. This will require first exposing some farmers in the 
network to the improved varieties, observing the extent of adoption and then following-up with 
a wide-scale introduction and promotion of the variety that leads in adoption in the network. 
This will reduce cost associated with the multiple introduction and promotion of competing 
technologies, where only one or some will gain acceptance by farmers, despite promotion 
efforts and expenditure. Moreover, there is the need for policymakers to focus promotion 
efforts on demonstrating the relative benefits of improved varieties introduced to farmers, since 
this would be a motivation for farmers to adopt. Finally, the findings suggest that interventions 
to promote soybean farming should also consider measures that improve access to financial 
resources and enhance the human capital of farmers to reduce challenges of adoption.   
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Appendix 
Appendix A 
 
  
Fig. 2.A1 Network with minimum transitivity of 
0.182 
Fig. 2.A2 Network with the mean transitivity of 
0.470 
  
Fig. 2.A3 Network with the 75th transitivity of 0.534 Fig. 2.A4 Network with the highest transitivity of 
0.603 
Figure 2.A Networks by distribution of transitivity 
 
Notes: Figures 2.A1 - 2.A2 show representations of graphs by the distribution of the transitivity values in the sample 
networks. Fig. 2.A1 shows the network with the lowest transitivity value, Fig. 2.A2 shows a network with the average 
transitivity of all the networks while Figs. 2.A3 – 2.A4 present the networks with the 75th percentile and with the highest 
transitivity, respectively.  
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Table 2.A1 Mean differences in market access and production cost of adopters of 
respective varieties 
 Salintuya Jenguma Mean 
difference 
 Afayak Mean 
difference 
 Mean 
difference 
 (1) (2) (3) = (2-1) (4) (5) = (4-1) (6) = (4-2) 
Panel A: Marketing       
Sold in market in the 
village (0,1) 
 36.5 
 (3.8) 
 33.7 
 (3.3) 
 -2.8 
 (5.1) 
  29.6 
 (4.1) 
 -6.9 
 (5.7) 
  -4.1 
 (5.3) 
Sold in market outside 
village (0,1) 
 53.2 
 (4.0) 
 62.4 
 (3.4) 
  9.2* 
 (5.2) 
  65.6 
 (4.3) 
 12.4** 
 (5.9) 
  -3.2 
 (5.4) 
Sold to market traders 
(0,1) 
 80.1 
 (3.2) 
 79.7 
 (2.8) 
 -0.4 
 (4.3) 
  81.6 
 (3.4) 
  1.5 
 (4.7) 
  1.9 
 (4.5) 
Sold to buying 
organization (0,1) 
 12.8 
 (2.6) 
 15.8 
 (2.5) 
  3.0 
 (3.7) 
  14.4 
 (3.2) 
  1.6 
 (4.1) 
  -1.4 
 (4.1) 
Selling price in GHS/kg  1.27 
(0.03) 
 1.25 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
  1.37 
(0.04) 
 0.10** 
(0.05) 
  0.12** 
(0.04) 
Distance to district centre 
in kilometres 
 18.4 
 (1.1) 
 15.1 
 (0.8) 
 -3.3** 
 (1.4) 
  12.9 
 (0.7) 
 -5.4*** 
 (1.4) 
  -2.2* 
 (1.2) 
         
Panel B: Seed price and other production cost       
Price in GHS/kg  1.06 
(0.01) 
 1.07 
(0.01) 
 0.01 
(0.02) 
  1.04 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
 -0.03 
(0.02) 
Farm size in acres  1.82 
(0.08) 
 2.01 
(0.08) 
 0.19 
(0.12) 
  1.85 
(0.08) 
 0.03 
(0.11) 
 -0.16 
(0.12) 
Expenditure on seeds in 
GHS per acre 
 7.11 
(0.43) 
 6.57 
(0.33) 
-0.54 
(0.53) 
  6.95 
(0.48) 
-0.15 
(0.64) 
  0.39 
(0.56) 
Exp. on fertilizer in GHS 
per acre 
 0.99 
(0.65) 
 3.85 
(1.13) 
 2.86** 
(1.40) 
  2.18 
(0.82) 
 1.19 
(1.03) 
 -1.68 
(1.57) 
Exp. on pesticide in GHS 
per acre 
 0.90 
(0.29) 
 1.48 
(0.38) 
 0.58 
(0.51) 
  1.33 
(0.33) 
 0.42 
(0.45) 
 -0.16 
(0.55) 
Exp. on weedicides in 
GHS per acre 
 15.0 
 (0.7) 
 22.5 
 (2.1) 
  7.5*** 
 (2.5) 
  23.7 
 (3.4) 
  8.7** 
 (3.2) 
   1.2 
 (3.8) 
Labor use in man-days 
per acre 
 14.5 
 (0.8) 
 15.0 
 (0.8) 
  0.6 
 (1.1) 
  15.4 
 (0.9) 
  0.9 
 (1.2) 
   0.4 
 (1.2) 
Soil quality  2.73 
(0.08) 
 3.47 
(0.04) 
  0.74*** 
 (0.09) 
  2.87 
(0.09) 
 0.14 
(0.12) 
 -0.60*** 
(0.09) 
Credit constraint (0,1) 0.69 
(0.04) 
0.42 
(0.03) 
 -0.27*** 
 (0.05) 
 0.68 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
  0.26*** 
(0.06) 
Extension  0.21 
(0.03) 
 0.37 
(0.03) 
  0.14*** 
 (0.04) 
  0.24 
(0.04) 
  0.03 
(0.05) 
 -0.12** 
(0.05) 
Risk  1.04 
(0.11) 
 1.02 
(0.10) 
 -0.02 
 (0.15) 
  1.04 
(0.13) 
 0.00 
(0.17) 
  0.02 
(0.16) 
Notes: the table reports comparison of the mean differences in proxies of market access in panel A, and production cost 
components across the three varieties. Exp. denotes expenditure. The values in the parenthesis are standard errors. The asterisks 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 2.A2 Sensitivity of estimates to alternative specifications, network links truncation and additional market factors 
 No Network FEs  No contextual effects  With additional market 
access controls 
 Cross-choice influence in 
variance-covariance 
 Excludes those who were 
neighbors to all 5 matches 
 (1) 
Jenguma 
(2) 
Afayak 
(3) 
Jenguma 
(4) 
Afayak 
(5) 
Jenguma 
(6) 
Afayak 
(7) 
Jenguma 
(8) 
Afayak 
(9) 
Jenguma 
(10) 
Afayak 
 Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
Prop. Neighbadopt_ Jenguma   0.315*** 
(0.017) 
-0.039*** 
(0.014) 
  0.283*** 
(0.016) 
-0.058*** 
(0.015) 
  0.228*** 
(0.025) 
-0.054*** 
(0.017) 
  0.140*** 
(0.008) 
   0.133*** 
(0.011) 
-0.027** 
(0.010) 
Prop. Neighbadopt_Afayak -0.040** 
(0.015) 
 0.361*** 
(0.014) 
 -0.076*** 
(0.016) 
 0.355*** 
(0.013) 
 -0.053*** 
(0.018) 
 0.336*** 
(0.016) 
   0.158*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.007 
(0.010) 
 0.153*** 
(0.007) 
               
Cov [ 12σ ] of Jenguma and Afayak     
         -1.472** 
(0.634) 
 
    
Cov [ 21σ ] of Afayak and Jenguma 
          -1.472** 
(0.634) 
   
     Market in village        0.045 
(0.052) 
-0.047 
(0.057) 
      
     Market outside village        0.021 
(0.047) 
 0.032 
(0.052) 
      
     Traders       -0.007 
(0.043) 
-0.036 
(0.046) 
      
     Organization        0.016 
(0.052) 
-0.055 
(0.055) 
      
     Distance to town       -0.003 
(0.025) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
      
     Selling price       -0.026 
(0.025) 
 0.019 
(0.028) 
      
Own characteristics    Yes   Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes    Yes 
Contextual effects    Yes   Yes      No   No     Yes    Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes    Yes 
Network Fes     No    No     Yes  Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes    Yes 
Link formation residual    Yes   Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes    Yes 
Constant  0.189 
(0.156) 
 0.276** 
(0.116) 
  0.221* 
(0.169) 
 0.326*** 
(0.118) 
  0.412** 
(0.184) 
 0.349** 
(0.149) 
     
 
  0.615*** 
(0.132) 
 0.394*** 
(0.130) 
Pseudo R2 0.718  0.793  0.841  0.639  0.671 
DIC 1,211.70   1,224.10  1,279.90   2,868.00   2,340.00 
Mean Log-likelihood            -1,009.80  -1,020.10              -1,066.60  -2,390.10               -1,950.40 
Notes: n = 483; # of draws = 5000 and burnin = 2000. The Cov [ 12σ ] and Cov [ 21σ ] denote the covariance of the two improved variety equations and show the cross variety effects.  The estimates in this table were also 
obtained from the standardized social weight matrix and thus these estimates represent the effects of these covariates on adoption in terms of proportions. The values in the parenthesis are standard deviations. The asterisks 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.A3 Estimates of Group Fixed-Effects (Table 2.4 continued) 
 Jenguma Afayak 
 Estimates SD Estimates SD 
Village 2  0.014 0.057 -0.047 0.066 
Village 3 -0.073 0.065 -0.139** 0.069 
Village 4 -0.064 0.065  0.008 0.069 
Village 5 -0.022 0.070 -0.109* 0.071 
Village 6 -0.045 0.066  0.013 0.072 
Village 7  0.064 0.065 -0.034 0.069 
Village 8 -0.053 0.071 -0.044 0.071 
Village 9 -0.115** 0.062 -0.131** 0.072 
Village 10  0.082 0.073 -0.129* 0.081 
Village 11  0.058 0.066 -0.040 0.070 
Village 12  0.024 0.072  0.045 0.082 
Village 13  0.181** 0.066 -0.071 0.073 
Village 14  0.232*** 0.067 -0.020 0.080 
Village 15  0.262*** 0.062 -0.135** 0.072 
Village 16  0.283*** 0.065 -0.012 0.080 
Village 17 -0.150** 0.068  0.010 0.074 
Village 18 -0.045 0.064  0.018 0.071 
Village 19 -0.025 0.064 -0.031 0.065 
Village 20 -0.086 0.070 -0.083 0.072 
Village 21 -0.136** 0.064 -0.154** 0.069 
Village 22 -0.091* 0.065 -0.148** 0.073 
Village 23  0.014 0.061 -0.084 0.070 
Village 24  0.059 0.064  0.051 0.070 
Village 25  0.017 0.070  0.043 0.071 
Notes: the table is a continuation of the estimates reported in table 2.4 and shows the group/network fixed-effects estimates. 
The base category is village 1. SD denotes standard deviation. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix B: Network formation and endogeneity 
 
2.B1. Network formation and endogeneity of neighbors’ adoption  
The section describes the network formation model estimated and discussed under subsection 
2.4.1. We estimated a conditional edge independence model, which assumes links form 
independently, conditional on node- and link- level covariates (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007) as 
follows;  
 𝐿𝑖𝑗,𝑔 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1|𝑐𝑖𝑔 − 𝑐𝑗𝑔| + 𝛿2(𝑐𝑖𝑔 + 𝑐𝑗𝑔) + 𝛿3|ℒ𝑖𝑗𝑔| + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑔  
where 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑔 is an 𝑚𝑔 × (𝑚𝑔 − 1) matrix indicating whether there is a link between individuals 
𝑖 and 𝑗 in group/village 𝑔 (𝑔 =1,…, 𝐺, and 𝐺 is the number of groups/villages in the sample), 
𝑐𝑖𝑔 and 𝑐𝑗𝑔 are characteristics of individual 𝑖 and 𝑗 in group 𝑔. 𝛿1 measures the influence of 
differences in their attributes, and 𝛿2 measures the effect of combined level of their attributes. 
ℒ𝑖𝑗𝑔 captures attributes of the link between 𝑖 and 𝑗 such as geographical or social distance 
between them, and 𝛿3 is the associated parameter estimate. The estimates of this model are 
reported in Table 2.B1. We next use the average of the predicted residuals of this link formation 
model as control functions in our adoption equation to account for the endogeneity of peer 
effects due to unobserved factors that determine link formation. 
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Table 2.B1 First-stage dyadic regression of network formation by village   
       Vill._1    Vill. 2    Vill. 3    Vill. 4    Vill. 5    Vill. 6    Vill. 7    Vill. 8 Vill. 9 
 Distance between peers in kilometres -0.066 -0.000 0.114** -0.007 0.031 -0.009 0.056 -0.035 -0.012 
   (0.065) (0.046) (0.051) (0.043) (0.055) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.047) 
 Difference in distance to road between peers in kilometres 0.024 0.191* -0.070 0.097 0.048** 0.085* 0.054* -0.124** 0.051* 
   (0.033) (0.103) (0.056) (0.063) (0.022) (0.047) (0.030) (0.058) (0.030) 
 Relatives = 1 0.261 -0.026 0.144 -0.190 -0.383 0.382 0.479 -0.509 -0.741** 
   (0.382) (0.362) (0.606) (0.522) (0.286) (0.657) (0.368) (0.330) (0.351) 
 Same religion = 1 n.a. n.a. -0.175 -0.437 -0.363 -0.017 0.501 -0.418 -0.346 
   n.a. n.a. (0.224) (0.328) (0.303) (0.483) (0.516) (0.484) (0.328) 
 Difference: Sex (= 1 if male) 1.135*** 0.808*** 7.435*** -0.318 0.425 0.045 0.782** 0.607* 0.260 
   (0.354) (0.241) (0.387) (0.255) (0.329) (0.255) (0.367) (0.345) (0.531) 
 Difference: Age -0.003 -0.026* 0.035** -0.015 -0.050*** -0.041*** 0.036*** 0.132*** 0.040*** 
   (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.036) (0.013) 
 Difference: Years of schooling 0.090* -0.006 0.056 0.061 3.078*** -0.148*** -0.054* 2.854*** 0.030 
   (0.047) (0.039) (0.054) (0.064) (0.189) (0.046) (0.028) (0.498) (0.070) 
 Difference: Household size -0.214** -0.103 -0.070 0.096 -0.224** 0.156** -0.138 0.021 0.099 
   (0.102) (0.093) (0.090) (0.083) (0.091) (0.077) (0.103) (0.075) (0.068) 
 Difference: Household landholding in hectares -0.202 -0.164 0.060 0.460*** 0.158 0.439** -0.159 0.005 -0.097 
   (0.238) (0.103) (0.172) (0.111) (0.169) (0.219) (0.110) (0.112) (0.135) 
 Difference: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 1.109** 0.163 -0.607** 0.824*** -0.258 -0.054 -0.885*** 6.091*** -0.691** 
   (0.509) (0.347) (0.307) (0.277) (0.237) (0.340) (0.262) (0.437) (0.297) 
 Difference: Household wealth (predicted) in GHS 1.359 -0.953 0.346 -0.075 0.933 -0.553 -1.959*** 1.209 0.148 
   (1.142) (0.641) (1.046) (0.889) (1.284) (0.879) (0.721) (1.197) (0.927) 
 Difference:  Authority = 1 if any parent of the farmer had an authority in village 6.788*** 0.636* 0.924*** -0.145 -13.271*** 7.636*** -0.017 0.498 7.011*** 
   (0.420) (0.370) (0.327) (0.309) (1.385) (0.821) (0.310) (0.472) (0.405) 
 Sum: Sex (= 1 if male) -0.407 0.630*** 7.241*** 0.054 0.959*** 0.387* 0.478* 0.464 0.256 
   (0.279) (0.213) (0.362) (0.235) (0.302) (0.232) (0.249) (0.291) (0.341) 
 Sum: Age 0.003 0.010 -0.019 -0.021*** 0.011 0.003 -0.041*** -0.072*** -0.013 
   (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.027) (0.011) 
 Sum: Years of schooling -0.045 0.041** 0.012 -0.085 -3.041*** 0.101*** -0.026 -3.946*** -0.055 
   (0.041) (0.020) (0.036) (0.059) (0.175) (0.035) (0.032) (0.564) (0.065) 
 Sum: Household size -0.076 0.122** 0.145** -0.044 0.069 -0.043 0.018 -0.086 0.106** 
   (0.049) (0.056) (0.071) (0.053) (0.047) (0.035) (0.059) (0.062) (0.052) 
 Sum: Household landholding in hectares -0.120 0.028 -0.051 -0.076 -0.282** -0.334** 0.252** 0.154** 0.142 
   (0.120) (0.060) (0.160) (0.108) (0.132) (0.166) (0.115) (0.072) (0.121) 
 Sum: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 1.118*** 0.049 0.186 0.338 -0.027 0.237 0.035 7.209*** -0.874*** 
  (0.337) (0.328) (0.348) (0.217) (0.256) (0.254) (0.213) (0.394) (0.223) 
 Sum: Authority = 1 if any parent of the farmer had an authority in village -7.669*** 0.292 -0.822** 1.182*** 12.932*** -7.503*** 0.508*** 1.451*** -6.989*** 
   (0.381) (0.394) (0.379) (0.354) (1.255) (0.910) (0.162) (0.518) (0.450) 
 Constant  -3.496* -4.083** -16.801*** -0.384 -3.759** -0.987 1.351 -12.817*** -1.143 
   (1.803) (1.634) (2.016) (1.505) (1.619) (2.075) (1.395) (2.078) (1.752) 
 Observation 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
 Pseudo R2  0.133 0.090 0.108 0.099 0.097 0.087 0.120 0.169 0.093 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.B1 (continued)   
       Vill._10    Vill._11 Vill. 12    Vill. 13    Vill. 14 Vill. 15    Vill. 16    Vill. 17    Vill. 18 
 Distance between peers in kilometres -0.021 -0.085 -0.048 -0.008 -0.017 -0.073 -0.030 0.002 -0.012 
   (0.059) (0.064) (0.037) (0.044) (0.080) (0.062) (0.047) (0.047) (0.030) 
 Difference in distance to road between peers in kilometres 0.070 8.799*** -0.044 -0.018 -0.027 -0.170*** 0.018 0.025 0.075 
   (0.069) (2.821) (0.050) (0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.017) (0.019) (0.047) 
 Relatives = 1 -0.024 -0.062 0.241 0.115 0.293 0.413 -0.079 0.884 0.115 
   (0.552) (0.390) (0.354) (0.242) (0.387) (0.302) (0.496) (0.659) (0.497) 
 Same religion = 1 0.105 0.062 0.372 0.267 -0.661* -0.622* 0.006 -0.137 -0.217 
   (0.321) (0.350) (0.313) (0.390) (0.385) (0.327) (0.400) (0.420) (0.301) 
 Difference: Sex (= 1 if male) -0.122 0.310 0.546 -0.404 0.442 0.337 0.970*** 0.369 0.965*** 
   (0.343) (0.316) (0.462) (0.273) (0.332) (0.329) (0.296) (0.359) (0.306) 
 Difference: Age 0.022** -0.032** 0.009 0.011 -0.011 -0.044 -0.004 0.019 0.002 
   (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.031) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) 
 Difference: Years of schooling 1.440*** -0.058 0.083 1.308*** -0.043 -0.181*** 6.607*** 0.862*** -0.158*** 
   (0.103) (0.051) (0.053) (0.075) (0.046) (0.043) (0.609) (0.061) (0.048) 
 Difference: Household size 0.150 0.119* -0.029 -0.178** 0.046 0.042 -0.183*** -0.003 -0.024 
   (0.126) (0.070) (0.114) (0.076) (0.096) (0.098) (0.055) (0.094) (0.135) 
 Difference: Household landholding in hectares 0.585*** -0.052 -0.067 0.075 -0.197 0.371*** 0.022 0.321*** -0.157 
   (0.150) (0.084) (0.137) (0.166) (0.211) (0.130) (0.086) (0.088) (0.155) 
 Difference: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village -0.598* -0.492 1.038** 0.289 0.406 0.576** 0.205 -1.484*** -0.011 
   (0.354) (0.357) (0.454) (0.281) (0.361) (0.257) (0.456) (0.424) (0.249) 
 Difference: Household wealth (predicted) in GHS -0.101 -1.171 0.993 0.038 -0.088 -0.633 -1.175 -2.981*** -1.232* 
   (0.772) (1.159) (0.933) (1.032) (1.148) (0.649) (1.815) (0.908) (0.726) 
 Difference:  Authority = 1 if any parent of the farmer had an authority in village 7.301*** 0.422 -0.398 8.514*** 7.684*** 5.605*** -0.331 6.989*** 0.346 
   (0.381) (0.631) (0.363) (0.450) (0.392) (0.641) (0.331) (0.572) (0.399) 
 Sum: Sex (= 1 if male) 0.928*** -0.492* 0.687** 0.208 0.193 -1.030*** 0.649* -0.040 -0.096 
   (0.244) (0.279) (0.307) (0.229) (0.347) (0.232) (0.334) (0.356) (0.240) 
 Sum: Age -0.013 -0.002 -0.000 0.004 -0.008 -0.004 0.017* 0.029 -0.017* 
   (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.009) (0.021) (0.010) 
 Sum: Years of schooling -1.530*** -0.075** 0.001 -1.198*** 0.006 0.020 -5.548*** -0.774*** 0.041 
   (0.081) (0.033) (0.046) (0.085) (0.040) (0.037) (0.658) (0.055) (0.025) 
 Sum: Household size -0.162* 0.252*** 0.142** 0.020 0.086 0.147*** 0.141** 0.205*** 0.095 
   (0.092) (0.054) (0.070) (0.078) (0.055) (0.045) (0.057) (0.058) (0.077) 
 Sum: Household landholding in hectares -0.547*** 0.238*** -0.108 -0.082 0.178 0.129 0.079 -0.073 0.104 
   (0.144) (0.081) (0.110) (0.140) (0.131) (0.099) (0.081) (0.080) (0.093) 
 Sum: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 0.423 1.021*** 0.697* 0.508* 0.903*** 0.756*** 0.976** 0.343 0.160 
  (0.331) (0.323) (0.390) (0.274) (0.347) (0.273) (0.393) (0.396) (0.198) 
 Sum: Authority = 1 if any parent of the farmer had an authority in village -7.146*** 0.984* -0.327 -7.003*** -7.211*** -5.772*** 0.870** -7.568*** 1.121*** 
   (0.418) (0.581) (0.261) (0.463) (0.445) (0.721) (0.340) (0.883) (0.289) 
 Constant  0.921 -3.133 -6.525*** -2.981*** -3.922** -3.085 -4.933 -2.307 0.173 
   (1.952) (2.655) (2.180) (1.109) (1.943) (1.941) (4.367) (2.875) (2.125) 
 Observation 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
 Pseudo R2  0.131 0.075 0.059 0.098 0.088 0.146 0.089 0.162 0.114 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.B1 (continued)   
      Vill._19    Vill._20   Vill._21    Vill._22    Vill._23    Vill._24    Vill._25 
 Distance between peers in kilometres -0.006 0.018 -0.009 0.060 0.014 -0.047 0.044 
   (0.061) (0.030) (0.039) (0.067) (0.046) (0.048) (0.050) 
 Difference in distance to road between peers in kilometres 0.012 1.274 0.686 0.059** 0.686 -1.425 0.024 
   (0.008) (2.839) (0.659) (0.024) (3.460) (3.339) (0.016) 
 Relatives = 1 -0.471* 0.358 0.090 1.345 -0.492 0.262 -0.523 
   (0.268) (0.223) (0.272) (1.195) (0.459) (0.320) (0.538) 
 Same religion = 1 -0.304 n.a. 0.180 0.107 0.714 n.a. 0.152 
   (0.383) n.a. (0.479) (0.578) (0.517) n.a. (0.423) 
 Difference: Sex (= 1 if male) -0.385 0.862* -0.352 8.166*** -0.932*** -0.539* 0.744* 
   (0.275) (0.478) (0.423) (0.404) (0.205) (0.285) (0.392) 
 Difference: Age 0.003 -0.007 -0.040** -0.000 0.011 0.016 0.029 
   (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.025) 
 Difference: Years of schooling 0.009 -0.052 0.043 n.a. 0.119 0.373*** 0.142*** 
   (0.045) (0.033) (0.065) n.a. (0.079) (0.062) (0.050) 
 Difference: Household size 0.049 0.145* 0.086 0.076 -0.032 0.254*** 0.229*** 
   (0.063) (0.088) (0.088) (0.097) (0.089) (0.092) (0.081) 
 Difference: Household landholding in hectares -0.066 -0.085 -0.077 0.126 0.359** 0.600** -0.263 
   (0.088) (0.103) (0.100) (0.163) (0.168) (0.233) (0.218) 
 Difference: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 6.526*** -0.247 8.173*** 0.638 -0.122 0.216 -0.235 
   (0.422) (0.325) (0.403) (0.490) (0.309) (0.323) (0.412) 
 Difference: Household wealth (predicted) in GHS 1.450 -1.346 -0.100 2.782*** 2.355*** -1.985** -0.522 
   (1.150) (0.987) (0.639) (0.976) (0.868) (0.851) (1.269) 
 Difference:  Authority = 1 if any parent of the farmer had an authority in village n.a. -1.108*** n.a. n.a. -0.205 -0.898*** n.a. 
   n.a. (0.291) n.a. n.a. (0.290) (0.289) n.a. 
 Sum: Sex (= 1 if male) 0.504* 0.850* -0.293 8.878*** 0.734*** 0.112 0.161 
   (0.284) (0.436) (0.245) (0.510) (0.215) (0.187) (0.278) 
 Sum: Age -0.012 -0.006 0.010 0.017 0.005 0.036** -0.002 
   (0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.014) (0.021) 
 Sum: Years of schooling 0.033 0.075*** 0.210*** n.a. 0.097 -0.427*** 0.019 
   (0.024) (0.021) (0.037) n.a. (0.067) (0.048) (0.059) 
 Sum: Household size -0.000 -0.054 -0.072 0.028 0.160*** 0.056 -0.284*** 
   (0.048) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.056) (0.090) (0.056) 
 Sum: Household landholding in hectares 0.123 -0.081 0.270*** -0.382* -0.344*** -0.237 0.248 
   (0.092) (0.084) (0.082) (0.198) (0.126) (0.217) (0.169) 
 Sum: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 6.413*** -0.400* 7.525*** 1.116** 0.078 0.658*** -0.821*** 
  (0.380) (0.239) (0.431) (0.435) (0.193) (0.244) (0.278) 
 Sum: Authority = 1 if any parent of the farmer had an authority in village n.a. 0.828** n.a. n.a. -0.822*** -0.404 n.a. 
   n.a. (0.331) n.a. n.a. (0.268) (0.336) n.a. 
 Constant  -17.238*** 0.065 -18.598*** -26.287*** -5.388*** -3.241* 0.730 
   (2.569) (2.076) (1.453) (2.379) (1.821) (1.969) (2.514) 
 Observation 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
 Pseudo R2  0.075 0.093 0.160 0.155 0.094 0.098 0.201 
            Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.B2 Instrumenting regression for Wealth in Dyadic model 
 Difference of wealth  Sum of wealth 
 Coefficient Robust 
S. E. 
Dyadic 
S. E. 
 Coefficient Robust 
S. E. 
Dyadic 
S. E. 
 All regressors as difference  All regressors as sums 
    
Sex = 1 if male      0.080 0.036 0.086   -0.237* 0.034 0.154 
Years of education of farmer  -0.026** 0.004 0.010   -0.040** 0.004 0.017 
Born = 1 if born in village  -0.106* 0.036 0.069       0.200* 0.034 0.144 
Value of inherited land in GHS      0.277*** 0.040 0.089       0.925*** 0.048 0.142 
        
District dummies        
     1 if farmer resides in district 1  -0.322 0.052 0.262   -0.552* 0.066 0.397 
     1 if farmer resides in district 2  -0.493** 0.051 0.257   -0.757** 0.066 0.405 
     1 if farmer resides in district 3      0.298 0.068 0.327       0.429 0.090 0.539 
     1 if farmer resides in district 4  -0.150 0.082 0.426   -0.369 0.097 0.560 
             
Intercept      1.488*** 0.056 0.214       2.614*** 0.088 0.429 
Observations      9500         9500   
Notes: the table presents first-stage estimates for instrumenting wealth in the dyadic link formation model. Columns 1, 2 and 
3 present results for the difference of wealth between neighbors. Columns 4, 5 and 6 show results of the sum of wealth 
estimates. The table also show both the conventional robust standard errors (in columns 2 and 5) and the Fafchamps and Gubert 
(2007) group dyadic standard errors (columns 3 and 6). The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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2.B2. Endogeneity of other covariates  
The variables credit-constrained, extension contact and non-governmental/research 
organization (NGO/Res) are potentially endogenous in the specification. In particular, credit-
constrained could be endogenous because adopters of the improved varieties could be farmers 
with higher yields and incomes, which provide them an urge in acquiring collaterals and in 
meeting minimum savings requirements for accessing credit. Endogeneity of extension and 
NGO/Res contacts could result from the fact that extension and NGO/Res officers visit farmers 
because they adopted the improved varieties. These potential endogeneity concerns were 
addressed through a two-stage generalized residual inclusion estimation procedure suggested 
by Wooldridge (2015). We first estimate a probit model for each of the endogenous variables 
with a set of explanatory variables and at least an instrument that highly explains these 
endogenous variables, but indirectly affects adoption.  
 
The generalized residuals for the first-stage probit estimates are then plugged into the second-
stage adoption equation to account for potential endogeneity of these variables. This approach 
provides an optimal test of the null hypothesis that the potential endogenous variable is 
exogenous and also makes it possible to consistently estimate the average structural model by 
averaging out the generalized errors (Wooldridge, 2015). The first-stage estimates are reported 
in Table 2.B3. In the credit constraint equation, distance to the nearest financial institution was 
used as an instrument, which affects access to credit, but not the decision to adopt the 
technology. With regard to the extension and NGO/Research contacts equations, we employed 
distance to the nearest extension office and distance to the nearest NGO/Research station, 
respectively, as instruments, which affect extension and NGO/Research contacts but not 
adoption of the technology directly. These instruments were excluded from the second-stage 
estimation to ensure identification in the estimation of the adoption (structural) equation.   
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Table 2.B3 First-stage probit estimates for liquidity constraint, extension and 
NGO/Research equations 
Variable Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Credit constraint  Extension contact  NGO/Res contact 
Coefficient Std 
Error 
 Coefficient Std 
Error 
 Coefficient Std 
Error 
Constant      4.752*** 1.015   -4.132*** 1.147   -3.759*** 1.218 
Own characteristics         
    Age  -0.001 0.006       0.014** 0.006       0.005 0.007 
    Gender  -0.363** 0.157    0.165 0.185    0.040 0.196 
    Education  -0.061 0.044       0.042 0.031       0.046 0.035 
    Experience  -0.084*** 0.030       0.005 0.026       0.098*** 0.029 
    Household       0.046 0.036   -0.023 0.042   -0.066 0.047 
    Landholding  -0.045 0.062       0.037 0.064       0.117 0.075 
    Risk      0.117** 0.055   -0.023 0.064   -0.032 0.071 
    Association  -0.238*** 0.067   -0.005 0.078   -0.277*** 0.094 
    Electronic      0.001 0.209   -0.049 0.217       0.006 0.263 
    Soil quality  -0.178** 0.084   -0.031 0.094       0.068 0.101 
    Price  -1.199* 0.634       1.865*** 0.636       0.132 0.672 
    Credit - -   -0.699*** 0.192       0.027 0.226 
    Extension  -0.382 0.409  - -       0.364** 0.152 
    NGO/Res  -0.055 0.214       0.546*** 0.197  - - 
Contextual effects         
    Age    -0.003 0.003       0.004* 0.002       0.003 0.003 
    Gender  -0.048 0.069       0.024 0.074    0.124 0.092 
    Education  -0.006 0.016       0.010 0.013       0.012 0.017 
    Experience  -0.001 0.013   -0.002 0.015    0.011 0.015 
    Household       0.019 0.017       0.013 0.022   -0.044* 0.023 
    Landholding  -0.019 0.026    0.018 0.028       0.085*** 0.028 
    Risk      0.011 0.028   -0.035 0.036   -0.184*** 0.046 
    Association  -0.005 0.028   -0.010 0.028   -0.035 0.033 
    Electronic  -0.096 0.111   -0.025 0.151       0.056 0.128 
    Soil quality  -0.074** 0.035   -0.022 0.042    0.022 0.043 
    Price  -0.831 0.802       0.621 0.782       2.014** 0.893 
    Credit - -   -0.255*** 0.082    0.043 0.097 
    Extension  -0.318 0.494  - -    0.132** 0.059 
    NGO/Res      0.046 0.086   -0.025 0.089  - - 
Instruments          
    FinDistance  -0.037*** 0.012  - -  - - 
    ExtDistance - -   -0.032*** 0.011  - - 
    RNDistance  - -  - -   -0.090*** 0.013 
Pseudo 
2
R       0.378        0.391        0.425  
Loglikelihood  -205.0    -170.2    -145.3  
LR 
2
X       249.1        218.2        215.3  
Prob 
2
X       0.000        0.000        0.000  
Notes: table reports first-stage instrumenting probit estimates of household credit constraints in model (1), extension contact 
in model (2) and NGO/Research agent contact in model (3). The predicted generalized residuals of these models were used to 
account for the potential endogeneity of household credit constrains (Residliquid), extension contact (Residextens) and 
NGO/Research agent contact (ResidNGO).  Std Error denotes standard error. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Appendix C 
 
Bayesian Estimation Procedure 
 
Conditional distribution of   and    
Let’s assume an independent normal-Wishart prior for the   and Σ  parameters, a uniform 
prior for   and consequently given that the conditional and prior distributions of   come from 
the same distribution type with updated parameters (Wang et al. 2014), the normal prior of   
can be set as  ~ , MVN b B . This allows the conditional posterior distribution of   to be 
expressed as: 
 
     * *( | ,  ,  Σ)   | ,  , ΣYp Y p       
(C1)     1 1  , ( ) , TMVN H X H H MVN b B       
       , ΣMVN    
  
where 1 ' *Σˆ B b X H Y
    
;  kVH I W   ; 1 1Σ  X X B      and X  is a vector 
representing all other controls in equation (6). 
Uninformative prior mean distribution  0b   and a diffuse prior variance  1 12B e   for 
  were used to avoid biasing estimates and inferences by assuming high prior information. 
LeSage and Pace (2009) also show that assuming non-informative and diffuse priors in 
sufficiently large samples produce estimates comparable to those obtained from maximum 
likelihood.  The sampling of the posterior conditional distribution of   can be done either by 
Metropolis-Hasting (M-H) or by integration and draw by inversion approach (see LeSage and 
Pace 2009, chapter 5). The use of these procedures are necessitated by the fact that conditional 
posterior distribution of   doesn’t lend itself to a known standard distribution like   and Σ  
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(Autant-Bernard et al., 2008). Given that the posterior distribution of 
ij  relies on its Beta prior 
function of  p  , the posterior distribution of   is expressed as;  
(C2)  
1
'
* * ' *2
1
( | , , Σ, ) 
2
ij ijp Y H exp HY X H H HY X p     
 
          
 
,  
 
 
where 
ij  is a matrix   except the ij th element. For the M-H sampling, we require a proposal 
distribution from which a potential value for the parameter   is to be obtained. This potential 
parameter is labeled as * . An acceptable probability for drawing   based on a random walk 
from a standard normal distribution is computed in equation (C2) using the * , a current value 
of   defined as 
P  and a tuning parameter T  suggested by Holloway et al (2002). The 
proposal distribution is expressed as; 
(C3)  * ~ 0,1P T N   . 
 
The tuning of the proposal distribution from the normal distribution is to enable the M-H 
sampling process goes through the whole conditional distribution in order for the proposal 
distribution to yield draws that are within the dense part of the distribution (LeSage and Pace, 
2009). This process is done on each pass of the MCMC sampling steps. Following, Autant-
Bernard et al. (2008), the log-determinant of H  was computed with the lattice of values for 
, in the feasible range of – 1 and 1, and with the direct sparse matrix LU decomposition 
procedure.     
 
Conditional distribution of   and *Y  
In this study, Σ  is restricted to equal VI  following LeSage and Pace (2009) because the cross-
choice dependence is being captured in the mean part instead of in the covariance structure of 
the model reducing the number of parameters to be estimated. Hence, the variance-covariance 
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matrix also becomes  
1
'Ω H H

  which is used in the n-steps of the Gibbs sampling 
procedure. The latent *Y is the terminal draw to be done and each *Y  can be drawn distinctly 
given that the observations are considered independent (Autant-Bernard et al. 2008; Wang et 
al., 2014). The *Y  variable has a conditional distribution which is multivariate normal 
truncated14 (Geweke 1991). This takes the form as follows with a mean of   and variance-
covariance matrix of  .  as; 
 (A4)  
1
* 1 '~ ,  TMVN H X H HY 

 
  
,  
   * ~ , TMVY N    
subject to the constraint *a dY b   where  d is the diagonal of an kJ kJ  block diagonal 
matrix limiting 
jiY  to assume the largest value of 
*Y  if jiY j  or assumes negative if max(
) 0jiY  , 
1H X  ,   
1
'H H

 and a  and b  are the truncation bounds which depends on 
the observed 0,1 values of  y . Autant-Bernard et al. (2008) and LeSage and Pace (2009) 
modified the Geweke (1991)15 n-step Gibbs sampler for a multinomial setting to generate draws 
of kJ  variate truncated normal distribution. The procedure uses a precision matrix 
' 1Td H Hd    with dimensions kJ kJ  to sequentially generate draws from the transformed 
normal distribution  ~ 0, u N   subject to the constraint *b z b  , where 
; b a d b b d      and the *z  samples are used to produce * 1 *d zY    . Following 
                                                          
14 Note the observed response values are such that 
iY j  if 
*
,i VY   * *,1 , max , , 0i i VY Y    and 0 if 
*
,0 0iY  .  
15 Geweke (1991) shows that drawing from  * ~ , Y TMVN    subject to *a Y b   is equivalent to 
generating draws from n-variate normal distribution   *  ~ , z N    subject to the linear restriction 
*b z b  . 
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Wang et al. (2014), *
iz  is expressed as a weighted average of the other elements (
*
iz ) plus a 
noise tem as; 
 (A5) * *
kV
i i i i i
i
z z V u  

  , 
subject to the constraint * */ ) /
nV nV
i i i i i i i i i
i i
b z V u b z V    
 
 
      
 
  , where 
1
i i i  

   , 
and  
12
i iV 

 . Each pass of the entire n passes samples one element of 
*  iz which is 
conditional on the rest of the *
iz ’s and this continues until all the kV  
*
iz ’s are sampled with 
the last pass of *
iz  used to impute the 
*Y  using the * 1 *d zY     equality. A value of n = 10 
was used because Geweke (1991) indicated that even relatively small values of n can produce 
fairly desirable estimate. 
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Abstract 
The complexity of agricultural innovations and heterogeneity of circumstances of technology 
application, outcomes and social network structures have often led to obstacles in social 
learning and sub-optimal adoption. This paper examines technology diffusion in the context of 
heterogeneous peer benefits, know-how and network structures, using survey data of 500 farm 
households in Northern Ghana and random matching within sampling to generate social 
network contacts. We identify network effects and the impact of social learning on adoption, 
using a selectivity control function in a discrete survival model. Our results reveal that social 
learning favors adoption, if past adopters with increased yields, or even more with profound 
knowledge of the cultivation techniques form part of the social network. We also find that 
social learning and the likelihood of adoption is higher when peers are central nodes, and 
particularly, when they belong to cohesive subgroups, but lower in highly segregated networks. 
The results shed a new light on the role of central agents, since highly cohesive neighborhoods 
seem to promote diffusion more in high modularity networks than central nodes. 
 
JEL codes: C31, C35, C41, D83, O13, O33 
 
Keywords: Benefits, Know-how, Social learning, Social network structures, Technology 
diffusion  
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3.1 Introduction 
Adoption of agricultural technologies is comparatively low in developing countries, with sub-
optimal adoption of these technologies by farmers, despite their potential benefits in improving 
productivity and agricultural performance (Magnan et al. 2015). Available evidence shows that 
improved crop varieties and other inputs have contributed between 40% to 100% increase in 
farm yields and profits, food security and poverty gains in sub-Saharan Africa. In spite of these 
noteworthy benefits, adoption levels of improved crop varieties in this region are comparatively 
low compared to the rest of the world (Suri 2011; Walker et al. 2011). Walker et al. (2014) 
estimate the mean level of adoption across 20 improved crop varieties at 35%, with two-thirds 
of these crops falling below this mean level. Understanding the way and rationale behind 
farmers’ adoption of these technologies is, therefore, important for economic policies meant to 
promote agricultural productivity and household welfare through improved technologies.      
 
Numerous studies have shown the significance of social interaction and learning in the 
agricultural technology adoption literature, although the results have been mixed, with some 
authors finding positive impacts of social learning on adoption (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; 
Munshi 2004; Bandiera and Rasul 2006; Conley and Udry 2010; Beaman et al. 2018), while a 
few find no effects (e.g., Duflo, Kremer and Robinson 2011). One possibility of enhancing the 
understanding of adoption in social interaction settings and, perhaps, resolving these 
contrasting results is to move beyond the implicit assumption that farmers observe the field 
trials of their neighbors with little friction in the flow of information (BenYishay and Mobarak 
2018) to examine the roles of both benefits and know-how as well as network structures in 
social learning, as these shape the learning process (Jackson et al. 2017; Nourani 2019).  
 
The literature provides a number of explanations on how adoption decisions of neighbors, 
heterogeneities cropping conditions and benefits (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Munshi 2004; 
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Conley and Udry 2010) influence social learning in technology adoption.  More recently, 
BenYishay and Mobarak (2018) and Beaman et al. (2018) considered the performance of 
targeting strategies within networks. Specifically, BenYishay and Mobarak (2018) showed that 
performance incentives and social identity of experimenting farmers are important, whereas 
Beaman et al. (2018) found that it is the targeting strategy that matters in social learning.  Less 
is, however, known about the role of know-how (i.e., production process) of the technology16 
in the social learning process and whether both benefits and/or know-how17 could play 
important roles in the learning process, given the technological context.  
 
Our study first explores the impact of know-how (i.e., knowledge on cultivating the crop) on 
adoption of agricultural technologies, and whether given the technology and the social and 
agronomic context, both benefits and knowledge among social network members matter in 
social learning. Examining the roles of benefits and know-how are important in learning 
because farmers decisions to invest in learning about a new technology, and whether to adopt 
or not to, depend on the expected benefits, and the associated learning and investment costs of 
the technology. When the learning and investment costs are higher than the expected benefits, 
farmers may not be inclined to learn and/or adopt the new technology (Beaman et al. 2018; 
Nourani, 2019).  Thus, learning about benefits (i.e., expected profitability) and know-how are 
important in understanding the diffusion process of new technologies18.   
                                                          
16 A notable exception is Beaman and Dillon (2018) who traced how knowledge is aggregated in a network based on the 
social distance of a node to a central node, but did not examine how differences in the knowledge accumulated by network 
members influences the decision of farmers in the adoption process.   
17 Existing studies have either found learning about benefits for ease-to-use (Magnan et al. 2015) or know-how for hard-
to-use (Oster and Thornton 2012) technologies.  
18 We conceptualize learning about the expected profitability as farmers’ beliefs about the benefits of the improved variety 
which is based on the shares of past adopters among their peers. That is, farmers’ beliefs about profitability vary with the share 
of adopting peers such that more adopting peers will stimulate beliefs that the expected benefit of the improved variety is high 
and vice versa.  Know-how is about farmers’ efforts to acquire knowledge about the production process, which involves cost 
in time and commitment that decrease with increased learning opportunities from peers and own experimentation. That is, 
learning opportunities (costs) about know-how increase (decrease) with increasing peer experience.    
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Furthermore, examining both benefits and know-how has context relevance for two reasons. 
First, the technology (improved soybean variety) we consider has been introduced mainly to 
enhance farmers’ incomes (MoFA 2017), but awareness and knowledge of farmers about the 
returns are limited (AGRA-SSTP 2017). Second, many farmers are not aware of the standard 
agronomic practices19 required for this variety in order to achieve the desired yields, which has 
usually resulted in sub-optimal productivity, profitability and weak diffusion of the technology 
(Goldsmith 2017). Existing evidence shows that the use of improved soybean seed is quite low, 
and ranges between 16% and 33% of soybean farmers in Ghana (Dogbe et al. 2013). In such 
setting, it is significant to highlight the differences in benefits and know-how regarding the 
application of the innovation by network contacts and their relative roles in the diffusion of the 
technology.  
 
Our discussion so far assumes homogenous network structures and hence similar conditions of 
learning across networks. However, social network structures play important roles in shaping 
the nature of interaction within networks and neighborhoods, and have been shown to exert 
overarching effects on many behavioral patterns and other economic outcomes (Jackson et al. 
2017). Many studies have argued that network structures, such as transitivity20 and modularity, 
play important roles in social interactions and influence patterns of behavior used as social 
collateral (Karlan et al. 2009; Jackson et al. 2012), risk sharing (Ambrus et al. 2014; Alatas et 
al. 2016), and diffusion processes (Bollobas 2001; Centola 2010; Jackson et al. 2017). 
Transitivity or local cohesiveness/clustering coefficient measures how close the neighborhood 
of a farmer is to being a complete network. Modularity measures the proportion of links that 
                                                          
19 These agronomic rules and regulations were spelt out by the inspectorate division of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
(MoFA), Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute (SARI). 
20 Assortativity is a related structure which refers to the level of interconnectivity between agents with similar individual 
or micro-scale network characteristics. We do not examine it in this study as it has been shown that high transitive networks 
display high assortativity and thus are quite correlated (Foster et al. 2011).  
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lie within communities (i.e., components or segments) of a network minus the expected value 
of the same quantity in a network where links were randomly generated (Jackson 2008). Higher 
transitivity of a farmer’s neighborhood, and low modularity of a network will mean more 
opportunities for the farmer to learn from peers and from different neighborhoods in the 
network. Such opportunities can lead to reduced cost of learning and increase the possibility of 
diffusion across the network. These two network characteristics are also very important for the 
understanding of, and in policy design to support learning in social networks (Girvan and 
Newman 2002).  
 
This implies that the diffusion rate of a new technology will be different across communities, 
if transitivity and modularity of the networks, which condition information externalities, vary 
across these communities. For instance, if network structures exhibit the tendency to be less 
transitive or highly modular, then there may be friction in the diffusion of information about 
benefits and know-how of the technology through the social network, thereby reinforcing 
differences in farmers’ response rates to the technology, even under uniform cultivation 
conditions and benefits. Hence, higher transitivity (lower modularity) implies the possibility of 
effective and efficient spread of information due to the increased number of alternative routes 
information can take through the network.  
 
In spite of the significance of these network structures, the empirical literature on social 
learning and technology diffusion has focused on the role of central agents, with very few 
studies providing evidence on the significance of transitivity and modularity. (Karlan et al. 
2009; Beaman et al. 2018). In particular, Karlan et al. (2009) show that multiplicity of routes 
associated with higher transitivity enhance the credibility of agents in a network, while Beaman 
et al. (2018) demonstrate that understanding of aspects of an innovation that are particularly 
difficult to learn requires several interactions among agents. 
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Our study relates to the existing literature on network characteristics, influence of central 
agents21, technology conditions and adoption (Jackson et al. 2012; Beaman and Dillon 2018; 
BenYishay and Mobarak 2018; Beaman, et al. 2018). However, the current study differs from 
these previous studies because it examines the impact of transitivity and network modularity, 
and how modularity influences the performance of other network characteristics such as 
centrality and transitivity in the diffusion process. This is particularly significant, because the 
effectiveness and efficiency of centrality in technology processes depend on the extent to which 
modularity and cohesiveness of the neighborhood (transitivity) will allow for it.  
 
Specifically, we use observational data from a recent survey of soybean farmers conducted in 
Ghana to show how learning about benefits, know-how and network structures drive adoption 
in a dynamic theoretical framework. We estimate the model with a two-step selectivity 
approach of network formation and survival analysis to account for correlated unobservables 
at the link formation level (Brock and Durlauf 2001), and to investigate the threats of 
measurement errors due to missing network data issues (Chandrasekhar and Lewis 2016). The 
estimation results suggest that both learning about benefits and know-how are important in 
accelerating adoption, although the effects of know-how are higher when sufficient peers adopt 
the improved variety in all specifications. We find the role of transitivity in the learning and 
diffusion processes to be stronger, compared to centrality, but modularity tends to slow down 
the diffusion process, and also limits the significance of both transitivity and centrality.   
 
These results have the following policy implications. First, it will inform policymakers about 
when to focus on promoting adoption, directly, through extension services, public learning 
and/or training workshops – especially when the share of adopters is low –, and when to focus 
                                                          
21 Few other studies such as Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) considered network architecture among village labor-sharing 
networks in explaining farm returns in Ethiopia, and Banerjee et al. (2013) focused on network centrality in microfinance.  
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on module bridging measure that indirectly promote adoption through increased interactions 
between adopters and non-adopters, as well as across segments of the village. Second, our 
findings on the relative importance of transitivity and centrality will help policymakers to 
identify when to leverage influential nodes (centrality) or the cohesiveness of the neighborhood 
(transitivity) in encouraging adoption under different complexities of the technology (Beaman 
et al. 2018) and in socially structured settings. Finally, an analysis of modularity will show 
whether specific biases and/or patterns exist in these villages in terms of social interactions and 
structures (Jackson 2008; Jackson et al. 2017), which will be relevant in informing policy 
intervention options. For example, the existence of such structures or biases in these villages, 
when failed to be considered in policy intervention, could result in policy impacts focusing on 
specific segments of the villages instead of the whole village.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the context and the data. 
Section 3.3 discusses the theoretical framework, showing the role of learning about expected 
profitability, know-how and network structures on speed of adoption. The empirical model and 
estimations are described in section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents the empirical results, whereas 
section 3.6 concludes.    
 
3.2 Context and data 
3.2.1 Context 
We now describe the context of the technology in question and the data used. Soybean is 
primarily a commercial crop mainly cultivated in the Northern, Upper East, Upper West and 
Volta regions of Ghana, by smallholder farmers and under rain-fed conditions, with Northern 
region alone producing 72% of the national output. The crop has very high local demand and 
potential of increasing farmers’ incomes in Ghana (MoFA 2017). The compounded annual 
growth in demand for the crop was recorded as 39% from 2008 to 2010, compared to 10.5% 
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and 6.3% for the other two legumes (cowpea and groundnut), respectively over the same period 
(AGRA-SSTP 2017). However, the average yield of 1.68MT/ha has been described as below 
the national achievable yields of 2.50 – 3.10MT/ha (CSIR-SARI 2013).  
 
Realizing this, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Savanna 
Agricultural Research Institute (SARI) developed and introduced the Jenguma variety, in 2003, 
for adoption by farmers in order to circumvent the problems associated with the existing 
traditional variety22. This improved variety has higher yield potential of over 2.0 MT/ha, 
resistant to pod-shattering, matures about 35 days earlier, and is resistant to other agricultural 
stress such as pests, diseases, low phosphorous soil and climatic variabilities (CSIR-SARI 
2013). Although the crop was introduced primarily as a commercial crop meant to increase 
smallholder farm profitability and incomes (MoFA 2017), there is lack of awareness and 
certainty among farmers about the expected yields, market outlets and returns on investments 
of this improved variety. This is due to limited investment in promotion events and lack of 
continued campaign to demonstrate returns and profitability of this variety (AGRA-SSTP 
2017).  
 
Added to this is that cultivation of the improved variety requires adherence to the rules and 
regulations of the inspectorate division of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) in 
order to achieve potential high yields of 2MT/ha, and to reduce labor cost by about 20% of 
total production cost. These requirements include planting depths, row-spacing, quantity of 
seeds and timing of sowing, inoculant and phosphorus application, as well as timing of 
harvesting and plant growth for effectiveness of other inputs and varietal suitability (Heatherly 
and Elmore 2004). The discussion suggests that both knowledge of benefits and of the 
                                                          
22 The traditional variety, Salintuya, has been described as low yielding (about 1.0 MT/ha), early shattering of pods and 
susceptible to disease and pests which sometimes lead to complete loss of the crop (Ampadu-Ameyaw et al. 2016). 
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production process are important, and therefore important for the analysis of their impact on 
the diffusion of the variety.  
 
3.2.2 Data 
We describe our data, before moving to a formal discussion of the theoretical and econometric 
aspects of social learning and social network structures. We conducted a survey of 500 farm 
households in Northern Ghana between July and September 2017. Five districts were 
purposively selected based on their intensity of soybean production23, and then 25 villages were 
randomly selected across these districts, with the allocation of villages done in proportion to 
the total households in each district. These villages are remote and small with less than 150 
households in each. Given this, we randomly selected 20 household heads in each village, and 
then used structured questionnaires to interview the primary decision makers in the households. 
In addition, a detailed discussion using an interview guide was administered in each village to 
a group of village leaders and/or representatives to obtain information on village 
characteristics. The study combines modules of household characteristics, social networks and 
agricultural production to construct pseudo-panel data for the analysis of timing of adoption of 
the improved soybean variety.   
 
Improved soybean adoption and household characteristics 
In order to collect data on the year of adoption of the improved soybean variety by households, 
we use a question that asked farmers to recall the year they adopted the improved variety. 
Responses to this recall question was used to construct the time to adoption variable, 𝐴𝑖𝑡, of a 
household.  Table 3.1, panel A shows the summary statistics of adoption of the improved 
variety by selected years, and depicts an increased adoption overtime since its introduction in 
2003. Only 4% of farmers had adopted the improved variety among the sampled farmers in the 
                                                          
23 This was done in consultation with the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Resilience in Northern Ghana (RING).   
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year of its introduction. By 2007, 28% of farmers had adopted. Adoption continued to increase 
from 2007, and by 2012 and 2016, 56% and 67% of farmers had adopted the improved variety, 
respectively. Whereas the percentage of adoption in 2012 is more than double that of the rate 
in 2007, the percentage of adoption in 2016 suggests a slowdown in uptake of the improved 
variety.  
 
Table 3.1. Variable definition, measurement and descriptive statistics 
Variables Definition and measurement Mean S.D. 
Panel A   
Dependent variable   
Adopted by     
2003 1 if the farmer adopted the improved variety in 2003; 0 censored 0.04 0.19 
2007 1 if the farmer adopted the improved variety by 2007; 0 censored 0.28 0.45 
2012 1 if the farmer adopted the improved variety by 2012; 0 censored 0.56 0.49 
2016 1 if the farmer adopted the improved variety by 2016; 0 censored 0.67 0.47 
    
Panel B: Control variables   
   
Time-varying   
Age in     
2003 Age of farmer in 2003 (years) 30.03 12.04 
2007 Age of farmer in 2007 (years) 35.03 12.04 
2012 Age of farmer in 2012 (years) 40.03 12.04 
2016 Age of farmer in 2016 (years) 43.03 12.04 
    
Time-invariant     
Gender 1 if male; 0 otherwise   0.59   0.49 
Education Number of years in school   1.27   3.27 
Experience Number of years in farming 13.06   4.02 
Household Household size (No. of members)   5.64   2.14 
Landholding Total land size of household (in hectares)   2.56   1.56 
Credit 1 if farmer was credit constrained and/or not successful in applying for 
credit; 0 otherwise 
  0.55   0.49 
Risk Risk of food insecurity (No. of months household was food inadequate)   0.93   1.37 
Extension 1 if ever had extension contact; 0 otherwise   0.34   0.47 
Association No. of associations a farmer is a member   1.07   1.27 
Price Soybean price in GHS/kg   1.06   0.19 
Soil quality 4=fertile; 3=moderately fertile; 2=less fertile; and 1=infertile   2.97   0.97 
    
Panel C    
Instruments    
G2Credit Proportion of peers of peers who are credit constrained   0.55   0.28 
G2Extension Proportion of peers of peers who ever had extension contact   0.35   0.28 
    
Notes: the table depicts the definition, measurement and descriptive statistics of farmers and households. Panel A shows 
the proportion of adopting farmers across selected year. Panel B shows that of time-varying and time-invariant characteristics 
of the sampled households whereas the descriptive statistics of instruments for the first-stage liquidity constraints and 
extensions regressions are in panel C. S. D. denotes Standard deviation. G denotes the network.  
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The analysis controls for a number of individual and household level variables that may affect 
a farmer’s decision to adopt the improved variety. Panel B of table 3.1 shows the definition, 
measurement and descriptive statistics of these observable characteristics of farmers. Age is 
the only time-varying characteristic of individual farmers, the summary statistics of which has 
been presented for selected years. The average farmer is 43 years in 2016, has 1.3 years of 
schooling, 13 years of farming experience and has an average household size and landholding 
of 6 members and 2.56 hectares, respectively. Majority of these farmers are males (59%) and 
are credit constrained (55%).  
 
Social networks 
We used random matching within sample, following Conley and Udry (2010), to generate the 
potential social network contacts. For each of the 20 household heads selected in a village, we 
randomly selected and assigned to him 5 household heads from the remaining 19 sampled 
households heads, as his24 potential social network contacts. Each farm household was asked 
whether they know any of the 5 households randomly assigned to them. On average, the 
respondents knew 3.14 of the households randomly assigned to them, and with an average 
standard deviation of 1.22 (Table 3.2). Conditional on knowing the assigned households, we 
elicited detailed information on their relationships, interactions and knowledge with the known 
randomly assigned households.  
Table 3.2. Network links by years known   
Number of network links Mean (%) SD 5-Pctile Median 95-pctile N 
   Known for <1-5 years 0.10 (0.03) 0.49 0 0 1 500 
   Known for 5-10 years 0.16 (0.05) 0.60 0 0 1 500 
   Known for 10-14 years 0.42 (13.4) 0.97 0 0 3 500 
   Known for 14+ years 2.46 (78.3) 1.56 0 4 5 500 
Total  3.14 1.22 0.5 4 5 500 
Notes: The table depicts the number of links by the number of years the relationship was formed. Known for <1-5 
years represents links that were formed within 1 to 5 years (i.e., nodes indicated they know their randomly assigned 
matches for 1 to 5 years). Known for 5-10 years represents links that were formed between 5 to 10 years, known for 10-
14 is for relationship formed between 10 to 14 years and known for 14+ years represents relationships that were formed 
for at least 14 years since 2016.  
                                                          
 24 We use the masculine gender because majority (59%) of the farmers in the sample are males. 
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In order to create time variation in the social network, we asked each responding household 
“How long have you known this person?”. Table 3.2 also shows the distribution of links across 
selected number of years respondents stated to have known their randomly assigned 
households. Of the 3.14 assigned households a farm household knows, 78% have been known 
by the farm household before 2003 (i.e., 14+ years, from 2002 to 2016), 13% have been known 
for 10 to 14 years and less than 1% have been known for less than 10 years. Given that the 
improved variety was introduced in 2003, this distribution of links across years suggests that 
most of these households knew each other prior to the introduction of the improved variety.  
     
We then construct farmers’ social network as a sociomatrix of each of the 25 village samples. 
We refer to each village as a group, 𝐺. Thus, the entries of this sociomatrix 𝑔𝑖𝑗 is one, if the 
farmer 𝑖 has stated he knows farmer 𝑗, and zero if otherwise. We define links as undirected 
such that 𝑖 is said to have a link with  𝑗 and vice versa, if any of them stated knowing the other. 
This yields a symmetric sociomatrix of the group 𝐺. We then use answers to the question of 
how long 𝑖 knows 𝑗 to construct time varying social networks from 2002 to 2015/16 (i.e., yearly 
sociomatrix for 14+ years to 1 or less year-old relationships), thus, making it possible for us to 
index the sociomatrix with a time subscript.  Using the sociomatrix, vectors of yearly binary 
adoption decisions, and the other control variables, we construct peer characteristics by 
multiplying the yearly vectors of adoption and other control variables by the sociomatrix of the 
respective years to obtain time-varying peer adoption, average peer experience and other 
contextual (peer) characteristics required for the analysis.  
 
Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics by selected years of peer adoption, average peer 
experience in farming the improved variety, and other peer characteristics. With only 3% of 
peers adopting the improved variety in 2003, the proportion of adopting peers of a farm 
household increased to 28% in 2007. By 2012, the proportion of adopting peers of a farm 
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household increased to 57%, and subsequently increased to 68% by 2016. Similarly, the 
average peer experience witnessed an increasing trend over time.  
 
Table 3.3. Contextual (peer) characteristics 
Time-varying variables Characteristics by year of network 
2003 2007 2012 2016 
     
A. Learning mechanism     
Average adopting peers 
 
0.03 
(0.11) 
0.28 
(0.33) 
0.57 
(0.39) 
0.68 
(0.40) 
Average peer experience  
 
0.17 
(0.45) 
0.99 
(1.41) 
2.30 
(1.84) 
2.79 
(1.87) 
B. Other peer characteristics     
Average peer age 
 
29.86 
(7.16) 
34.86 
(7.16) 
39.86 
(7.16) 
43.86 
(7.16) 
Average peer education 
 
1.59 
(2.47) 
1.59 
(2.34) 
1.58 
(2.29) 
1.58 
(2.24) 
Average peer household size 
 
5.74 
(1.50) 
5.72 
(1.42) 
5.73 
(1.39) 
5.74 
(1.38) 
Average peer landholding 
 
2.67 
(1.10) 
2.66 
(1.04) 
2.66 
(1.02) 
2.66 
(1.01) 
Average peer risk of food insecurity 
 
0.78 
(0.85) 
0.76 
(0.79) 
0.81 
(0.91) 
0.76 
(0.78) 
Average peer group associations 
 
1.18 
(0.91) 
1.19 
(0.85) 
1.20 
(0.84) 
1.21 
(0.83) 
Average peer soil quality 
 
2.97 
(0.68) 
2.99 
(0.65) 
2.99 
(0.65) 
2.99 
(0.65) 
Proportion of male peers 
 
0.66 
(0.33) 
0.65 
(0.32) 
0.65 
(0.31) 
0.64 
(0.30) 
Proportion of liquidity constraint peers 
 
0.49 
(0.35) 
0.49 
(0.33) 
0.49 
(0.32) 
0.49 
(0.32 
Proportion of peers with extension contact 
 
0.41 
(0.35) 
0.41 
(0.32) 
0.42 
(0.32) 
0.42 
(0.32) 
Notes: the table presents descriptive statistics of time-varying household variables in panel A, and that for peer 
characteristics constructed based on the networks defined using the number of years the agent indicated to have known 
the peer, in panel B. Columns 2003 to 2016 represent characteristics of households and peers as at the years 2003, 
2007, 2012 and 2016 (for the peer characteristics, these are based on the relationships that existed prior to 2003, i.e., J 
known for 14+ years; 2007 – J known for 10-14 years; 2012 – J known for 5-10 years; and 2016 – J known for <1-5 
years. Each of the contextual (peer) characteristic value was obtained by multiplying the respective variable by the D 
to obtain the value of an agents’ peer characteristics in respect of each of these variables. Values in parenthesis are 
standard deviations.  
 
We also constructed social network statistics at the individual level (i.e., degree, transitivity 
and eigenvector centrality)25 as the effects of these statistics on time-to-adoption are important 
in this study. Panel A of table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics of these across selected 
years. The average number of connections (degree) an individual has increases from 3, for the 
                                                          
25 See Appendix A for the calculation of these statistics. 
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14+ year length network, to about 4 persons, for the <1 to 5-year length network. Similarly, the 
average transitivity and eigenvector centrality both increase marginally, from 0.12 and 0.44, 
for the 14+ year network to 0.18 and 0.47, for the <1 to 5-year network, respectively.  
 
Table 3.4. Social network information  
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Panel A      
Degree       
  J known <1-5 years 3.708 1.868 1 12 500 
  J known 5-10 years 3.594 1.837 1 12 500 
  J known 10-14 years 3.437 1.804 1 12 500 
  J known 14+ years 3.118 1.755 1 11 500 
      
Local transitivity      
  J known <1-5 years 0.176 0.246 0 1 500 
  J known 5-10 years 0.178 0.251 0 1 500 
  J known 10-14 years 0.153 0.235 0 1 500 
  J known 14+ years 0.123 0.223 0 1 500 
      
Eigenvector centrality      
  J known <1-5 years 0.472 0.261 0 1 500 
  J known 5-10 years 0.473 0.267 0 1 500 
  J known 10-14 years 0.473 0.264 0 1 500 
  J known 14+ years 0.441 0.280 0 1 500 
      
Panel B      
Network modularity      
  J known <1-5 years 0.284 0.073 0.143 0.414 500 
  J known 5-10 years 0.293 0.079 0.173 0.424 500 
  J known 10-14 years 0.294 0.108 0 0.521 500 
  J known 14+ years 0.352 0.113 0.175 0.678 500 
Notes: the table presents descriptive statistics by the number of years a farm household (i.e., node) knows the 
respondent who was randomly matched to and known to him. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the 5 
respondents randomly assigned to, and known to the farm household, and the degree distribution for 4 networks which 
were constructed based on the number of years the farmer indicated to have known the contact. Specifically, J known 
<1-5 years implies i indicated knowing J for at least from 2012; J known 5-10 years implies i knows J since 2007 but 
not later than 2012; J known for 10-14 years represents i mentioned knowing J since 2003 but not late than 2007, and J 
known for 14+ years implies i mentioned knowing J since 2002 and earlier. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of 
two node level characteristics (i.e., local transitivity and eigenvector centrality), and one network level statistic (i.e., 
network modularity) by these 4 networks.  S.D. is standard deviation. Min is minimum and Max is maximum. N is 
observation. 
 
 
Of particular interest, in this study, is modularity which enables us measure the extent to which 
village networks are segregated into latent segments or communities. Suppose a given network 
is divided into two groups with 𝛲𝑖 =1 if node 𝑖 belongs to group 1 and 𝛲𝑖 = −1 if the node 
belongs to group 2. Let 𝑔𝑖𝑗 be the number of links between nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗, and denote the 
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expected number of links between nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗 if links were generated at random as 𝑑𝑖 𝑑𝑗 2𝑚⁄ , 
then the modularity of the network is calculated following (Newman 2006) as 
(1) 𝑀 =
1
4𝑚
∑ (𝑔𝑖𝑗 −
𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑗
2𝑚
) 𝛲𝑖𝛲𝑗𝑖𝑗  
where 𝑑𝑖 and 𝑑𝑗 are the degrees of the nodes and 𝑚 =
1
2
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑖  is the total number of links in the 
network. The statistic ranges from -1 to 1, where a measure of negative values mean segments 
are not isolated from others (i.e., integrated components). Positive values of modularity statistic 
mean strong segments (i.e., segmented components) and 0 means the components of the 
network are not capturing anything.  
 
Panel B of table 3.4 presents modularity statistic of the networks, also across selected years. 
For the 14+ year length network, the network (average) modularity is 0.35 and this consistently 
declines overtime to 0.28, for the <1 to 5-year network. These values suggest the presence of 
latent network structures in these networks, which appears to gradually weaken overtime. This 
is unsurprising because of the possibility of social structures to weaken overtime due to changes 
in demographics and development. The modularity of a network can condition the rate of 
diffusion of the improved technology, such that if the village network is highly segregated into 
components (i.e., high modularity), it can slow down diffusion at the village level.   
 
To show such a possibility, we present the summary statistics of the time-taken-to-adopt (i.e., 
adoption spell) and adoption decisions (i.e., failure or adopted) across terciles of modularity, 
for the network based on links known for 14+ years and <1 to 5 years, in table 3.5. The average 
time-taken-to-adopt increases from about 7 years for the bottom tercile to an average of about 
12 years for the top tercile of modularity, with the difference in average time-to-adoption being 
significantly higher for the middle and top terciles (p<0.05). Conversely, the proportion of 
adopters significantly decreases from 81% in the bottom tercile, for both networks, to about 
49% and 47% for the top terciles for the <1 to 5 and 14+ years networks, respectively. These 
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changes show the possible role of network structures in affecting diffusion of the improved 
variety in these networks. Please refer to table 3.B2 in Appendix B for the sampled networks 
(column 1) across quintiles of modularity.     
 
Table 3.5. Adoption spell and adoption by modularity distribution 
 By tercile of modularity distribution 
 (1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1)   (4) (5) = (4) – (2) 
 1st 2nd Difference 3rd Difference 
Adoption spell      
   J known <1-5 years 7.31 
(0.35) 
8.71 
(0.35) 
   1.39** 
  (0.49) 
11.51 
(0.35) 
   2.81*** 
  (0.43) 
   J known 14+ years 7.25 
(0.34) 
8.78 
(0.35) 
   1.53*** 
  (0.49) 
11.51 
(0.27) 
   2.73*** 
  (0.44) 
      
Failure (adopted)      
   J known <1-5 years 0.81 
(0.03) 
0.70 
(0.04) 
   0.11** 
  (0.05) 
0.49 
(0.04) 
   0.21*** 
  (0.05) 
   J known 14+ years 0.81 
(0.03) 
0.70 
(0.04) 
   0.11** 
  (0.05) 
0.47 
(0.04) 
   0.23*** 
  (0.05) 
N 180 160  160  
Notes: Table shows the adoption spell (i.e., the time taken to adopt) and failure (i.e., whether adopted) by tercile of 
modularity distribution. These were reported for networks that were defined based on relationships formed before the 
introduction of the improved variety (i.e., the node indicated to have known the match, 𝑗 ∈  𝐽, for 14+ years) and the network 
of relationships that were formed within the past 5 years to 2016 (i.e., the node indicated to have known the match, , 𝑗 ∈  𝐽, 
for <1-5 years). Column (1) reports these for the first tercile of modularity, column (2) reports for the second tercile and column 
(4) reports that of the third tercile. Columns (3) and (5) shows the differences between the first and second terciles and the 
second and third terciles, respectively. Values in parenthesis are standard errors. *, ** and *** are significant at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively 
 
3.3 Theoretical framework 
Using the target input model outlined in Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Bandiera and Rasul 
(2006), we develop a model of how farmers learn about new technologies from their social 
network members. Our model extends this framework by taking account of the drivers of social 
learning in the form of benefits, know-how, and the topological characteristics of the social 
network structure. For the theoretical as well as the empirical models, we do not only consider 
that farmers learn from those they have direct social links with (i.e., neighbors), but also the 
cohesiveness of their neighborhood, the level of segregation of the community and the farmer’s 
importance within the social network.  
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3.3.1 Updating profitability belief 
The model assumes each farmer i  knows the yield TV
iQ of the traditional variety cultivated on 
an acre of his land. The average yield of the improved variety IV
iQ  is not known. Thus, farmer 
i  forms beliefs about the profitability of the improved variety 𝑄𝑖
𝐼𝑉(𝒷) to guide his decision to 
learn or not. Farmers’ beliefs are within the range of 𝒷 ∈ [𝒷, 𝒷], with 0< 𝑄𝑖
𝐼𝑉(𝒷) < 𝑄𝑖
𝐼𝑉 <
𝑄𝑖
𝐼𝑉(𝒷).  
 
We delineate social learning process in two stages (Nourani 2019).26 In the first-stage, farmers 
are interested in knowing whether the expected yield potential of the improved variety is higher 
than the expected yield of the traditional variety cultivated on his land. We specify the first-
stage of the social learning process as a DeGroot updating process (DeGroot 1974), where we 
assume that the beliefs of the yield are based on the yield potential, i.e., the yields obtained 
with excellent production know-how. Since the formation of beliefs about the average yield of 
the improved variety is seen as a filter before realizing more intensive social learning based on 
Bayesian updating, it is desirable that this stage of the learning process is computationally 
simple and immediate. Moreover, DeGroot-updating allows for agents’ beliefs not converging 
to the same belief. Instead, groups of agents may reach different consensuses. The occurrence 
of different consensuses seem plausible in the case of farmers, since groups of farmers have 
context specific conditions, such as agronomic or farmer specific characteristics like, soil 
quality, exposition of the land, microclimate, agronomic experience or education. 
 
Communication with other farmers provides farmer i  information about other farmers’ beliefs. 
Farmer i  weights this information according to the reliability or trust he puts on farmer j . Let 
                                                          
26 Nourani (2019) links each stage of the two-stage learning process with a different type of agents. In our theoretical 
model each stage is based on all social ties of each agent. However, in the first-stage agents learn about the yield potential and 
in the second-stage about the know-how. 
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B  be an 𝑁 × 𝑁 interaction matrix between agents, where entries 𝑏𝑖𝑗 indicate the relative weight 
or trust farmer i  puts on farmer j  in comparison with all other farmers ,k k j , he relates to. 
As the weight is relative, the entries of each row of the matrix, 𝐵 sum up to one when 
normalized. The farmers’ initial beliefs at time 0 are exogenous and denoted by 𝒷𝑖0 for farmer 
i  . DeGroot updating from time period 1t   to period t  is given by the following rule 𝒷𝑖𝑡 =
∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 𝒷𝑗𝑡−1. Based on the updated value of 𝒷𝑖𝑡, farmer i  decides to learn about the 
cultivation technique, once his beliefs 𝒷𝑖𝑡 are higher than a given threshold. It can be given, 
for instance by the yield of the traditional variety, i.e., 𝑄𝑖
𝐼𝑉(𝒷) > 𝑄𝑖
𝑇𝑉.  
 
3.3.2 Learning about the production process 
Farmers can improve their initially rudimentary knowledge about the cultivation of the 
improved variety by learning from farmers that have adopted in the past and by their own 
experience once they have adopted. We assume that farmers use Bayesian updating to improve 
their knowledge about the cultivation technique. To keep the model simple, we do not consider 
institutional or public learning and focus on the effect of social learning. Furthermore, we 
assume that the price of output is normalized to one, inputs are costless and all farmers own 
the same size of land that is entirely cultivated to either the traditional or the improved variety. 
The agricultural production of farmer i  at time t  is a function of the applied input itI  . Farmers 
know the underlying production function of the improved variety up to a random optimal or 
“target” use of the applied input I . The yield of the improved variety ˆ
IV
itQ , declines in the 
square of the deviation of actual applied input itI  and the uncertain target 
ˆ
it . By observing the 
obtained yields of the improved variety and the applied input, the farmer learns about optimal 
target by his own and other farmers’ experiences. The observed yield of the improved variety 
ˆ IV
itQ is expressed as 
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 (2) ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝑉 = 𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝑉 − [𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝜃𝑖𝑡]
2
, 
where *ˆ
it itu   . The term  
*  represents the mean optimal effective input and itu  is the 
transitory random shocks that are i.i.d. with  20, uN  . At time t , farmers are assumed to be 
informed about 2
u  and to have prior beliefs about 
*  that are distributed as  * 2,it itN   . In 
each period, farmers learn about the systematic part of the target by observing input and yield 
from their own trial and/or from their social network members. This information allows farmers 
to update their prior 
*
t , and infer the systematic component of ̂ . This results in a posterior 
belief about the variance over 
*  as 
 (3) 𝜎𝜃𝑖𝑡
2 =
1
𝜋0+𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑡−1+𝜋𝑝𝐻 (𝐶𝑖𝑡−1,𝜆𝑖,𝜏𝑖,𝑀)
 ,   
 
where 
0
2
0 1/ i   is the precision of the farmer’s initial priors about the true value of 𝜃
∗, 
21/p u  , is the precision of the information produced by farmer i ’s own trial or by his peers’ 
trials, 1itp   is an indicator of i ’s cumulative information of his own trial up to time 1t  , and 
 H  represents the cumulative information farmer i ´s has obtained from his peers in the past 
up to time 1t  . The information gathered in the term 
, 1i tC  is based on the share of peer adopters 
in farmer i ´s neighborhood, 𝐴𝑗𝑡−1, farmer i ´s neighbors’ input 1jtI   and the yields 1
IV
jtQ   of the 
improved variety of farmer i ´s neighbors at time 𝑡. Thus, it is given by the function 
𝐶𝑖𝑡−1(𝐴𝑗𝑡−1, 𝐼𝑗𝑡−1𝑄𝑗𝑡−1
𝐼𝑉 ) ≥ 0.  
 
The term i denotes the centrality of farmers, which accounts for farmer i ’s immediate 
learning possibilities from farmers who are directly connected to him, as well as learning from 
well-connected neighbors (walks of length one). A high score means that a farmer is connected 
to many farmers or to farmers who themselves have high scores. If the number of walks tend 
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to infinity, i  stands for eigenvector centrality.
27 Farmers learn from others as they receive 
information about input and yield. However, farmers may give more or less credibility to the 
information, depending on the strength of the social ties between farmer i  and farmer j . 
Although the strength of social ties cannot be measured directly, it can be assumed to be 
stronger if the neighborhood is tied together by mutual friendships, or shared responsibilities. 
As a proxy for the strength of social ties, we consider the cohesiveness of the neighborhood 
(i.e., farmer i ’s neighbors are also connected among each other). Thus, the more cohesive 
farmer i ´s neighborhood is, the more credible is the information that flows to farmer i . The 
local cohesiveness of farmer i ’s neighborhood is denoted by i , with [0,1]i   in equation (3), 
see Appendix A for a precise definition of these network statistics and their corresponding 
metrics.  
 
Another influential factor for social learning, and central to this study, is the strength of 
segregation of a network into modules (modularity) that is denoted by M . In a highly 
segregated community, farmers obtain information from their neighbors, but there is no or only 
weak flow of information between the segregated modules. Thus, farmers are more likely to 
learn only from others if adopters form part of their module, while their chances of learning 
are slim if adopters do not form part of their module. Also, the strength of modularity affects 
the structure of the neighborhood of all agents, such that the centrality and cohesiveness are 
lower for agents who are not located in the central parts of the module relative to that of agents 
at the center of the module. The unbalanced distribution of these topological characteristics 
due to modularity can shape the nature of information diffusion and social learning. Thus, the 
overall quantity and quality of information gathered from other farmers, together with the effect 
                                                          
27 Paths are possible connections between agents of any length where no agent is visited more than once. Walks are 
also connections but agents and links can be visited/traversed multiple times. 
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of local cohesiveness, eigenvector centrality and modularity are given by the function 
 1 0, , ,i iitH MC    . The function H  recognizes that the social network related variables 
1, , ,i ijtA M  are interdependent. For instance, an increase in the degree or modularity changes 
the strength of local cohesiveness, the eigenvector centrality and the share of adopters. For this 
reason, one should think of H as a composite function where the inner function reflects the 
interdependencies between the social network variables in a form of a system of equations, and 
the outer function as the quantity and quality of the information the social network variables 
together with 𝐼𝑗𝑡−1and 𝑄𝑗𝑡−1
𝐼𝑉  provide.   
 
To maximize expected output, farmer 𝑖 applies inputs at the expected optimal level, such that 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡(𝜃𝑖𝑡) = 𝜃𝑡
∗, given 𝐸𝑡(𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0. Following equations (2) and (3), and the expected 
optimal level of input application, we express the conditional expected output function as 
 (4) 𝐸𝑡?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝑉[ 𝐻(𝐶𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜆𝑖, 𝜏𝑖, 𝑀)] = 𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝑉 −
1
𝜋0+𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑡−1+𝜋𝑝𝐻 (𝐶𝑖𝑡−1,𝜆𝑖,𝜏𝑖,𝑀)
− 𝜎𝑢
2  
which implies that the expected output increases as the uncertainty of the farmer’s beliefs on 
the optimal target and the variance of the transitory random shocks decreases.  
 
3.3.3 Adoption decision 
We assume farmers have access to improved variety and a riskless traditional variety with 
output TV
iQ , such that adoption, 1itA  , if a farmer adopts the new crop variety at time t , and 
0itA   otherwise. Following equation (4), we express the value of output flow to farmer 𝑖 from 
time t  to 1t   as 
𝑉𝑡[𝑝𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐻(𝐶𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜆𝑖, 𝜏𝑖, 𝑀)] 
(5) = max
𝐴𝑖𝑡∈{0,1}
(1 − 𝐴𝑖𝑡)𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑌 + 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐸𝑡?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝑉[𝑝𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐻(𝐶𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜆𝑖, 𝜏𝑖 , 𝑀)] 
              + 𝑟𝑉𝑡+1[{(1 − 𝐴𝑖𝑡)𝑝𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡}, 𝐻(𝐶𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜆𝑖 , 𝜏𝑖, 𝑀)]  
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where r  is the farmer’s discount rate.28 The farmer adopts the new crop variety at time t , if  
 (6) 𝐸𝑡{?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝑉[𝑝𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐻(𝐶𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜆𝑖, 𝜏𝑖 , 𝑀)] + 𝑟𝑉𝑡+1[𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝐻(𝐶𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜆𝑖 , 𝜏𝑖, 𝑀)]} 
                                                                ≥ 𝐸𝑡{𝑄𝑖
𝑇𝑌 + 𝑟𝑉𝑡+1[𝑝𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐻(𝐶𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜆𝑖, 𝜏𝑖, 𝑀)]}    .  
 
Thus, farmer 'i s adoption decision at time t  depends on the information obtained from his 
neighbors and the change in net value of output from adopting at time t  with respect to his 
neighbors experiences, 𝐶𝑖𝑡−1, and other social network related information 𝐴𝑗𝑡−1, 𝜆𝑖, 𝜏𝑖 and 𝑀. 
Let these five variables form a set denoted by S , with each element denoted by vS , where 
𝑣 =1,2,…,5. With respect to an increase in a farmer- or social network-related variable vS , the 
derivative of expected stream of net benefits at time t  is given by: 
 
            [
𝜕𝐸𝑡?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝑉[𝑝𝑖𝑡−1,𝐻(𝐶𝑖𝑡−1,𝜆𝑖,𝜏𝑖,𝑀)]
𝜕𝐻
+ 𝑟
𝜕𝐸𝑡{𝑉𝑡+1[𝑝𝑖𝑡,𝐻(𝐶𝑖𝑡−1,𝜆𝑖,𝜏𝑖,𝑀)]−𝑉𝑡+1[𝑝𝑖𝑡−1,𝐻(𝐶𝑖𝑡−1,𝜆𝑖,𝜏𝑖,𝑀)]}
𝜕𝐻
]
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑆𝑣
 
(7)       = [
1
[𝜋0+𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑡+𝜋𝑝𝐻 (𝐶𝑖𝑡−1,𝜆𝑖,𝜏𝑖,𝑀)]
2     
 +𝑟 ∑ 𝑟𝑢𝑇𝑢=1 {
1
[𝜋0+𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑡+𝜋𝑝𝐻 (𝐶𝑖𝑡−1,𝜆𝑖,𝜏𝑖,𝑀)]
2 −
1
[𝜋0+𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑡−1+𝜋𝑝𝐻 (𝐶𝑖𝑡−1,𝜆𝑖,𝜏𝑖,𝑀)]
2}]
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑆𝑣
⋚ 0 
 
where the first terms on both sides of the equation indicate the increase in current benefits 
resulting from more information,  ˆ 0IVt ítE Q H   , conditional on adoption of the improved 
variety.29 This indicates the learning externality, as farmer i  obtains more and better 
information about cultivating the improved variety. The sign of the learning externality is 
positive and favors adoption. The second term, enclosed in curly brackets, represents the 
difference in the future stream of discounted benefits, between adoption and non-adoption at 
                                                          
28 For instance, if we consider the initial moment of time where 0t  , the values of  1tp   and tp  are given by 0 and 1, 
respectively. 
29 If the improved variety were not adopted the current benefits would not change as a result of more information. 
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time t . Given that 1
1 1
T T
u u
u u
p p 
 
  , the sign of the sum is negative, suggesting that additional 
information from farmer i ´s own trials is less valuable than the additional information obtained 
from the farmer’s neighbors. Thus, farmer 𝑖 may strategically delay adoption to make use of the 
additional and more precise information obtained from his peer adopters. Thus, the sign of 
strategic delay is negative and tends to delay adoption. The overall effect of more and better 
information about the cultivation of the improved variety depends on the magnitude of these 
two effects and the sign of vSH  . The latter derivative indicates the marginal effect of 
farmer-related and social network-related variables on the quantity and quality of information 
received by farmer i  from neighbor j .    
 
It is expected that  decrease in modularity, and an increase in local cohesiveness i , the 
centrality of farmer i  in the social network, i , the share of past adopting peers, 𝐴𝑗𝑡−1, and the 
peers’ experiences about their input and output lead to more and better information about the 
improved variety, i.e.,  0vH S   . Since the learning externality is always positive and 
strategic delay is always negative, the change in the magnitude of these two effects as a result 
of more and better information tends to determine whether the farmer adopts or delays 
adoption. Although strategic delay is always negative, the difference between the terms in curly 
brackets decreases, if the value of H  increases and becomes dominant in both denominators. 
Thus, the sum of all terms in equation (7) tends to change sign from negative to positive as H  
increases and adoption takes place. However, if  0vH S   , the opposite result is obtained, 
whereby adoption is delayed.  
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Hypothesis 1: When the belief about expected profitability of the improved variety is lower 
than a given threshold, higher learning opportunities from experienced peers do not 
significantly increase the likelihood of adopting the improved variety.   
 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of adoption is low with increased modularity of the social 
network, but the influence of modularity on learning from peers for adoption is weaker, if social 
learning is among direct peers or within modules. 
 
Hypothesis 3: When increased local cohesiveness and centrality lead to more opportunities 
for learning and adoption, lower modularity is more likely to increase the likelihood of 
adoption than higher modularity.    
 
The theoretical model describes the signs of the effects of the driving forces on adoption, but 
does not offer insights about the strength of the effects. In the next section, we employ 
observational data to examine the magnitude of the influence of these unknowns.   
 
3.4. Empirical specification and estimation 
3.4.1 Empirical specification   
Our theoretical framework shows that the time at which a farmer adopts the new technology 
relates to the past adoption decisions of peers, information from past peer experiences, and the 
structure and characteristics of the social network. Based on the notation used in the theoretical 
framework, we specify our empirical model, by assuming a lag transmission of social network 
effects (Manski 1993) as: 
(8) 𝑃𝑟[𝑇 = 𝑡|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡, 𝐺, 𝐴0 … 𝐴𝑡 , 𝐶0 … 𝐶𝑡, 𝑋𝑡] 
       = 𝜌𝐺𝑡𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝐺𝑡𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑡𝐷𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡
′𝛾1 + 𝑋𝑡
′𝐺𝑡𝛾2 + 𝜄𝑡𝐺 + 𝑡, 
where 𝑇 is a random variable that denotes the time of adoption of the improved variety, 𝐺𝑡 is a 
normalized social network matrix, and 𝐺𝑡𝐴𝑡−1 is the share of past adopting peers. Given that 
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adoption decisions are based on the net expected returns from adoption, as discussed in the 
theoretical framework, it follows that changes in peer adoption decisions will inform the farmer 
about the profitability of the improved variety. Thus, 𝜌 shows the effect of the association 
between share of past peer adoption decisions, which indicates profitability signal, and the 
conditional probability of adoption at any given time. 𝐶𝑡 is farmers’ experience in cultivating 
the improved variety, 𝐺𝑡𝐶𝑡 is the average peer experience in the cultivation of the variety and 
𝛼 is the association between peer experience (i.e., learning about production process) and the 
conditional probability of adoption at time 𝑡. 𝐷𝑡 is a vector of farmer level network statistics 
[i.e., transitivity (𝜏𝑡) and centrality measures (𝜆𝑡)], 𝐺𝑡𝐷𝑡 is the farmer’s average peer network 
statistics, 𝑀𝑡 is the modularity of the network, and 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 are vectors of parameters to 
be estimated, while 𝑡 is the error term. 
 
Our specification of the effects of peer adoption decisions differs from the “traditional” 
endogenous peer effect as in Manski (1993). Specifically, we define this effect based on 
previous peer adoptions, and not contemporaneous adoptions. This simplifies the econometric 
framework because of the reflection problem. It also enhances identification, since farmers 
react to their peers’ adoption decisions only when observed (i.e., timing between own decision 
and peer decisions).  However, two critical concerns that arise are the contextual and correlated 
effects. Contextual effects refer to similarities in exogenous characteristics among peers, which 
can cause behaviors to correlate through such peer exogenous characteristics, and not due to 
peer behavior. We control for contextual effects with individual and peer characteristics (i.e., 
𝑋𝑡
′ and 𝑋𝑡
′𝐺𝑡, respectively), and the associated parameters to be estimated as 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 in 
equation (8).     
 
Next is the possibility of unobservables at the network and individual levels to drive 
correlations in individual adoption decisions (i.e., correlated effects) and cause identification 
 
114 
 
problems by confounding the peer effects estimates (Manski 1993; Moffitt 2001; Blume et al. 
2011). These are represented with the vector 𝜄𝑡𝐺  in equation (8), which consists of time, village 
and environmental factors (i.e., correlated effects) that affect adoption. Available approaches 
for accounting for these unobservables in the literature, given our setting, include, the use of a 
(i) standard instrumental variable approach, (ii) network fixed-effects to account for potential 
network-specific unobserved factors (Lee 2007; Liu and Lee 2010),30 and (iii) the control 
function for accounting for self-selection within social interactions (Goldsmith-Pinkham and 
Imbens 2013; Hsieh and Lee 2016). 
 
Our approach to accounting for correlated unobservable basically involve the last two: First, 
we decompose 𝜄𝑡𝐺  into time, 𝛿𝑡, and network, 𝓋𝐺 , effects and control for both in our 
specifications. The second approach (i.e., (iii) above) involves a first-stage model of network 
formation, given that link formation is a phenomenon of choice, determined by observed and 
unobserved agents’ characteristics. The estimated unobserved determinants of link formation, 
defined as ?̂?𝑡, at the first-stage, are retrieved and inserted into a second-stage adoption decision 
model to account for endogeneity of the network effect. This is similar in spirit to the Heckman 
(1979) sample selection approach and the Brock and Durlauf (2001; 2006) generalized 
multinomial control function for self-selection corrections with social interactions. Another 
merit of the use of this approach is that it allows us account for concerns of measurement errors 
due to the use of sampled networks (Chandrasekhar and Lewis 2016), as well as provides a 
natural source of instruments for identifying the social interaction effects (Brock and Durlauf 
2001) in order to obtain consistent estimates.  
 
  
                                                          
30 See Horrace et al. (2016) and Hsieh and Lee (2016) for discussion of these approaches. 
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3.4.2 Empirical estimation  
Our interest is in examining the network effects on the conditional probability of adopting 
improved soybean variety at time 𝑡 given that the farmer has not adopted until this time. Given 
that adoption of the technology in question were observed on annual basis, where observed 
durations are clustered at mass points, we model our duration to adoption in a discrete-time 
method to account for the banded nature of the survival time. Also, discrete-time methods do 
not impose functional form restriction on the time effects (allowing for specific time fixed 
effects to be captured) compared to the continuous time proportional hazard models, and make 
it possible to account for time-varying covariates (Jenkins 2005). 
 
If we define 𝑛 as the total number of farmers (𝑖 = 1,2,3, …) observed until time 𝑡𝑖, at which 
point the farmer either adopts the improved variety (i.e., uncensored) or do not adopt (i.e., 
censored). In this study, the entrance date is 2003 which is the year in which the improved 
variety was introduced (i.e., 𝑡 = 1). The exit date of the spell for the farmers who adopt the 
improved variety is the year of adoption, and farmers who have not adopted at the 2016 farming 
season are right-censored, because the data was collected on farmers’ agricultural production 
in the 2016 farming season. If we define 𝑿𝑖𝑡 as a vector of explanatory variables and 𝓑 as the 
associated vector of parameters in equation (8), we express the discrete-time hazard rate as 
 (9) 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟[𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡|𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡, 𝑿𝑖𝑡]  
where 𝑇 is the discrete random variable representing the adoption time of the farmer31. In order 
to express the dependence of the hazard rate on time and the explanatory variables, we use the 
complementary log-log link function which is not sensitive to the length of the time intervals, 
compared to the logistic regression function (Allison 1982). The complementary log-log 
                                                          
31 This also represents the conditional probability of adoption at time 𝑡, given that the farmer has not adopted until this time. 
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function assumes the data generating process is based on the continuous-time proportional 
hazard model and is express as   
 (10) 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1 −exp[−exp(𝓑
′𝑿𝑖𝑡)]. 
Equation (10) represents the discrete-time proportional hazard model. We estimate the hazard 
model by maximizing the likelihood of the function. Given that some of the observations are 
censored, we express the likelihood function of the data generation process as  
 (11) 𝐿 = ∏ [Pr (𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖)]
𝑎𝑖[Pr (𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡𝑖)]
1−𝑎𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1    
where 𝐿 is the likelihood of function, and 𝑎𝑖 is set equal to 1 if 𝑖 is uncensored and zero 
otherwise. Expressing each of the probabilities in equation (11) as a function of the hazard rate 
and taking the logarithm of this deliver the log-likelihood function as 
 (12) log 𝐿 = ∑ ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑖
𝑠=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 log[𝐴𝑖𝑠/(1 − 𝐴𝑖𝑠)] + ∑ ∑ log (1 − 𝐴𝑖𝑠)
𝑡𝑖
𝑠=1
𝑛
𝑖=1  
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if farmer 𝑖 adopted the improved variety at time 𝑡, 
and zero otherwise32. Each discrete-time unit for a farmer is treated as a separate observation, 
and the dependent variable is coded 1 if the farmer adopted the improved variety in that time 
unit and zero otherwise. The farmer contributes to the computation of 𝐴𝑖𝑠, if he adopts the 
improved variety at time 𝑡𝑖, and (1 − 𝐴𝑖𝑠) for the period before 𝑡𝑖. If the farmer does not adopt 
(i.e., censored) by the 2016 cropping season, he only takes part in the computation of the term 
second term of the right-hand size.  
 
Following the discussion of the identification of the peer effects and the hazard model, equation 
(8) can now be specified as:  
𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝜌𝐺𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝐺𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡  
        (13)         + 𝜌𝛼𝐺𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝐺𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑀𝐺𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛼𝑀𝐺𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑡 × 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽𝑀𝐺𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡 × 𝑀𝑡 
                             + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐺𝑡𝛾2 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝓋𝐺 + ?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, 
                                                          
32 See Allison (1982) for the steps required to arrive at the log-likelihood function.  
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where 𝜌 and 𝛼 represent the effects of learning about profitability and know-how, respectively; 
𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 show the effects of network characteristics; 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 represent contextual effects; 
𝛿𝑡, 𝓋𝐺  and ?̂?𝑖𝑡 account for correlated effects. The parameter 𝛿𝑡 is a flexible baseline hazard 
which indicates the pattern of duration dependence in the diffusion process over time, and is 
used to account for time fixed effects. The parameter 𝓋𝐺  accounts for network level effects that 
might drive peers’ behavior to be correlated. ?̂?𝑖𝑡 is a vector of predicted residuals of the link 
formation model used to account for unobserved factors that affect network formation at the 
farmer level (refer to Appendix B for discussion and estimation of the network-formation 
model).  
 
To examine the relationship between learning about profitability, know-how, and network 
statistics, the second row of equation (13) shows the interactions among these variables. In 
particular 𝜌𝛼 denotes the interaction effects of past adopting, 𝐺𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡−1, and experienced peers, 
𝐺𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑡. 𝜌𝑀 and 𝛼𝑀 show the effects of past adopting, 𝐺𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡−1, and experienced peers, 𝐺𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑡, 
conditioned on modularity of the network, 𝑀𝑡, respectively. 𝛽𝑀 represents the effect of farmer 
level network statistics, 𝐺𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡, (i.e., local transitivity, degree and eigenvector centrality), 
conditioned on modularity of the network, 𝑀𝑡, and the rest are as defined in equation (8).  
 
3.5 Empirical results and discussions 
This section presents and discusses the results of our empirical estimates. Table 3.6 presents 
the unconditional hazard ratio estimates of peer adoption, peer experience and network 
statistics on adoption, whereas table 3.7 presents the hazard ratio estimates of these conditioned 
on modularity of the social network.  
 
We first consider the unconditional hazard ratios of past peer adoption of the improved variety 
on adoption in columns (1, 3, 5 and 7) with degree centrality, and in columns (2, 4, 6 and 8) 
with eigenvector centrality, in table 3.6. Columns (1-4), present a restricted specification, 
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which does not control for contextual peer effects. Columns (5-8) control for peer contextual 
effects, 𝛾2, (refer to Appendix C table 3.C1 for estimates of the controls). There is little 
difference in the hazard ratios of peer adoption, peer experience and network statistics in any 
given year, when we estimate with and without the contextual peer effects. This suggests that 
adoption of the improved variety is unlikely to be due to the observable contextual peer 
characteristics. Columns (5-8) of table 3.C1 in the appendix show that the residuals, ?̂?𝑡 , of the 
network formation model are jointly statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating the 
significance of controlling for the unobservable factors that affect link formation at the farm 
household level. The baseline hazard33 estimates reveal that the rates of adoption increase 
overtime and peak in years 9 and 10 bin, and then begins to slowdown afterwards (see 
Appendix C, tables 3.C1 and 3.C2). The coefficients of the time effect dummies together show 
increasing and positive duration dependence in the adoption process. This is not surprising, 
because one will expect the adoption conditions to improve overtime, as the aggregate 
experience with the improved variety at the village level makes learning from others more 
effective.                 
 
3.5.1 Peer adoption decisions, experiences and diffusion  
We now focus on the unrestricted model in columns (5-8) in table 3.6 in discussing social 
network effects on the speed of adoption. The estimates reveal a positive and significant effect 
of past share of adopting peers on the conditional probability of adoption across all 
specifications. In fact, a percentage increase in adopting peers is associated with about 135 
percent higher hazard rate. Similarly, the coefficient estimates of peer experience indicate that 
those with more experienced peers with the improved variety have higher hazard rates. 
                                                          
33 A challenge with the time dummies in our application is that some of the year bins have very few incidences of adoption, 
which drops out during estimation. This means that using year specific time effects can lead to loss of important information 
required to estimate the network effects. To circumvent this situation, we select same-length of time bins (i.e., two-year-long 
periods) which allows for at least enough incidence of adoption for each of the time bins.    
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Specifically, a year increase in average peer experience with the improved variety is associated 
with about 84 percent higher hazard rate. Thus, signals from increased peer adoption decisions 
and experienced peers tend to increase learning opportunities and decrease learning costs, 
which consequently can speed up adoption of the improved variety (Beaman et al. 2018). 
 
We also present the distribution of marginal effects of estimates of the main specification in 
column (5) in Figure 3.1. These estimates reveal that a 20 percent standard deviation increase 
in adopting peers is associated with a 10 percentage points increase in the conditional 
probability of adoption in any given year. Similarly, a 20 percent (which translated into 1.4 
years) standard deviation increase in average peer experience is associated with about 9 
percentage points increase in the probability of adoption in any given year.  
 
The effects of peer experience with the improved variety on the conditional probability of 
adoption is lower than the effects of share of adopting peers, when the share of past adopting 
peers is below 25 percent. However, the effects of peer experience become higher and remains 
so with increasing peer experience in the cultivation of the improved variety, when more than 
30 percent of peers have adopted the improved variety. This is expected because the higher 
efforts required in learning about the production process will make farmers expect a certain 
level of peer adoption in order to increase learning opportunities, as indicated in the theoretical 
framework. Past studies found evidence of either learning about hard-to-use (Oster and 
Thornton 2012), or easy-to-use technologies in conditions of visible benefits (Magnan et al. 
2015). A possible implication of our finding is that network effects could drive both learning 
about benefits and application (use) of a technology that is relatively hard-to-apply, and with 
visible expected benefits that can be inferred from peer decisions, albeit the precise 
mechanisms cannot be determined with the data.
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Table 3.6. Estimates of Social learning and farmers’ adoption 
Notes: Random-effects complementary log-log estimation. Models 1-4 do not include average peer characteristics (i.e., contextual effects). Models 5-8 include these average peer characteristics 
(their coefficients and that of other controls are presented in appendix table 3.C1). Correlated effects include time fixed-effects, 𝛿𝑡, link formation residuals, ?̂?𝑡, and standard errors clustered at 
the village (i.e., network) level, in order to account for village factors that might drive peer behaviors to be correlated, 𝓋𝐺 [we did not use village dummies because of the need to avoid the 
incidental parameter problem (Lee et al., 2010) by having to include 25 village dummies, and also the fact that modularity is calculated for the entire network/village]. The asterisks ***, ** 
and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
    No Contextual Effects  Contextual Effects 
       (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Share of peer adopters   𝜌  2.350** 
(0.761) 
 2.319**             
(0.746) 
1.424 
(0.542) 
 1.417 
(0.541) 
  2.374** 
(0.762) 
 2.348** 
(0.746) 
 1.513 
(0.569) 
                1.503 
               (0.567) 
Peer experience   𝛼  1.840*** 
(0.232) 
 1.885*** 
(0.224) 
 1.770*** 
(0.226) 
 1.818*** 
(0.220) 
  1.834*** 
(0.224) 
 1.883*** 
(0.216) 
 1.771*** 
(0.216) 
                1.821*** 
               (0.209) 
Peer experience  
 × Share of peer adopters  
𝜌𝛼    1.523 
(0.414) 
 1.512 
(0.419) 
    1.459 
(0.382) 
                1.453 
               (0.391) 
Modularity  𝛽1  0.182** 
(0.146) 
 0.139** 
(0.118) 
 0.166** 
(0.129) 
 0.127** 
(0.103) 
  0.186** 
(0.139) 
 0.126** 
(0.103) 
 0.169** 
(0.121) 
                0.115** 
               (0.088) 
Transitivity  𝛽2  3.146** 
(1.340) 
 3.186** 
(1.435) 
 3.155** 
(1.331) 
 3.191** 
(1.424) 
  3.301** 
(1.449) 
 3.328** 
(1.534) 
 3.303** 
(1.438) 
                3.322** 
               (1.521) 
Degree 𝛽2  1.088 
(0.058) 
  1.090 
(0.058) 
   1.099* 
(0.056) 
  1.102* 
(0.057) 
 
Average peer degree   𝛽3  1.124* 
(0.074) 
  1.127* 
(0.073) 
   1.160** 
(0.080) 
  1.163** 
(0.081) 
 
Eigenvector   𝛽2   1.092 
(0.389) 
  1.119 
(0.397) 
   1.211* 
(0.409) 
                  1.243 
                (0.419) 
Average peer eigenvector  𝛽3   2.170** 
(0.793) 
  2.208** 
(0.799) 
   2.464** 
(1.049) 
                  2.509** 
                (1.066) 
Controls 𝛾1   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes                   Yes 
Contextual effects 𝛾2    No    No    No    No    Yes    Yes   Yes                   Yes 
Correlated effects  𝛿𝑡,𝓋𝐺 ,?̂?𝑡   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes                   Yes 
  𝜌 + 𝜌𝛼 = 0     5.68(0.02)                  5.73(0.02) 
  𝛼 + 𝜌𝛼 = 0     10.67(0.00)                 11.04(0.00) 
Link Residuals  𝑿𝟓
𝟐(p-val)  22.58(0.00) 25.64(0.00) 22.66(0.0
0) 
25.59(0.00)  22.71(0.00) 25.65(0.01) 22.99(0.00)                 26.21(0.00) 
LogLikelihood  -972.6 -972.6  -970.3  -971.2   -964.8  -965.8  -963.6                 -964.7 
Clusters     25    25    25     25     25      25     25                  25 
N   4,551  4,551   4,551   4,551   4,551   4,551   4,551                  4,551 
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Figure 3.1 Marginal Effects of peer adoption and production experience 
 
Notes: Marginal effects of the fully specified model (i.e., column 5 of table 3.6). In each case (e.g., peer 
adoption), all variables other than peer adoption are held constant at their mean values. Peer experience is 
expressed as a percent of the maximum average peer experience in the sample. Starting from baseline year 
adoption probabilities of about 9% and 6% for share of adopting and experienced peers, respectively, the 
probability of adoption marginally increases to about 18% with increased peer adoption of the improved variety 
(i.e., the thick-dot line), and to about 38% with increased peer experience in farming the improved variety 
soybean (i.e., the solid line).  
 
 
To show the dependence between signals from past peer adoption decisions and peer experience 
in soybean farming, we also estimated the conditional network effects by interacting share of past 
adopting peers with peer experience [i.e., the first term of row two in specification (13)] in columns 
(7) and (8). The estimates reveal that whereas the main effect, 𝜌, and interaction effect, 𝜌𝛼, are 
each not statistically significant, the main effect of peer experience, 𝛼, remains positive and 
statistically significant. This suggests that a year increase in average peer experience with the 
improved variety is associated with a hazard rate of at least 77 percent.   
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Figure 3.2 shows the marginal effects of the interaction between share of peer adopters and peer 
experience on the conditional probability of adoption in any given year. The interaction effects 
between the two appear to be complementary on the probability of adoption. Specifically, the 
probability of adoption is generally low at lower shares of adopting peers and peer experience, and 
does not exceed 25 percent with 10 percent adopting peers and even with 4 years (on average) peer 
experience. Even at the maximum levels of peer adoption of the improved variety, the conditional 
probability of adoption in any given year is between 24 – 33 percentage points with lower (i.e., 2 
year) average peer experience with the improved variety. However, a farmer who has peers with 
6 years average experience and 80 percent share of adopting peers has about 79-89 percentage 
points likelihood of adoption in any given year.  
 
Figure 3.2 Predicted probability of adoption by peer adoption and production experience 
 
Notes: Predicted probability of farm household adoption by peer adoption and production experience based on column 7 of table 
3.6. There is a positive association between peer adoption and production experience. Starting from a baseline probability of 15% 
with lower levels of peer adoption and experience, the probability of adoption increases to at least 79-89% at high levels of peer 
adoption and production experience.    
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This finding suggests that although having many adopting and experienced peers can increase the 
learning opportunities and possibly reduces the duration of non-adoption, the effects of learning 
about know-how from peer experience on adoption is much higher than the effect of peer adoption 
decisions. This is expected because soybean production is quite demanding in terms of labor 
inputs, management and timing of other inputs application, making the marginal returns to learning 
about production relatively higher than just signal from peer adoption decisions.  
3.5.2 Network statistics and diffusion  
We next consider the network statistics by first focusing on the individual level statistics (i.e., 
transitivity, degree and eigenvector centralities). In respect of degree and eigenvector centralities, 
we focus on the averages of farmers’ peer degree and eigenvector centralities because of our 
interest in showing the effects of a farmer’s connection to highly connected or important peers on 
the probability of adoption, and not that of the farmer himself. The results, reported in table 3.6, 
show a positive and significant association between the transitivity and the conditional probability 
of adoption in any given year across all specifications. In addition, farmers’ connections (i.e., 
degree) and farmers’ average peer connections (i.e., farmers’ average peer degrees) in column (7) 
as well as farmers’ average peer eigenvector centrality in column (8) each significantly increases 
the hazard rate in any given year. Interestingly, however, the hazard rate of transitivity is 
significantly higher than the hazard rate of peer degree (p=0.022), but not significantly different 
from the hazard rate of farmers’ average peer eigenvector centrality (p>0.1)34.  
                                                          
34 The coefficient of transitivity is also significantly higher than the coefficient of farmers’ own degree (p=0.00) in column (7). 
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This finding suggests that obtaining information on the new technology from multiple and 
interconnected sources is very important than from a highly connected farmer. This could be due 
to the fact that the influence of central nodes is more local35 (i.e., limited to few known direct 
nodes and the unknown nodes just learn by imitation) (e.g., see Banerjee et al. 2014; Beaman and 
Dillon 2018), and/or because the central node’s trustworthiness is low. It could also be associated 
with the fact that central nodes are unable to communicate intensively over a certain time for other 
farmers to get the required information (especially if learning is not easy) (Beaman et al. 2018).   
 
We earlier on argued that the extent of partitioning of the network into groups, which defines 
modularity, can affect the rate of interaction and diffusion of the improved variety, particularly if 
a network has high modularity statistics (i.e., highly segregated). Estimates of modularity show 
significant and negative association with adoption across all specifications in table 3.6. Thus, 
farmers who belong to highly segregated networks (i.e., higher modularity network) tend to have 
longer duration of non-adoption of the improved variety. Thus, whereas increasing transitivity of 
a farmer’s neighborhood is associated with higher hazard rate due to less structural holes and 
increased efficiency in information flow and diffusion, increasing modularity leads to lower hazard 
rate due to the highly structured latent groups in the networks. This confirms the arguments by 
Rogers (1995), Alatas et al. (2016), and Jackson et al. (2017) that the likelihood of information or 
behavior to spread from one node to other nodes is high in networks with less latent community 
structures and/or highly cohesive subgroups.  
 
 
  
                                                          
35 Beaman and Dillon (2018) found that information does not diffuse to people who are far from the first recipient of the 
information 
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3.5.3 Network modularity versus transitivity and centrality on diffusion  
To examine whether network modularity conditions the effects of information about peer adoption 
decisions, – and for that matter profitability beliefs –, and peer experiences in soybean production 
on the conditional probability of adoption by farmers, we interact past peer adoption decision and 
peer experiences with modularity in columns (1) and (2) of table 3.7. Although the main effects of 
peer adoption decisions and experiences remained significantly positive, it is the interaction effects 
of peer experience with modularity that is significant, suggesting that there is some dependence of 
learning from peer experiences on modularity.  
 
This is clearly shown in Figure 3.3 where the conditional probability of adoption continues to 
increase with increasing peer adoptions but with higher probability at higher levels of adopting 
peers and lower modularity (Fig. 4A). Similarly, the conditional probability of adoption increases 
with increasing peer experience but appears to show high effect of learning from peer experiences 
at higher peer experiences and modularity (Fig. 4B). These relationships suggest that farmers 
depend more on their direct peers or peers within their components in the network in learning from 
peer experiences, and possibly on both direct and indirect peers or even peers across components 
in observing peer adoption decisions.  
 
Our findings substantiate the argument by Jackson et al. (2017) that flow of information or 
behavior among nodes is stronger and can possibly reach all nodes, if these nodes belong to the 
same component in a network, and that of Nourani (2019) that farmers tend to learn about 
production knowledge from strong ties, and about profitability from weak ties. In effect, the figures 
show that when the proportion of peer adopters and years of experience are low changes in the 
modularity has little effect on adoption. When these values are high changes in the modularity are 
highly effective.  
 
126 
 
Table 3.7. Impact of network modularity on farmers’ adoption 
     (1)    (2)    (3)   (4) 
Share of peer adopters 𝜌  2.223*** 
(0.610) 
 2.194*** 
(0.588) 
  2.480** 
(0.788) 
 2.485*** 
(0.776) 
Peer experience  𝛼  1.934*** 
(0.223) 
 1.987*** 
(0.221) 
  1.773*** 
(0.214) 
 1.793*** 
(0.204) 
Modularity 𝛽1  0.159* 
(0.115) 
 0.109** 
(0.085) 
  0.134** 
(0.123) 
 0.127** 
(0.119) 
Transitivity 𝛽2  3.107** 
(1.328) 
 3.176** 
(1.427) 
  3.462** 
(1.531) 
 3.417** 
(1.593) 
Degree 𝛽2  1.117** 
(0.055) 
   1.060 
(0.052) 
 
Average peer degree 𝛽3  1.171** 
(0.082) 
   1.084 
(0.076) 
 
Eigenvector 𝛽2   1.257 
(0.413) 
   1.204 
(0.407) 
Average peer eigenvector 𝛽3   2.450** 
(1.067) 
   2.194* 
(0.866) 
Modularity 
          × Share of peer adopters 
𝜌𝑀  1.541 
(7.895) 
 1.297 
(6.514) 
   
Modularity 
         × Peer experience 
𝛼𝑀  4.273* 
(3.349) 
 3.544** 
(2.679) 
   
Modularity 
          × Transitivity 
𝛽𝑀     2.38E-5*** 
(8.43E-5) 
 1.16E-5*** 
(4.45E-5) 
Modularity 
          × Average peer degree 
𝛽𝑀     0.372** 
(0.154) 
 
Modularity 
          × Average peer eigenvector 
𝛽𝑀      0.004** 
(0.010) 
Controls 𝛾1   Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes 
Contextual effects 𝛾2   Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes 
Correlated effects  𝛿𝑡, 𝓋𝐺 , ?̂?𝑡   Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes 
LogLikelihood  -961.4 -963.2   -958.6  -959.1 
Clusters      25     25      25     25 
N   4,551  4,551    4,551   4,551 
Notes: Random-effects complementary log-log estimation of equation (13). Column 1 controls for the interactions of 
modularity on one hand and peer adopters and experience on the other hand as well as agent’s degree and average peer degree. 
Column 2 controls for the interactions of modularity on one hand and peer adopters and experience on the other hand but with 
agent’s eigenvector centrality and average peer eigenvector centralities. Column 3 controls for the interactions of modularity on 
one hand and agent’s local transitivity, degree and average peer degree, whiles column 4 controls for the interactions of modularity 
on one hand and agent’s local transitivity, eigenvector centrality and average peer eigenvector centrality. The coefficients of agents’ 
controls and that of peer characteristics are presented in appendix table 3.C2). Peer experience is the number of years of peer 
experience in cultivating the improved variety. Correlated effects include time fixed-effects, 𝛿𝑡, link formation residuals, ?̂?𝑡, and 
standard errors clustered at the village (i.e., network) level, in order to account for village factors that might drive peer behaviors 
to be correlated, 𝓋𝐺 [we did not use village dummies because of the need to avoid the incidental parameter problem (Lee et al., 
2010) by having to include 25 village dummies, and also the fact that modularity is calculated for the entire network/village]. The 
asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Thus, it is beneficial to target share of adopters through extension services and training workshops 
in promoting adoption in the short run, and then focus on measures that facilitate interactions 
among farmers at the village level in order to minimize the constraining effects of modularity on 
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social learning in the long run. We next check whether the latent network structures (modularity) 
condition the roles of transitivity and centrality in the social learning process, which is the last 
term of row two in specification (13). This is important because, the effectiveness of transitivity 
and centrality in the diffusion process depend on the extent of modularity of the network. High 
modularity networks are expected to constrain the role of transitivity and centrality in enhancing 
learning and diffusion in the network and the vice versa. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Predicted probability of adoption by modularity, peer adoption and experience  
Notes: The figure depicts the predicted probability of household adoption by modularity and peer adoption (A) and by modularity 
and peer experience (B). Starting from lower levels of adoption probabilities of 7.8% and 11% respectively for A and B, the 
probability of adoption increases to about 16% and 85%, with increasing peer adoption and peer experience but at lower and higher 
modularity, respectively. 
 
 
Columns (3) and (4) of table 3.7 show how modularity conditions the effects of these micro-
network structures by interacting transitivity, average peer degree and eigenvector centrality with 
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modularity. Whereas the main effects of transitivity show that increase in transitivity of a farmer’s 
neighborhood is associated with higher hazard rate, the coefficients of modularity and the 
interaction with transitivity in both columns show lower hazard rates.   
 
Similar effects are observed in the main and interaction effects of average peer degree, and 
eigenvector centrality with modularity. The interaction effects of modularity with average peer 
degree in column (3), and with average peer eigenvector centrality in column (4) are significant 
and less than one. These suggest that latent network structures significantly limit the role of these 
node level statistics in promoting social learning and diffusion. Figure 3.4 shows the interaction 
plots of modularity and average peer degree (A), average peer eigenvector (B) and farmer’s local 
transitivity (C). We find that the association between transitivity, average peer degree and 
eigenvector centrality, and the conditional probability of adoption in any given year changes, based 
on the level of modularity. Generally, the conditional probability of adoption in any given year 
increases with increase in each of these statistics at lower levels of modularity.  
 
The conditional probability of adoption reaches about 14, 10 and 9 percentage points at the highest 
levels of local transitivity, average peer eigenvector centrality and average peer degree, 
respectively, and at the lowest levels of modularity. However, the conditional probabilities of 
adoption are at most about 4 percentage points at the highest levels of local transitivity, average 
degree and eigenvector centrality when modularity is above 0.3. Thus, the higher the modularity 
of the network, the less effective is the influence of the local transitivity of a farmer’s 
neighborhood, and the effect of peers with higher connections and importance in the network. The 
rationale is that when the network has many small components, information or behavior that 
originates among neighbors or from central and influential nodes in a given component – 
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especially when important nodes are targeted in placement of intervention – will probably take 
more time to spread to nodes in other components.   
 
 
Figure 3.4 Predicted probability of adoption by modularity, centrality and transitivity 
 
Notes: The figure shows the interaction plots of the probability of household adoption by modularity and average peer degree (A), 
modularity and average peer eigenvector centrality (B) and modularity and peer transitivity (C). In all cases, the effect of these 
local measures on the probability of adoption is limited when the modularity of the network is high.   
 
        
This finding demonstrates the importance of social groups (i.e., latent network segregation pattern) 
in social learning and the technology diffusion process, as well as the need to consider social 
diversity and structures in interventions that are aimed at promoting information dissemination 
and technology diffusion. This is in line with the studies by Girvan and Newman (2002) and 
Newman (2002) who argue that communities in a network might signify actual social groupings 
based on interest, backgrounds or identities that are important in understanding and exploiting 
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networks effectively. The implication of this finding is that the common strategy of targeting initial 
adopters who are central in their networks may not be sufficient for promoting diffusion of 
improved soybean in these villages, if the community structures and diversities that underlie 
farmers’ interactions are ignored. The reason being that, the effect of a central member in a network 
will be limited in the presence of network structures and diversities. Hence, the use of approaches 
(such as farmer field days, self-help groups or multiple targeting) that lead to more interactions 
and subsequently creating more connection and increasing the density of contacts among farmers 
(as documented by Centola 2010; Magnan et al. 2015; Alatas et al. 2016) will be appropriate in 
promoting diffusion at the village (network). 
   
3.5.4 Other possible effects and robustness checks 
This section presents robustness checks by investigating the possibility of concerns that might 
threaten the effects observed in our analysis. Despite the fact that our specifications account for 
some correlated unobservables, with the residuals of the network formation model, and that all the 
study villages are in the Northern region of Ghana and have similar agricultural, climatic and 
market conditions, we nevertheless cannot completely rule out the possibility that our estimates 
could be driven by village and other environmental effects.    
 
Individual ability and spurious correlations 
The first concern is the possibility of the peer adoption effects to be spuriously correlated due to 
differences in farmers’ and household abilities rather than due to social learning. To check this, 
we estimated our baseline models in columns (5) and (6) of table 3.6 with the squared term of peer 
adoption decisions, which are reported in column (1) of table 3.8. The coefficients of share of peer 
adopters and the share of peer adoption squared show a nonlinear relationship between peer 
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adoption and the conditional probability of adoption of the improved variety, which partly suggests 
these effects are not driven by spurious correlations. This suggests that the total impact of peer 
adoption share is much stronger for low levels of peer adoption and then levels out for moderate 
levels of peer adoption. The effect tends to negative at high levels of peer adoption, which is 
consistent with the social learning literature that the marginal benefit of peer adoption decreases 
with increased peer adoption (Bandiera and Rasul 2006).  
 
Table 3.8. Peer adoption squared and resource pooling 
 Peer adoption squared Excludes sample below the 5th and above 
the 95th average peer 
  Excludes 
landholding 
below 5th and above 
95th percentile 
Landholding 
 
Household 
size 
Liquidity 
constraints 
      
     (1)               (2)    (3)     (4)     (5) 
Share of peer adopters  3.031*** 
(0.689) 
           3.004*** 
         (0.824) 
 0.855** 
(0.370) 
 1.067*** 
(0.309) 
 1.333*** 
(0.426) 
Peer experience   0.554*** 
(0.117) 
          0.497*** 
         (0.143) 
 0.569*** 
(0.129) 
 0.608*** 
(0.128) 
 0.506*** 
(0.136) 
Modularity -1.676** 
(0.707) 
         -1.537 
         (0.949) 
-1.976** 
(0.743) 
-1.814** 
(0.814) 
-1.435* 
(0.863) 
Transitivity  1.156** 
(0.427) 
          1.134** 
         (0.424) 
 1.111** 
(0.496) 
 1.165** 
(0.437) 
 1.630*** 
(0.396) 
Degree  0.084 
(0.049) 
          0.099* 
         (0.051) 
 0.123* 
(0.061) 
 0.090* 
(0.053) 
 0.089 
(0.068) 
Average peer degree  0.142** 
(0.067) 
          0.155** 
         (0.069) 
 0.172** 
(0.068) 
 0.170** 
(0.077) 
 0.195** 
(0.079) 
Share of peer adopters 
squared 
-3.697*** 
(1.053) 
         -3.565*** 
         (1.272) 
   
      
Controls   Yes            Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes 
Contextual effects   Yes            Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes 
Correlated effects    Yes            Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes 
Log Likelihood -961.2         -812.1 -833.7 -901.3 -787.2 
Clusters    25             25      25     25    25 
N  4,551          3,811  4,055  4,136  3,582 
Notes: Random-effects complementary log-log estimation of equation (11). Column 1 controls for peer adoption squared, 
and column 2 controls for peer adoption squared but without households below the 5th percentile and above the 95th percentile 
of household land holding. Columns 3-5 present estimates of our baseline model excluding households with average peer 
landholding, household size and liquidity constraints below the 5th percentile and above the 95th percentile of the distribution 
of peer landholding, household size, and liquidity constraints. Correlated effects include time fixed-effects, 𝛿𝑡, link formation 
residuals, ?̂?𝑡, and standard errors clustered at the village (i.e., network) level, in order to account for village factors that might 
drive peer behaviors to be correlated, 𝓋𝐺 [we did not use village dummies because of the need to avoid the incidental parameter 
problem (Lee et al., 2010) by having to include 25 village dummies, and also the fact that modularity is calculated for the entire 
network/village]. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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However, Bandiera and Rasul (2006) argue about the possibility of heterogeneities in abilities to 
spuriously drive such nonlinear peer relationship, particularly, when relatively low-ability 
households tend to be constrained in adoption, and high-ability households with investment 
options tend to be less likely to adopt. Thus, we estimated the same specification in column (1) of 
table 3.8 by excluding households with landholding below the 5th and above the 95th percentiles. 
The results, which are reported in column (2) of table 3.8, show the inverse U-shaped relationship 
still persists, suggesting that social learning does play a role in the diffusion process.      
 
Resource effects and not learning 
The next concern is resource-sharing effects, where exchanges of resources among peers can speed 
up the ability of resource constrained farm households to adopt the improved variety. The 
assumption is that households who are relatively resource poor can depend on relatively better 
households for resources required for cultivation. Also, gains from peer adoption that ease input  
constraints such as land, labor and liquidity can enhance the ability of poor and resource 
constrained households to access these inputs for cultivation. This has the potential of showing 
effects that are similar to social learning, where a farmer’s conditional probability of adoption 
increases as a result of past adoption decisions of peers in the farmer’s network.  
 
To investigate this, we first replicated the results of the baseline model in column (5) of table 3.6 
excluding households with average peer landholding, household size and liquidity constraints 
below the 5th and the 95th percentiles. These resources are important for soybean production in the 
area because the crop is labor intensive and also requires application of inputs such as inoculant, 
fertilizer and herbicides to obtained desired output (Heatherly and Elmore 2004). Farmers who are 
constrained in these inputs can benefit through increased access, following adoption of their peers, 
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or from better-off peers. Reassuringly, the results remain stable, with positive and significant peer 
effects on the conditional probability of adoption in any given year.  
 
Furthermore, we interact farmers’ and peers’ landholding and household size to examine whether 
households with more or less own and peer landholding and household size are more or less likely 
to adopt faster, and how such dependence in terms of resources affect our results. We report the 
results in columns (1) and (2) of table 3.9.  Both estimates are small and statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that increase in peer landholding (household size), given the farmer’s landholding 
(household size) is associated with a delayed (faster) adoption, but statistically not significant. The 
estimates of peer adoption decisions and the other network effects remain robust to this exercise.  
 
Threats of geographic proximity 
Another challenge has to do with residential and/or farm proximity between farmers and their 
peers, where farmers with similar soil quality and features on their plots, that favor a particular 
variety, might appear to have similar varietal choices. This may drive adoption decisions between 
peers and farmers to be correlated without social learning effect. Column (3) of table 3.9 contains 
interaction of farmers’ soil quality with average peer soil quality, and the term shows that farmers 
who have peers with high (on average) soil quality have higher conditional probability of adoption, 
albeit not statistically significant. This suggests weak dependence in soil quality of farmers and 
peers. Columns (4) of table 3.9 investigate the validity of this issue in respect of residential 
proximity. We control for the average distance between household locations of farmers and their 
peers in this specification. Despite these specifications, the results in terms of magnitudes and 
directions of our estimates remain qualitatively similar to the baseline model, suggesting that social 
learning does play a role in the adoption of the improved variety.  
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Table 3.9. Geographic proximity, soil and experience 
   Land Household 
size 
   Soil  Household 
distance 
 Correlated 
effects 
     (1)     (2)     (3)        (4)     (5) 
Share of peer adopters  0.866** 
(0.319) 
 0.868** 
(0.318) 
 0.876** 
(0.322) 
      0.857** 
    (0.315) 
  0.138 
(0.319) 
Peer experience   0.602*** 
(0.121) 
 0.605*** 
(0.123) 
 0.600*** 
(0.125) 
     0.606*** 
   (0.123) 
  0.225** 
(0.084) 
Modularity -1.628** 
(0.763) 
-1.717** 
(0.765) 
-1.792** 
(0.768) 
    -1.617** 
   (0.736) 
  
Transitivity  1.190** 
(0.435) 
 1.181** 
(0.436) 
 1.174** 
(0.433) 
     1.165** 
   (0.437) 
  1.061** 
(0.518) 
Degree  0.088* 
(0.051) 
 0.099** 
(0.048) 
 0.100* 
(0.051) 
     0.091* 
   (0.051) 
  0.158** 
(0.063) 
Average peer degree  0.150** 
(0.069) 
 0.148** 
(0.068) 
 0.149** 
(0.069) 
     0.147** 
   (0.069) 
  0.117 
(0.077) 
Landholding 
        × average peer landholding 
-0.036 
(0.044) 
   
 
    
Household 
        × average peer household size 
  0.014 
(0.026) 
     
Soil quality 
        × average peer soil quality 
   
 
 0.140 
(0.121) 
    
Distance: household and peers         0.015 
   (0.025) 
  
Controls   Yes   Yes   Yes       Yes    Yes 
Contextual effects   Yes   Yes   Yes       Yes    Yes 
Correlated effects    Yes   Yes   Yes       Yes    Yes 
Correlated effects by village and 
time 
   No    No    No        No    Yes 
Log Likelihood -964.6 -964.6 -964.1    -962.1  -850.5 
Clusters    25    25    25       25      25 
N  4,551  4,551  4,551     4,549   3,469 
 Notes: Random-effects complementary log-log estimation of equation (11). Columns 1-3 control for the interactions 
of household and average peer soil quality, land holding and average peer landholding, and household size and average peer 
household size. Columns 4 control for the average distance between households and peers. Column 5 controls for correlated 
effects by village and time. The sample size in column 5 is 3,469 because the village by time interactions resulted in some 
village-time bins not having enough observation and as a result some observations were dropped in the estimation process due 
to collinearity. Correlated effects include time fixed-effects, 𝛿𝑡, link formation residuals, ?̂?𝑡, and standard errors clustered at 
the village (i.e., network) level, in order to account for village factors that might drive peer behaviors to be correlated, 𝓋𝐺 [we 
did not use village dummies because of the need to avoid the incidental parameter problem (Lee et al., 2010) by having to 
include 25 village dummies, and also the fact that modularity is calculated for the entire network/village]. The asterisks ***, 
** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
Within village correlated effects 
The next concern is the issue of correlated effects due to village-specific time trends, which might 
affect farmers’ decisions to adopt the improved variety. One issue that arises in considering this is 
the fact that modularity is calculated for the whole network and only varies at the village level.  
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Hence, the inclusion of modularity, time and village fixed effects, and village × time fixed effects 
result in convergence problem during the estimation. As a result, modularity is dropped in this 
specification. Column (5) of table 3.9 presents results of the specification that includes time, 
village and village × time fixed effects, and shows, with the exception of share of adopters which 
loses its significance but still positively correlates with adoption, that most of the coefficients are 
qualitatively similar to the baseline results.   
 
Sampled networks and robustness of results   
Given that our network data is sampled and not based on a census of connections of households of 
these villages, there could be some bias in the estimates. Households were asked whether they 
know any of 5 households randomly drawn from the village sample and assigned to them, and 
links were defined based on whether the household knew the match or not. This implies that, when 
a household is not randomly assigned to a responding household, one cannot determine whether 
the responding household knows the non-sampled household (𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 1) or not (𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 0).  
 
To investigate this issue, we use the graphical reconstruction technique developed by 
Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2016) to simulate the complete network for each village. We first 
estimate a model of network formation, using the sampled network of each village, and then use 
the estimated model to simulate the complete networks (i.e., predict the missing links of the 
network) (see appendix B for model, estimates and networks). We next calculate our social 
network statistics (i.e., modularity, transitivity, degree and eigenvector centrality) using the 
complete networks, and then use these statistics to estimate our baseline specification. The results 
are reported in columns (1) and (2) of table 3.10 for degree and eigenvector, respectively, and the 
key findings remain similar to the baseline estimates.  
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Furthermore, in order to investigate the direction of potential bias associated with the use of the 
sample networks in the calculation of the network statistics used in the estimations, we use an 
approach similar to Alatas et al. (2016). That is, we explore what would happen to the estimates if 
we progressively drop links of the simulated network up to the sample selection ratio of our 
sampled networks, which is 34 percent of households in the median village. To explore this, we 
first drop 25 percent of links uniformly at random, calculate the network statistics used in the 
analysis and estimate the baseline specification with these statistics, with the results, reported in 
columns (3) and (4) of table 3.10 with degree and eigenvector centrality, respectively.  
 
We further drop 50 percent of the links, calculate the network statistics and re-estimate our baseline 
specification, and these results are reported in columns (5) and (6) of table 3.10. Finally, we drop 
70 percent of the links and repeat the analysis and present the results in columns (7) and (8) of 
table 3.10. The results, generally, remain qualitatively similar to the baseline in terms of the 
direction of their effects, although with generally decreasing levels of the coefficients of these 
network statistics, as more links are dropped. This suggest that our point estimates of the effects 
of these network statistics using the sample networks are susceptible to measurement errors, which 
is shown to be an attenuation bias. Thus, the estimated parameters of the network statistics should 
best be considered as a lower bound on the true coefficients.  
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Table 3.10.  Bias in estimation of network statistics (modularity, transitivity, degree and eigenvector centralities) based 
on model specification in columns (5) and (6) 
 100% links  75% links  50% links  30% links 
     (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)    (8) 
Share of peer adopters  0.833** 
(0.310) 
  0.861** 
 (0.307) 
  0.820** 
(0.301) 
 0.855** 
(0.307) 
  0.808** 
(0.305) 
 0.836** 
(0.306) 
  0.804** 
(0.308) 
 0.828** 
(0.309) 
Peer experience   0.596*** 
(0.123) 
  0.591*** 
 (0.118) 
  0.604*** 
(0.119) 
 0.613*** 
(0.118) 
  0.621*** 
(0.120) 
 0.625*** 
(0.112) 
  0.624*** 
(0.117) 
 0.624*** 
(0.111) 
Modularity -5.599* 
(3.109) 
-11.351*** 
 (2.457) 
 -1.728 
(2.614) 
-5.337** 
(2.716) 
 -2.080 
(2.055) 
-4.440** 
(1.982) 
 -3.251* 
(1.757) 
-4.414** 
(1.700) 
Transitivity  2.386** 
(0.992) 
  2.707** 
 (1.014) 
  1.021** 
(0.503) 
 0.778 
(0.552) 
  0.677 
(0.474) 
 0.591 
(0.506) 
  0.628 
(0.459) 
 0.562 
(0.458) 
Degree  0.061** 
(0.021) 
   0.047*** 
(0.016) 
   0.048** 
(0.016) 
   0.026 
(0.020) 
 
Average peer degree  0.137** 
(0.076) 
   0.166** 
(0.069) 
   0.171** 
(0.068) 
   0.174** 
(0.068) 
 
Eigenvector    0.627 
 (0.387) 
   0.408 
(0.351) 
   0.496 
(0.346) 
   0.214 
(0.265) 
Average peer eigenvector    1.130** 
 (0.436) 
   1.161*** 
(0.393) 
   1.151*** 
(0.399) 
   1.200*** 
(0.405) 
Controls    Yes     Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes    Yes 
Contextual effects    Yes     Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes    Yes 
Correlated effects    Yes     Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes    Yes 
LogLikelihood  -959.5   -961.1   -966.6  -969.2   -966.5  -968.8  -967.9 -968.7 
Clusters     25      25      25     25      25      25     25    25 
N   4,551    4,551    4,551   4,551    4,551    4,551   4,551  4,551 
Notes: Random-effects complementary log-log estimation of equation (11). Columns (1) and (2) present estimates where network statistics (i.e., modularity, transitivity, degree 
and eigenvector centrality) are calculated using the simulated complete social networks. Columns (3) and (4) show estimates with 25% of links of the simulated complete social 
networks deleted (i.e., estimated with 75% of the links in each simulated village network). Columns (5) and (6) present the same estimates with network statistics computed from 
networks with 50% of the links deleted (i.e., calculated with 50% of links of the simulated network). Columns (7) and (8) depict estimates with only 30% of the links (i.e., 70% of 
links of the simulated social networks deleted). Correlated effects include time fixed-effects, 𝛿𝑡, link formation residuals, ?̂?𝑡, and standard errors clustered at the village (i.e., network) 
level, in order to account for village factors that might drive peer behaviors to be correlated, 𝓋𝐺 [we did not use village dummies because of the need to avoid the incidental parameter 
problem (Lee et al., 2010) by having to include 25 village dummies, and also the fact that modularity is calculated for the entire network/village]. The asterisks ***, ** and * are 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
Although learning for technology adoption has become an important focus of research and policy 
interventions in promoting agricultural advancement, especially in developing countries, the 
complexity of the technology itself, heterogeneity of benefits and in understanding the technology, 
as well as in the structure of social interactions have often led to sub-optimal adoption and 
inconclusive evidence of social network effects. Policy interventions have operated based on the 
assumption that farmers can learn from their peers, with little friction in the flow of information. 
However, this assumption can be costly in the presence of heterogeneity in social network 
structures, which condition the flow of information. We investigated this assertion using 
observational data from a survey of 500 farm households in Northern Ghana and random matching 
within sample to generate social network contacts. 
 
We first provide a dynamic framework of how social learning and heterogeneity of network 
structures influence farmers’ adoption decisions. Second, we estimate the effect of learning from 
peers on the speed of adoption, conditional on the transitivity of farmers’ neighborhoods, 
connectivity to important peers and modularity of the network. Our approach of accounting for 
contextual effects and correlated effects (using the control function approach, clustering at 
village/network level, and village and time fixed effects) are key to the identification of the 
different network effects.  
 
Our empirical results reveal significant and positive duration dependence in the adoption process, 
justifying the relevance of the duration model in this study. Generally, having past adopting peers 
and high (on average) experienced peers tend to increase the speed of adoption, but the magnitude 
of peer experience on the speed of adoption is higher if the farmer has more peers already adopting 
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the improved variety. Thus, we find evidence that both benefits and production know-how play 
important roles in how farmers learn from their network contacts, which suggests the existence of 
social learning among network members. The likelihood of adopting faster increases with high 
values of transitivity and centrality. However, we generally find the role of local transitivity in the 
learning process to be stronger and more efficient in enhancing diffusion, compared to centrality. 
This could be attributed to the limited influence of central members to farmers they have direct 
contacts with, especially when the frequency and intensity of interactions between groups of agents 
is limited by highly segregated network structures. On the other hand, highly cohesive networks 
favor the frequency and intensity of interactions, in segregated network structures, that seems 
important for social learning.   
The findings generally suggest that the common extension strategy of targeting initial and 
influential adopters in the network for disseminating information may not be appropriate in 
engendering diffusion at the network level. Given the role of transitivity in promoting adoption 
and that of modularity in restricting diffusion, and the influence of the other network 
characteristics, it will be important for policymakers to consider introducing the technology 
through densely subgroups, or using policies and interventions aimed at engineering connections 
among farmers (such as farmer field days or self-help groups) to improve information flow. Also, 
network-oriented policies such as workshops and seminars or supporting adopters’ association that 
is open also to non-adopters can increase the diffusion process. Furthermore, interventions such as 
extension services, public learning and training workshops, where people are specifically invited 
from different segments of the village at the early stages of adoption, can promote bridges between 
modules and diffusion. These would create more avenues for interactions in order to increase links 
among farmers and between groups which could overcome the limitations of lowly cohesive or 
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highly segregated networks. Network oriented policies are likely to enhance the role of social 
networks in information and diffusion process of the technology.  
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Appendix  
Appendix A  
Metrics of Transitivity, Degree and Eigenvector centrality 
Transitivity or local cohesiveness/clustering coefficient τ𝑖 measures how close the 
neighborhood 𝑑𝑖(𝑔) of a farmer (𝑖) is to being a complete network. If farmer 𝑖 has 𝑑𝑖 neighbors 
(degree) in the network 𝑔, such that 𝑗𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑖, the local transitivity coefficient is calculated as 
 (A1) τ𝑖  =
#{𝑗𝑘∈𝑔|𝑘≠𝑗,𝑗∈𝑑𝑖(𝑔),𝑘∈𝑑𝑖(𝑔)}
𝑑𝑖(𝑔)[𝑑𝑖(𝑔)−1]/2
 .    
Transitivity lies in the range of 0 and 1, with 1 suggesting a full interconnected neighborhood 
and 0 indicating there are no contacts of a farmer that are linked to each other (e.g. a network 
in the form of a star).   
Degree centrality measures how well a farmer is connected, in terms of direct connections and 
is simply calculated as 𝑑𝑖(𝑔). High values of degree centrality imply that the farmer is 
central/influential and low values mean that the farmer is less central.   
Eigenvector centrality measures the centrality of a farmer 𝑖 by considering how important 
(central) his neighbors are. The centrality of a farmer is proportional to the sum of the centrality 
of its neighbors. Thus, we calculate the eigenvector centrality, Λ𝑑𝑖
𝑒(𝑔), of 𝑖 as 
 (A3) Λ𝑑𝑖
𝑒(𝑔) = ∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑗
𝑒(𝑔)𝑗  
where Λ is a proportionality factor and represents the corresponding eigenvalue of 𝑑𝑖
𝑒(𝑔). This, 
when normalized, ranges from 0 to 1 with values close to 1 meaning the farmer is very important 
and values close to 0 implies the farmer is not important. Both degree and eigenvector 
centralities are represented in the theoretical framework by the same notation 𝜆𝑖 but can 
distinguished by the value 𝜆𝑖. However, these three farmer level statistics are represented by 𝐷𝑡 
in the empirical specifications in eqns. (8), (11) and (12).    
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Appendix B 
Network formation model and estimates 
B.1 The network formation model 
Our model of network formation is based on the behavior of utility maximization. In this 
framework, each group member is assumed to have some characteristics that are only observed 
by other group members in the same group, and the distances in these observable and 
unobservable characteristics between individuals explain their link formation (Hsieh and Lee 
2016).  Each individual 𝑖, chooses to link to 𝑗, that is 𝑑𝑖𝑗,𝑔 = 1, if 𝑈𝑖𝑗,𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑗,𝑔 = 1) −
𝑈𝑖𝑗,𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑗,𝑔 = 0) > 0, and 𝑑𝑖𝑗,𝑔 = 0 otherwise, where 𝑈𝑖𝑗,𝑔 denotes utility function from the 
link 𝑖𝑗. We express the above utility differences as 
 (B1) 𝑈𝑖𝑗,𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑗,𝑔 = 1) − 𝑈𝑖𝑗,𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑗,𝑔 = 0) = 𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑔(𝐿𝑔, 𝒜) + 𝑟𝑖𝑗,𝑔,       
 
where 𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑔(𝐿𝑔, 𝒜) is the observed link formation due to exogenous effects with specific 
elements, 𝑙𝑖𝑗,𝑔, as a vector of observed dyad-specific variables (such as age, sex, years of 
schooling etc.) and attributes of the link between 𝑖 and 𝑗 such as geographical and social distance 
between them. 𝑟𝑖𝑗,𝑔 is the error term and represents the unobservable characteristics that effect 
link formation between 𝑖, 𝑗, and  𝒜 is a vector of parameter estimates.  
 
We implement this by estimating a conditional edge independence model, which assumes links 
form independently, conditional on node- and link- level covariates (Fafchamps and Gubert 
2007; Chandrasekhar and Lewis 2016) as follows;  
(B2) 𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝒶0 + 𝒶1|𝑙𝑖,𝑔 − 𝑙𝑗,𝑔| + 𝒶2(𝑙𝑖,𝑔 + 𝑙𝑗,𝑔) + 𝒶3|𝑙𝑖𝑗,𝑔| + 𝑟𝑖𝑗,𝑔  
where 𝑃𝑖𝑗 is an 𝑁 × (𝑁 − 1) matrix indicating whether there is a link between individuals 𝑖 and 
𝑗,  𝑙𝑖,𝑔 and 𝑙𝑗,𝑔 are characteristics of individual 𝑖 and 𝑗. 𝒶1 measures the influence of differences 
in their attributes, and 𝒶2 measures the effect of combined level of their attributes. 𝑙𝑖𝑗,𝑔 captures 
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attributes of the link between 𝑖 and 𝑗 such as geographical or social distance between them, and 
𝒶3 is the associated parameter estimate. The estimates of eq. (B1.1) are reported in table 3.B1.  
With respect to potential endogeneity due to unobservables at the farmer link formation level, 
we retrieved the predicted residuals, ?̂?𝑖𝑗,𝑔, and inserted these into our estimation equation to 
account for these threats. This also allows us to account for concerns of measurement errors 
due to the use of sampled networks (Chandrasekhar and Lewis 2016) by using the predicted 
probabilities of links in the respective village networks to simulate the completed networks of 
the villages. This is termed the graphical reconstruction approach by Chandrasekhar and Lewis 
(2016). With this, we are able to reconstruct the networks and thus able to predict what we 
would find if we had the missing part of the networks. This was used to perform sensitivity 
checks of our parameters to measurement errors due to the use of the sample data (see figures 
in table 3.B2 for a number of the sampled networks and their respective reconstructed versions).  
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B.2 The network formation estimates 
Table 3.B1. Dyadic logit regression of network formation model  
       Village1    Village2    Village3    Village4    Village5    Village6    Village7    Village8    Village9 
 Distance between peers in kilometres -0.040 0.025 0.116** -0.035 -0.025 -0.005 -0.075 -0.019 -0.006 
   (0.062) (0.044) (0.050) (0.039) (0.079) (0.045) (0.059) (0.048) (0.044) 
 Difference in distance to road between peers in kilometres -0.003 0.202* -0.044 0.076 -0.020 0.094** -0.171*** 0.042** 0.041 
   (0.030) (0.104) (0.055) (0.058) (0.030) (0.038) (0.029) (0.019) (0.025) 
 Relatives = 1 0.013 0.121 0.064 -0.323 0.304 0.294 0.407 -0.001 -0.685** 
   (0.339) (0.369) (0.580) (0.558) (0.389) (0.662) (0.303) (0.508) (0.349) 
 Same religion = 1 n.a n.a. -0.095 -0.730** -0.652** -0.020 -0.610* -0.013 -0.281 
   n.a. n.a. (0.245) (0.329) (0.326) (0.486) (0.342) (0.402) (0.323) 
 Difference: Sex (= 1 if male) 1.150*** 0.821*** 7.767*** -0.306 0.428 0.013 0.334 0.976*** 0.260 
   (0.342) (0.251) (0.375) (0.256) (0.332) (0.258) (0.329) (0.300) (0.516) 
 Difference: Age 0.004 -0.031** 0.031** -0.003 0.003 -0.037*** -0.044 -0.001 0.041*** 
   (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.031) (0.016) (0.014) 
 Difference: Years of schooling 0.090** 0.015 0.066 0.062 -0.046 -0.081** -0.175*** 6.946*** 0.020 
   (0.046) (0.040) (0.050) (0.064) (0.043) (0.033) (0.043) (0.611) (0.067) 
 Difference: Household size -0.212** -0.097 -0.080 0.067 0.074 0.157** 0.046 -0.177*** 0.103 
   (0.097) (0.096) (0.090) (0.085) (0.099) (0.073) (0.098) (0.052) (0.070) 
 Difference: Household landholding in hectares -0.239 -0.200** 0.098 0.343*** -0.172 0.487** 0.369*** 0.008 -0.071 
   (0.218) (0.096) (0.173) (0.119) (0.201) (0.217) (0.130) (0.082) (0.132) 
 Difference: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 1.065** 0.287 -0.469 0.845*** 0.374 -0.028 0.607** 0.143 -0.671** 
   (0.513) (0.353) (0.310) (0.290) (0.342) (0.323) (0.266) (0.448) (0.307) 
 Difference: Household wealth (predicted) in GHS 1.173 -0.223 0.882 0.189 -0.181 -0.288 -0.589 -1.611 0.060 
   (1.211) (0.786) (0.685) (0.993) (1.060) (0.798) (0.665) (1.840) (0.843) 
 Sum: Sex (= 1 if male) -0.651*** 0.483*** 7.522*** -0.345 0.160 0.380* -1.051*** 0.637** 0.295 
   (0.239) (0.185) (0.356) (0.217) (0.329) (0.229) (0.215) (0.313) (0.311) 
 Sum: Age -0.005 0.011 -0.019 -0.023*** -0.010 0.001 -0.005 0.027*** -0.015 
   (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008) (0.011) 
 Sum: Years of schooling -0.018 0.028 0.012 -0.141** 0.008 0.042 0.008 -6.015*** -0.066 
   (0.042) (0.020) (0.037) (0.062) (0.038) (0.026) (0.036) (0.646) (0.058) 
 Sum: Household size -0.010 0.163*** 0.112 -0.002 0.091 -0.040 0.140*** 0.106* 0.121*** 
   (0.051) (0.056) (0.070) (0.051) (0.057) (0.036) (0.038) (0.054) (0.046) 
 Sum: Household landholding in hectares -0.051 -0.005 0.011 0.113 0.174 -0.360** 0.134 0.083 0.173* 
   (0.113) (0.062) (0.136) (0.136) (0.120) (0.159) (0.100) (0.081) (0.097) 
 Sum: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 1.019*** 0.169 0.096 0.029 0.921*** 0.259 0.794*** 0.955** -0.925*** 
   (0.367) (0.331) (0.283) (0.217) (0.342) (0.255) (0.266) (0.394) (0.190) 
 Intercept -3.504* -5.325*** -17.991*** 0.004 -3.781* -1.176 -3.036 -4.480 -1.282 
   (1.983) (1.838) (1.825) (1.742) (1.941) (1.986) (1.876) (4.427) (1.827) 
          
 N 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
 Pseudo R2  0.114 0.072 0.092 0.082 0.061 0.077 0.146 0.083 0.080 
Notes: the table reports results of the dyadic regression of network link formation in eq. (B2). The dependent variable = 1 if 𝑖 (𝑗) cites 𝑖 (𝑗) as knowing the other. Estimator is logit and all standard errors are clustered at 
the village level.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.B1. (continued)  
       Village10    Village11    Village12    Village13    Village14    Village15    Village16    Village17    Village18 
 Distance between peers in kilometres 0.011 -0.079 -0.058 -0.022 0.028 0.038 -0.065 -0.042 0.018 
   (0.043) (0.064) (0.038) (0.056) (0.054) (0.042) (0.045) (0.035) (0.052) 
 Difference in distance to road between peers in kilometres 0.002 6.556** -0.024 0.065 0.047** 0.069** -0.142** 0.034 0.617 
   (0.026) (2.820) (0.053) (0.069) (0.022) (0.031) (0.060) (0.047) (3.403) 
 Relatives = 1 0.026 0.274 0.051 -0.025 -0.346 0.570 -0.685** 0.103 -0.712 
   (0.241) (0.384) (0.382) (0.552) (0.283) (0.376) (0.304) (0.514) (0.435) 
 Same religion = 1 0.324 -0.129 0.320 0.038 -0.369 0.349 -0.811* 0.183 0.759 
   (0.389) (0.361) (0.317) (0.268) (0.307) (0.503) (0.439) (0.342) (0.506) 
 Difference: Sex (= 1 if male) -0.400 0.254 0.522 -0.134 0.437 0.744** 0.381 0.821*** -0.919*** 
   (0.293) (0.314) (0.461) (0.344) (0.335) (0.359) (0.359) (0.283) (0.195) 
 Difference: Age 0.017 -0.028* 0.009 0.026*** -0.051*** 0.038*** 0.093*** 0.033 0.010 
   (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.036) (0.023) (0.009) 
 Difference: Years of schooling 1.131*** -0.033 0.060 1.402*** 3.489*** -0.044* 3.064*** -0.143*** 0.144* 
   (0.073) (0.050) (0.052) (0.103) (0.189) (0.025) (0.386) (0.055) (0.075) 
 Difference: Household size -0.117 0.087 0.005 0.163 -0.223** -0.123 0.011 -0.043 -0.042 
   (0.082) (0.069) (0.120) (0.118) (0.091) (0.103) (0.063) (0.133) (0.082) 
 Difference: Household landholding in hectares 0.137 -0.067 0.007 0.579*** 0.130 -0.197* 0.089 -0.115 0.268* 
   (0.169) (0.085) (0.146) (0.152) (0.153) (0.110) (0.113) (0.149) (0.155) 
 Difference: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 0.227 -0.395 0.907** -0.570 -0.262 -0.865*** 6.740*** -0.062 -0.122 
   (0.272) (0.320) (0.444) (0.382) (0.239) (0.262) (0.516) (0.232) (0.313) 
 Difference: Household wealth (predicted) in GHS -0.205 -0.709 0.541 0.152 0.826 -1.780*** 2.738* -0.858 2.433*** 
   (1.309) (1.303) (1.063) (0.658) (1.291) (0.588) (1.592) (0.976) (0.935) 
 Sum: Sex (= 1 if male) 0.535** -0.027 0.500* 0.874*** 0.942*** 0.577** 0.548* -0.068 0.426** 
   (0.250) (0.298) (0.296) (0.212) (0.298) (0.277) (0.314) (0.266) (0.175) 
 Sum: Age 0.019** 0.000 -0.010 -0.011 0.012 -0.032*** -0.056** -0.029** -0.002 
   (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.025) (0.012) (0.009) 
 Sum: Years of schooling -1.125*** -0.043 -0.033 -1.482*** -3.470*** -0.014 -3.092*** 0.071*** 0.088 
   (0.087) (0.034) (0.048) (0.080) (0.180) (0.031) (0.398) (0.022) (0.068) 
 Sum: Household size -0.093 0.172*** 0.130* -0.153* 0.064 0.028 -0.037 0.171** 0.048 
   (0.097) (0.053) (0.072) (0.093) (0.046) (0.061) (0.076) (0.083) (0.041) 
 Sum: Household landholding in hectares 0.083 0.091 -0.013 -0.539*** -0.246*** 0.181* -0.058 -0.129 -0.115 
   (0.134) (0.064) (0.115) (0.143) (0.094) (0.107) (0.096) (0.093) (0.102) 
 Sum: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 0.422 0.392 0.572 0.362 -0.039 0.082 6.841*** 0.078 -0.231 
   (0.268) (0.277) (0.405) (0.288) (0.256) (0.234) (0.487) (0.218) (0.196) 
 Intercept -3.558** -2.183 -5.001** 0.240 -3.804** 0.751 -14.108*** 1.407 -3.877** 
   (1.657) (2.780) (2.115) (1.978) (1.606) (1.442) (2.475) (2.590) (1.602) 
          
 N 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
 Pseudo R2  0.049 0.059 0.047 0.117 0.096 0.113 0.122 0.073 0.073 
Notes: the table reports results of the dyadic regression of network link formation in eq. (B2). The dependent variable = 1 if 𝑖 (𝑗) cites 𝑖 (𝑗) as knowing the other. Estimator is logit and all standard errors are clustered at 
the village level.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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   Table 3.B1. (continued) 
      Village19    Village20    Village21    Village22    Village23    Village24    Village25 
 Distance between peers in kilometers -0.006 -0.040 0.044 0.060 -0.009 0.018 0.009 
   (0.061) (0.046) (0.050) (0.067) (0.039) (0.030) (0.047) 
 Difference in distance to road between peers in kilometres 0.012 -1.666 0.024 0.059** 0.686 0.820 0.024 
   (0.008) (3.250) (0.016) (0.024) (0.659) (2.653) (0.018) 
 Relatives = 1 -0.471* 0.227 -0.523 1.345 0.090 0.390* 0.717 
   (0.268) (0.307) (0.538) (1.195) (0.272) (0.205) (0.605) 
 Same religion = 1 -0.304 n.a. 0.152 0.107 0.180 n.a. -0.014 
   (0.383) n.a. (0.423) (0.578) (0.479) n.a. (0.384) 
 Difference: Sex (= 1 if male) -0.385 -0.457 0.744* 8.166*** -0.352 0.849* 0.435 
   (0.275) (0.278) (0.392) (0.399) (0.423) (0.447) (0.336) 
 Difference: Age 0.003 -0.009 0.029 -0.000 -0.040** -0.016 0.012 
   (0.019) (0.012) (0.025) (0.014) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) 
 Difference: Years of schooling 0.009 0.421*** 0.142*** n.a. 0.043 -0.054* 0.803*** 
   (0.045) (0.062) (0.050) n.a. (0.065) (0.030) (0.060) 
 Difference: Household size 0.049 0.252*** 0.229*** 0.076 0.086 0.149* 0.020 
   (0.063) (0.093) (0.081) (0.097) (0.088) (0.089) (0.082) 
 Difference: Household landholding in hectares -0.066 0.619*** -0.263 0.126 -0.077 -0.088 0.289*** 
   (0.088) (0.235) (0.218) (0.163) (0.100) (0.105) (0.085) 
 Difference: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 6.526*** 0.210 -0.235 0.638 8.173*** -0.273 -1.469*** 
   (0.422) (0.327) (0.412) (0.490) (0.403) (0.315) (0.419) 
 Difference: Household wealth (predicted) in GHS 1.450 -2.289*** -0.522 2.782*** -0.100 -1.353 -3.162*** 
   (1.150) (0.794) (1.269) (0.976) (0.639) (0.884) (0.861) 
 Sum: Sex (= 1 if male) 0.504* 0.219 0.161 8.878*** -0.293 0.810** 0.134 
   (0.284) (0.173) (0.278) (0.517) (0.245) (0.388) (0.294) 
 Sum: Age -0.012 0.030** -0.002 0.017 0.010 -0.004 0.016 
   (0.011) (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) 
 Sum: Years of schooling 0.033 -0.460*** 0.019 n.a. 0.210*** 0.077*** -0.733*** 
   (0.024) (0.047) (0.059) n.a. (0.037) (0.021) (0.045) 
 Sum: Household size -0.000 0.099 -0.284*** 0.028 -0.072 -0.044 0.196*** 
   (0.048) (0.085) (0.056) (0.062) (0.062) (0.054) (0.055) 
 Sum: Household landholding in hectares 0.123 -0.413* 0.248 -0.382* 0.270*** -0.078 -0.063 
   (0.092) (0.213) (0.169) (0.198) (0.082) (0.085) (0.080) 
 Sum: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 6.413*** 0.725*** -0.821*** 1.116** 7.525*** -0.381 0.213 
   (0.380) (0.228) (0.278) (0.435) (0.430) (0.240) (0.374) 
 Intercept -17.238*** -2.388 0.730 -26.287*** -18.598*** -0.160 -0.735 
   (2.569) (1.844) (2.514) (2.386) (1.453) (1.444) (2.445) 
        
 N 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
 Pseudo R2  0.075 0.083 0.201 0.155 0.160 0.086 0.155 
    Notes: the table reports results of the dyadic regression of network link formation in eq. (B2). The dependent variable = 1 if 𝑖 (𝑗) cites 𝑖 (𝑗) as knowing the other. Estimator is logit and all 
standard errors are clustered at the village level.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.B2. Sampled and simulated networks by quintiles of modularity  
1. Sampled network 2. Simulated networks 
 
 
Fig. 1A. Lowest modularity network (0.143) Fig. 2A. Lowest modularity network (0.163) 
 
 
Fig. 1B. Mean modularity network (0.289) Fig. 2B. Lowest modularity network (0.205) 
 
 
Fig. 1C. Median modularity network (0.345)  Fig. 2C. Lowest modularity network (0.233) 
 
 
Fig. 1D. Highest modularity network (0.414) Fig. 2D. Lowest modularity network (0.319) 
Notes: the table shows plots of some of the social networks by quintiles of modularity in two columns. Column 1 shows a 
cross section of the sampled networks used categorized into the network at the lowest (Fig. 1A), at the mean (Fig. 1B), at the 
median (Fig. 1C) and at the highest (Fig. 1D) of modularity distribution.  Column 2 shows the respective simulated (i.e., 
reconstructed) versions of these sampled networks based on the approach of Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2016). Figs. 1A and 1B 
have more interconnected nodes and lower modularity statistics, of 0.143 and 0.289, respectively, than figs. 1C and 1D. Similar 
trend is observed in the modularity statistics when calculated with simulated complete versions of these networks in figs. 2A-2D. 
We, therefore, expect learning and diffusion to be faster in the case of figures A and B. 
  
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
X7
X8
X9
X10
X11
X12
X13
X14
X15
X16
X17
X18
X19
X20
V1
V2
V3
V4
V5
V6
V7
V8
V9
V10
V11
V12
V13
V14
V15
V16
V17
V18
V19
V20
V21
V22
V23
V24
V25
V26
V27
V28
V29
V30
V31
V32V33
V34
V35
V36
V37
V38
V39
V40
V41
V42
V43
V44
V45
V46
V47
V48
V49
V50
V51
V52
V53V54
V55
V56
V57
V58
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
X7
X8
X9
X10
X11
X12
X13
X14
X15
X16
X17X18
X19
X20
V1
V2
V3
V4
V5
V6
V7
V8
V9
V10
V11
V12
V13
V14
V15
V16
V17
V18
V19
V20
V21
V22
V23
V24
V25
V26
V27
V28
V29
V30
V31
V32
V33
V34
V35
V36
V37
V38
V39
V40
V41
V42
V43
V44
V45
V46
V47
V48
V49
V50
V51
V52
V53
V54
V55
V56
V57
V58
V59V60
V61
V62
V63
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
X7
X8
X9
X10
X11
X12
X13
X14
X15
X16
X17
X18
X19
X20
V1
V2
V3
V4
V5
V6
V7
V8
V9
V10
V11
V12
V13
V14
V15
V16
V17
V18
V19
V20
V21
V22
V23
V24
V25
V26
V27
V28
V29
V30
V31
V32 V33
V34
V35
V36
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6 X7
X8
X9
X10
X11
X12
X13
X14 X15
X16
X17
X18
X19
X20
V1
V2
V3
V4
V5
V6
V7
V8
V9
V10
V11
V12
V13
V14
V15
V16
V17
V18
V19
V20
V21
V22
V23
V24
V25
V26
V27
V28
V29
V30
V31
V32
V33
V34
V35
V36
V37
V38
V39
V40
V41
V42
V43
V44
V45
V46
 
153 
 
Table 3.B3. Instrumenting regression for Wealth in Dyadic model 
 Difference of wealth  Sum of wealth 
 Coefficient Robust 
S. E. 
Dyadic 
S. E. 
Coefficient Robust 
S. E. 
Dyadic 
S. E. 
 All regressors as difference All regressors as sums 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex = 1 if male      0.080 0.036 0.086   -0.237* 0.034 0.154 
Years of education of farmer  -0.026** 0.004 0.010   -0.040** 0.004 0.017 
Born = 1 if born in village  -0.106* 0.036 0.069       0.200* 0.034 0.144 
Value of inherited land in GHS      0.277*** 0.040 0.089       0.925*** 0.048 0.142 
        
District dummies        
     1 if farmer resides in district 1  -0.322 0.052 0.262   -0.552* 0.066 0.397 
     1 if farmer resides in district 2  -0.493** 0.051 0.257   -0.757** 0.066 0.405 
     1 if farmer resides in district 3      0.298 0.068 0.327       0.429 0.090 0.539 
     1 if farmer resides in district 4  -0.150 0.082 0.426   -0.369 0.097 0.560 
             
Intercept      1.488*** 0.056 0.214       2.614*** 0.088 0.429 
N      9500         9500   
Notes: the table presents first-stage estimates for instrumenting wealth in the dyadic link formation model. Columns 1, 2 
and 3 present results for the difference of wealth between neighbors. Value of inherited land is use as the instrument. Columns 
4, 5 and 6 show results of the sum of wealth estimates. The table also show both the conventional robust standard errors (in 
columns 2 and 5) and the Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) group dyadic standard errors (columns 3 and 6). The asterisks ***, ** 
and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix C 
Other estimates 
Table 3.C1. Control and contextual variables in Table 6 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Household controls,  𝜸𝟏         
   Age -0.008 0.006 -0.008 0.006 -0.008 0.006 -0.008 0.006 
   Gender  0.325 0.213  0.355 0.217  0.325 0.210  0.356* 0.215 
   Education  0.131*** 0.039  0.130*** 0.039  0.129*** 0.040  0.128*** 0.040 
   Experience -0.229*** 0.041 -0.226*** 0.040 -0.228*** 0.042 -0.225*** 0.040 
   Household -0.083 0.054 -0.085 0.055 -0.082 0.054 -0.084 0.055 
   Landholding  0.270*** 0.071  0.263*** 0.071  0.228*** 0.071  0.259*** 0.070 
   Credit -0.306 0.774 -0.195 0.780 -0.354 0.784 -0.238 0.790 
   Risk  0.021 0.074  0.027 0.076  0.023 0.075  0.029 0.076 
   Extension  1.024 0.866  1.157 0.868  0.998 0.870  1.139 0.872 
   Association -0.322*** 0.100 -0.325*** 0.100 -0.322*** 0.100 -0.326*** 0.100 
   Price -1.742** 0.621 -1.814*** 0.610 -1.727** 0.616 -1.806*** 0.605 
   Soil quality  0.530*** 0.155  0.385*** 0.111  0.526*** 0.156  0.526*** 0.157 
Contextual (peer) controls, 𝜸𝟐        
   Gage  0.010 0.012  0.011 0.012  0.009 0.012  0.010 0.012 
   GGender -0.596* 0.306 -0.551* 0.306 -0.588* 0.302 -0.543* 0.301 
   GEducation -0.043 0.052 -0.041 0.052 -0.038 0.051 -0.035 0.050 
   GHousehold -0.009 0.078 -0.005 0.078  0.010 0.076  0.007 0.078 
   GLandholding -0.061 0.106 -0.053 0.106 -0.054 0.105 -0.046 0.107 
   GCredit -0.400 0.267 -0.397 0.267 -0.390 0.263 -0.389 0.266 
   GRisk  0.237 0.164  0.241 0.164  0.233 0.166  0.237 0.163 
   GExtension  0.337 0.375  0.355 0.375  0.336 0.373  0.354 0.374 
   GAssociation  0.096 0.143 -0.105 0.143  0.086 0.142  0.095 0.139 
   GPrice -0.859 0.684 -0.916 0.684 -0.889 0.685 -0.951 0.687 
   GSoil quality -0.079 0.150 -0.079 0.150 -0.086 0.150 -0.086 0.147 
Time effects,  𝜹𝒕         
   Year 3&4  0.736*** 0.183  0.735*** 0.180  0.739*** 0.190  0.738*** 0.187 
   Year 5&6  1.081*** 0.339  1.111*** 0.331  1.089*** 0.350  1.120*** 0.341 
   Year 7&8  1.509*** 0.374  1.535*** 0.367  1.544*** 0.389  1.572*** 0.382 
   Year 9&10  1.945*** 0.432  1.964*** 0.420  1.985*** 0.445  2.006*** 0.432 
   Year 11&12  1.798*** 0.467  1.808*** 0.456  1.841*** 0.474  1.853*** 0.462 
   Year 13&14  1.842*** 0.520  1.785*** 0.516  1.879*** 0.528  1.820*** 0.522 
Link residuals,  ?̂?𝒕         
   Av.Residual 1st quintile  -5.768*** 1.970 -6.142*** 2.011 -5.709*** 1.939 -6.097*** 1.983 
   Av.Residual 2nd quintile 10.067** 3.823  9.530** 3.945  9.433** 3.671  8.883** 3.791 
   Av.Residual 3rd quintile  1.265* 0.765  1.029 0.742  1.251* 0.752  1.015 0.729 
   Av.Residual 4th quintile  0.076 0.122  0.037 0.133  0.080 0.120  0.041 0.131 
   Av.Residual 5th quintile -0.156 0.097 -0.170* 0.089 -0.162 0.098 -0.178* 0.091 
District fixed-effects         
    SaveluguNanton -0.781*** 0.229 -0.770*** 0.229 -0.768*** 0.234 -0.758*** 0.234 
    Karaga -0.668* 0.358 -0.580 0.356 -0.663* 0.360 -0.574 0.357 
    Gushegu -0.984** 0.366 -0.886** 0.372 -0.989** 0.369 -0.888** 0.374 
First-stage residuals         
    Residuals Extension -0.098 0.522 -0.158 0.527 -0.094 0.525 -0.158 0.529 
    Residuals Liquidity constr. -0.288 0.408 -0.351 0.415 -0.264 0.414 -0.329 0.421 
Notes: The table presents coefficients of controls of the models in columns 5-8 of table 3.6. D is the social network. Years 1 and 2 
are the reference years. Av.Residual is the average residuals of the link formation model over a given quintile arranged in ascending 
order – 1st quintile is average of the predicted residuals of the first four set of peers of a household with the least predicted residuals 
(i.e., less likely to link up due to unobserved determinant of link formation). The 2nd quintile is the average residuals of the link 
formation model for the next set of four peers and so on until the 5th set of four peers as those with the highest residuals (i.e., those 
most likely to link up due to unobserved determinants of link formation). These are used as instruments to account for potential 
endogeneity due to correlated unobservables at the link formation level. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.C2. Control and contextual variables in Table 7 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Household controls         
   Age -0.008 0.006 -0.008 0.006 -0.009 0.006 -0.008 0.006 
   Gender  0.336* 0.201  0.365* 0.208  0.364* 0.210  0.395* 0.215 
   Education  0.128*** 0.039  0.127*** 0.039  0.133*** 0.039  0.134*** 0.039 
   Experience -0.218*** 0.043 -0.217*** 0.042 -0.225*** 0.040 -0.218*** 0.038 
   Household -0.076 0.052 -0.080 0.053 -0.077 0.053 -0.083 0.053 
   Landholding  0.263*** 0.071  0.258*** 0.071  0.256*** 0.070  0.250*** 0.069 
   Credit -0.293 0.734 -0.176 0.746 -0.108 0.757 -0.003 0.773 
   Risk  0.019 0.073  0.025 0.076  0.026 0.069  0.024 0.070 
   Extension  0.897 0.851  1.055 0.861  1.306 0.843  1.319 0.865 
   Association -0.314*** 0.097 -0.318*** 0.098 -0.344*** 0.097 -0.339*** 0.096 
   Price -1.690** 0.638 -1.779** 0.629 -1.683** 0.605 -1.672*** 0.574 
   Soil quality  0.515*** 0.152  0.518*** 0.153  0.497*** 0.148  0.505*** 0.148 
Contextual (peer) controls         
   Gage  0.010 0.012  0.011 0.012  0.007 0.012  0.008 0.012 
   GGender -0.516* 0.271 -0.473* 0.277 -0.553* 0.326 -0.526* 0.315 
   GEducation -0.042 0.052 -0.040 0.051 -0.036 0.054 -0.035 0.052 
   GHousehold  0.001 0.075 -0.002 0.078  0.001 0.072  0.001 0.076 
   GLandholding -0.061 0.101 -0.051 0.104 -0.050 0.096 -0.061 0.098 
   GCredit -0.397 0.263 -0.392 0.268 -0.391 0.280 -0.417 0.278 
   GRisk  0.232 0.161  0.238 0.159  0.210 0.153  0.221 0.154 
   GExtension  0.300 0.373  0.331 0.370  0.349 0.356  0.349 0.356 
   GAssociation  0.110 0.139  0.122 0.136  0.080 0.140  0.072 0.135 
   GPrice -0.920 0.659 -0.970 0.666 -0.781 0.667 -0.874 0.671 
   GSoil quality -0.093 0.150 -0.091 0.148 -0.097 0.145 -0.101 0.143 
Time effects         
   Year 3&4  0.726*** 0.177  0.729*** 0.176  0.745*** 0.178  0.746*** 0.175 
   Year 5&6  1.018*** 0.335  1.058*** 0.328  1.114*** 0.344  1.137*** 0.333 
   Year 7&8  1.413*** 0.350  1.455*** 0.351  1.535*** 0.379  1.561*** 0.366 
   Year 9&10  1.813*** 0.404  1.850*** 0.402  1.964*** 0.444  1.987*** 0.426 
   Year 11&12  1.613*** 0.416  1.647*** 0.417  1.804*** 0.471  1.821*** 0.456 
   Year 13&14  1.590*** 0.483  1.545*** 0.501  1.914*** 0.539  1.900*** 0.530 
Link residuals         
   Av.Residual 1st quartile -5.441*** 1.888 -5.932*** 1.926 -5.671*** 1.818 -5.820*** 1.835 
   Av.Residual 2nd quartile  9.985** 3.675  9.447** 3.815  9.861** 3.642  9.436** 3.749 
   Av.Residual 3rd quartile  1.241 0.838  0.974 0.803  1.138 0.765  0.998 0.737 
   Av.Residual 4th quartile  0.075 0.116  0.029 0.128  0.091 0.122  0.077 0.130 
   Av.Residual 5th quartile -0.186** 0.090 -0.196** 0.082 -0.095 0.099 -0.103 0.095 
District fixed-effects         
    SaveluguNanton -0.813*** 0.198 -0.799*** 0.205 -0.668*** 0.231 -0.679*** 0.224 
    Karaga -0.655* 0.335 -0.563* 0.339 -0.618* 0.353 -0.577* 0.343 
    Gushegu -0.981*** 0.322 -0.879** 0.338 -0.890** 0.377 -0.813** 0.378 
First-stage residuals         
    Residuals Extension -0.033 0.507 -0.103 0.517 -0.245 0.509 -0.243 0.526 
    Residuals Liquidity constr. -0.305 0.392 -0.373 0.400 -0.361 0.409 -0.428 0.415 
Notes: The table presents coefficients of controls of the models in columns 5-8 of table 3.6. D is the social network. Years 1 and 2 
are the reference years. Av.Residual is the average residuals of the link formation model over a given quintile arranged in ascending 
order – 1st quintile is average of the predicted residuals of the first four set of peers of a household with the least predicted residuals 
(i.e., less likely to link up due to unobserved determinant of link formation). The 2nd quintile is the average residuals of the link 
formation model for the next set of four peers and so on until the 5th set of four peers as those with the highest residuals (i.e., those 
most likely to link up due to unobserved determinants of link formation). These are used as instruments to account for potential 
endogeneity due to correlated unobservables at the link formation level. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively.
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Appendix D 
Endogeneity of credit-constraint and extension contact 
The final issue we address is the potential endogeneity of credit-constraint and extension 
contact. Credit-constraint could be endogenous because farmers with higher yields and incomes 
will be less credit-constrained as a result of the associated increased yields and incomes from 
adoption. On the other hand, extension contact could be endogenous because extension officers 
may be more inclined to visit farmers who adopted than farmers who did not adopt. We used a 
two-stage generalized residual inclusion estimation procedure suggested by Wooldridge 
(2015), where we first estimate a probit model for each of these endogenous variables using the 
variables in the diffusion model (to be estimated in the second-stage) and two instruments in 
each case as explanatory variables. The generalized residuals from the first-stage estimation are 
then included with the observed values of the potentially endogenous variables in the second-
stage specification.  
We use credit-constraint and extension contacts of farmer 𝑖’s indirect, 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐺𝑡
2,𝔫
, [i.e., first (𝑖, 𝑗 +
1) generation] peers (neighbors) as instruments. These are considered valid and relevant 
instruments because the credit-constraint and extension contacts of the 𝑗 + 1 peers of farmer 𝑖 
relate indirectly to his own credit-constraint and extension contacts through the credit-
constraints and extension contacts of his direct neighbors 𝑗, (i.e., 𝑋𝑡
′𝐺𝑡
𝔫) who are direct peers of 
the 𝑗 + 1 peers. These variables, however, are not expected to directly affect the farmer’s 
conditional probability of adoption. Bramoulle et al. (2009) show that these are valid 
instruments once there are intransitive triads36 in the network, so that the characteristics of the 
first and higher generation neighbors of the farmer affect the characteristics and outcomes of 
                                                          
36 The average transitivity statistics in table 3.4 is less than 0.2 across the networks, suggesting that majority of triads on 
average are intransitive. 
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the farmer through his direct neighbors. Estimates of the first-stage probit are presented in table 
3.D1.  
 
Table 3.D1. First stage probit estimates for credit constraints and extension contact 
Variable  Credit constraint  Extension 
 Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E. 
  Age     -0.004 0.005     0.003 0.005 
  Gender     -0.489*** 0.141    -0.078 0.147 
  Education      0.045* 0.022    -0.002 0.021 
  Experience     -0.016 0.020    -0.029 0.019 
  Household     -0.025 0.030     0.001 0.032 
  Landholding     -0.069 0.046     0.094** 0.044 
  Credit       -0.394** 0.141 
  Risk      0.104* 0.055    -0.157** 0.061 
  Extension     -0.391** 0.147    
  Association     -0.146** 0.057    -0.206*** 0.054 
  Price     -1.410*** 0.417     2.251*** 0.441 
  Soil quality     -0.103 0.071     0.068 0.075 
       
  DAge     -0.003 0.009   -0.004 0.009 
  DGender      0.115 0.237   -0.119 0.240 
  DEducation      0.056** 0.036   -0.039 0.038 
  DExperience      0.004 0.034   -0.003 0.032 
  DHousehold      0.044 0.048   -0.017 0.058 
  DLandholding     -0.021 0.077   -0.022 0.086 
  DCredit     -0.267 0.270   -0.080 0.278 
  DRisk     -0.137 0.092    0.123 0.097 
  DExtension      0.093 0.248   -0.554* 0282 
  DAssociation     -0.014 0.093    0.089 0.095 
  DPrice     -0.279 0.633    0.628 0.661 
  DSoil quality     -0.037 0.109    0.108 0.119 
    D2Credit      2.942*** 0.483  - - 
    D2Extension       -     2.741*** 0.572 
Constant      2.113 1.161   -5.462*** 1.214 
       
Instrument validity 𝑿𝟐(p-value)      37.12(0.000)   23.01(0.000) 
Log likelihood    -252.34   -227.64  
Wald (𝑿𝟐𝟓
𝟐 )     144.35    140.94  
    p-value      0.000     0.000  
Pseudo 𝑹𝟐      0.265     0.288  
Notes: the table presents first-stage estimates of credit constraints and extension contacts of households. S.E. is robust 
standard errors. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Abstract  
In this study, we examine the effects of own and peer adoption of improved soybean variety on 
household yields, food and nutrients consumption, using observational data from Ghana. We 
employ the marginal treatment effect approach to account for treatment effects heterogeneity 
across households, and a number of identification strategies to capture social network effects. 
Our empirical results show that households with higher unobserved gains are more likely to 
adopt because of their worse outcomes when not adopting. We also find strong peer adoption 
effect on own yield, only when the household is also adopting, and on food and nutrients 
consumption when not adopting. However, the peer adoption effect on consumption attenuates 
when the household adopts the improved variety. Furthermore, our findings reveal that adoption 
tends to equalize households in terms of observed and unobserved gains on consumption, and 
can thus serve as a mechanism for promoting food security and nutrition in this area.       
  
JEL codes: C21, D60, D85, O13, O33 
Keywords: Improved variety, Technology adoption, Social networks, Marginal treatment 
effects, Food and nutrition security  
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4.1 Introduction 
Food insecurity remains a major concern across many sub-Saharan African countries, despite 
significant strives and improvements in agricultural technologies and crop varieties over the 
past few decades (Shiferaw et al. 2014; FAO, et al. 2019). Globally, the prevalence of hunger 
increased from 10.6% in 2015 to 10.8% in 2018, while that of sub-Saharan Africa increased 
from 20.9% in 2015 to 22.8% in 2018 (FAO, et al. 2019), suggesting the prevalence in sub-
Saharan Africa is not only twice that of the world prevalence, but also a cumulative increase 
from 2015 of about nine times that of the world. This increasing food insecurity in the midst of 
increased availability of improved agricultural technologies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Minten and Barrett 2008; Shiferaw et al. 2014), suggest the need to obtain better understanding 
of technology adoption and consumption of food and specific nutrients in order to enhance the 
effectiveness of improved technologies in addressing food insecurity in these areas.  
While the literature has made significant strides in investigating the importance of improved 
crop varieties on household welfare, not much consideration has been given to the impact of 
improved crop varietal adoption by households and their peers on household food and nutrients 
consumption (Minten and Barrett 2008; Shiferaw et al. 2014; Smale et al. 2015; Verkaart et al. 
2017). Also, studies that examined the impact of technology adoption on performance outcomes 
tend to focus on crop yield and income related measures (e.g., Becerril and Abdulai, 2010; 
Abdulai and Huffman 2014; Verkaart et al. 2017; Wossen et al. 2019). There is virtually no 
rigorous empirical evidence on the potential impact of improved crop varieties on the 
consumption of specific nutrient rich foods among households (Hotz et al. 2012; Smale et al. 
2015; Larsen and Lilleør 2016; Ogutu et al. 2020)37. The few that examined the impact of 
                                                          
37 Previous studies focused on production diversification on households’ and children’s dietary diversity and consumption of 
specific food groups (Dillon et al. 2015; Lovo and Veronesi 2019); caregivers nutrition knowledge on the types of foods 
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improved crop varietal adoption on food security and nutrition focused on food group diversity 
and vitamin A intake (Hotz et al. 2012; Smale et al. 2015; Larsen and Lilleør 2016), without 
much consideration given to the other components of nutrients such as protein rich food intake. 
In particular, improving household consumption of protein rich foods is important in the 
prevention of wasting, stunting and micronutrients deficiencies that cause diseases and deaths38. 
Thus, a better understanding of the link between adoption of improved technology and 
consumption of food and these specific nutrients is key in helping policy-makers design policies 
to promote food and nutrition security.    
 
Despite the increasing interest in understanding the role of social interaction on households’ 
decision-making and individual welfare (e.g., Bandiera and Rasul 2006; Fafchamps and Gubert 
2007; Conley and Udry 2010; Garcia et al. 2014; De Giorgi et al. 2020), the voluminous 
literature on social interactions has virtually not provided evidence on the potential benefits of 
peer adoption of agricultural technologies on household food and nutrients consumption. With 
the exception of a few such as Maurer and Meier (2008), and De Giorgi et al. (2020) on 
endogenous consumption peer effects; and Kuhn et al. (2011) on lottery prices39, this has not 
been done on peer adoption effects. There are various reasons one will expect spill overs from 
peer adoption on household food and nutrients consumption. First, peer adoption that leads to 
                                                          
consumed by children (Hirvonen et al. 2017) and the impacts of improved extension designs on smallholder sensitivity to 
nutrition (Ogutu et al. 2020).  See Sibhatu and Qaim (2018) for a meta-analysis.  
38 The World Food Program (2015) argues that tackling vitamin A deficiency, before the age of five, can reduce mortality and 
infectious diseases up to a third.   
39 Maurer and Meier (2008) study intertemporal consumption effects among peers using panel data from US, and find moderate, 
but significant evidence of consumption externalities across peer-groups. De Giorgi et al. (2020) investigate consumption 
network effects, using administrative dataset and complementing it with data on consumption survey of households’ 
expenditure on goods, and find peer consumption effects on household consumption to be non-negligible. Kuhn et al. (2011) 
study the effect of lottery prices on neighbors of winners, and find evidence for effects of lottery prices on winners’ neighbors, 
but only for consumption of cars.  
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increased learning opportunities and productivity of the household can enhance the household’s 
consumption, especially in rural Africa, where the issues of missing and inefficient markets are 
prevalent (de Janvry et al. 1991). Second, when peer adoption leads to increased peer 
productivity, and changes in peer consumption, can affect household consumption either due to 
endogenous peer effect, or through private cash transfers to the household in a form of safety 
net.  
The purpose of this study is twofold: to investigate the effect of household adoption of improved 
crop variety on the consumption of food and specific nutrients among households; and to 
examine the effect of peer adoption of the improved crop variety on yield, food and nutrients 
consumption. We do this by using detailed data of 500 farm households from northern Ghana 
to examine the effect of household and peer adoption of improved soybean variety on crop 
yield, and the household’s consumption of food, vitamin A and protein rich foods. Analytically, 
we exploit spatial econometric techniques to generate instruments (Bramoullé et al. 2009; 
Acemoglu et al. 2015), and then use the instruments, in addition to controlling for network fixed 
effects and potential endogeneity of network link formation with the control function approach 
by Brock and Durlauf (2001) to identify peer adoption effects on own adoption and outcomes. 
We employ the marginal treatment effects (MTE) approach, following Heckman and Vytlacil 
(2005) and Cornelissen et al. (2018) to estimate the treatment effects heterogeneities. This 
approach is significant in the sense that it allows us to identify, at least, a substantial part of the 
range of individual treatment effects, and as a result characterize the extent and pattern of 
treatment effects heterogeneity (Cornelissen et al. 2016; 2018)40.  
                                                          
40 Previous studies (e.g., Minten and Barrett 2008; Shiferaw et al. 2014) have assumed homogenous treatment effects, focusing 
mainly on addressing selectivity problems arising from unobserved characteristics, and aggregate parameter estimates. As 
argued by Cornelissen et al. (2016), this approach can mask important heterogeneity in treatment effects.  
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Poverty incidence and its extreme form have been consistently higher in northern Ghana than 
the national average and that of the rest of the country since 2005, and with worsening rates of 
extreme poverty, as the incidence increased from 29.7% in 2012/13 to 34.5% in 2016/17 (GSS 
2018). This has resulted in higher incidence of food insecurity and malnutrition in the area, 
compared to the rest of the country, and the use of a number of strategies including credit 
purchases and borrowing from friends and relatives to cope with food insecurity (WFP and GSS 
2012). This makes northern Ghana a suitable area for assessing the impact of improved crop 
varietal adoption by households and their peers on crop yield, and household food and nutrients 
consumption.  
Our findings show strong evidence of heterogeneity in returns to adoption in both observed and 
unobserved characteristics. Specifically, we find positive selection on gains due to unobserved 
characteristics, mainly driven by worse outcomes, of households with less resistance to adopt, 
in the non-adoption state. However, adoption appears to make the potential outcomes of 
households quite homogenous, irrespective of their level of resistance to adoption. Peer 
adoption increases the household’s food and nutrients consumption, when the household is not 
adopting the improved variety, but with attenuating effects when the household adopts, 
suggesting that non-adopters tend to depend more on adopting peers in terms of food and 
nutrients consumption than adopters. We, however, note that the estimated effects cannot be 
interpreted as causal-effects in its strictest sense, given that households were not randomly 
assigned to treatment and control groups, as in a randomized controlled trial41.   
Our study contributes to the literature in threefold: first, it provides empirical insights into the 
importance of improved crop varieties on welfare indicators such as crop yields and 
consumption of specific nutrient rich foods, while highlighting heterogeneity in returns to 
adoption in observed and unobserved characteristics. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
                                                          
41 We thank the reviewers and editor for suggesting this to us. 
 
163 
 
first study to use this approach to quantify the effects of improved crop variety on food and 
nutrients consumption. Second, the paper presents evidence of exogenous interaction effects 
(Manski 2013) on food and nutrients consumption of smallholders. As indicated previously, 
understanding the relationship between peer adoption and household consumption may present 
an alternative to public food and nutrition security interventions through private transfers 
among peers, given the challenges of sustainable and exit mechanisms of public food transfer 
modalities (Holden et al. 2006). Finally, the study provides insights into the effectiveness of 
policy options (i.e., whether to promote affordability or availability of the improved soybean 
seeds) that shift some non-adopting households to adopt on the outcomes.   
The next section presents the conceptual framework of the analysis. In section 4.3, we present 
the context and data used in the analysis. Section 4.4 presents the analytical and empirical 
frameworks and estimation. In Section 4.5, we report the results, and then discuss in section 
4.6. The final section presents a brief summary and conclusions.   
4.2 Conceptual framework 
In this section, we explore the conceptual mechanisms by which own and peer adoption may 
affect crop yield, food and nutrients consumption. To the extent that the improved variety is 
characterized as high yielding, early maturing and resistant to agricultural and climatic stress 
(CSIR-SARI 2013), own adoption of the improved variety can lead to increased yields and 
reduced production costs, which may result in increased farm income and subsequently 
increased food consumption. However, when own adoption and investments in the new variety 
is not complemented with good production “know-how”, or soybean market, this may lead to 
reduced income and food consumption, since soybean is not a staple food in the area but is 
mainly produced for cash sales42. Similarly, food and nutrients consumption may decrease, if 
                                                          
42 The other pathways through which agriculture production can affect food security and nutrition are changes in food prices, 
consumption of own production and intra-household dynamics related to gender and resource control. However, we do not 
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additional income from adoption of the improved variety is not spent on food and nutrients 
(Carletto et al. 2015, Sibhatu and Qaim 2018).   
 
Given that smallholder farmers in the rural areas of developing countries often face missing or 
inefficient markets, making household production and consumption decisions jointly 
determined and thus “non-separable” (de Janvry et al. 1991), peer adoption decisions that affect 
household production can alter household consumption decisions as well. For example, peer 
adoption that provides learning opportunities and eases input constraints can lead to increased 
crop yield, farm income and consequently food consumption possibilities (Conley and Udry 
2010; De Giorgi et al. 2020). However, when a household does not adopt, peer adoption can 
reduce (increase) learning opportunities (costs), especially if the production processes of the 
improved and traditional varieties are not complementary (Niehaus 2011), which can constrain 
household productivity, income and possibly consumption capabilities.  
 
Peer adoption effects can also impact on own yield and food consumption through private 
transfers that result in a shift in the household’s resources. In particular, if peer adoption leads 
to increased yield, income and wealth of peers, this can as well empower peers to undertake 
private transfers to the household. This can then lead to an increase in the household resource 
possibilities to (a) directly spend on food and/or (b) indirectly relax the liquidity constraint of 
the household in production, which may increase crop yield and food consumption possibilities.  
However, own adoption by the household which leads to increased productivity and income 
especially of poorer households may attenuate peer effects through private transfers on the 
households’ food consumption, when the increase in productivity and income from adoption, 
                                                          
emphasize the food price and intra-household effects because the focus of the study is on farm-level effects and not on 
individual household members (Carletto et al. 2015). Also, consumption of own production is not emphasized here because 
soybean is not a staple food in the study area but a crop that mainly produced for cash sales and incomes (CSIR-SARI 2013).  
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leads to a decrease in the private transfers from peers or reduce dependence on peers. Studies 
have noted that, when the cost of sharing or altruistic effort is sufficiently higher than the 
benefit, then no member will undertake any effort to share (e.g., Alger and Weibull 2012; Di 
Falco and Bulte 2013). Finally, peer adoption effect on food consumption could decline, 
following own adoption, if own adoption by the household, leads to increased productivity and 
results in the need to settle past transfer commitments (Di Falco et al. 2018). 
 
We deduce a number of implications from the foregoing discussion to guide our interpretation 
of the empirical results. When the household is not adopting, the impact of peer adoption on 
the household’s yield and food consumption could be either positive, if the production processes 
of the improved and traditional varieties are complementary, or negative if otherwise, thereby 
constraining transferability of production “know-how” and other inputs. The impact of peer 
adoption on household food security should be positive, if peer adoption leads to increased 
private transfers from peers. When the household adopts, the impact of peer adoption on crop 
yield and food consumption could be positive, if own adoption enhances learning and relaxes 
input constraints, which leads to increased household productivity, income and spending on 
food. On the contrary, the impact of peer adoption on consumption in particular could be 
negative, if increased productivity and income due to own adoption either results in reduction 
of dependence on social transfers from peers, or in the need to return private transfers received 
from peers by the household, indicating peer and own adoption are substitutes (Di Falco et al. 
2018).  
 
4.3 Context and data 
4.3.1 Context  
Ghana is a lower middle-income country that has made steady progress in economic growth, 
food security, and in reducing poverty rate from 56.5% in 1991 to 23.4% in 2018 (GSS 2018). 
Despite this progress, substantial regional disparities exist, with some of the poorest indicators 
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(i.e., high incidence of poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition) found in the northern part of 
the country. In the three northern regions (Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions) of 
Ghana, about 16% of all households are food insecure, with diets consisting of staple foods and 
occasionally accompanied by oil and vegetables (WFP and GSS 2012). Food insecurity in these 
regions is largely associated with poverty, weather constraints, seasonal effects and high food 
prices. The major sources of food for households are own production and market purchases, 
with more than 65% of food consumption coming from cash purchases during the lean season 
months. Similarly, households in this area resort to borrowing food or money from friends and 
relatives in coping with food insecurity (WFP and GSS 2012).  
Soybean is a viable crop that can enhance the incomes and resilience of the poor households, 
because of its commercial potential and also the fact that it is mainly produced in the northern 
regions, which are the poorest regions in the country. The climatic conditions in this area are 
suitable for soybean cultivation, because of the high temperature requirement of 20oC to 30oC 
for successful cultivation. Among the regions of the north, the Northern region, in particular, 
which is the study region, accounts for over 65% of the total area cultivated to the crop and 
produces about 72% of the national output. The crop is cultivated mostly by smallholder 
farmers under rain-fed conditions, and with an average area cultivated of less than two acres. It 
has received significant promotion by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) and the 
Ghana ADVANCE43 program in value chain enhancement and through seed price subsidies to 
farmers aimed at increasing productivity and incomes (MoFA 2017). 
The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Savanna Agricultural 
Research Institute (SARI) developed and introduced the improved variety in order to 
                                                          
43 ADVANCE refers to the Feed the Future Ghana Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement Project funded 
by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 
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circumvent the problems associated with the traditional variety44. The improved variety has 
higher yield potential of over 2.0 MT/ha, resistant to pod-shattering, matures in about 35 days 
earlier, and is resistant to other agricultural and climatic variabilities (CSIR-SARI 2013). 
Despite these interventions, the average national yield of 1.68MT/ha has remained below the 
national achievable yields of 2.50 – 3.10MT/ha (CSIR-SARI 2013). Also, available evidence 
shows that the use of improved soy seed is still quite low, with estimates ranging between 16% 
and 33% (CSIR-SARI 2013) of soybean farmers. Although, SARI and the Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture (MoFA) have worked with private seed companies and other local input dealers 
to enhance supply at the district level, farmers in some communities still travel long distances 
to acquire the seeds from input dealers (MoFA 2017). 
4.3.2 Data 
Data on farm households 
We conducted a survey in 25 villages across 5 districts in the Northern region of Ghana between 
June and September 2017. A random sample of 500 farm households was drawn in three stages. 
In the first step, we purposively sampled five (5) soybean producing districts in the region, 
based on their intensity of soybean production. In the second stage, we used a list of soybean 
producing villages in each district obtained from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) 
offices to randomly sample 8 villages in Savelugu-Nanton, 6 in Gushegu, 5 in Tolon, 4 in 
Karaga and 2 in Kumbungu districts, in proportion to the number of households engaged in 
agriculture in each district (GSS 2014).   
 
In the third stage, (i.e., the village level), we conducted a listing of households in each village 
and randomly selected 20 households in each village for interview and a structured 
                                                          
44 The traditional variety, Salintuya, has been described as low yielding (about 1.0 MT/ha), early shattering of pods and 
susceptible to disease and pests, which sometimes lead to complete loss of output (CSIR-SARI 2013). 
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questionnaire was administered to them. We obtained information from households about their 
agricultural production for the 2016 cropping year, household land, assets and wealth, 7-day 
recall daily food and nutrients consumption; and distance to the nearest soybean seed source 
among others. Finally, we organized a focus group discussion with 4 to 6 village leaders in each 
village, and village level information such as local farm input prices, wage rate, and distance to 
the nearest paved road, market and the district capital was collected from this medium.    
 
Data on social networks 
We used the random matching within sample, which involves drawing a random sample from 
a population and collecting information on the links among them (Conley and Udry 2010). This 
approach offers the advantage of having both households (i.e., nodes45) in any link, randomly 
selected (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007). At the beginning of the interview for each household, 
we randomly matched 5 households from the rest of the village sample to the household, and 
information was collected on the matched households the respondent knew. In particular, we 
collected information on exchanges of agricultural information, labor, credit and land; social 
relations (i.e., whether relatives and friends) and geographic proximity (i.e., whether farm 
neighbors) between the household and the assigned matches the household knew.  
 
We then define the matched households the household shared any of the above exchanges, 
social relation and geographical proximity with as the social contacts. Using these social 
contacts and denoting the responding household as 𝑖 and a given village as 𝑣, we next construct 
a 20 x 20 village social network, which we denote as 𝑁(𝑣). Thus, 𝑁(𝑣) denotes a symmetric 
matrix of the set of 20 households randomly sampled in a village, with undirected entries, being 
equal to one if the respondent has any of these social contacts with a known match (which 
                                                          
45 Nodes represent agents (i.e., households in this study) in a network. Degree is the number of links of a household (i.e., node) 
in an undirected network (Chandrasekhar and Lewis 2016). 
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defines the peers), and zero if otherwise. A household in the network [i.e., 𝑁𝑖(𝑣)]
46 has an 
average of 4 links (i.e., degree) with other sampled households in the village, and an average 
node transitivity of 0.46, suggesting that 46% of triads of a household head and the peers have 
links with one another. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
This section describes the data used by focusing on the main outcomes which are soybean 
yields, food consumption score (food) and nutrient rich food consumption scores. Soybean yield 
is measured as the total soybean output in kilograms divided by the acres47 cultivated to the 
crop by household. Given that the food and nutrients outcomes measure the frequency of 
consumption of food and nutrient rich foods, we ask households the question “How many days 
in the last 7 days your household ate the following foods?” We calculated the food consumption 
score by first grouping all food items consumed by households into main staple, pulses, 
vegetables, fruit, meat and fish, milk, sugar, oils and condiments, and the food consumption 
score-nutrition by grouping food items into 15 food groups.  
 
We then categorized these groups into vitamin A rich foods as dairy, organ meat, eggs, orange 
and green vegetables, and orange fruits, and protein rich foods as pulses, dairy, flesh meat, 
organ meat, fish and eggs (WFP 2015). We next sum all the consumption frequencies of the 
food and nutrient rich food items of the same group. For the food consumption score, we 
multiply the value obtained for each food group by the group weight to obtain weighted food 
group scores, and then add the weighted food groups to generate the food consumption score 
                                                          
46 𝑁𝑖(𝑣) is the 𝑖th row of the network matrix 𝑁(𝑣). 
47 The acres cultivated to soybean exclude the proportion of the plots cultivated to vegetables by the 1% of farmers who planted 
some vegetables on their soybean plots. 
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for a household48. For each nutrient rich food group, we sum the number of days the food sub-
group belonging to this was consumed to obtain the food consumption score-nutrition for the 
household (WFP 2015).     
 
The descriptive statistics of these outcome variables are presented in table 4.1 for the whole 
sample and by own adoption status and quintiles of average peer adoption. With a mean soybean 
yield of 631 kilograms per acre (kgs/ac), the mean yield for adopters is 726 kgs/ac, which is 
significantly higher than the mean yield, 439 kgs/ac, of non-adopters.  
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics of outcomes by own and quintiles of average peer 
adoption 
  By quintiles of average peer adoption 
 All 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  
Main outcomes       
Soybean yield 630.7 551.8 621.8 610.9 667.9 701.1 
   Adopters 725.8 688.5 727.7 705.1 751.7 739.8 
   Nonadopters 439.5 420.5 433.7 443.5 472.3 442.3 
   Adopters – nonadopters  286.3***      
       
Food   33.6 29.5 33.2 32.4 35.2 37.3 
    Adopters  34.9 34.1 33.6 33.0 36.2 37.2 
    Nonadopters  30.7 25.1 32.6 32.0 33.1 38.6 
    Adopters – nonadopters    4.2***      
       
Vitamin A  12.4 10.1 12.4 12.0 13.5 14.3 
    Adopters  13.4 12.9 12.9 12.4 13.9 14.3 
    Nonadopters  10.5 7.3 11.5 11.0 12.4 14.4 
    Adopters – nonadopters    2.9***      
       
Protein   6.2 4.5 6.3 5.8 6.8 7.2 
    Adopters   7.4 7.7 7.4 6.7 7.6 7.5 
    Nonadopters   3.8 2.2 4.4 4.1 4.9 5.2 
    Adopters – nonadopters   3.8***      
       
Nadoption at means  0.69 0.38 0.61 0.71 0.81 0.94 
Notes: The table presents means of the main outcomes, and proportion of adopting peer for the sample and by quintiles of 
proportions of adopting peers. For each variable, the table presents the mean for all the sample, adopters and non-adopters. 
Nadoption denotes the proportion of peers who adopted the improved variety. The table also presents the differences between 
adopters and non-adopter for all the variables. *** denotes significance at 1%. 
                                                          
48 The food consumption score (FCS) is highly correlated with the household dietary diversity score (HDDS) given that they 
both measure the frequency of consumption of different food groups at the household level (FAO 2010). However, whereas 
the FCS weights the various food groups based on nutrient quality, the HDDS uses the unweighted food groups in the 
computation. The limitation of these measures is that they do not provide information on food consumption, dietary diversity 
and specific nutrient intake of individuals in the household, which make them suitable only for household level analysis (FAO 
2010; WFP 2015).     
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The mean food consumption frequency is 34 for the entire sample, with the mean consumption 
of 35 for adopters, being significantly higher than the mean food consumption of 31 for non-
adopters. Similarly, adopters of the improved variety have significantly higher consumption 
frequencies of nutrient rich foods (i.e., vitamin A and protein rich foods). These observations 
motivate the empirical investigation, where there is significant unequal consumption 
frequencies of food and nutrient rich foods that appear to coincide with adoption status. 
 
Given the association between household adoption and food and nutrients consumption 
frequencies, we next explore whether peer adoption can possibly be associated with household 
food and nutrients consumption by providing descriptive statistics according to quintiles of peer 
adoption. The mean soybean yield increases from 552, 689 and 421 kgs/ac for the lowest 
quintile to 701, 740 and 442 kgs/ac for all the sample, adopters and non-adopters, respectively, 
in the top quintile, an increase that is statistically significant for all sample (p = 0.000) and only 
adopters (p = 0.015). The mean food consumption frequency also increases from 30, 34 and 25 
for the bottom quintile to 37, 37 and 39 for the top one for the entire sample, adopters and non-
adopters respectively, an increase which is statistically significant (p = 0.000).  However, the 
food consumption difference between adopters and non-adopters markedly narrows at the top 
quintile of peer adoption (p = 0.449).   
Similarly, the mean consumption frequencies of nutrient rich foods closely follow that of food 
consumption in general. While the consumption of vitamin A and protein rich foods by non-
adopters significantly increase from 7.3 and 2.2 for the bottom quintile to 14.4 and 5.2 for the 
top one, respectively, the consumption frequencies of adopters do not witness significant 
changes. The weaker correlation between peer adoption and yield of non-adopters and the 
stronger association between peer adoption and non-adopters’ food and nutrients consumption, 
suggest the possibility of stronger peer adoption effects in the form of risks sharing and private 
transfers when the farmer is not adopting.  
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We present definition, measurement and descriptive statistics of characteristics of the sample 
and peers in table 4.2. Of particular interest is panel B, which presents the main instrument, 
distance to the nearest soybean seed source used to identify household adoption of the improved 
variety. In our sample, the average distance from the household location to the nearest seed 
source is about 6 kilometres (km). Even though some households are located in less than 2 km 
to the nearest soybean seed source, the distance increases to an average of about 11 km for the 
households in the highest distance quintile in the sample (see Table 4.A1 in appendix A3). 
Panels C of table 4.2, shows that a household has an average of 65% of the peers being males, 
aged 44 years and with landholding of 2.7 hectares.  Also, 63% of a household’s peers of peers 
are males, aged 44 and with landholding of 2.7 hectares (panel D).  
 
4.4 Methodology 
4.4.1 Analytical framework 
The significant differences between the outcomes of adopters and non-adopters, and the 
heterogeneity in these outcomes across the distribution of adopting peers, shown in section 4.3, 
suggest the need for a framework that can estimate the effects of own adoption on these 
outcomes, while accounting for heterogeneity in gains from peer adoption, as well as other 
observed and unobserved characteristics of these farm households. Thus, we use the marginal 
treatment effects framework, which is based on the generalized Roy model (Heckman and 
Vytlacil 2005; Cornelissen et al. 2016; 2018).  
 
We assume that treatment (adoption) of a household, 𝑖, is a binary variable denoted by 𝐴𝑖, and 
the household’s potential outcome (e.g., yield, food and nutrients consumption) under the 
hypothetical situation of being an adopter (𝐴𝑖 = 1) and non-adopter (𝐴𝑖 = 0) as 𝑌1𝑖 and 𝑌0𝑖, 
respectively. Let 𝐴𝑗 represent peer adoption, with 𝜌1 and 𝜌0 as the parameter estimates showing 
the effects of peer (𝑗’s) adoption on own (𝑖) potential outcomes under the situation of the 
household adopting and not adopting, respectively.  
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Table 4.2. Variable definition, measurement and descriptive statistics 
Variables Definition and measurement Mean SD 
Panel A:    Household characteristics       
Adoption 1 if farmer adopted the improved variety; 0 otherwise 0.67 0.47 
Nadoption Proportion of peers who adopted the improved variety  0.69 0.01 
Sex 1 if male; 0 otherwise 0.59 0.49 
Age Age of farmer (years) 44.03 12.04 
Education Number of years in school 1.27 3.27 
Hsize Household size (number of persons) 5.64 2.14 
HLand Total land size of household (in hectares) 2.56 1.56 
HWealth Value of household durable assets in 10,000 GHS 1.29 2.00 
HRisk Risk of food insecurity (No. of months household was food inadequate) 0.93 1.37 
Soil fertility 4=fertile; 3=moderately fertile; 2=less fertile; and 1=infertile 2.97 0.97 
Seed use Quantity of soybean seeds used per acre in kilograms  9.58 4.37 
Fertilizer cost Cost of fertilizer applied per acre in GHS  151.4 226.1 
Pesticide cost Cost of pesticides applied per acre in GHS  1.45 5.26 
Weedicide cost Cost of weedicides applied per acre in GHS 22.52 37.18 
Machinery Log of machinery cost per acre 4.16 0.50 
Local wage rate Log of local wage rate per day 1.80 0.23 
Labor use Number of man-days per acre  14.95 10.21 
Extension 1 if ever had extension contact; 0 otherwise 0.34 0.47 
Farm revenue Total farm revenue of household in 1000 GHS 6.37 4.23 
Soybean income Net income from soybean in GHS calculated as total soybean revenue 
per acre minus the cost of seeds, fertilizer, weedicide, labor and 
machinery used on soybean farm per acre.  
  
Association Number of associations the farmer is a member in the community 1.07 1.27 
Town center Distance from community to main town center in kilometers 15.46 11.86 
    
Panel B:    Instruments   
SoySeed price Soybean seed price in GHS/kilograms 1.06 0.19 
SoySeed distance   Distance from household location to soybean seed source in kilometers 5.54 3.51 
NResident distance Average distance from farmer to peers’ residence in kilometers 5.33 3.48 
N2Resident 
distance 
Average distance from peers to peers of peers’ residence in kilometers 5.22 2.06 
    
Panel C:   Direct peer characteristics      
NSex Proportion of male peers  0.65 0.17 
NAge Average age of peers  43.65 4.37 
NEducation Average years of schooling of peers 1.58 1.12 
NHsize Average households’ size (number of persons) of peers 5.74 0.79 
NLandholding Average landholdings of peers  2.67 0.67 
NWealth Average value of household durable assets of peers (normalized) 0.03 0.34 
NSoil Average soil fertility of peers  3.02 0.31 
NExtension Proportion of peers with extension contact ever 0.38 0.15 
NFarm revenue Log of average total farm revenue of peers 8.55 0.52 
NSoySeed 
distance 
Average distance from peers’ household locations to soybean seed 
source in kilometers  
5.52 3.30 
    
Panel D:   Indirect peer characteristics          
N2Sex Proportion of male peers of peers 0.63 0.13 
N2Age Average age of peers of peers 43.73 3.82 
N2Education Average years of schooling of peers of peers 1.51 0.92 
N2Hsize Average households’ size (number of persons) of peers of peers 5.73 0.74 
N2Landholding Average landholdings of peers of peers 2.65 0.59 
N2Wealth Average value of household durable assets of peers of peers  0.04 0.31 
N2Soil Average soil fertility of peers of peers 3.01 0.29 
N2Extension Proportion of peers of peers with extension contact ever 0.38 0.14 
N2Farm revenue Log of average total farm revenue of peers of peers 8.56 0.51 
N2SoySeed 
distance 
Average distance from peers of peers household locations to soybean 
seed source in kilometers  
5.51 3.28 
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Also, let 𝑋𝑖 denote a vector of farmer and household characteristics, with 𝜂1 and 𝜂0 being the 
associated vector of parameter estimates under the situation of being an adopter and non-
adopter, respectively; 𝐺𝑖 represents a vector of village characteristics and network fixed effects. 
Given these definitions, we model the potential outcomes as 
 𝑌1𝑖 = 𝜌1(𝐴𝑗) + 𝜂1(𝑋𝑖) +  𝐺𝑖
′𝜏 + 𝑈1𝑖,  
(1)  
 𝑌0𝑖 = 𝜌0(𝐴𝑗) +  𝜂0(𝑋𝑖) + 𝐺𝑖
′𝜏 + 𝑈0𝑖  
 
where 𝜏 is a vector of parameters to be estimated, while  𝑈1𝑖 and 𝑈0𝑖 represent deviations from 
the mean and are assumed to have means of zero. The peer adoption variable, 𝐴𝑗, is obtained 
by multiplying the adoption variable, 𝐴𝑖, by the 𝑖th row of the social network matrix 𝑁(𝑣) 
[i.e., 𝑁𝑖(𝑣)𝐴𝑖], which we discussed in subsection 4.3.2  
We express adoption decision of 𝑖 in the following latent variable (i.e., 𝐴𝑖
∗) discrete choice 
model: 
(2) 𝐴𝑖
∗ = Θ𝐴(𝐴𝑗 , 𝑋𝑖, 𝐺𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖) − 𝑖  with 𝐴𝑖 = {
1 if 𝐴𝑖
∗ ≥ 0 
 0  otherwise
 
where 𝐴𝑖 is a binary indicator that equals 1 if household 𝑖 adopts the improved soybean variety 
and zero otherwise. The other variables are as defined earlier, and 𝑅𝑖 is an instrument excluded 
from eq. (1), and used to identify the effect of household adoption decisions on the outcomes. 
Θ𝐴 is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 𝑖 is an i.i.d. error term, and because it enters the 
selection equation with a negative sign, it represents the unobserved characteristics, also 
referred to as resistance, that make individuals less likely to adopt.  
 
If we assume a cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of 𝑖 as Φ( 𝑖), then the mean part of eq. 
(2) [i.e., Θ𝐴(. )] will represent the propensity score of adoption [defined as Φ(Θ𝐴(. ))≡ 𝑃(𝑍)], 
which is based on the observed characteristics. The c.d.f. of 𝑖 represents the quantiles of 
distribution of the unobserved resistance to adoption [defined as Φ( 𝑖) ≡ 𝑈𝐴]. A farm household 
will adopt, if the propensity score of adoption is greater than the unobserved resistance to 
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adoption [i.e., Φ(Θ𝐴(. )) ≥ Φ( 𝑖)]. Given the propensity score and eq. (1), we can estimate the 
outcome equation as a function of the observed regressors (𝐴𝑗 , 𝑋𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 , 𝐺𝑖) and the propensity 
score 𝑃(𝑍) as   
 𝐸[𝑌|𝐴𝑗 = 𝑎, 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥,   𝐺𝑖 = 𝑔,  𝑃(𝑍) = 𝑝] 
(3) 
  = 𝐴𝑗𝜌0 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝜂0 + 𝐺𝑖𝜏 + 𝐴𝑗
′(𝜌1 − 𝜌0)𝑝 + 𝑋𝑖
′(𝜂1 − 𝜂0)𝑝 + 𝐸(𝑈1𝑖 − 𝑈1𝑖)𝑝 
 
where 𝑌 = 𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖, (𝜌1 − 𝜌0)𝑝 and (𝜂1 − 𝜂0)𝑝 measure the returns to adoption for 
households with different levels of peer adopters, 𝐴𝑗 , and other observable covariates, 𝑋𝑖, 
respectively. These observed gains could be positive or negative depending on whether 
households with higher values (such as more adopting peers) have higher or lower than average 
returns to adoption (Carneiro et al. 2011). 𝐸(𝑈1𝑖 − 𝑈1𝑖)𝑝 represents the returns to adoption due 
to unobserved ability of the household. Suppose that 𝑌 is yield, a positive (negative) effect of 
𝐸(𝑈1𝑖 − 𝑈1𝑖)𝑝 will imply a negative (positive) selection on unobserved gains.  
 
Following Heckman and Vytlaci (2005) and Cornelissen et al. (2018) we obtain the marginal 
treatment effects (MTE) for 𝐴𝑗 , 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑈𝐴 = 𝑝 by taking the derivative of eq. (3) with respect 
to 𝑝 as  
(4) MTE(𝑎, 𝑥, 𝑝) =
𝜕𝐸[𝑌| .  , 𝑃(𝑍)=𝑝]
𝜕𝑝
= 𝐴𝑗
′(𝜌1 − 𝜌0) + 𝑋𝑖
′(𝜂1 − 𝜂0) +
𝜕𝐾(𝑝)
𝜕𝑝
 
where 𝐾(𝑝) is a nonlinear function of the propensity score. Equation (4) suggests that treatment 
effects heterogeneity can result from both observed and unobserved characteristics. Estimation 
of the treatment effects requires a first-stage in which the instrument, 𝑅𝑖, in eq. (2) causes 
variation in the probability of adoption, conditional on the observed characteristics [i.e., 𝑅𝑖 ⊥
(𝑈0𝑖, 𝑈1𝑖, 𝑖)|(𝐴𝑗, 𝑋𝑖, 𝐺𝑖)]. Given the exclusion instrument, we estimate a first-stage probit eq. 
(2) to obtain estimates of the propensity score ?̂? = Φ(Θ𝐴(. )). Modeling 𝐾(?̂?) as a polynomial 
in degree 2, we estimate the marginal treatment effects (MTE), using the local instrumental 
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variable (IV) estimator by expressing eq. (3) as a function of observed regressors (𝐴𝑗 , 𝑋𝑖, 𝐺𝑖) 
and the propensity score 𝑃(𝑍). This is specified as 
 
(5) 𝑌 = 𝐴𝑗𝜌0 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝜂0 + 𝐺𝑖𝜏 + 𝐴𝑗(𝜌1 − 𝜌0)?̂? + 𝑋𝑖
′(𝜂1 − 𝜂0)?̂? + 𝐾(?̂?) + 𝜇𝑖 
 
 
where 𝐾(?̂?) is a non-linear function of the propensity score and 𝜇𝑖 is the error term. Equation 
(5) expresses the returns to adoption for an individual with adopting peers  𝐴𝑗 = 𝑎, and 
observed characteristics 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥, who is in the 𝑈𝐴th quantile of the distribution of . We compute 
the unconditional treatment effects of household adoption [i.e., the average treatment effects 
(ATE), treatment effects on the treated (TT) and treatment effects on the untreated (TUT)] by 
aggregating the MTE over the 𝑈𝐴 and the appropriate distributions of the covariates. Given our 
interest in evaluating policy intervention that seeks to subsidize soybean seed price or reduce 
distance to soybean seeds source, we also use the Policy Relevant Treatment Effects (PRTE) to 
estimate the aggregate effects of such policy changes (Heckman and Vytlacil 2005) (refer to 
appendix A1 for expression of these treatment effects measures).  
 
4.4.2 Exclusion restriction and identification of the peer effect  
The first identification concerns are issues of standard endogeneity and omitted variable biases 
of own adoption in eq. (1), due to the fact that own adoption is endogenously determined. Our 
strategy for dealing with this is to rely on the distance of the household to the closest source of 
soybean seeds, and not necessarily where soybean seeds are actually purchased. We argue that 
distance to soybean seed source indicates the availability of the soybean seeds in the district, 
and will likely alter the relative cost of adoption by a household (see also Suri 2011). Thus, 
households located close to improved soybean seed source will have lower costs and possibly 
higher net benefits from adoption, which will make them more likely to adopt than those not 
closer. We further argue that distance to soybean seed source is not directly related to our 
outcome variables, except through the effect on adoption, because the main sources of the 
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improved soybean variety are agricultural input dealers some of who are located in the district 
capitals (CSIR-SARI 2013)49.  
Two main possible concerns about the exogeneity of our instrument are that; if soybean seed 
dealers chose their location strategically close to their buyers, and if households’ location was 
endogenously determined based on the location of input dealers. In respect of the first concern, 
we show that this is not the case with results of t-test of differences in means, across different 
distance bandwidths, for variables at the village level, household levels and the outcomes in 
table 4.A1 in appendix A3. The tests suggest that villages and households located closer to 
soybean seed source are not systematically different from those located further away. The 
second concern is not likely the case, because soybean is not the main crop cultivated by these 
households and thus, it is unlikely that a household will change location because it wants to 
access improved soybean seeds. Table 4.A1 further shows no significant difference in distance 
and adoption status among households who changed location over the past 5 and 10 years as at 
the time of the interviews.  
The next critical issue of identification is the peer effects in eqs. (1) and (2). The first concern 
is the endogeneity of the peer effects. First, the peer adoption effect (i.e., 𝐴𝑗), in eq. (1) cannot 
generally be consistently estimated, especially with OLS, because of the correlation of the error 
term in this equation with this term [i.e., cov(𝐴𝑗 , 𝑈1,0𝑖) ≠ 0], possibly due to the omitted effects 
of the peer outcomes (Acemoglu et al. 2015). The second aspect is that, the estimation of own 
                                                          
49 Of course, distance to seed source could be correlated with distance to town centre, where households who have their closest 
seed source located in the town centre inadvertently live closer to the town centre and therefore more likely to be wealthy 
and to be able to buy or trade for food, increasing food security. This could threaten our identification strategy because 
distance to soybean source in this case can affect our outcomes through closeness to town centre and household wealth, and 
not only through adoption. For this reason, we controlled for distance to town centre and household wealth in all 
specifications.    
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and peer adoption (𝐴𝑗 is endogenous effect) in eq. (2) poses endogeneity concerns because of 
the Manski’s (1993) “reflection problem” and correlated unobservables [i.e., cov(𝐴𝑗 , 𝑖) ≠ 0]. 
The reflection problem is the result of the coexistence of the endogenous peer effect and the 
contextual effect in eq. (2)50. 
In order to identify the contextual effect in eq. (1), and the contextual and endogenous effects 
in eq. (2), we follow the approaches of Bramoullé et al. (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2015), 
who use the average characteristics of peers of peers [i.e., 𝑁2(𝑣)] as an instrument for the 
average adoption of peers. Intuitively, since the characteristics of a household’s peers of peers 
are correlated with the behavior and outcome of the household’s peers, but are exogenous to 
the behavior and outcome of the household, these satisfy the exclusion restriction of being valid 
instruments for the adoption decision of the household’s peers (see Appendix A2 for a case on 
social network structures and identification of peer effects). Two key requirements for the use 
of this strategy are that the peers of peers characteristics (such as distance to soybean seed 
source by peers of peers) that are used as instruments should be uncorrelated with the instrument 
used to identify own adoption, and that the peers of peers instrument must be independent of 
own outcomes, except through average peer adoption (Acemoglu et al. 2015).  
However, given that our main instrument is the distance to soybean seed source, it is likely that 
the household’s own distance to seed source will be correlated with the average distance to 
soybean seed source by peers of peers. As a result, we use the average distance between the 
residence of the household’s peers and the peers of peers as an instrument to identify the effect 
of average peer adoption on household own adoption and the outcomes. The reasoning is that, 
when farmers are residentially close to each other, they are more likely to interact and exchange 
                                                          
50 These identification issues are discussed in the social networks and peer effects literature (Bramoullé et al. 2009; Acemoglu 
et al. 2015; De Giorgi et al. 2020). The formal development of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. We refer the 
reader to Acemoglu et al. (2015) for the formal development and identification problems therein.    
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information and resources, which can increase the likelihood of them influencing the behavior 
and decisions of each other. Thus, if a farmer has geographically closed peers whose closer 
peers have new and more access to information about the improved variety, that farmer could 
receive this information and advice from the peers of peers through the farmer’s peers.    
Indeed, whereas the distance to soybean seed source of peers of peers appears to be highly 
correlated with own distance (0.942), the average distance between the residence of farmer’s 
peers and the peers of peers is uncorrelated with own distance to the seed source (0.010) as 
shown in table 4.A2. To test the second assumption, we followed the approach of Di Falco et 
al. (2011) by regressing the outcomes of non-adopters on the own and average peer adoption 
instruments in table 4.A3. Whereas the estimate generally show that these instruments do not 
significantly correlate with the outcomes, tables 4.B1.1 and 4.C1-4.C3 in the supplementary 
material show that the instruments significantly explain average peer adoption and own 
adoption, respectively.  
 
Thus, to account for the endogeneity of peer adoption, we regress peer adoption on own, 𝑋𝑖, 
and peer characteristics (𝑁𝑖(𝑣)𝑋𝑖), as well as the characteristics of the peer of peers (𝑁𝑖
2(𝑣)𝑋𝑖), 
obtain the predicted peer adoption, and use this as the peer adoption variable in the outcome 
(eq.1) and selection (eq.2) equations (see table 4.B1.1 in appendix B1). Finally, we partly 
capture correlated effects by including village dummies to account for network fixed effects 𝐺𝑖 
(i.e., individuals self-select into networks based on network-specific characteristics). To 
account for correlated effects at the link formation level, we estimated a network formation 
model and inserted the predicted generalized residuals of this model into eqs. (1) and (2) as 
control functions (Brock and Durlauf 2001) (see Appendix B2.).    
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4.5 Empirical Results  
4.5.1 First-stage adoption  
Table 4.3 reports the marginal effects estimates of the first-stage probit selection model in 
column (1) for soybean yield, and in column (2) for food and nutrients consumption. The 
distance to the closest soybean seed source is a strong predictor of adoption, and as expected, 
the coefficients of the distance suggest a strong relationship between the availability of the 
improved seeds and the decision to adopt.  
 
Table 4.3. First-stage adoption results of yield and food and nutrients consumption 
specifications  
 (1) 
Yield  
 (2) 
Food and nutrients  
Coefficient S. E. Coefficient S. E. 
𝚯𝑨 𝚯𝑨 
Nadoption (Predicted)      0.168*** 0.047       0.110** 0.049 
Sex      0.050 0.052       0.011 0.053 
Age  -0.002 0.001   -0.002 0.001 
Education      0.002 0.008       0.004 0.008 
Hsize  -0.035** 0.013   -0.041*** 0.013 
HLand      0.052** 0.022       0.041* 0.021 
HWealth (predicted)      0.163*** 0.045       0.169*** 0.045 
Soil fertility      0.022 0.026       0.038 0.027 
Seed use  -0.014** 0.006   -0.015** 0.006 
Fertilizer cost   -1.8E-5    7.0E-5   -3.9E-5    6.0E-5 
Pesticide cost      0.001 0.004       0.003 0.004 
Weedicide cost      3.6E-4 0.001   -2.6E-5 0.001 
Machinery  -0.006 0.052   -0.066 0.059 
Labor use      0.001 0.002       0.001 0.002 
Extension (predicted)      0.568*** 0.110       0.572*** 0.108 
Soy selling price      0.166 0.203       0.088 0.194 
Farm revenue (predicted)         0.270*** 0.070 
Residuals_NWLink  -0.054 0.034   -0.046 0.034 
   Local wage rate      0.137 0.101   -0.266* 0.151 
   Network Fes       Yes         Yes  
   Town center      0.004* 0.002       0.005** 0.002 
   NSex  -0.240 0.151   -0.498*** 0.163 
   NAge      0.003 0.005       0.002 0.005 
   NLand  -0.098** 0.040   -0.116** 0.040 
   SoySeed Distance    -0.478*** 0.089   -0.483*** 0.094 
   N2SoySeed Distance      0.147*** 0.027       0.144*** 0.029 
   SoySeed price  -0.481** 0.193   -0.497** 0.194 
      
The table reports the first-stage adoption results of the yield equation in column (1) and food and nutrients consumption equation in 
columns (2). The estimates are marginal effects from probit selection model of adoption decisions (first-stage eq. 2). Our instrument 
is distance to soybean seed source, which is normalized about its overall mean. Θ𝐴 is a vector of parameter estimates from equation 
(2). Network FEs is network fixed effects and Residuals_NWLink is residuals of the link formation model. S.E. are bootstrapped 
standard errors with 50 replications. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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As expected, the soybean seed price shows a strong negative correlation with the decision to 
adopt. We also report the chi-squared test of the excluded instruments at the bottom panels of 
these tables, and based on this, we can, throughout, reject the hypotheses that the excluded 
instruments are not relevant. The results suggest that there is a strong and significant 
relationship between the adoption decisions of peers and one’s own decision to adopt the 
improved variety. To facilitate interpretation, we normalize peer adoption over its mean. 
Specifically, a standard deviation (SD) increase in the number of adopters of the improved 
variety among a household’s peers, raises the probability of the household’s (own) adoption by 
at least about 11 percentage points. The estimated peer adoption effects correct for the potential 
endogeneity of the peer adoption variable by using predicted peer adoptions, and account for 
correlated unobservables with the network fixed effects and residuals of the link formation 
model (Residuals_NWLink) in all specifications.  
 
The first-stage probit generates a large common support for the propensity score P(Z) and this 
ranges from 0.1 to at least 0.99 (figure 4.1) for both soybean yield (part A) and food and 
nutrients (part B). This satisfies the requirement that the instrument should generate enough 
common support for the estimation of the MTE (Cornelissen, et al. 2016).  
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Figure 4.1 Common support for Soybean yield and food and nutrition security  
 
The figure plots the frequency distribution of the propensity score by adopters and non-adopters. The 
propensity score is predicted from the baseline first-stage regressions. Part A is based on the regression for 
soybean yield and part B is based on the regressions on food and nutrition. We have two different specification 
of the first-stage equation, and thus the two propensity score plots because we included extension contact in 
both the selection and the outcome stages in the yield equation, but included it only in the first-stage of the food 
and nutrients consumption equations. The reason is that whereas extension was conceived as having potential 
effects on both adoption and yield directly, we considered the effect of extension on food and nutrients 
consumption will be through farm income which we controlled for.  
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4.5.2 Summary treatment effects and marginal treatment effects of household adoption 
We report the summary treatment effect estimates of eq. (5) in panel A of table 4.4 (refer to 
table 4.C1-4.C3 in appendix C for the complete estimates). The ATE indicates that for a 
soybean producing household chosen at random from the population of soybean producing 
households, adopting the improved variety increases soybean yield by 61 percentage points. 
Our results for the TT imply that for an average adopting household, adoption significantly 
results in about 77 percentage points increase in soybean yield.  In the TUT case, for an average 
non-adopting household, adoption would significantly increase soybean yield of the household 
by 28 percentage points. 
 
    Table 4.4. Aggregate Treatment effects of adoption on Yield, food and nutrients 
consumption  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Yield Food Vitamin A Protein 
Panel A     
ATE       0.606*** 
(0.095) 
      0.294*** 
 (0.080) 
      0.526*** 
(0.121) 
      1.041*** 
(0.198) 
TT       0.772*** 
(0.149) 
    0.299** 
(0.118) 
      0.596*** 
(0.173) 
      1.128*** 
(0.284) 
TUT    0.278** 
(0.098) 
      0.283*** 
(0.078) 
     0.384*** 
(0.089) 
      0.864*** 
(0.185) 
     
Panel B     
Nadoption 𝜌0   -0.051 
     (0.033) 
    0.087** 
(0.033) 
      0.198*** 
(0.049) 
      0.292*** 
(0.086) 
TE for Nadoption (𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?       0.128** 
     (0.051) 
 -0.107*** 
(0.034) 
   -0.214*** 
(0.055) 
    -0.346*** 
(0.087) 
     
p-values for essential 
heterogeneity 
0.010 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Observations 500 500 500 500 
Notes: The table reports the average treatment effect (ATE), average treatment effect on the treated (TT), average 
treatment effect on the untreated (TUT), effect of peer adoption (i.e., Nadoption 𝜌0), treatment effect of peer adoption, 
[i.e., TE for Nadoption (𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?] using the baseline specification and the 𝜌’s are as defined in equations (1) and (3). 
The yield column (1) refers to the soybean yield equation. The food, vitamin A and protein columns (2 to 4) refer to 
the food consumption, and vitamin A and protein rich food consumption equation (estimates of other variables are in 
tables 4.C1 to 4.C3). The p-value for the test of essential heterogeneity tests for a nonzero slope of the MTE curve. 
Bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications are reported in parentheses. The asterisks ***, ** and * are 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
Similarly, for a soybean producing household picked at random from the soybean producing 
population, adoption of the improved variety increases food and nutrients consumption from 
29 percentage points, for food, to about 104 percentage points for protein. These estimated 
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parameters are all statistically significant at the 1% level. Also, the TT estimates show that for 
an average adopting household, adoption results in 30 percentage points increase in food 
consumption, and 60 to 113 percentage points increase in nutrients consumption. These 
parameters are significantly different from zero, at least, at the 5% level. The significance of 
adoption is still observed, even in the untreated case, where the food and nutrients consumption 
of non-adopters will increase by 28 to 86 percentage points, if they adopt the improved variety.  
 
The summary measures of treatment effects suggest possible treatment effect heterogeneity 
among soybean producing households. In particular, all parameter estimates in table 4.4 show 
that the TT is greater than the ATE, which is also greater than the TUT. This is suggestive of 
positive selection on gains, where individuals who are more likely to adopt (perhaps because 
of their innate ability or variation in the quality of adoption and production conditions) tend to 
benefit more from adoption in terms of yield and food/nutrients consumption. However, as 
indicated earlier, these summary measures mask such treatment effects heterogeneity and thus, 
we show the marginal treatment effects (MTEs) in figures 4.2. These figures relate the 
unobserved parts of the outcomes ( 𝑈1 −  𝑈0) to that of the adoption decision ( 𝑈𝐴). Higher 
values of  𝑈𝐴 imply lower probabilities of adoption (i.e., higher resistance to adoption).  
 
The MTE curves decline with increasing resistance to treatment in all instances, and indicate a 
pattern of positive selection on gains. In effect, given the unobserved characteristics, 
households who are most likely to adopt the improved variety appear to benefit the most from 
adoption. Thus, the slopes of the MTE curves in each case suggest a pattern of heterogeneity in 
returns to adoption, that is significantly different from zero at the 5% level (see the p-values for 
the test of essential heterogeneity at the bottom of table 4.4). Part A of figure 4.2 depicts the 
MTE for yield and shows that for households who are more likely to adopt than the average 
household ( 𝑈𝐴 < 0.5), their returns to adoption are higher than the average household albeit not 
significantly different from the returns to adoption of an average household. For the households 
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with higher resistance to adoption than the average household, their yield returns to adoption is 
significantly lower than that of the average household selected at random for the 30% of 
households with the highest resistance to adoption ( 𝑈𝐴 > 0.7). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 MTE curves for soybean yield  
 
The figure shows the marginal treatment effect (MTE) curves for yield, food and nutrient rich food consumption at the 
average values of the covariates based on specifications in equations (4 and 5). U_A denotes unobserved resistance to 
treatment/adoption. Part A is the MTE curve for soybean yield. Part B depicts the MTE curve for food consumption, part C 
shows the MTE curve for vitamin A rich foods consumption and part D is the MTE curve for protein rich foods consumption. 
The dashed lines are the average treatment effects (ATE). The 95% confidence interval (95% CI) is based on bootstrapped 
standard errors with 50 replications. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 also shows there is clear heterogeneity in returns to adoption in terms of food and 
nutrients consumption. We observe a similar pattern of positive selection on gains, with returns 
to adoption significantly higher than the average household, at least, for the 20%, for food 
consumption, and 25% for nutrients consumption of households who are most likely to adopt. 
Figure 4.2 further shows that returns to adoption in terms of food and nutrients consumption 
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decrease and fall below that of the average soybean producing household, for the households 
with over 33% (i.e.,  𝑈𝐴 > 0.33) resistance to adoption.  
 
In order to probe for the source of this treatment effect heterogeneities, we check whether the 
positive gains on selection on unobserved characteristics (i.e.,  𝑈1 −  𝑈0| 𝑈𝐴 =  𝑢𝐴) are because 
of heterogeneity in the outcomes when not adopting [i.e., upward sloping in 𝐸( 𝑌0| 𝑈𝐴 =  𝑢𝐴)], 
when adopting [i.e., downward sloping 𝐸( 𝑌1| 𝑈𝐴 =  𝑢𝐴)], or both. We report the plot of  𝑌1 and 
 𝑌0 for the various outcomes in figure 4.C1. The figure shows, across all outcomes that, the 
differences in the outcomes are driven by worse outcomes in the non-adoption state, as shown 
by the increasing dashed-dotted lines. However, the outcomes in the adoption state (i.e., dotted 
lines) are more homogenous throughout.  
 
4.5.3 Treatment effect heterogeneity in peer adoption  
For easy reference, we report the estimates of peer adoption effects in panel B of table 4.4, 
where we first present the effect for the case when the household is not adopting (i.e., 𝜌0) and 
when the household is adopting [i.e., (𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?]. The results show that in the non-adoption 
state, a standard deviation increase in the number of adopting peers of the improved soybean 
variety, is associated with a decrease in one’s own soybean yield, although not statistically 
significant. However, the treatment effect of peer adoption is significantly positive and 
increases own yield by about 13 percentage points.  
 
In respect of food and nutrients consumption, the results show that when not adopting, a 
standard deviation increase in peer adoption increases food consumption of the household by 9 
percentage points, and consumption of vitamin A and protein rich foods by 20 and 29 
percentage points, respectively. These effects are significant at least at the 5% level, and suggest 
that non-adopting households benefit from their adopting peers in terms of enhanced food and 
nutrients consumption. Interestingly, when the household adopts, the treatment effect of a 
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standard deviation increase in adopting peers is negative (i.e., (𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?), suggesting that 
household adoption of the improved variety significantly reduces the heterogeneity in food and 
nutrients consumption due to adopting peers by 11, 21 and 35 percentage points for food, 
vitamin A and protein consumption, respectively. These results indicate that households with 
more (fewer) adopting peers tend to gain more in terms of increased soybean yields (food and 
nutrients consumption), when they adopt than their counterparts with fewer (more) adopting 
peers.  This is not surprising because as shown in table 4.1, non-adopters appear to have lower 
yields and food consumption.  
 
4.5.4 Effect mechanisms  
Given the generally positive effects of adoption of the improved variety on yields, food and 
nutrients consumption, we next investigate the mechanisms by which adoption can affect food 
and nutrients consumption in particular. Our conceptual framework suggests that own adoption 
can enhance consumption through increased yields and changes in household income, 
consumption of own production, food prices and intra-household dynamics51. This analysis is 
shown explicitly in table 4.5, where we first estimate the levels and heterogeneity effects of 
gains in yield from adoption on soybean income, food and nutrients consumption (cols. 1-4). 
The estimates reveal a significantly positive association between gains in yield and income 
from soybean. In particular, a log percentage point increase in yield from adoption of the 
improved variety significantly increases the gains in soybean income by over GHS 700 [i.e., 
(𝜂1 − 𝜂0)𝑝], which is about 30% higher than the mean soybean income of non-adopters.  
 
                                                          
51 Given the macro nature of food prices and the focus of the analysis on farm level links, and the limitation of data on the 
sources of households’ food and nutrients consumption (i.e., whether from own production or purchases), we are unable to 
show the effects of changes in food prices and consumption of own produce on food and nutrients consumption.  
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In addition, food and nutrients consumption gains from increased yield due to adoption is 
positive, but significant for food and vitamin A and not for protein. This is expected, given that 
soybean is not a staple food consumed by households, but a crop that is primarily produced for 
sale to enhance household income. Following this, we next check the effects on food and 
nutrients consumption given income gains from adoption (cols. 5-7). In effect, whereas at the 
non-adoption state increase in household income is significantly and positively associated with 
increased food and nutrients consumption, the nutrients consumption, in particular, is 
significantly higher for non-adopters when they adopt, as revealed by the negative treatment 
effects for income.  
 
Table 4.5. Estimates of effects mechanisms 
Soybean  (1) 
Soybean 
income 
(2) 
Food 
(3) 
Vitamin A 
(4) 
Protein 
(5) 
Food 
(6) 
Vitamin A 
(7) 
Protein 
Yield 𝜂0 653.4*** 
(34.1) 
 0.084 
(0.208) 
 0.027 
(0.335) 
 0.112 
(0.545) 
   
TE for Yield 
(𝜂1 − 𝜂0)?̂? 
764.5*** 
(50.6) 
 0.467* 
(0.247) 
 0.833** 
(0.414) 
 1.057 
(0.740) 
   
        
Income 𝜂0      0.211*** 
(0.069) 
 0.476*** 
(0.143) 
 0.545*** 
(0.163) 
TE for Income 
(𝜂1 − 𝜂0)?̂? 
    -0.030 
(0.079) 
-0.395** 
(0.165) 
-0.497** 
(0.196) 
        
Sex 𝜂0      0.103* 
(0.055) 
 0.148 
(0.102) 
 0.140 
(0.117) 
TE for Sex 
(𝜂1 − 𝜂0)?̂? 
    -0.905 
(0.069) 
-0.130 
(0.126) 
-0.126 
(0.158) 
        
Observations    500   500   500   500   500   500    500 
Notes: the table shows the effect pathways of adoption of the improved soybean variety. 𝜂0 presents effects of yield and 
income on soybean income and food and nutrients consumption when the household is not adopting as in equations 
(3). (𝜂1 − 𝜂0)?̂? shows the treatment effects on consumption due to yield and income gains from adoption also as in equation 
(3). TE denotes treatment effects. 
 
 
We also noted in the conceptual framework that the effect of agricultural production on food 
and nutrients consumption can be mediated by gender-related issues (Carletto et al 2015). 
Interestingly, table 4.5 shows that the treatment effect of adoption is not statistically significant 
across gender for all the outcomes, although the negative sign suggests females tend to benefit 
more from adoption in terms of food and nutrients consumption compared to males. This 
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finding confirms that the main mechanism by which adoption affects food and nutrients 
consumption is through increased soybean yields and household income. It further suggests that 
the attenuating treatment effects of peers observed when a farmer adopts can be attributed to 
increased household income following own adoption.    
 
4.5.5 Policy strategies 
Our results so far, have demonstrated that adoption of the improved variety does not only lead 
to increased soybean yield, but also contributes to increasing food and nutrients consumption 
of not only adopters, but that of non-adopters should they adopt. This implies that policies that 
seek to overcome structural barriers and induce people to adopt can be much rewarding. Thus, 
we show the effects of a policy that reduces soybean seed price by 50% (in line with current 
Government policy in Ghana), and a policy that reduces the distance of the household to the 
nearest soybean seed source to a maximum of four kilometres, using the policy-relevant 
treatment effects (PRTE). Whereas the subsidy policy seeks to improve affordability, the 
distance policy attempts to enhance availability of the seeds of the improved variety. 
 
Table 4.6 (col. 1) shows the propensity score at the baseline policy, columns (2) and (3) show 
the propensity scores and the PRTE, respectively, for soybean seed price subsidy, and columns 
(4) and (5) show the propensity scores and PRTE, respectively, for the policy of reducing 
distance to soybean seed source. The estimates show that subsidizing soybean seed price by 
50%, and reducing the distance to soybean seed source to a maximum of four kilometres shift 
households with high unobserved resistance to adoption into adoption, and as a result 
significantly increase soybean yield by 42 and 36 percentage points, respectively, per household 
shifted from non-adoption into adoption. The magnitude of the price subsidy effect on yield is 
higher than that of the distance to seed source. We find statistically significant policy effects 
for both policies in food and nutrients consumption, but with marginally higher effects for the 
reduction in distance to seed source. These findings show that, whereas reducing distance to 
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soybean seeds source appears to be more effective in promoting food and nutrients consumption 
through adoption than the price subsidy, the subsidy appears to produce higher yield effect than 
the policy of reducing the distance to soybean seed source.   
 
Table 4.6.  Policy simulations of the effects of changes in soybean price and distance 
to soybean seed source on soybean yield, food and nutrients consumption 
  Soybean seed price  Distance seed source 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
 Baseline 
propensity 
score 
Policy 
propensity 
score 
PRTE  Policy 
propensity 
score 
PRTE 
Soybean yield 0.664 0.819     0.421*** 
(0.082) 
 0.829       0.361*** 
(0.109) 
Food 0.665 0.823     0.205*** 
(0.055) 
 0.828       0.275*** 
(0.055) 
Vitamin A 0.665 0.823       0.323*** 
(0.078) 
 0.828       0.373*** 
(0.072) 
Protein 0.665 0.823       0.733*** 
(0.099) 
 0.828       0.859*** 
(0.109) 
Notes: The table presents the policy-relevant treatment effects (PRTE) per net household shift into 
adoption for two different policies. Column 1 reports the baseline propensity score, and columns 2 and 4 report 
the increase in the propensity induced by the soybean price subsidy and increase proximity to seed source, 
respectively, based on the baseline specification for the various outcomes. Columns 3 and 5 are the policy-
relevant treatment effects for the soybean seed and seed proximity policies respectively. Bootstrapped standard 
errors (50 replications) are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *** indicates significance at 1% level.  
 
 
4.5.6 Robustness  
In order to examine the robustness of our estimates, we examine the sensitivity of our results to 
changes in alternative specifications of the MTE functional form, outcome and selection 
equations, as well as in the peer effects. We first consider the baseline pattern of our MTE curve 
of positive selection on gains. This is because the estimation of the MTE depends on the 
functional form assumptions invoked, and also the MTE obtained under different functional 
form assumptions may yield different weighted effects of the instrument (i.e., IV effects) 
(Heckman and Vytlaci, 2005). In figure 4.C2 in appendix C, we present MTE curves that 
include specifications based on the parametric normal model (which assumes returns to 
adoption decreases monotonically with resistance to adoption), parametric cubic and a 
semiparametric approach. These curves suggest that the basic shape of the MTE curve is robust 
 
191 
 
to different functional forms, and generally show a similar pattern as in the baseline 
specification.   
 
We next consider the sensitivity of our ATE, TT and TUT to different specifications, as these 
put most weights in different segments of the MTE, and therefore could be sensitive to changes 
in the estimated MTE (Carneiro, et al. 2011). In panel A of table 4.C5, we present estimates 
from a model where we control for other contextual peer effects (i.e., peers’ sex, age, 
landholding and soil fertility) in the outcome equations (cols. 1-3) to assess whether the 
observed peer and treatment effects could be driven by contextual effects or correlation in soil 
conditions between farmers and their peers. In columns 4 to 6, we present estimates of a 
specification that excludes the effects of peer adoption to examine these estimates under the 
stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA)52. The estimates are marginally low and high 
for yield and food consumption (col. 4-6), and suggest expansion and attenuation biases, 
respectively, albeit similar in directions and significance to the baseline estimates.  
 
In columns 1 to 3 of panel B, we report estimates when estimating the first-stage with a squared 
term of distance to nearest soybean seed source as additional instrument to account for the fact 
that at longer distances to seed sources, the probability of adoption will become very low. In 
columns 4 to 6 of panel B, we interact distance to soybean seed source with household wealth 
and household size, because the effect of our instrument is likely to vary across households, 
based on their observed resource status (Carneiro, et al. 2011). Table 4.C6 reports results that 
show the sensitivity of the estimates to the use of standard errors clustered at the village level 
in columns (1) to (3) (Cameron, et al. 2008), and when we control for mobile phone network 
                                                          
52 The SUTVA requires that the potential outcomes of treatment observed on one farm household should not be affected by the 
treatment of other farm households. The inclusion of the peer adoption effects violates this assumption but Manski (2013) 
provides characterization of bounds on the treatment effects under social interactions, and thus our estimates should be 
interpreted as bounds and not necessarily as the point estimates.  
 
192 
 
coverage in the village in columns (4) and (5). In order to show the sensitivity of the results to 
changes in the measure of household food consumption, we report treatment effects of adoption 
on household dietary diversity in column (6) of table 4.C6 (FAO 2010). In spite of these 
exercises, the treatment effects estimates remain qualitatively similar to those reported in table 
4.4. 
 
Finally, table 4.C7, columns (1) to (3) of panel A explore the sensitivity of the estimates to peer 
effects through means other than peer adoption. Recall from subsection 4.3.2 that links in our 
networks are defined using social and farm plot proxies, and some of these (such as labor and 
land exchanges) can present effects similar to peer adoption effects. We explore this by 
accounting for household (node) degree, which is the total number of connections a household 
has in the network. A related concern is the issue of the use of the sampled networks which 
truncate the number of households’ social connections and could lead to important links and 
nodes not observed, which can bias the estimates (Chandrasekhar and Lewis 2016).  
 
In order to examine the sensitivity of our estimates to this issue, we follow the approach of Liu 
et al. (2017) by re-running our models without households with links with all the 5 randomly 
matched households to them. Finally, in columns (1) to (3) of panel B, we report estimates with 
difference in adopting peers of a household between a year after the introduction of the 
improved variety (i.e., 2004) and the 2016 cropping season. The results of these exercises 
remain very similar to our baseline results in table 4.4, suggesting that our findings of the pattern 
of selection and the treatment effects are robust to various functional forms and specifications.  
 
4.6 Discussion 
We find significant effects of household adoption on yield, food and nutrients consumption as 
expected, which can be partly attributed to the yield, income and agro-climatic advantages of 
the improved over the traditional variety (CSIR-SARI, 2013). The high magnitudes of these 
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effects, especially on food and nutrients consumption can be explained by the interplay of two 
factors: one is the timing of the survey, as it was conducted in the lean season when households 
rely heavily on food consumption from cash purchases, and the commercial status of soybean, 
as an income enhancing crop for households (see also WFP and GSS 2012; Carletto et al. 2015).  
 
Our findings of heterogeneity in returns to adoption show that households with low resistance 
to adoption do much worse than an average soybean producing household without adoption of 
the improved variety. However, these households become relatively similar with adoption. This 
is perhaps because the production of the traditional variety is more demanding (in terms of time 
and labor), and requires farmers to invest more resources to minimize the production 
challenges. This could increase the risk of vulnerable households who are not able to meet these 
production requirements of losing their crops or entire investment due to early shattering. But 
the improved variety is quite resistant to these issues (CSIR-SARI 2013).     
 
Whereas peer adoption effect has significant and positive effect on households’ yields when 
adopting, we find no significant peer effect on yield when the household is not adopting. A 
potential interpretation is that when the household is not adopting, increased peer adoption 
could reduce private learning opportunities from peers, especially if the production processes 
of the improved and traditional varieties are not complementary. However, household adoption 
increases private learning and imitation opportunities from adopting peers (Niehaus 2011).  
 
Our findings on peer adoption effect on food and nutrients consumption in the non-adoption 
state are suggestive of some form of private transfer among peers, since consumption increases 
with peer adoption in the non-adoption state.  However, own adoption leads to attenuating peer 
adoption effects and this can primarily be attributed to the yield and income gains from the 
improved soybean variety that tend to substantially increase the consumption of non-adopters 
when they adopt. This indicates that consumption benefits from peer adoption tend to decline 
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with own adoption, suggesting that increased own productivity and household income lead to 
reduction in farmers’ dependence on peers (Alger and Weibull 2012; Di Falco et al. 2018).  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This paper examined the impact of adoption of improved soybean variety on soybean yield, and 
household food and nutrients consumption, using household survey data from Ghana. In 
particular, we estimated the marginal treatment effects of adoption of the improved variety on 
these outcomes, and thus, show heterogeneities in returns to adoption due to observed and 
unobserved characteristics of households. The results generally show positive association 
between adoption and the outcomes, but do not necessarily establish causality. We note three 
main findings: First, a pattern of positive selection on unobserved gains from adoption of the 
improved variety is observed across all outcomes, which is due to the fact that households who 
are more likely to adopt the improved variety have lower returns, than that of an average 
soybean producing household, when not adopting. This finding is in line with the hypothesis of 
adoption based on comparative advantage (Suri, 2011). However, adoption of the improved 
variety tends to make these households quite homogeneous across these outcomes, suggesting 
that adoption can serve as means by which poorer households can narrow the gaps in yields, 
and food and nutrients consumption with better and richer households.    
 
Second, we find that households benefit, in terms of increased soybean yield, from having peers 
who are adopters only when the households also adopt, suggesting the possibility of social 
learning, imitation and/or exchange of resources that are complementary in the soybean 
cultivation process. However, on food and nutrients consumption, we find that having adopting 
peers results in increased household food and nutrients consumption, when the household is not 
adopting, but attenuates when the household adopts. This suggests that households tend to 
depend on peers more in meeting food and nutrients consumption, when not adopting (possibly 
in the form of private transfers) which decreases when the household adopts. These findings 
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suggest that network effects can be an important means of promoting adoption of the improved 
variety and food and nutrients consumption of vulnerable households. Interventions, such as 
self-help groups and/or farmer field-days, aimed at promoting interactions among farm 
households, and enhancing exchange can increase the effectiveness of social networks in 
promoting adoption, soybean yield, and household food security and nutrition. 
 
Finally, subsidizing soybean seed price, and reducing distance to soybean seed source are 
estimated to increase adoption, soybean yield, and household food and nutrients consumption. 
This implies that interventions to minimize production and structural constraints to adoption 
could be an important strategy in mitigating the cost associated with technology adoption, at 
least in the setting at hand. Whereas our evidence suggests that input subsidy is likely to be a 
move in the right direction in enhancing adoption and household outcomes, the option of 
increasing access by reducing the distance to soybean seed source could produce some 
additional gains in food and nutrients consumption. Hence, government and development 
partners can consider increasing access through availability of the improved seeds at the local 
levels, such as empowering village level shops or community-based groups to engage in input 
marketing. 
 
  
 
196 
 
References 
Abdulai, A. and Huffman, W. (2014). The adoption and impact of soil and water conservation 
technology: An endogenous switching regression application. Land Economics 90(1):117-
130 
Acemoglu, D., Garci-Jimeno, C. and Robinson, J.A. (2015). State capacity and economic 
development: A network approach. American Economic Review 105(8): 2364 – 2409. 
Alger, I., and Weibull, J. (2012). A generalization of Hamilton’s rule - love; others how much? 
Journal of Theoretical Biology 299(4): 42-54. 
Bandiera, O. and Rasul, I. (2006). Social networks and technology adoption in northern 
Mozambique. The Economic Journal 116(514): 869-902.  
Becerril, J. and Abdulai, A. (2010). The impact of improved maize varieties on poverty in 
Mexico: A propensity score-matching approach. World Development 38(7): 1024-1035. 
Bramoullé, Y., Djebbari, H. and Fortin, B. (2009). Identification of peer effects through social 
networks. Journal of Econometrics 150(1): 41 – 55. 
Brock, W.A. and Durlauf, S.N. (2001). Interaction-based models. In Handbook of 
Econometrics, Vol. 5, ed. Heckman, J., Leaner, E. pp. 3297 – 3380: North-Holland. 
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J.B. and Miller, D.L. (2008). Bootstrap-based improvements for 
inference with clustered errors. Review of Economics and Statistics 90 (3): 414–427. 
Carletto, G., Ruel, M., Winters, P. and Zezza, A. (2015). Farm-level pathways to improve 
nutritional status: Introduction to the special issue. Journal of Development Studies, 51 (8): 
945-57 
Carneiro, P., Heckman, J.J. and Vytlacil, E.J. (2011). Estimating marginal returns to education. 
The American Economic Review 101 (6): 2754–81. 
Chandrasekhar, A.G. and Lewis, R. (2016). Econometrics of sampled networks. Mimeo, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Conley, T.G. and Udry, C.R. (2010). Learning about a new technology: Pineapple in Ghana. 
American Economic Review, 100(1): 35–69. 
Cornelissen, T., Dustmann, C., Raute, A. and Schönberg, U. (2016). From LATE to MTE: 
Alternative methods for the evaluation of policy interventions. Labour Economics. 41:47–
60. 
Cornelissen, T., Dustmann, C., Raute, A. and Schönberg, U. (2018). Who benefits from 
universal child care? Estimating marginal returns to early child care attendance. Journal of 
Political Economy 126(6): 2356 – 2407. 
 
197 
 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and Savanna Agricultural Research Institute 
(CSIR-SARI). (2013). Effective farming systems research approach for accessing and 
developing technologies for farmers. Annual Report, SARI: CSIR-INSTI.  
De Giorgi, G., Frederiksen, A. and Pistaferri, L. (2020). Consumption network effects. Review 
of Economic Studies, 87(1): 130-163. 
de Janvry, A., Fafchamps, M. and Sadoulet, E. (1991). Peasant household behaviour with 
missing markets: Some paradoxes explained. Economic Journal 101(409): 1400-1417. 
Di Falco, S., Veronesi, M. and Yesuf, M. (2011). Does adaptation to climate change provide 
food security? A micro-perspective from Ethiopia. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 93(3): 829 – 846. 
Di Falco, S., and Bulte, E. (2013). The impact of kinship networks on the adoption of risk-
mitigating strategies in Ethiopia. World Development, 43(3): 100-110. 
Di Falco, S., Feri, F., Pin, P. and Vollenweider, X. (2018). Ties that bind: Network redistributive 
pressure and economic decisions in villages economics. Journal of Development 
Economics 131 (3): 123-131. 
Dillon, A., McGee, K. and Oseni, G. (2015). Agricultural production, dietary diversity, and 
climate variability. Journal of Development Studies 51 (8): 976–995. 
Fafchamps, M., and Gubert, F. (2007). The formation of risk sharing networks. Journal of 
Development Economics 83(2) 326–350. 
FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. (2019). The State of Food Security and Nutrition in 
the World 2018. Building climate resilience for food security and nutrition. Rome, FAO. 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). (2010). Guidelines for Measuring Household and 
Individual Dietary Diversity. Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome Available at. 
http://www.fao.org/3/i1983e/i1983e00.htm, Accessed date: 10 November 2020. 
Garcia, S., Kere, E.N. and Stenger, A. (2014). Econometric analysis of social interactions in the 
production decisions of private forest owners. European Review of Agricultural Economics 
41(2): 177 -198.  
Ghana Statistical Service (GSS). (2014). 2010 Population and Housing Census. District 
Analytical Reports. Northern Region. Ghana Statistical Service. Accra, Ghana. 
Ghana Statistical Service (GSS). (2018). Ghana Living Standards Survey Round 7: Poverty 
Trends in Ghana 2005-2017. Ghana Statistical Service. Accra, Ghana. 
Heckman, J.J. and Vytlaci, E.J. (2005). Structural equations, treatment effects, and econometric 
policy evaluation. Econometrica 73 (3): 669–738. 
 
198 
 
Hirvonen, K., Hoddinott, J., Minten, B, and Stifel, D. (2017). Children's diets, nutrition 
knowledge, and access to markets. World Development 95: 303–315. 
Holden, S., Barrett, C. and Hagos, F. (2006). Food-for-work for poverty reduction and the 
promotion of sustainable land use: Can it work? Environment and Development Economics 
11 (01): 15-38. 
Hotz, C., Loechl, C., de Brauw, A., Eozenou, P., Gilligan, D., Moursi, M., Munhaua, B., van 
Jaarsveld, P., Carriquiry, A. and Meenakshi, J.V. (2012). A large-scale intervention to 
introduce orange sweet potato in rural Mozambique increases vitamin A intakes among 
children and women. British Journal of Nutrition 108(1): 163-76.   
Kuhn, P., Kooreman, P., Soetevent, A. and Kapteyn, A. (2011). The effects of lottery prizes on 
winners and their neighbors: Evidence from the Dutch postcode lottery. American 
Economic Review 101(5): 2226-2247.  
Larsen, A.F. and Lilleør, H.B. (2016). Can agricultural interventions improve child nutrition? 
Evidence from Tanzania. World Bank Economic Review 31(3):767-85. 
Liu, X., Patacchini, E. and Rainone, E. (2017). Peer effects in bedtime decisions among 
adolescents: a social network model with sampled data. The Econometrics Journal 20(3): 
103-125.  
Lovo, S. and Veronesi, M. (2019). Crop diversification and child health: Empirical evidence 
from Tanzania. Ecological Economics 158(C):168-179. 
Manski, C.F. (1993). Identification of endogenous social effects: The reflection problem. 
Review of Economic Studies 60(3): 531–542. 
Manski, C.F. (2013). Identification of treatment response with social interactions. The 
Econometrics Journal (16): S1–S23. 
Maurer, J. and Meier, A. (2008). Smooth It Like the ‘Joneses’? Estimating peer-group effects 
in intertemporal consumption choice. The Economic Journal, 118 (527): 454-76.  
Minten, B. and Barrett, C.B. (2008). Agricultural technology, productivity, and poverty in 
Madagascar. World Development 36 (5), 797–822. 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA). (2017). Planting for Food and Jobs: Strategic Plan 
for Implementation (2017–2020). Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Accra, Ghana. 
Niehaus, P. (2011). Filtered social learning. Journal of Political Economy 119(4): 686-720.  
Ogutu, S. O., Fongar, A., Godecke, T., Jackering, L, Mwololo, H., Njuguna, M., Wollin, M. 
and Qaim, M. (2020). How to make farming and agricultural extension more nutrition-
sensitive: evidence from a randomised controlled trial in Kenya. European Review of 
Agricultural Economics 47(1): 95 – 118. 
 
199 
 
Shiferaw, B., Kassie, M., Jaleta, M. and Yirga, C. (2014). Adoption of improved wheat varieties 
and impacts on household food security in Ethiopia. Food Policy 44 (2014) 272–284. 
Sibhatu, K.T. and Qaim, M. (2018). Meta-analysis of the association between production di- 
versity, diets, and nutrition in smallholder farm households. Food Policy 77, 1–18. 
Smale, M., Moursi, M. and Birol, E. (2015). How does adopting hybrid maize affect dietary 
diversity on family farms? Micro-evidence from Zambia. Food Policy 52, 44–53. 
Suri, T. (2011). Selection and comparative advantage in technology adoption. Econometrica 79 
(1): 159 – 209. 
Verkaart, S., Munyua, B.G., Mausch, K. and Michler, J.D. (2017). Welfare impacts of improved 
chickpea adoption: A pathway for rural development in Ethiopia? Food Policy 66: 50-61. 
World Food Program and Ghana Statistical Service (WFP and GSS). (2012). Comprehensive 
Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis: Ghana 2012; focus on Northern Ghana. Rome, 
Italy: WFP.    
World Food Programme (WFP). (2015). Food Consumption Score Nutritional Quality 
Analysis. Rome, Italy: WFP. 
Wossen, T., Alene, A., Abdoulaye, T., Feleke, S., Rabbi, I.Y. and Manyong, V. (2019). Poverty 
reduction effects of agricultural technology adoption: The case of improved cassava 
varieties in Nigeria. Journal of Agricultural Economics 70(2): 392–407. 
  
 
200 
 
Appendix 
Appendix A1: Expressions of treatment effects measures 
 
A.1.1 Conventional treatment effects measures 
E.1  ATE = 𝐸[𝑌1 − 𝑌0] = 𝐸[𝜂1(𝑋𝑖) − 𝜂0(𝑋𝑖)];  
E.2 TT = 𝐸[𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝐴𝑖 = 1] = 𝐸[𝜂1(𝑋𝑖) − 𝜂0(𝑋𝑖)|𝐴𝑖 = 1] + 𝐸[𝑈1𝑖 − 𝑈0𝑖|𝐴𝑖 = 1]  
E.3 TUT = 𝐸[𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝐴𝑖 = 0] = 𝐸[𝜂1(𝑋𝑖) − 𝜂0(𝑋𝑖)|𝐴𝑖 = 0] + 𝐸[𝑈1𝑖 − 𝑈0𝑖|𝐴𝑖 = 0]. 
 
A.1.2 Policy Relevant Treatment Effects (PRTE) 
Given that the conventional treatment parameters often present estimates of effects of 
interventions in gross terms (Heckman & Vytlacil 2005), we use the Policy Relevant Treatment 
Effects (PRTE) to estimate the aggregate effects of policy intervention that seek to subsidize 
soybean seed price or reduce distance to soybean seeds source. Such a policy only changes who 
selects into adoption but does not change the underlying distribution of treatment effects or 
preference for treatment (Cornelissen et al. 2016). Suppressing the 𝑖 subscript, if 𝐴 represents 
adoption under the prevailing state, and ?̃? as the adoption under the alternative policy (i.e., after 
the subsidy or seed availability intervention), the unconditional PRTE is defined as  
(6) PRTE=  𝐸[𝑌1 − 𝑌0|?̃? = 1]𝐸[?̃?] − [𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝐴 = 1]𝐸[𝐴]  +
𝐸[𝑈1−𝑈0|𝐴=1]𝐸[𝐴]−[𝑈1−𝑈0|𝐴=1]𝐸[𝐴]
𝐸[𝐴]−𝐸[𝐴]
 .    
This is the mean effect of going from the prevailing policy to the alternative policy per net 
person shift (Heckman & Vytlacil 2005; Cornelissen et al. 2016).   
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Appendix A2: Note on social network structures and identification of peer effects  
 
Manski’s linear-in-means model assumed individuals in a group are affected by all members of 
the group, and not by members outside. The simultaneity in behaviour of same group members 
creates perfect collinearity between the behavioural peer effect and the contextual effects, 
which causes identification problem. However, in majority of social networks, individuals are 
influenced by their direct connections or peers, making the impact of members on individuals 
not even in the network. In this case, the structure of the social network can be relied on to 
identify peer effects. This makes it possible to identify the two effects if there exist 
intransitivities in the network such that if individuals 𝑖 and 𝑗 are connected and 𝑗 and 𝑘 are 
connected but 𝑖 and 𝑘 are not connected, then the characteristics of 𝑘 can be used as an 
instrument to identify the effect of 𝑗 on 𝑖 (Bramoullé et al. 2009; Di Giorgi et al 2019). 
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Appendix A3: Excluded instruments 
 
Table 4.A1. Difference in community and key household characteristics across 
different bandwidths of distance to soybean seed source  
Quartiles 1 2 1-2 3 1-3 4 1-4 5 1-5 
Distance bandwidth 
in kilometres (km) 
0.30 
to 
2.50 
2.70 
to 
4.00 
 4.10  
to  
5.40 
 5.5    
to   
8.00 
 8.30 
to 
17.00 
 
          
Community characteristics        
Periodic market (0,1) 0.45 
(0.05) 
0.53 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
0.43 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.40 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
0.41 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
Mobile phone 
network (0,1) 
0.75 
(0.04) 
0.71 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.73 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
0.64 
(0.05) 
  0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.77 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
Nearest paved road 
(Distance in km) 
7.81 
(0.68) 
9.26 
(0.78) 
-1.45 
(1.04) 
7.90 
(0.68) 
-0.09 
(0.96) 
9.41 
(0.74) 
-1.60 
(1.00) 
8.13 
(0.53) 
-0.32 
(0.87) 
Local wage rate (in 
GHS) 
6.21 
(0.11) 
6.20 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
6.08 
(0.15) 
0.12 
(0.18) 
6.49 
(0.13) 
-0.28 
(0.17) 
6.22 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.16) 
Local soybean price 
(in GHS) 
1.06 
(0.02) 
1.06 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
1.04 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
1.05 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
1.05 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
          
Household          
Wealth (in 10,000 
GHS) 
1.61 
(0.31) 
1.23 
(0.16) 
0.34 
(0.35) 
1.20 
(0.18) 
0.41 
(0.36) 
1.22 
(0.13) 
0.39 
(0.33) 
1.16 
(0.17) 
0.45 
(0.36) 
Landholding (in 
hectares) 
2.89 
(0.17) 
2.44 
(0.16) 
  0.46* 
(0.23) 
2.48 
(0.15) 
  0.41* 
(0.22) 
2.62 
(0.17) 
0.27 
(0.23) 
2.36 
(0.12) 
    0.53** 
(0.21) 
Household size  5.37 
(0.20) 
5.24 
(0.20) 
0.12 
(0.28) 
5.52 
(0.20) 
-0.15 
(0.29) 
5.47 
(0.22) 
-0.10 
(0.29) 
6.67 
(2.16) 
-1.31*** 
(0.29) 
Farmer education (in 
years) 
1.55 
(0.37) 
2.13 
(0.42) 
-0.57 
(0.56) 
0.86 
(0.24) 
0.69 
(0.45) 
0.80 
(0.24) 
0.75* 
(0.44) 
1.01 
(0.31) 
0.54 
(0.49) 
Change location in 
5yrs (0,1) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Change location in 
10yrs (0,1) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
          
Outcomes          
Soybean yield 638.6 
(15.4) 
641.3 
(15.7) 
-2.6 
(22.0) 
626.2 
(17.2) 
12.4 
(23.0) 
626.4 
(15.5) 
12.1 
(21.9) 
620.0 
(18.0) 
18.6 
(23.5) 
Food cons. score 32.6 
(0.7) 
33.9 
(0.7) 
-1.4 
(1.1) 
33.4 
(0.8) 
-0.8 
(1.1) 
33.5 
(0.8) 
-0.9 
(1.1) 
34.4 
(0.9) 
-1.8 
(1.2) 
Vitamin A Cons.  12.0 
(0.4) 
12.7 
(0.4) 
-0.7 
(0.5) 
12.4 
(0.4) 
-0.4 
(0.5) 
12.6 
(0.4) 
-0.6 
(0.5) 
12.3 
(0.4) 
-0.3 
(0.6) 
Protein Cons.  6.4 
(0.4) 
6.7 
(0.3) 
-0.3 
(0.5) 
6.0 
(0.3) 
0.4 
(0.5) 
5.9 
(0.3) 
0.4 
(0.5) 
5.9 
(0.4) 
0.5 
(0.5) 
Hem iron Cons.  3.9 
(0.2) 
4.1 
(0.2) 
-0.2 
(0.3) 
3.7 
(0.2) 
0.2 
(0.3) 
3.6 
(0.2) 
0.3 
(0.3) 
3.6 
(0.2) 
0.3 
(0.3) 
          
Mean (in km) 1.46 
(0.73) 
3.46 
(0.46) 
 4.95 
(0.27) 
 6.79 
(0.75) 
 11.46 
(2.15) 
 
Observations  101 103  96  107  93  
Notes: the table reports results of t-test of community and household level characteristics by different bandwidths of the 
distance of farm households to the closest soybean seed source. Distance to seed source was categorized into 5 quantiles and 
the closest bandwidth (i.e., columns 1) was compared with the rest of the bandwidths. The asterisks ***, ** and * are 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 4.A2. Pairwise correlations between own instruments and peers of peers’ 
instruments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 SoySeed 
Distance   
N2SoySeed 
Distance 
SoySeed 
price 
NResident 
distance 
N2Resident 
distance 
SoySeed Distance        
N2SoySeed Distance 0.942 
(0.000) 
    
SoySeed price 0.008 
(0.857) 
-0.009 
 (0.825) 
   
NResident distance -0.029 
(0.505) 
-0.016 
 (0.717) 
-0.048 
 (0.275) 
  
N2Resident distance 0.010 
(0.823) 
0.013 
(0.767) 
-0.007 
 (0.859) 
0.019 
 (0.666) 
 
Adopted -0.238 
(0.000) 
-0.157 
(0.000) 
-0.011 
 (0.798) 
-0.090 
 (0.044) 
0.091 
(0.042) 
      Note: Values in parenthesis are p-values. 
 
 
Table 4.A3. OLS estimates of the effect of distance to soybean seed source on 
outcomes 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
 Instruments for own adoption Instruments for peer adoption 
Panel A       Yield    Food    Vitamin A    Protein    Yield    Food    Vitamin A    Protein 
SoySeed 
Distance   
   -0.041    -0.046 -0.036 0.017     
   (0.025) (0.032) (0.042) (0.071)     
N2SoySeed 
Distance 
0.013* 0.012 0.020 0.009     
   (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.023)     
SoySeed price    -0.036    -0.049      -0.012 -0.032     
   (0.066) (0.085) (0.124) (0.228)     
NResident 
distance  
    0.004 -0.004 -0.010 0.001 
       (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) 
N2Resident 
distance 
    0.003 0.002 0.011 0.023 
       (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.017) 
Household 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm inputs and 
revenue 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Contextual 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Network Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 5.666*** 1.297*** -0.182 -2.095*** 5.511*** 0.756 -1.603* -3.089** 
   (0.145) (0.220) (0.358) (0.572) (0.305) (0.510) (0.822) (1.230) 
 R-squared  0.815 0.476 0.472 0.500 0.504 0.551 0.523 0.585 
 Observation 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 
Notes: the table presents an ordinary least square (OLS) regression to test the effect of the distance to soybean seed source (i.e., 
the exclusion instrument) on our outcomes. Conditional on the household, network (also village) and district controls, the 
instrument (SoySeed Distance) does not significantly affect any of the outcomes. Values in parenthesis are standard errors. The 
asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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Appendix B1: First stage estimates 
Table 4.B1.1.  First-stage estimates of peers’ adoption of improved soybean variety 
       Peer adoption 
    Coefficients S.E. 
Sex 0.004 0.010 
Age        -0.000 0.000 
Education        -0.002 0.001 
Hsize         0.005** 0.002 
HLand 0.002 0.003 
HWealth (predicted) 0.001 0.005 
Soil fertility        -0.009 0.005 
Seed use         0.001 0.001 
Fertilizer cost         0.000 0.000 
Pesticide cost 0.001 0.001 
Weedicide cost 0.000 0.000 
Machinery        -0.005 0.008 
Labor use   -0.001** 0.000 
Local wage rate        -0.192*** 0.032 
Soyseed price        -0.002 0.019 
Extension (predicted)        -0.037 0.032 
Residuals_NWLink 0.007 0.006 
Degree 0.006 0.004 
   
NSex  0.053* 0.030 
NAge        -0.002 0.002 
NEducation        -0.000 0.009 
NHsize         0.007 0.014 
NLandholding         0.042** 0.017 
NWealth      0.111*** 0.041 
NSoil        -0.110** 0.047 
NExtension        -0.198 0.129 
NResident distance        -0.002** 0.001 
   
N2Sex        -0.312*** 0.055 
N2Age         0.001 0.002 
N2Education         0.016 0.012 
N2Hsize        -0.055*** 0.014 
N2Landholding      -0.081*** 0.017 
N2Wealth         0.110** 0.055 
N2Soil         0.294*** 0.058 
N2Soyseed price         0.822*** 0.137 
N2Extension        -0.154 0.162 
N2Resident distance        -0.005*** 0.002 
   
Town centre        -0.002*** 0.001 
Network Fes           Yes 
Intercept -0.229 0.181 
   
R-squared          0.882  
Observation 500  
Notes: table reports first-stage estimates of peer adoption equations used to predict the peer 
adoption variable. Columns 1 and 2 present results for the soybean yield specification, whereas 
columns 3 and 4 display the results for the food and nutrition specification. S.E. are reported robust 
standard errors. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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B1.2. Further empirical Issues 
Our final concern is the potential endogeneity of household wealth, extension contact and farm 
revenue. In the adoption and outcome equations, household wealth and farm revenues are 
potentially endogenous because households who adopted the improved variety are expected to 
have higher yields, which will likely translate into higher farm revenues, incomes and more 
assets. Also, given that soybean is a market-oriented crop, one can expect that households who 
are food secured will more likely invest in the new variety, which could lead to increased yield, 
farm revenues and enhanced wealth. Extension contact could also be endogenous because 
extension officers may be more inclined to visit farmers who adopted (or performing farmers) 
than non-adopting (or nonperforming farmers).  
 
To account for this, we use predicted instead of the observed values of these variables obtain 
from a regression of each of these variables on the entire set of exogenous characteristics and 
at least an instrument. For the wealth equation, we use whether any parent of the farmer or 
spouse ever had authority in the community, as instrument. We believe this to be valid and 
relevant instrument because the authority of the parents in the traditional political system are 
mostly predetermined by lineage, and can therefore be reasonably assumed to be exogenous. 
Also, the traditional authority system gives the parent access to land and other natural resources 
in the village, which the children can benefit from. One issue that might threaten the use of 
these as instruments is when access to these resources are able to affect our outcomes through 
a different route, such as household landholding, as well. For this reason, we control for 
household landholding in all specifications. In the extension contact and farm revenue, 
following the network literature, we use the extension contact and farm revenues, respectively, 
of direct and indirect peers, respectively, as instruments. The first-stage instrumenting 
regressions are presented in table 4.B1.2.   
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Table 4.B1.2.  Instrumenting regressions for wealth, extension contact and farm 
revenue 
      (1)    (2)    (3)  
       Wealth     Extension     Extension  
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Adoption      0.131** 0.057      0.168*** 0.038      0.066 0.043 
Nadoption      0.100 0.227     -0.007 0.144      0.017 0.145 
Sex     -0.079 0.058     -0.013 0.039      0.033 0.036 
Age      0.001 0.002      0.001 0.001      0.001 0.001 
Education     -0.012 0.009      0.003 0.006     -0.002 0.006 
Hsize      0.004 0.016      0.008 0.009      0.015* 0.009 
HLand      0.056** 0.023      0.008 0.014      0.024** 0.012 
HWealth(predicted)        0.012 0.027      0.011 0.022 
HRisk     -0.015 0.019     -0.034** 0.013     -0.010 0.014 
Soil fertility      0.045 0.031      0.034* 0.018     -0.024 0.020 
Seed use      0.012* 0.007      0.007 0.005      0.006 0.004 
Fertilizer cost      0.000* 0.000      0.000 0.000      0.000** 0.000 
Pesticide cost      0.002 0.005     -0.002 0.003      0.001 0.003 
Weedicide cost      0.000 0.001     -0.000 0.000      0.001* 0.000 
Machinery      0.084 0.077      0.004 0.030      0.105** 0.042 
Labor use      -0.002 0.003      0.002 0.002      0.001 0.002 
Soybean seed price      0.103 0.164        0.223*** 0.081 
Extension (predicted)         -0.047 0.072 
Local wage rate     -0.038 0.123        0.106 0.088 
Town center     -0.003 0.003     -0.001 0.002     -0.001 0.002 
       
Contextual effects and link residual      
NSex      0.103 0.172      0.179* 0.102      0.055 0.102 
NAge     -0.008 0.006     -0.001 0.004     -0.001 0.004 
NLandholding      0.003 0.045      0.019 0.031      0.021 0.030 
Residuals_NWLink     -0.009 0.037      0.000 0.024      0.006 0.022 
       
Instruments       
Parent authority      2.200*** 0.132     
NExtension         -2.756*** 0.253   
N2Extension        3.671*** 0.262   
Association        0.063*** 0.014   
NFarm Revenue          -5.747*** 0.892 
N2Farm Revenue          -2.636 2.283 
N3Farm Revenue          9.333*** 3.034 
Network FEs       Yes         Yes          Yes  
Intercept     -0.713 0.553     -0.269 0.274     -0.722* 0.406 
R-squared       0.678       0.446       0.746  
Observation       500        500        500  
Notes: the table presents first-stage estimates for instrumenting wealth, extension and revenue used in the soybean yield and 
food and nutrition estimations. Columns 1 and 2 present results for the household wealth equation. Columns 3 and 4 shows the 
extension contact results and columns 5 and 6 presents the results of the revenues equation. Network FEs is network fixed effects 
and Residuals_NWLink is residuals of the link formation model. S.E. are reported robust standard errors. The asterisks ***, ** 
and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix B2 First-stage network formation model and estimates 
 
B2.1. Network formation model 
The section describes the network formation model estimated. We estimated a conditional edge 
independence model, which assumes links form independently, conditional on node- and link- 
level covariates as follows;  
(B2.1) 𝐿𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1|𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑗| + 𝛽2(𝑐𝑖 + 𝑐𝑗) + 𝛽3|ℒ𝑖𝑗| + 𝜇𝑖𝑗  
where 𝐿𝑖𝑗 is an 𝑁 × (𝑁 − 1) matrix indicating whether there is a link between individuals 𝑖 and 
𝑗,  𝑐𝑖 and 𝑐𝑗 are characteristics of individual 𝑖 and 𝑗. 𝛽1 measures the influence of differences in 
their attributes, and 𝛽2 measures the effect of combined level of their attributes. ℒ𝑖𝑗 captures 
attributes of the link between 𝑖 and 𝑗 such as geographical or social distance between them, and 
𝛽3 is the associated parameter estimate. The estimates of eq. (B2.1) are reported in table 4.B2.1. 
We next use the average of the predicted residuals of the link formation model as control 
functions in our selection and outcome equations to account for the endogeneity of peer effects 
due to unobserved factors that determine link formation. 
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Table 4.B2.1. Dyadic regression of network link formation 
       Village1    Village2    Village3    Village4    Village5    Village6    Village7    Village8    Village9 
 Distance between peers in kilometers -0.040 0.025 0.116** -0.035 0.028 -0.005 0.038 -0.065 -0.006 
   (0.062) (0.044) (0.050) (0.039) (0.054) (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044) 
 Difference in distance to road between peers in kilometres -0.003 0.202* -0.044 0.076 0.047** 0.094** 0.069** -0.142** 0.041 
   (0.030) (0.104) (0.055) (0.058) (0.022) (0.038) (0.031) (0.060) (0.025) 
 Relatives = 1 0.013 0.121 0.064 -0.323 -0.346 0.294 0.570 -0.685** -0.685** 
   (0.339) (0.369) (0.580) (0.558) (0.283) (0.662) (0.376) (0.304) (0.349) 
 Same religion = 1 n.a n.a. -0.095 -0.730** -0.369 -0.020 0.349 -0.811* -0.281 
   n.a. n.a. (0.245) (0.329) (0.307) (0.486) (0.503) (0.439) (0.323) 
 Difference: Sex (= 1 if male) 1.150*** 0.821*** 7.767*** -0.306 0.437 0.013 0.744** 0.381 0.260 
   (0.342) (0.251) (0.375) (0.256) (0.335) (0.258) (0.359) (0.359) (0.516) 
 Difference: Age 0.004 -0.031** 0.031** -0.003 -0.051*** -0.037*** 0.038*** 0.093*** 0.041*** 
   (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.036) (0.014) 
 Difference: Years of schooling 0.090** 0.015 0.066 0.062 3.489*** -0.081** -0.044* 3.064*** 0.020 
   (0.046) (0.040) (0.050) (0.064) (0.189) (0.033) (0.025) (0.386) (0.067) 
 Difference: Household size -0.212** -0.097 -0.080 0.067 -0.223** 0.157** -0.123 0.011 0.103 
   (0.097) (0.096) (0.090) (0.085) (0.091) (0.073) (0.103) (0.063) (0.070) 
 Difference: Household landholding in hectares -0.239 -0.200** 0.098 0.343*** 0.130 0.487** -0.197* 0.089 -0.071 
   (0.218) (0.096) (0.173) (0.119) (0.153) (0.217) (0.110) (0.113) (0.132) 
 Difference: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 1.065** 0.287 -0.469 0.845*** -0.262 -0.028 -0.865*** 6.740*** -0.671** 
   (0.513) (0.353) (0.310) (0.290) (0.239) (0.323) (0.262) (0.516) (0.307) 
 Difference: Household wealth (predicted) in GHS 1.173 -0.223 0.882 0.189 0.826 -0.288 -1.780*** 2.738* 0.060 
   (1.211) (0.786) (0.685) (0.993) (1.291) (0.798) (0.588) (1.592) (0.843) 
 Sum: Sex (= 1 if male) -0.651*** 0.483*** 7.522*** -0.345 0.942*** 0.380* 0.577** 0.548* 0.295 
   (0.239) (0.185) (0.356) (0.217) (0.298) (0.229) (0.277) (0.314) (0.311) 
 Sum: Age -0.005 0.011 -0.019 -0.023*** 0.012 0.001 -0.032*** -0.056** -0.015 
   (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.025) (0.011) 
 Sum: Years of schooling -0.018 0.028 0.012 -0.141** -3.470*** 0.042 -0.014 -3.092*** -0.066 
   (0.042) (0.020) (0.037) (0.062) (0.180) (0.026) (0.031) (0.398) (0.058) 
 Sum: Household size -0.010 0.163*** 0.112 -0.002 0.064 -0.040 0.028 -0.037 0.121*** 
   (0.051) (0.056) (0.070) (0.051) (0.046) (0.036) (0.061) (0.076) (0.046) 
 Sum: Household landholding in hectares -0.051 -0.005 0.011 0.113 -0.246*** -0.360** 0.181* -0.058 0.173* 
   (0.113) (0.062) (0.136) (0.136) (0.094) (0.159) (0.107) (0.096) (0.097) 
 Sum: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 1.019*** 0.169 0.096 0.029 -0.039 0.259 0.082 6.841*** -0.925*** 
   (0.367) (0.331) (0.283) (0.217) (0.256) (0.255) (0.234) (0.487) (0.190) 
 Intercept -3.504* -5.325*** -17.991*** 0.004 -3.804** -1.176 0.751 -14.108*** -1.282 
   (1.983) (1.838) (1.825) (1.742) (1.606) (1.986) (1.442) (2.475) (1.827) 
          
 Observation 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
 Pseudo R2  0.114 0.072 0.092 0.082 0.096 0.077 0.113 0.122 0.080 
Notes: the table reports results of the dyadic regression of network link formation in eq. (B2.1). The dependent variable = 1 if 𝑖 (𝑗) cites 𝑖 (𝑗) as ever having any of the social and locational contact dimensions discussed 
under section 4.2.2. Estimator is logit and all standard errors are clustered at the village level.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. n.a. denotes not available. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.B2.1. (continued)  
       Village10    Village11    Village12    Village13    Village14    Village15    Village16    Village17    Village18 
 Distance between peers in kilometers -0.022 -0.079 -0.058 0.011 -0.025 -0.075 -0.019 0.009 -0.042 
   (0.056) (0.064) (0.038) (0.043) (0.079) (0.059) (0.048) (0.047) (0.035) 
 Difference in distance to road between peers in kilometres 0.065 6.556** -0.024 0.002 -0.020 -0.171*** 0.042** 0.024 0.034 
   (0.069) (2.820) (0.053) (0.026) (0.030) (0.029) (0.019) (0.018) (0.047) 
 Relatives = 1 -0.025 0.274 0.051 0.026 0.304 0.407 -0.001 0.717 0.103 
   (0.552) (0.384) (0.382) (0.241) (0.389) (0.303) (0.508) (0.605) (0.514) 
 Same religion = 1 0.038 -0.129 0.320 0.324 -0.652** -0.610* -0.013 -0.014 0.183 
   (0.268) (0.361) (0.317) (0.389) (0.326) (0.342) (0.402) (0.384) (0.342) 
 Difference: Sex (= 1 if male) -0.134 0.254 0.522 -0.400 0.428 0.334 0.976*** 0.435 0.821*** 
   (0.344) (0.314) (0.461) (0.293) (0.332) (0.329) (0.300) (0.336) (0.283) 
 Difference: Age 0.026*** -0.028* 0.009 0.017 0.003 -0.044 -0.001 0.012 0.033 
   (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.031) (0.016) (0.019) (0.023) 
 Difference: Years of schooling 1.402*** -0.033 0.060 1.131*** -0.046 -0.175*** 6.946*** 0.803*** -0.143*** 
   (0.103) (0.050) (0.052) (0.073) (0.043) (0.043) (0.611) (0.060) (0.055) 
 Difference: Household size 0.163 0.087 0.005 -0.117 0.074 0.046 -0.177*** 0.020 -0.043 
   (0.118) (0.069) (0.120) (0.082) (0.099) (0.098) (0.052) (0.082) (0.133) 
 Difference: Household landholding in hectares 0.579*** -0.067 0.007 0.137 -0.172 0.369*** 0.008 0.289*** -0.115 
   (0.152) (0.085) (0.146) (0.169) (0.201) (0.130) (0.082) (0.085) (0.149) 
 Difference: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village -0.570 -0.395 0.907** 0.227 0.374 0.607** 0.143 -1.469*** -0.062 
   (0.382) (0.320) (0.444) (0.272) (0.342) (0.266) (0.448) (0.419) (0.232) 
 Difference: Household wealth (predicted) in GHS 0.152 -0.709 0.541 -0.205 -0.181 -0.589 -1.611 -3.162*** -0.858 
   (0.658) (1.303) (1.063) (1.309) (1.060) (0.665) (1.840) (0.861) (0.976) 
 Sum: Sex (= 1 if male) 0.874*** -0.027 0.500* 0.535** 0.160 -1.051*** 0.637** 0.134 -0.068 
   (0.212) (0.298) (0.296) (0.250) (0.329) (0.215) (0.313) (0.294) (0.266) 
 Sum: Age -0.011 0.000 -0.010 0.019** -0.010 -0.005 0.027*** 0.016 -0.029** 
   (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
 Sum: Years of schooling -1.482*** -0.043 -0.033 -1.125*** 0.008 0.008 -6.015*** -0.733*** 0.071*** 
   (0.080) (0.034) (0.048) (0.087) (0.038) (0.036) (0.646) (0.045) (0.022) 
 Sum: Household size -0.153* 0.172*** 0.130* -0.093 0.091 0.140*** 0.106* 0.196*** 0.171** 
   (0.093) (0.053) (0.072) (0.097) (0.057) (0.038) (0.054) (0.055) (0.083) 
 Sum: Household landholding in hectares -0.539*** 0.091 -0.013 0.083 0.174 0.134 0.083 -0.063 -0.129 
   (0.143) (0.064) (0.115) (0.134) (0.120) (0.100) (0.081) (0.080) (0.093) 
 Sum: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 0.362 0.392 0.572 0.422 0.921*** 0.794*** 0.955** 0.213 0.078 
   (0.288) (0.277) (0.405) (0.268) (0.342) (0.266) (0.394) (0.374) (0.218) 
 Intercept          
   0.240 -2.183 -5.001** -3.558** -3.781* -3.036 -4.480 -0.735 1.407 
 (1.978) (2.780) (2.115) (1.657) (1.941) (1.876) (4.427) (2.445) (2.590) 
 Observation 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
 Pseudo R2  0.117 0.059 0.047 0.049 0.061 0.146 0.083 0.155 0.073 
Notes: the table reports results of the dyadic regression of network link formation in eq. (B2.1). The dependent variable = 1 if 𝑖 (𝑗) cites 𝑖 (𝑗) as ever having any of the social and locational contact dimensions discussed 
under section 4.2.2. Estimator is logit and all standard errors are clustered at the village level.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. n. a. denotes not available. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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   Table 4.B2.1. (continued) 
      Village19    Village20    Village21    Village22    Village23    Village24    Village25 
 Distance between peers in kilometers -0.006 0.018 -0.009 0.060 0.018 -0.040 0.044 
   (0.061) (0.030) (0.039) (0.067) (0.052) (0.046) (0.050) 
 Difference in distance to road between peers in kilometres 0.012 0.820 0.686 0.059** 0.617 -1.666 0.024 
   (0.008) (2.653) (0.659) (0.024) (3.403) (3.250) (0.016) 
 Relatives = 1 -0.471* 0.390* 0.090 1.345 -0.712 0.227 -0.523 
   (0.268) (0.205) (0.272) (1.195) (0.435) (0.307) (0.538) 
 Same religion = 1 -0.304 n.a. 0.180 0.107 0.759 n.a. 0.152 
   (0.383) n.a. (0.479) (0.578) (0.506) n.a. (0.423) 
 Difference: Sex (= 1 if male) -0.385 0.849* -0.352 8.166*** -0.919*** -0.457 0.744* 
   (0.275) (0.447) (0.423) (0.399) (0.195) (0.278) (0.392) 
 Difference: Age 0.003 -0.016 -0.040** -0.000 0.010 -0.009 0.029 
   (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.025) 
 Difference: Years of schooling 0.009 -0.054* 0.043 n.a. 0.144* 0.421*** 0.142*** 
   (0.045) (0.030) (0.065) n.a. (0.075) (0.062) (0.050) 
 Difference: Household size 0.049 0.149* 0.086 0.076 -0.042 0.252*** 0.229*** 
   (0.063) (0.089) (0.088) (0.097) (0.082) (0.093) (0.081) 
 Difference: Household landholding in hectares -0.066 -0.088 -0.077 0.126 0.268* 0.619*** -0.263 
   (0.088) (0.105) (0.100) (0.163) (0.155) (0.235) (0.218) 
 Difference: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 6.526*** -0.273 8.173*** 0.638 -0.122 0.210 -0.235 
   (0.422) (0.315) (0.403) (0.490) (0.313) (0.327) (0.412) 
 Difference: Household wealth (predicted) in GHS 1.450 -1.353 -0.100 2.782*** 2.433*** -2.289*** -0.522 
   (1.150) (0.884) (0.639) (0.976) (0.935) (0.794) (1.269) 
 Sum: Sex (= 1 if male) 0.504* 0.810** -0.293 8.878*** 0.426** 0.219 0.161 
   (0.284) (0.388) (0.245) (0.517) (0.175) (0.173) (0.278) 
 Sum: Age -0.012 -0.004 0.010 0.017 -0.002 0.030** -0.002 
   (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.013) (0.021) 
 Sum: Years of schooling 0.033 0.077*** 0.210*** n.a. 0.088 -0.460*** 0.019 
   (0.024) (0.021) (0.037) n.a. (0.068) (0.047) (0.059) 
 Sum: Household size -0.000 -0.044 -0.072 0.028 0.048 0.099 -0.284*** 
   (0.048) (0.054) (0.062) (0.062) (0.041) (0.085) (0.056) 
 Sum: Household landholding in hectares 0.123 -0.078 0.270*** -0.382* -0.115 -0.413* 0.248 
   (0.092) (0.085) (0.082) (0.198) (0.102) (0.213) (0.169) 
 Sum: Village born = 1 if farmer was born in village 6.413*** -0.381 7.525*** 1.116** -0.231 0.725*** -0.821*** 
   (0.380) (0.240) (0.430) (0.435) (0.196) (0.228) (0.278) 
 Intercept        
   -17.238*** -0.160 -18.598*** -26.287*** -3.877** -2.388 0.730 
 (2.569) (1.444) (1.453) (2.386) (1.602) (1.844) (2.514) 
 Observation 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
 Pseudo R2  0.075 0.086 0.160 0.155 0.073 0.083 0.201 
Notes: the table reports results of the dyadic regression of network link formation in eq. (B2.1). The dependent variable = 1 if 𝑖 (𝑗) cites 𝑖 (𝑗) as ever having any of the social and locational contact 
dimensions discussed under section 4.2.2. Estimator is logit and all standard errors are clustered at the village level.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. n.a. denotes not available. The asterisks ***, 
** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.B2.2. Instrumenting regression for Wealth in Dyadic model 
 Difference of wealth  Sum of wealth 
 Coefficient Robust 
S. E. 
Dyadic 
S. E. 
 Coefficient Robust 
S. E. 
Dyadic 
S. E. 
 All regressors as difference  All regressors as sums 
    
Sex = 1 if male      0.080 0.036 0.086   -0.237* 0.034 0.154 
Years of education of farmer  -0.026** 0.004 0.010   -0.040** 0.004 0.017 
Born = 1 if born in village  -0.106* 0.036 0.069       0.200* 0.034 0.144 
Value of inherited land in GHS      0.277*** 0.040 0.089       0.925*** 0.048 0.142 
        
District dummies        
     1 if farmer resides in district 1  -0.322 0.052 0.262   -0.552* 0.066 0.397 
     1 if farmer resides in district 2  -0.493** 0.051 0.257   -0.757** 0.066 0.405 
     1 if farmer resides in district 3      0.298 0.068 0.327       0.429 0.090 0.539 
     1 if farmer resides in district 4  -0.150 0.082 0.426   -0.369 0.097 0.560 
             
Intercept      1.488*** 0.056 0.214       2.614*** 0.088 0.429 
Observations      9500         9500   
Notes: the table presents first-stage estimates for instrumenting wealth in the dyadic link formation model. Columns 1, 2 and 
3 present results for the difference of wealth between neighbors. Columns 4, 5 and 6 show results of the sum of wealth estimates. 
The table also show both the conventional robust standard errors (in columns 2 and 5) and the Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) 
group dyadic standard errors (columns 3 and 6). S.E. denotes standard errors. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix C: Results 
 
Table 4.C1. Soybean varietal adoption and yield 
 Selection   Outcome  
 Coefficient  S. E.  Coefficient S. E. 
    Panel A            𝚯𝑨  𝝆𝟎, 𝜼𝟎 
Nadoption (Predicted)    0.168*** 0.047    -0.051 0.033 
Sex    0.050 0.052    -0.028 0.053 
Age   -0.002 0.001     0.001 0.002 
Education    0.002 0.008     0.029*** 0.008 
Hsize   -0.035** 0.013    -0.005 0.011 
HLand    0.052** 0.022     0.047 0.029 
HWealth (predicted)    0.163*** 0.045     0.069 0.074 
Soil fertility    0.022 0.026     0.009 0.026 
Seed use   -0.014** 0.006     0.005 0.006 
Fertilizer cost   -1.8E-5 7.0E-5    -2.4E-5  8.4E-5 
Pesticide cost    0.001 0.004    -0.006 0.012 
Weedicide cost    3.6E-4 0.001     0.002** 0.001 
Machinery   -0.006 0.052     0.102 0.095 
Labor use    0.001 0.002    -0.001 0.002 
Extension (predicted)    0.568*** 0.110    -0.021 0.127 
Soy selling price    0.166 0.203    -0.046 0.130 
Residuals_NWLink   -0.054 0.034     0.055* 0.031 
Intercept       5.435*** 0.406 
   Panel B             (𝝆𝟏 − 𝝆𝟎) ?̂?, (𝜼𝟏 − 𝜼𝟎) ?̂? 
Nadoption (Predicted)       0.128** 0.050 
Sex       0.053 0.061 
Age      -0.002 0.002 
Education      -0.013 0.010 
Hsize       0.001 0.014 
HLand      -0.036 0.032 
HWealth (predicted)      -0.061 0.078 
Soil fertility       0.012 0.032 
Seed use      -0.004 0.007 
Fertilizer cost       6.1E-5 1.0E-4 
Pesticide cost       0.008 0.014 
Weedicide cost      -0.003*** 0.001 
Machinery      -0.106 0.104 
Labor use       0.001 0.002 
Extension (predicted)       0.066 0.139 
Soy selling price       0.018 0.176 
Residuals_NWLink      -0.042 0.042 
Intercept       1.106** 0.460 
    Panel C      (𝝉 ) 
   Local wage rate    0.137 0.101    -0.013 0.042 
   Network FEs     Yes        Yes  
   Town center    0.004* 0.002    -0.001 0.001 
   NSex   -0.240 0.151    
   NAge    0.003 0.005    
   NLand   -0.098** 0.040    
   SoySeed Distance     -0.478*** 0.089    
   N2SoySeed Distance    0.147*** 0.027    
   SoySeed price   -0.481** 0.193    
X2: excluded instruments       36.99     
p-value: excluded instruments       0.000     
p-value: observed heterogeneity    0.000  
Observations         500   500  
Notes: The “selection” column reports the marginal effects from probit selection model of adoption decisions, with Θ𝐴 as the 
vector of parameter estimates, equation (2). Our instrument is distance to soybean seed source, which is normalized about its overall 
mean. ?̂? is the predicted propensity score from the estimated first-stage adoption equation. The “outcome” column shows the estimates 
of the soybean yield equations (1 and 5). 𝜌0, 𝜂0 in panel A denote effects of covariates on the outcome when the household is not 
adopting as in equations (3). (𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?, (𝜂1 − 𝜂0)?̂? in panel B denote the treatment effects of the covariates on the outcome due to 
gains from adoption as in equation (3). 𝜏 is a parameter vector of village characteristics and network fixed effects (Network Fes). 
Residuals_NWLink is residuals of the link formation model. S.E. are bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications. The asterisks 
***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 4.C2. Soybean variety adoption, food and vitamin A consumption 
 Selection Outcome 
   Food Vitamin A 
 Coefficient S. E. Coefficient S. E. Coefficient S. E. 
    Panel A                  𝚯𝑨 𝝆𝟎, 𝜼𝟎 𝝆𝟎, 𝜼𝟎 
Nadoption (predicted)    0.110** 0.049    0.087** 0.033    0.198*** 0.048 
Sex    0.011 0.053    0.103* 0.055    0.148 0.102 
Age   -0.002 0.001   -0.002 0.002    0.003 0.003 
Education    0.004 0.008    0.022** 0.010    0.040*** 0.011 
Hsize   -0.041*** 0.013   -0.035*** 0.011   -0.016 0.027 
HLand    0.041* 0.021    0.058** 0.027    0.036 0.043 
HWealth (predicted)    0.169*** 0.045    0.127* 0.076    0.190** 0.087 
Soil fertility    0.038 0.027    0.030 0.035   -0.045 0.048 
Seed use   -0.015** 0.006    0.003 0.007    0.007 0.010 
Fertilizer cost   -3.9E-5 6.0E-5    2.4E-5 6.8E-5   -3.8E-5 1.3E-4 
Pesticide cost    0.003 0.004    0.012* 0.007    0.015 0.011 
Weedicide cost   -2.6E-5 0.001   -8.6E-5 0.001    1.7E-4 0.001 
Machinery   -0.066 0.059    0.056 0.090    0.023 0.128 
Labor use    0.001 0.002    0.007** 0.002    0.010** 0.004 
Farm revenue (predicted)    0.270*** 0.070    0.211*** 0.064    0.476*** 0.127 
Residuals_NWLink   -0.046 0.034    0.017 0.029    0.049 0.057 
Soybean selling price    0.088 0.194    0.227* 0.137    0.073 0.270 
Intercept      0.519 0.669   -2.980*** 0.920 
     Panel B              (𝝆𝟏 − 𝝆𝟎) ?̂?, (𝜼𝟏 − 𝜼𝟎) ?̂? (𝝆𝟏 − 𝝆𝟎) ?̂?, (𝜼𝟏 − 𝜼𝟎) ?̂? 
Nadoption (predicted)     -0.107*** 0.033 -0.214*** 0.055 
Sex     -0.095 0.069 -0.130 0.126 
Age      0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.004 
Education     -0.024** 0.010 -0.042*** 0.014 
Hsize      0.041** 0.015  0.026 0.035 
HLand     -0.075** 0.030 -0.035 0.047 
HWealth (predicted)     -0.135 0.083 -0.195* 0.100 
Soil fertility     -0.030 0.047  0.068 0.062 
Seed use       0.003 0.009 -0.004 0.013 
Fertilizer cost     -1.2E-5 8.7E-5  1.1E-4    1.8E-4 
Pesticide cost     -0.013* 0.008 -0.017 0.013 
Weedicide cost      3.4E-4 0.001  3.6E-5 0.002 
Machinery     -0.006 0.098  0.050 0.149 
Labor use     -0.011*** 0.003 -0.014** 0.005 
Farm revenue (predicted)     -0.030 0.068 -0.395** 0.145 
Residuals_NWLink     -0.039 0.040 -0.091 0.073 
Soybean selling price     -0.232 0.179 -0.120 0.337 
Intercept      1.072 0.761  3.931*** 0.995 
      Panel C   (𝝉 ) (𝝉 ) 
   Extension (predicted)    0.572*** 0.108     
   Local wage rate   -0.266* 0.151  0.015 0.040  0.166** 0.065 
   Network FEs       Yes    Yes     Yes  
   Town center    0.005** 0.002  0.001 0.001  0.005*** 0.001 
   NSex   -0.498*** 0.163     
   NAge    0.002 0.005     
   NLand   -0.116** 0.040     
   SoySeed Distance     -0.483*** 0.094     
   N2SoySeed Distance    0.144*** 0.029     
   SoySeed price   -0.497** 0.194     
X2: excluded instruments 38.10      
p-value: excluded instruments 0.000      
p-value: observed heterogeneity   0.000  0.000  
Observations 500  500  500  
Notes: The “selection” column reports the marginal effects from probit selection model of adoption decisions, with Θ𝐴 as the 
vector of parameter estimates, equation (2). Our instrument is distance to soybean seed source, which is normalized about its overall 
mean. ?̂? is the predicted propensity score from the estimated first-stage adoption equation. The “outcome” column shows the estimates 
of the food and vitamin A foods consumption equations (1 and 5). 𝜌0, 𝜂0 in panel A denote effects of covariates on the outcomes when 
the household is not adopting as in equations (3). (𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?, (𝜂1 − 𝜂0)?̂? in panel B denote the treatment effects of the covariates on 
the outcomes due to gains from adoption as in equation (3). 𝜏 is a parameter vector of village characteristics and network fixed effects 
(Network Fes). Residuals_NWLink is residuals of the link formation model. S.E. are bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications. 
The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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 Table 4.C3. Soybean variety adoption and protein consumption 
 Selection  Protein  
 Coefficient S. E. Coefficient S. E. 
    Panel A                  𝚯𝑨 𝝆𝟎, 𝜼𝟎 
Nadoption (predicted)    0.110** 0.049    0.292*** 0.086 
Sex    0.011 0.053    0.140 0.117 
Age   -0.002 0.001    0.001 0.005 
Education    0.004 0.008    0.074** 0.027 
Hsize   -0.041*** 0.013   -0.031 0.036 
HLand    0.041* 0.021    0.076 0.058 
HWealth (predicted)    0.169*** 0.045    0.440*** 0.118 
Soil fertility    0.038 0.027    0.068 0.065 
Seed use   -0.015** 0.006    0.019 0.019 
Fertilizer cost   -3.9E-5 6.0E-5   -2.4E-5 2.1E-4 
Pesticide cost    0.003 0.004   -0.005 0.024 
Weedicide cost   -2.6E-5 0.001    0.002 0.003 
Machinery   -0.066 0.059   -0.070 0.243 
Labor use    0.001 0.002    0.010 0.007 
Farm revenue (predicted)    0.270*** 0.070    0.546*** 0.157 
Residuals_NWLink   -0.046 0.034     0.008 0.068 
Soybean selling price    0.088 0.194   -0.194 0.253 
Intercept     -4.702*** 1.440 
     Panel B              (𝝆𝟏 − 𝝆𝟎) ?̂?, (𝜼𝟏 − 𝜼𝟎) ?̂? 
Nadoption (predicted)     -0.346*** 0.087 
Sex     -0.126 0.158 
Age      0.003 0.007 
Education     -0.101*** 0.033 
Hsize      0.030 0.047 
HLand     -0.045 0.065 
HWealth (predicted)     -0.510*** 0.145 
Soil fertility     -0.001 0.096 
Seed use      -0.012 0.025 
Fertilizer cost      1.6E-4 2.5E-4 
Pesticide cost      0.009 0.029 
Weedicide cost     -0.002 0.004 
Machinery      0.219 0.295 
Labor use     -0.015* 0.008 
Farm revenue (predicted)     -0.497** 0.200 
Residuals_NWLink     -0.039 0.095 
Soybean selling price      0.185 0.316 
Intercept      4.319** 1.837 
      Panel C   (𝝉 ) 
   Extension (predicted)    0.572*** 0.108   
   Local wage rate   -0.266* 0.151    0.310** 0.121 
   Network FEs       Yes        Yes  
   Town center    0.005** 0.002    0.011*** 0.002 
   NSex   -0.498*** 0.163   
   NAge    0.002 0.005   
   NLand   -0.116** 0.040   
   SoySeed Distance     -0.483*** 0.094   
   N2SoySeed Distance    0.144*** 0.029   
   SoySeed price   -0.497** 0.194   
X2: excluded instruments 38.10    
p-value: excluded instruments 0.000    
p-value: observed heterogeneity   0.000  
Observations 500  500  
Notes: The “selection” column reports the marginal effects from probit selection model of adoption decisions, with Θ𝐴 as the 
vector of parameter estimates, equation (2). Our instrument is distance to soybean seed source, which is normalized about its overall 
mean. ?̂? is the predicted propensity score from the estimated first-stage adoption equation. The “outcome” column shows the estimates 
of the protein foods consumption equations (1 and 5). 𝜌0, 𝜂0 in panel A denote effects of covariates on the outcome when the household 
is not adopting as in equations (3). (𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?, (𝜂1 − 𝜂0)?̂? in panel B denote the treatment effects of the covariates on the outcome 
due to gains from adoption as in equation (3). 𝜏 is a parameter vector of village characteristics and network fixed effects (Network 
Fes). Residuals_NWLink is residuals of the link formation model. S.E. are bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications. The 
asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 4.C4. Soybean variety adoption, yield and food consumption with mobile 
phone coverage 
 Selection Outcome 
   Yield Food 
 Coefficient S. E. Coefficient S. E. Coefficient S. E. 
    Panel A                  𝚯𝑨 𝝆𝟎, 𝜼𝟎 𝝆𝟎, 𝜼𝟎 
Nadoption (predicted)  0.138** 0.052 -0.064 0.037  0.097*** 0.097 
Sex  0.043 0.052 -0.027 0.045  0.103** 0.103 
Age -0.002 0.001  0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
Education  0.001 0.008  0.030*** 0.009  0.022** 0.022 
Hsize -0.034** 0.013 -0.004 0.011 -0.035** -0.035 
HLand  0.054** 0.022  0.049 0.034  0.057** 0.057 
HWealth (predicted)  0.159*** 0.045  0.056 0.139  0.128 0.128 
Soil fertility  0.021 0.026  0.011 0.027  0.032 0.032 
Seed use -0.014** 0.006  0.005 0.006  0.003 0.003 
Fertilizer cost -1.7E-05   7.0E-05 -1.9E-05     8.9E-05  2.2E-05     2.2E-05 
Pesticide cost  0.001 0.004 -0.009 0.010  0.013 0.013 
Weedicide cost  0.001 0.001  0.002*** 0.001 -9.9E-05   -9.9E-05 
Machinery -0.008 0.051  0.125 0.089  0.048 0.048 
Labor use  0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002  0.007*** 0.007 
Extension (predicted)  0.580*** 0.111 -0.021 0.114   
Farm revenue (predicted) -0.064 0.029    0.215*** 0.215 
Residuals_NWLink -0.052 0.034  0.055 0.033  0.015 0.015 
Soybean selling price  0.161 0.205 -0.052 0.148  0.234* 0.234 
Intercept       5.376*** 0.477  0.524 0.524 
     Panel B              (𝝆𝟏 − 𝝆𝟎) ?̂?, (𝜼𝟏 − 𝜼𝟎) ?̂? (𝝆𝟏 − 𝝆𝟎) ?̂?, (𝜼𝟏 − 𝜼𝟎) ?̂? 
Nadoption (predicted)    0.137** 0.059 -0.111*** 0.033 
Sex    0.049 0.051 -0.094* 0.055 
Age   -0.001 0.002  0.002 0.003 
Education   -0.014 0.010 -0.024** 0.011 
Hsize    0.001 0.015  0.039** 0.016 
HLand   -0.039 0.037 -0.075*** 0.024 
HWealth (predicted)   -0.047 0.150 -0.137 0.092 
Soil fertility    0.009 0.031 -0.032 0.031 
Seed use    -0.004 0.007  0.003 0.008 
Fertilizer cost    5.0E-05     1.1E-04 -7.6E-06     9.2E-05 
Pesticide cost    0.011 0.012 -0.014 0.009 
Weedicide cost   -0.003*** 0.001  0.001 0.001 
Machinery   -0.135 0.099  0.008 0.087 
Labor use    0.002 0.003 -0.011*** 0.003 
Extension (predicted)    0.066 0.131   
Farm revenue (predicted)     -0.033 0.077 
Residuals_NWLink   -0.041 0.044 -0.036 0.034 
Soybean selling price    0.043 0.192 -0.241 0.152 
Intercept    1.163** 0.536  1.082 0.745 
      Panel C   (𝝉 ) (𝝉 ) 
   Local wage rate  0.145 0.101 -0.019 0.036  0.014 0.046 
   Mobile network  0.112 0.098  0.018 0.029  0.033 0.027 
   Network FEs       Yes    Yes     Yes  
   Town center  0.004 0.002  0.001 0.001  0.002*** 0.001 
   NSex -0.254* 0.154     
   NAge  0.002 0.005     
   NLand -0.068 0.046     
   SoySeed Distance   -0.483*** 0.091     
   N2SoySeed Distance 0.154*** 0.029     
   SoySeed price -0.465** 0.197     
p-value: observed heterogeneity   0.000  0.000  
Observations 500  500  500  
Notes: The “selection” column reports the marginal effects from probit selection model of adoption decisions, with Θ𝐴 as the 
vector of parameter estimates, equation (2). Our instrument is distance to soybean seed source, which is normalized about its overall 
mean. ?̂? is the predicted propensity score from the estimated first-stage adoption equation. The “outcome” column shows the estimates 
of the soybean yield and food consumption equations (1 and 5). 𝜌0, 𝜂0 in panel A denote effects of covariates on the outcomes when 
the household is not adopting as in equations (3). (𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?, (𝜂1 − 𝜂0)?̂? in panel B denote the treatment effects of the covariates on 
the outcomes due to gains from adoption as in equation (3). 𝜏 is a parameter vector of village characteristics and network fixed effects 
(Network Fes). Residuals_NWLink is residuals of the link formation model. S.E. are bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications. 
The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.    
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Figure 4.C1 Counterfactual outcomes  
The figure shows the treatment effects and potential outcomes (unobserved) as a function of resistance to treatment (U_A) for 
all the outcomes, based on the baseline specification. In each case, it displays the marginal treatment effects, MTE (solid line), 
and average treatment effects, ATE (dashed line).  More importantly, it shows the distribution of the outcomes, Y0 and Y1, in 
the non-adoption (dashed-dot line) and adoption (dotted line) states, respectively.  
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Figure 4.C2 MTE Functional form sensitivity for food and nutrition security 
 
Figure 4.C2 shows the marginal treatment effects (MTE) functional form robustness checks based on the same specifications 
in figure 4.3, evaluated at average values of the covariates. U_A denotes unobserved resistance to treatment/adoption. Part A 
depicts MTE curves for soybean yield, part B shows the MTE curve for food consumption, part C is the MTE curve for vitamin 
A rich foods consumption, while part D is the MTE curve for protein rich foods consumption. The solid MTE curve refers to 
our baseline specification, where we include the propensity score and its square in the specification. The figure also displays 
three additional specifications that allow for a specification without square of the propensity score (i.e., normal), one with cubic 
of the propensity score (third order) and a specification obtained from semiparametric approach (Semiparametric). 
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Table 4.C5. Aggregate treatment effects of adoption on Soybean yield, food and 
vitamin A: Sensitivity to different specification of the outcomes and selection 
equations  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A Sensitivity to different specification of the outcome equation 
 Contextual network effects and peer soil  Exclude peer effects for SUTVA 
 Yield Food Vitamin A  Yield Food Vitamin A 
ATE   0.671*** 
 (0.119) 
  0.276*** 
 (0.093) 
  0.589*** 
 (0.164) 
  0.527*** 
(0.122) 
  0.329*** 
 (0.070) 
  0.566*** 
 (0.128) 
TT   0.867*** 
 (0.164) 
  0.279** 
 (0.129) 
  0.677*** 
 (0.234) 
  0.625*** 
(0.163) 
  0.374*** 
 (0.103) 
  0.716*** 
 (0.188) 
TUT   0.284** 
 (0.115) 
  0.271*** 
 (0.076) 
  0.411*** 
 (0.101) 
  0.333** 
(0.127) 
  0.241*** 
 (0.077) 
  0.267*** 
 (0.086) 
Nadoption 𝜌0  -0.070 
 (0.037) 
  0.088** 
 (0.040) 
  0.155** 
 (0.069) 
    
TE for Nadoption (𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?   0.157*** 
 (0.043) 
-0.085** 
 (0.047) 
-0.135* 
 (0.079) 
    
        
p-values for essential 
heterogeneity 
  0.002    0.011    0.001   0.041    0.001    0.000 
        
Panel B Sensitivity to the specification of the choice equation 
 Distance squared   Distance interacted with wealth and 
household size 
 Yield Food Vitamin A  Yield Food Vitamin A 
ATE   0.569*** 
 (0.124) 
  0.342*** 
 (0.072) 
  0.621*** 
 (0.133) 
   0.622*** 
 (0.105) 
  0.292*** 
 (0.071) 
  0.535*** 
 (0.118) 
TT   0.723*** 
 (0.172) 
  0.380** 
 (0.111) 
  0.742*** 
 (0.190) 
   0.791*** 
 (0.159) 
  0.287** 
 (0.107) 
  0.604*** 
 (0.161) 
TUT   0.265** 
 (0.124) 
  0.265*** 
 (0.063) 
  0.379*** 
 (0.079) 
   0.287** 
 (0.103) 
  0.299*** 
 (0.074) 
  0.394*** 
 (0.086) 
Nadoption 𝜌0 -0.050 
 (0.034) 
  0.075** 
 (0.027) 
  0.180*** 
 (0.056) 
 -0.059 
(0.035) 
  0.089** 
 (0.033) 
  0.198*** 
 (0.058) 
TE for Nadoption (𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?   0.135** 
 (0.049) 
-0.089** 
 (0.031) 
-0.188** 
 (0.065) 
   0.136** 
 (0.048) 
-0.108 
 (0.038) 
-0.211*** 
 (0.063) 
        
p-values for essential 
heterogeneity 
  0.003   0.000   0.000    0.001    0.001   0.001 
Notes: The table reports the average treatment effect (ATE), average treatment effect on the treated (TT), average treatment 
effect on the untreated (TUT), effect of peer adoption (i.e., Nadoption 𝜌0), treatment effect of peer adoption, [i.e., TE for Nadoption 
(𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?] using different specification for soybean yield, food and nutrients consumption. The 𝜌’s are as defined in equations (1) 
and (3). Panel A shows the sensitivity of the outcome equations to different specifications. Panel B dwells on sensitivity of the selection 
equation, which includes the square of the instrument and the instrument interacted with household size and wealth. The p-value for 
the test of essential heterogeneity tests for a nonzero slope of the MTE curve. Bootstrapped standard errors (50 replications) are reported 
in parentheses. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4.C6. Aggregate treatment effects of adoption on outcomes: Sensitivity to use 
of clustered standard errors, mobile phone network coverage and household 
dietary diversity 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Sensitivity to: 
Use of clustered errors  Mobile network HDDS 
Yield Food Vitamin A  Yield Food 
ATE  0.606*** 
(0.105) 
 0.294*** 
(0.078) 
 0.526*** 
(0.143) 
 0.617*** 
(0.103) 
0.295*** 
(0.077) 
 1.317** 
(0.521) 
TT  0.772*** 
(0.142) 
 0.299** 
(0.101) 
 0.596** 
(0.188) 
 0.788*** 
(0.166) 
0.296** 
(0.107) 
 1.206* 
(0.727) 
TUT  0.278** 
(0.121) 
 0.283*** 
(0.086) 
 0.384*** 
(0.106) 
 0.280** 
(0.119) 
0.294*** 
(0.065) 
 1.532*** 
(0.451) 
Nadoption  𝜌0 -0.051 
(0.033) 
 0.087** 
(0.028) 
 0.198*** 
(0.057) 
 0.064 
(0.037) 
0.097*** 
(0.030) 
 0.455** 
(0.226) 
TE for Nadoption (𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?  0.128** 
(0.045) 
-0.107*** 
(0.033) 
-0.214*** 
(0.053) 
 0.137** 
(0.059) 
-0.111*** 
(0.033) 
-0.613** 
(0.245) 
        
p-values for essential 
heterogeneity 
 0.004  0.001  0.003  0.016 0.001 0.045 
Observations    500    500     500  500 500  500 
Notes: The table reports the average treatment effect (ATE), average treatment effect on the treated (TT), average treatment 
effect on the untreated (TUT), effect of peer adoption (i.e., Nadoption 𝜌0), treatment effect of peer adoption, [i.e., TE for Nadoption 
(𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?]. The 𝜌’s are as defined in equations (1) and (3). Columns (1) to (3) report estimates where standard errors are clustered 
at the village level following Cameron et al. (2008). Columns (4) and (5) present estimates where we accounted for village mobile 
phone network coverage, whiles column (6) presents estimates where household food dietary diversity score (HDDS) is used as the 
outcome. The p-value for the test of essential heterogeneity tests for a nonzero slope of the MTE curve. Bootstrapped standard errors 
(50 replications) are reported in parentheses in columns (4) to (6). The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 4.C7. Aggregate treatment effects of adoption on Soybean yield, food and 
vitamin A: Sensitivity to Network Fixed Effects, Unobserved Link formation and 
differences in peers 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A Sensitivity to farmers’ degree and truncation of links due to sampling 
 Degree  Without those with links with all 5 
 Yield Food Vitamin A  Yield Food Vitamin A 
ATE   0.627*** 
 (0.115) 
  0.312*** 
 (0.082) 
  0.547*** 
 (0.128) 
  0.618*** 
(0.096) 
 0.316*** 
(0.093) 
 0.549*** 
(0.123) 
TT   0.796*** 
 (0.165) 
  0.346*** 
 (0.119) 
  0.671*** 
 (0.188) 
  0.789*** 
(0.139) 
 0.335** 
(0.146) 
 0.629*** 
(0.181) 
TUT   0.293** 
 (0.113) 
  0.244*** 
 (0.066) 
  0.301*** 
 (0.090) 
  0.296** 
(0.108) 
 0.279*** 
(0.059) 
 0.396*** 
(0.096) 
Nadoption  𝜌0  -0.046 
 (0.046) 
  0.128** 
 (0.046) 
  0.279*** 
 (0.074) 
 -0.045 
(0.032) 
 0.082*** 
(0.032) 
 0.198*** 
(0.049) 
Degree 𝜌0,𝑑   0.042 
 (0.070) 
 -0.071 
 (0.061) 
 -0.122 
 (0.121) 
    
TE for Nadoption (𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?   0.113* 
 (0.058) 
 -0.165*** 
 (0.055) 
 -0.328*** 
 (0.098) 
  0.122** 
(0.047) 
-0.101** 
(0.037) 
-0.215*** 
(0.054) 
        
TE for Degree (𝜌1,𝑑 − 𝜌0,𝑑) ?̂?   0.045 
 (0.078) 
  0.146 
 (0.072) 
  0.278* 
 (0.147) 
    
p-values for essential 
heterogeneity 
  0.005   0.006   0.018   0.000  0.000  0.000 
    500    500     500    478   478   478 
        
        
Panel B Sensitivity to changes in adopting peers over time and use of HDDS 
 Difference in peer adopters: 2016 – 2004   
 Yield Food Vitamin A     
ATE   0.598*** 
 (0.119) 
  0.298*** 
 (0.076) 
  0.540*** 
 (0.131) 
    
TT   0.760*** 
 (0.169) 
  0.307*** 
 (0.106) 
  0.615*** 
 (0.179) 
    
TUT   0.279** 
 (0.109) 
  0.281*** 
 (0.078) 
  0.390*** 
 (0.091) 
    
Nadoption 𝜌0  -0.055 
 (0.039) 
  0.075** 
 (0.029) 
  0.176*** 
 (0.075) 
    
TE for Nadoption (𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂?   0.131** 
 (0.050) 
-0.101*** 
 (0.031) 
-0.203*** 
 (0.059) 
    
        
p-values for essential 
heterogeneity 
  0.006   0.000   0.000     
Observations    500    500    500     
Notes: The table reports the average treatment effect (ATE), average treatment effect on the treated (TT), average treatment effect 
on the untreated (TUT), effect of peer (i.e., 𝜌0 and 𝜌0,𝑑 for peer adoption and degree, respectively), treatment effect of peers [i.e., 
(𝜌1 − 𝜌0) ?̂? and (𝜌1,𝑑 − 𝜌0,𝑑) ?̂? for peer adoption and degree, respectively] and the p-value for the test of essential heterogeneity 
using different specification for soybean yield, food and nutrients consumption. Panel A shows the sensitivity of our estimates to 
household degree and measurement errors due to the use of the sampled networks. Panel B dwells on sensitivity of the estimates the 
use of differenced peer adoption.  The p-value for the test of essential heterogeneity tests for a nonzero slope of the MTE curve. 
Bootstrapped standard errors (50 replications) are reported in parentheses. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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   Table 4.C8. Estimates of network fixed effects (Tables C1 and C2 continued) 
      (1)   (2) (3) (4) 
 Selection equations Outcome equations 
       Yield   Food Yield  Food 
 Village 2 184.375*** 178.404*** 0.063 -0.030 
   (64.354) (62.591) (0.077) (0.074) 
 Village 3 128.749*** 124.759*** -0.031 -0.123* 
   (44.421) (43.226) (0.076) (0.067) 
 Village 4 126.167*** 122.800*** 0.002 -0.065 
   (44.058) (42.831) (0.057) (0.067) 
 Village 5 117.003*** 113.338*** 0.052 -0.124** 
   (41.210) (40.053) (0.091) (0.062) 
 Village 6 43.525*** 42.898*** -0.032 -0.142** 
   (14.861) (14.426) (0.075) (0.069) 
 Village 7 375.646*** 363.032*** -0.024 -0.053 
   (130.379) (126.753) (0.057) (0.064) 
 Village 8 78.181*** 75.635*** -0.030 0.015 
   (28.067) (27.265) (0.098) (0.080) 
 Village 9 121.510*** 115.719*** -0.024 -0.037 
   (41.596) (40.539) (0.066) (0.093) 
 Village 10 -100.812*** -99.107*** 0.113 0.021 
   (34.630) (33.657) (0.076) (0.085) 
 Village 11 -100.972*** -99.779*** -0.086 -0.053 
   (35.957) (34.953) (0.073) (0.105) 
 Village 12 -78.137*** -77.489*** -0.007 -0.036 
   (27.630) (26.847) (0.054) (0.094) 
 Village 13 -9.003* -9.642** -0.151 -0.061 
   (4.933) (4.772) (0.095) (0.121) 
 Village 14 -50.025*** -48.998*** 0.050 -0.027 
   (17.612) (17.047) (0.071) (0.072) 
 Village 15 -18.533** -18.862** -0.183** -0.101 
   (8.561) (8.315) (0.091) (0.114) 
 Village 16 -5.114* -5.135* -0.071 -0.054 
   (2.727) (2.687) (0.068) (0.085) 
 Village 17 138.474*** 132.801*** -0.013 -0.011 
   (48.015) (46.701) (0.058) (0.069) 
 Village 18 -38.725*** -37.550*** -0.019 -0.048 
   (13.670) (13.328) (0.051) (0.057) 
 Village 19 -6.225*** -6.795*** 0.005 0.037 
   (1.926) (1.913) (0.063) (0.073) 
 Village 20 30.308*** 28.587*** 0.022 0.024 
   (10.833) (10.501) (0.056) (0.058) 
 Village 21 -92.361*** -90.162*** -0.157 -0.026 
   (30.394) (29.590) (0.142) (0.128) 
 Village 22 -134.078*** -129.525*** -0.180 0.015 
   (44.845) (43.647) (0.186) (0.138) 
 Village 23 59.334*** 58.869*** -0.126 -0.147 
   (19.061) (18.561) (0.077) (0.100) 
 Village 24 65.202*** 63.404*** -0.038 -0.171** 
   (22.110) (21.540) (0.067) (0.067) 
 Village 25 n.a. n.a. 0.024 0.090 
 n.a. n.a. (0.103) (0.078) 
     Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors (50 replications) are reported in parentheses. The 
asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. n.a. denotes not 
available. 
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Abstract 
This article presents a systematic review of the literature on policy options to improve food 
security and nutrition in developing countries, and an empirical analysis of the impact of 
smallholder market participation on food security and nutrition in Ghana. The review focuses 
on the impacts of policy strategies such as structural changes in relative prices, agricultural 
infrastructure, economic incentives and agricultural technologies. In order to account for threats 
of selection bias and omitted variable problem, the empirical analysis uses an ordered probit 
selection model to jointly estimate households’ market orientation decisions and food and 
nutrients consumption. The empirical results show that transitioning from one market 
orientation to another significantly increase households’ food and nutrients consumption.  
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5.1 Introduction 
Food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa remains a major developmental challenge, despite 
several interventions to improve food security and nutrition in many developing regions. Recent 
official estimates suggest that hunger and malnutrition appear to be increasing in most sub-
Saharan African countries, a situation that is in contrast to the rest of the world (FAO, ECA and 
AUC 2020)53. The increasing food insecurity in Africa, combined with the fact that persistent 
food insecurity contributed to the failure of countries in the region in meeting the Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) of halving the number of hungry people by 2015 (Abdulai and 
Kuhlgatz 2012), suggest the need for continuous efforts in supporting and promoting measures 
to improve food security in the region. While the worsening food situation can partly be 
attributed to climate change (Abdulai 2018; FAO, ECA and AUC 2020), as well as poor and 
weakening market conditions, the impact of agricultural markets on food security and nutrition 
appears to be far from being conclusive (Carletto et al. 2017; Linderhof et al. 2019; Ehui 2020).  
 
Many authors have emphasized the role of new agricultural technologies, specialization and 
commercialization in increasing farm productivity and household welfare through enhanced 
efficiency, competitiveness and gains from comparative advantage (Govereh and Jayne 2003; 
Ochieng et al. 2019). However, prohibitive transaction costs imposed by underdeveloped 
market systems and infrastructure, market failures, and inadequate access to finance and 
technologies in most developing countries have often hindered the efficiency of food market 
systems, and limited the potentials of agricultural marketing in these areas (Fafchamps 1992; 
Abdulai and Birachi 2009; Abdul-Rahaman and Abdulai 2020). Notwithstanding these 
                                                          
53 Whereas there was no increase in the prevalence of undernourishment in the rest of world between 2014-2018, growth in 
prevalence for the whole of Africa and sub-Saharan Africa was 1.7 and 2.0 percentage points, respectively, over the same period 
(FAO, ECA and AUC 2020). 
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constraints, smallholder marketing has been shown to increase farmers’ access to improved 
crop inputs, productivity and income (Ashraf et al. 2009; Abdul-Rahaman and Abdulai 2020).  
 
Despite the widespread agreement on the role of smallholder marketing in improving food 
security and nutrition, the empirical evidence on this issue remain scanty, with mixed findings 
(Carletto et al. 2017; Linderhof et al. 2019; Kuma et al. 2018). While studies such as Ochieng 
et al. (2019) analyzed the impact of commercialization of bananas and legumes on dietary 
diversity in central Africa, and Kuma et al. (2018), who examined the effects of coffee 
production on household food security in Ethiopia show that commercialization improved 
household dietary diversity and food security, others authors report that the impacts of 
commercialization on food consumption and nutrition is either negative or non-existent (e.g., 
Carletto et al. 2017; Linderhorf et al. 2019).  
 
Moreover, most of these studies have often failed to consider the possible market orientation54  
of smallholders’ crop sales, which may mask the extent and pattern of gains from crop sales, 
given that smallholders’ crop sales are driven by profit and non-profit motives (Pingali and 
Rosegrant 1995; Jacoby and Minten 2009). Production and marketing decisions of smallholders 
in Africa are often fragmented and characterized by a blend of subsistence, surplus, commercial 
and distress55 motives, which may have various implications on the gains and impacts of 
commercialization across farmers (Pingali and Rosegrant 1995). For instance, if households are 
                                                          
54 Household market orientation in developing countries has been classified into three (FAO 1989; Pingali and Rosegrant 1995). 
1) Subsistence farmer where the farmer’s objective is food self-sufficiency, produces wide range of products and/or sells not 
more than 25% of the output; 2) Transitional or surplus farmer where the farmer produces for household consumption and sale 
of surplus, but sells at least 25% and less than 50% of the output; and 3) Commercial farmer where the farmer is profit oriented, 
highly specialized and with high market engagement, and sells more than 50% of the output.    
55 Distress sales usually arise when farmers are forced to sell their harvest to meet immediate financial requirements (such as 
servicing of debts or meeting other household needs) (Jacoby and Minten 2009). 
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subsistence-oriented or surplus-oriented, they may choose to produce different crop mix in 
order to secure food self-sufficiency, and to spread market-related risks due to market 
imperfections and lack of risk mitigating mechanisms such as insurance and credit markets 
(Zanello 2012; Ecker 2018). If, however, farm households are commercial-oriented, then 
production and marketing decisions could be based on profit and some market intelligence, 
which can result in higher ‘gains’ from trade, increased household income and improved food 
security and nutrition (Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; Abdulai and Huffman 2000).   
 
In this paper, our goal is twofold: First, to provide an overview of the literature on food security 
and nutrition strategies in developing countries. While food security and nutrition are of interest 
in their own rights, we focus on the survey of the literature on economic policies and micro 
strategies of promoting smallholder food security and nutrition in sub-Saharan Africa. Second 
is to provide an empirical example of how smallholder market orientation impacts on food 
security and nutrition in Ghana. The empirical analysis builds on the review by showing how 
commercially/profit-oriented market engagement by smallholders can serve as a food security 
and nutrition enhancing strategy in the area. While previous studies have considered the role of 
smallholder market participation and commercialization on food security and nutrition, there is 
almost no study on how smallholder market orientation affects the impacts of 
commercialization on food security and nutrition56. The empirical analysis is partly justified by 
the fact that the extent of smallholder market integration is closely associated with the motive 
                                                          
56 Some studies examine the impacts of smallholder market participation and commercialization by focusing on market 
participation decisions, cultivation and sale of cash crops, as well as the value of total crop harvest sold. Strasberg et al. (1999), 
Govereh and Jayne (2003), Zanello (2012) and Kuma et al. (2018), for instance, focus on smallholder marketing decisions, and 
cultivation and sales of cash crops, and Carletto et al. (2017) and Linderhof et al. (2019) focus on the value of crops sold. 
Notable exceptions are Ochieng et al. (2019) who focus on the effect of households moving from non-commercialized to 
commercialized, and Ogutu et al. (2019) who emphasis the effects of commercialization in a continuum (i.e., continuous 
treatment effects), but not on how market orientation affects food security and nutrition. 
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of production, which tends to have varied impacts on household welfare (Abdulai and Huffman 
2000; Ecker 2018). This, therefore, allows us to delineate smallholder market participation 
effects on household food security and nutrition under different motives of market engagement 
by smallholders.       
 
Second, the empirical analysis allows us to highlight the impact of smallholder transition from 
subsistence to commercial on the consumption of specific nutrient rich foods. The analysis on 
specific nutrients intake is significant in this setting for at least two reasons: First, unlike most 
previous studies that focused on calorie and/or food consumption (Kuma et al. 2018; Ochieng 
et al. 2019), which do not enhance the understanding of individual nutrients intake patterns, 
analysis of the consumption of nutrient rich foods provide insights into specific nutrients intake 
and therefore, serve as a wedge between food patterns and food quality (Freisling et al. 2010). 
Second, the distinction between food/calorie and specific nutrient rich foods is important, 
because many African countries, including the study country, face deficiencies in specific 
nutrients such as vitamins, protein and iron, in spite of appreciable or relatively normal levels 
of food and calorie intake (Abdulai and Kuhlgatz 2012; Colen et al. 2018). This, coupled with 
the fact that the recent deteriorating food security and nutrition situation in Africa has been 
partly attributed to adverse food market conditions, underscore the need to further understand 
how smallholder market orientation affects the impact of commercialization on household food 
security and nutrition.    
  
The rest of the paper is organized into three main sections as follows: The next section presents 
an overview of food security research in Africa, with particular emphasis on food security and 
nutrition promotion strategies in the literature. Section 5.3 shows the empirical example of 
smallholder market participation as a food security and nutrition enhancing strategy. Section 
5.4 concludes and highlights some policy and future research implications.   
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5.2 Food Security in Africa 
The recent increase in the incidence of food insecurity and malnutrition in sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries calls for the need to seriously assess and find ways to promote food security in 
the sub-region. Evidence shows that the prevalence of food insecurity and malnutrition have 
risen from 18.2% in 2014 to 20% in 2018 in Africa, with that of sub-Saharan Africa, increasing 
from 20.8% to 22.8% over the same period (FAO, ECA and AUC 2020). Estimates from the 
FAO, ECA and AUC (2020) reveal that about 239 million in the region were undernourished 
in 2018. The number of undernourished people in Nigeria, which is the most populated country 
in the region, was estimated to be over 25 million in 2018, which is about 180% increase over 
the past decade (FAO, ECA and AUC 2020). This development suggests that, as was in the 
case of the failure to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of halving the incidence of 
hunger by 2015, the realization of the Sustainable Development Goal two of eradicating hunger 
and improving nutrition by 2030 may not be realized, if concerted efforts are not made to 
overcome the barriers to improving food security and nutrition in the region (OECD 2016).  
 
The state of food security and nutrition in developing countries has been a consequence of 
environmental and economic factors including climate shocks; conflicts; unemployment; low 
wages and food price inflation; lack of access to and adoption of improved technologies; and 
lack of institutions, structures and markets for farmers and consumers (Weber et al. 1988; 
Abdulai and Kuhlgatz 2012; Abdulai and Huffman 2014; FAO, ECA and AUC 2020). In this 
section, we provide an overview of the literature on how these factors have impacted food 
security and nutrition, as well as general household welfare.   
 
5.2.1 Economic Policies and Food Security  
In most African countries, the fundamental agricultural policy objectives have been to increase 
productivity and private sector engagement in agriculture, reduce state involvement, improve 
innovation and technology, opening up markets and allowing prices to determine the allocation 
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of factors of production (Abdulai and Huffman 2000). Food security policies in many of these 
economies have also focused on improving food trade and market integration through enhanced 
infrastructure, private and state trade support policies, and public buffer stocks. These policies 
have resulted in key policy initiatives such as the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural 
Development Programme (CAADP) and the African Regional Nutrition Strategy (ARSN) 
aimed at increasing investment in research and development, agricultural infrastructure, 
extension services and the subsidization of farm inputs to increase productivity, trade and food 
security (Sheahan and Barrett 2017; FAO, ECA and AUC 2020).  Also, in the wake of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, which has resulted in border closures, lockdowns and curfews, and the 
consequent disruption in supply chains as well as projected contraction of agricultural 
production, ministers for agriculture of African Union members have publicly committed to 
implementing measures to minimize food system disruptions and ensure food security and 
nutrition for their citizens (Ehui 2020). 
 
The issue of food prices has been a key focus of interest in food security policies in many 
developing countries. Such policies aim at improving food access through lower market prices 
and stabilization of consumption in times of high food price inflation (Barrett 2002; OECD 
2016). Two main approaches have been widely used to implement these policies in the past. 
These included universal price subsidies that benefit net buyers of food, and limited access 
subsidies that provide rationed quantities at reduced prices (Byerlee et al. 2006; Abdulai and 
Kuhlgatz 2012). However, the limitations of these policies have been the lack of sustainability 
and exit mechanisms, and the accruals of greater shares of rationed food gains to political actors 
and groups at the expense of the poor. Moreover, a number of these price policies did not 
sufficiently incorporate country specific price and production risk factors. This resulted in the 
failure of several food price policies to produce the desired results with respect to food security 
and nutrition measures (Barrett 2002; Byerlee et al. 2006).  
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Similarly, the Structural Adjustment Programs that were implemented by many African 
governments in the 1980s also contributed to food security dynamics in many of these countries. 
Available evidence shows that the response of the agriculture sector in Africa to these policy 
reforms was encouraging, because output and productivity increased in the countries that 
pursued reforms compared to countries that failed to implement these reforms (Byerlee et al. 
2006; Abdulai and Kuhlgatz 2012). However, the reduction or removal of subsidies on farm 
inputs following the structural reforms also led to increased input prices, which later led to 
reduced farm output and productivity, and increased food insecurity and malnutrition (Abdulai 
and Huffman 2000). This suggests the need for policy-makers and researchers to put particular 
emphasis on how long-term policies and interventions can ensure a balance between state 
efficiency and productivity, without compromising food security and nutrition goals.  
 
5.2.2 Climate Change and Food Security 
Climate change and shocks continue to have serious adverse effects on agricultural production 
and food security, particularly in developing countries (Abdulai 2018; Eastin 2018; Shahzad 
and Abdulai 2020; FAO, ECA and AUC 2020). In particular, high temperatures, heat, water 
stress and related weather extremes tend to affect poor people in developing countries the most, 
because of their heavy reliance on agriculture for their livelihoods, low economic 
diversification and their inability to cope with food price inflation and income shocks (Abdulai 
and CroleRees 2001; Eastin 2018). Several attempts have been made to address or mitigate the 
adverse impacts of climate change in Africa, with some prominent strategies being the 
development of irrigation systems and the adoption of climate-smart agricultural practices 
(Lipper et al. 2014; Abdulai 2018). Climate-smart agriculture is an embodiment of practices 
that seek to promote the reliance on agricultural systems and livelihoods to promote production, 
and reduce risks of food insecurity and malnutrition for the current and future generations 
(Lipper et al. 2014; Issahaku and Abdulai 2020).  
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The literature has shown a variety of climate-smart practices that include conservation 
agriculture, use of improved and drought-tolerant crop varieties, adoption of improved 
technologies, crop rotation and mixed cropping, matching livestock to supply of grazing land 
as well as crop diversification and economic diversification into non-farm income activities 
(Abdulai and CroleRees 2001; Di Falco and Veronesi 2013; FAO 2016; Shahzad and Abdulai 
2020). Earlier studies on the impact of climate change focused on crop productivity at the 
country, regional and global levels, and only provided insights into the impacts of climate 
change in aggregate terms (Di Falco et al. 2011). However, the need to promote resilience of 
the poorest and vulnerable segments of rural population in developing countries (Eastin 2018), 
resulted in the need to understand smallholder adaptation strategies (Di Falco et al. 2011; 
Issahaku and Abdulai 2020). Thus, recent studies have focused on understanding the drivers of 
smallholder adaptation to climate change in developing countries, and also quantifying the 
effects of adaptation strategies on farm performance and household welfare measures such as 
yields, net returns, poverty reduction, and food security and nutrition (FAO 2016; Eastin 2018; 
Issahaku and Abdulai 2020; Shahzad and Abdulai 2020).    
 
Promotion of drought resistant crop varieties, and conservation agriculture remain top of the 
list of climate change adaptation practices, since these have been shown to have substantial 
impacts on household resilience to climate change and on household welfare in Africa (Di Falco 
et al. 2011; Abdulai 2018). Many studies have shown positive effects of climate change 
adaptation practices such as changing crop varieties, soil and water conservation practices, 
water harvesting and irrigation, tree planting, matching livestock to supply of grazing land, and 
economic diversification on household welfare in Africa and Asia (e.g., Di Falco et al. 2011; 
FAO 2016; Issahaku and Abdulai 2020; Shahzad and Abdulai 2020). For instance, Issahaku 
and Abdulai (2020) show that smallholder adaptation to climate change increases household 
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dietary diversity and reduces household food insecurity by about 15% and 35%, respectively in 
Ghana. 
  
Despite the benefits of these practices, adoption of specific climate-smart practices remains low 
in many African countries (Walker et al. 2014; Abdulai and Huffman 2014; Issahaku and 
Abdulai, 2020). Whereas available evidence estimates the average adoption of climate-smart 
practices at about 66% (Di Falco et al. 2011; Issahaku and Abdulai 2020), the incidence of 
adoption of specific strategies have been quite low. For instance, Di Falco and Veronesi (2013) 
show that farmers’ adoption of water strategies ranges from 4 to 16%, while their adoption of 
other strategies such as the use of new technologies and diversification into off-farm jobs stand 
at 1.35% and 6.83%, respectively. Also, in spite of the burgeoning literature on impact of 
adaptation to climate change, discourse between adaptation and food security and nutrition in 
developing countries is quite limited (Di Falco et al. 2011; Di Falco and Veronesi 2013; 
Issahaku and Abdulai 2020). 
 
5.2.3 Adoption of Technology and Food Security  
In addition to the issues of climate-smart and sustainable agriculture, the association between 
adoption of improved agricultural technologies and household welfare has received 
considerable attention among policymakers and researchers (Abdulai and Huffman 2005; 
Foster and Rosenzweig 2010). This is due to the long recognition that productivity growth in 
agriculture partly depends on the availability of improved technologies and the adoption of 
these technologies (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010; Pannell and Zilberman 2020). Studies on this 
front can be broadly categorized into those that focus on understanding the drivers of 
technology adoption and diffusion in developing countries, and those that examine the impacts 
of adoption on household welfare (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010; Abdulai and Huffman 2014; 
Wossen et al. 2019; Huffman 2020).  
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In the case of the former, many factors have been found to be associated with the lack of 
adoption of improved technologies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Prominent among these 
factors are credit constraints, absence of insurance and other risk mitigating schemes, high 
transaction costs due to lack of market infrastructure and efficient markets, lack of access to 
extension services and some behavioral limitations (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010; Pannell and 
Zilberman 2020). Information failure has also been identified as an important factor that limits 
farmers awareness, understanding and adoption of improved technologies in many developing 
countries. This contributed to increased interest in understanding the role of social learning and 
other peer effects in the adoption and diffusion of improved technologies in Africa (Abdulai 
and Huffman 2005; Foster and Rosenzweig 2010; Huffman 2020).  
 
The other strand of adoption studies focused on understanding the impacts of adoption on 
household welfare (e.g., Becerril and Abdulai 2010; Abdulai and Huffman 2014; Kassie et al. 
2017; Wossen et al. 2019). Most of these studies show that adoption of improved technologies 
tends to increase household productivity, income and consumption, with some of the studies 
reporting impacts of 24% and 16% increase in smallholder crop yields and farm net returns, 
respectively (Abdulai and Huffman 2014; Kassie et al. 2017; Wossen et al. 2019). 
Unfortunately, despite the significance of improved technologies for farm productivity and 
income, Africa has lagged behind in the use of improved and modern technologies, and as such 
has not been able to reap the productivity and welfare benefits of the so-called Green revolution 
(Sheahan and Barrett 2017). For instance, Walker et al. (2014) estimate the mean level of 
adoption across 20 improved crop varieties at 35% in Africa, with two-thirds of these crops 
having adoption rates lower than this mean level.  
 
Similarly, in spite of the high interest in understanding the impact of agricultural technologies 
on household welfare, not much has been done on the impacts of adoption of improved crop 
varieties on food security and, in particular, on the consumption of specific nutrient rich foods 
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in Africa. Previous studies mostly focused on adoption, farm returns and to a lesser extent on 
food security (Abdulai and Huffman 2014; Kassie et al. 2017; Wossen et al. 2019), and when 
attempts are made in the realm of specific nutrients consumption, the focus has been on calorie-
income and price elasticities (Abdulai and Aubert 2004; Colen et al. 2018). There is therefore 
the need for an in-depth examination and understanding of the impacts of specific food security 
promotion strategies such as adoption of new technologies, smallholder diversification and 
marketing, as well as the associated impact mechanisms on specific food nutrients intake. Such 
information would be relevant in informing the design and implementation of pro-poor policies 
in Africa, and in increasing the effectiveness of food security and nutrition policies in realizing 
the Sustainable Development Goal of eradicating hunger, achieving food security and improved 
nutrition, and promoting sustainable agriculture (Abdulai 2018; Colen et al. 2018).  
 
Thus, the empirical analysis considers the role of smallholder market engagement as a 
diversification strategy that can enhance the resilience of smallholders to food and nutrition 
insecurity. Smallholder farmers market engagement generally include non-farm employment, 
diversification into cash cropping, selling of harvest and purchases of food to minimize seasonal 
variation in food availability (Abdulai and CroleRees 2001; Wiggins et al. 2011; Di Falco and 
Veronesi 2013; Kuma et al. 2018), and these have been recognized as food insecurity coping 
mechanisms (Di Falco and Veronesi 2013; Shahzad and Abdulai 2020). Also, the integration 
of smallholders into output and input markets can result in increased motivation of smallholders 
to produce for profit maximization, which may lead to increased household welfare (Abdulai 
and Huffman 2000). Thus, the next section focuses on the issues of agricultural 
commercialization and household food security and nutrition.  
 
5.2.4 Market Engagement and Food Security  
Agricultural marketing or commercialization has been conceived in the literature as involving 
smallholder participation in non-farm economic activities, participation in output and input 
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markets, as well as the profit motive or orientation of the farm business (Pingali and Rosegrant 
1995; Abdulai and Delgado 1999; Wiggins et al. 2011; Dithmer and Abdulai 2017; Carletto et 
al. 2017). A considerable body of empirical research has focused on understanding the role of 
smallholder non-farm work and market participation on household welfare (Abdulai and 
Delgado 1999; Abdulai and CroleRees 2001; Zanello 2012; Carletto et al. 2017). This is due to 
the fact that non-farm engagement or marketing has long been recognized as a means by which 
smallholders can move from subsistence farming to a more commercialized one, and also 
minimize agricultural risks, given the failure or absence of consumption and insurance markets 
in developing countries (Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; Reardon et al. 2006). These studies place 
more emphasis on understanding the determinants of smallholder participation in non-farm 
work or marketing, and the impact of such participation on smallholder welfare indicators such 
as productivity, net returns and income (Abdulai and Delgado 1999; Abdulai and CroleRees 
2001; Wiggins et al. 2011; Zanello 2012).   
 
Many factors such as education, availability of markets and other infrastructure, household 
access to credit, income and capital have been reported as influencing smallholders’ decisions 
to participate in non-farm work or economic diversification, since the lack of access to these 
factors appears to make it difficult for smallholders in many developing countries to diversify 
away from subsistence agriculture (Abdulai and CroleRees 2001; Wiggins et al. 2011). Also, 
studies have shown that transaction costs, wealth and assets, contractual and cooperative 
marketing substantially affect smallholders’ marketing decisions and the quantities of inputs 
and outputs traded (Abdulai and Birachi 2008; Zanello 2012; Abdul-Rahaman and Abdulai 
2020). In particular, recent studies show that smallholder contract and cooperative marketing 
tend to reduce market risks, increase smallholders’ bargaining power, and contribute to increase 
farm productivity, income and household welfare in some Asian and African countries (Abdulai 
and Birachi 2008; Ma et al. 2018; Abdul-Rahaman and Abdulai 2020).  
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In addition, several studies have examined the impacts of non-farm work and diversification 
(Holden et al. 2004; Owusu et al. 2011; Ecker 2018), sale and purchase of food (Zanello 2012; 
Ogutu et al. 2019), and contracting or cooperative marketing (Ma et al. 2018; Abdul-Rahaman 
and Abdulai 2020) on household welfare. Smallholder marketing has contributed to increased 
household productivity and farm returns in Asia and Africa (Ma et al. 2018; Abdul-Rahaman 
and Abdulai 2020; Ogutu et al. 2019; Ochieng et al. 2019), although its impacts on food security 
and particularly nutrients intake remain inconclusive (Zanello 2012; Carletto et al. 2017; Ogutu 
et al. 2019).   
 
One possibility of resolving the mixed and inconclusive findings on the impacts of smallholder 
marketing on food security and nutrition is to consider the fact that consumption gains from 
commercialization could be heterogeneously distributed among households, and also within 
household members (Carletto et al. 2017; Ogutu et al. 2019). However, studies have mostly 
failed to consider these dimensions in examining the impacts of commercialization on 
household welfare (Carletto et al. 2017). In addition, existing studies have completely neglected 
smallholder profit or market orientation on welfare gains, in spite of the fact that smallholders’ 
production and marketing decisions in developing countries are characterized by different 
motives, including “distress sales” (Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; Reardon 2006; Jacoby and 
Minten 2009). A notable exception is Ogutu et al. (2019), who examined the heterogeneity in 
the impacts of agricultural commercialization on household calorie and micronutrients 
consumption, but did not consider the profit motive or market-orientation of smallholders.  
 
The empirical analysis builds on these previous studies, by examining the impact of smallholder 
market-orientation on household food and nutrient rich food consumption. This is partly 
justified by the fact that the extent of smallholder market integration is closely associated with 
the motive of production, which has been argued as having varied impacts on household welfare 
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(Abdulai and Huffman 2000; Ecker 2018). Another motivation for the analysis is the fact that, 
the recent upsurge in malnutrition in Africa has been attributed to the adverse impact of climate 
change and worsening food markets’ conditions in the region (FAO, ECA and AUC 2020).  
 
5.3 Empirical Analysis  
This section presents the empirical analysis of the impact of smallholder market participation 
as household food security and nutrition strategy. The section consists of the conceptual 
framework, the study area and data, analytical and empirical strategies, as well as the results of 
the analysis.  
 
5.3.1 Conceptual Framework 
In this section, we outline three pathways highlighting the conditions under which smallholder 
market orientation may lead to different levels of food and nutrients consumption among 
households. 
 
The first is the pure income effect. The underlying premise of this pathway is that agricultural 
commercialization and specialization through high value crops, or selling higher quantities at 
higher prices for current crops can lead to increased farm incomes and consequently increased 
household consumption possibilities of food and other essential household needs (Carletto et 
al. 2017; Kuma et al. 2018). Increased household income from commercialization can also 
enhance the household’s ability to purchase food items that are not produced by the household 
through cash purchases from the market (Abdulai and Aubert 2004; Ecker 2018).  However, 
increased specialization in cash crops and sale of output may lead to reduced production of 
diverse foods and availability of staples for home consumption, which can predispose 
commercially-oriented households to food insecurity and malnutrition, especially if the 
additional income is not spent on food, or if output prices are low (von Braun et al. 1989; 
Carletto et al. 2017).  
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Second is that cash income from crop sales can enhance households’ access to and affordability 
of improved farm inputs and better technologies that can be used for staple crop production 
(Minten et al. 2011). Likewise, households who diversify their crops may enjoy economies of 
scope, where skills, experiences and inputs acquired to grow staple crops for domestic 
consumption can also be used to produce cash crops, and vice versa (Abdulai and CroleRees 
2001; Govereh and Jayne 2003; Ecker 2018). However, missing, inefficient or very volatile 
food markets can lead to high transaction costs or interrupted input supply, which may tend to 
limit households access to inputs and other market opportunities, and can result in reduced 
household income, food purchases and consumption (Fafchamps1992; Abdul-Rahman and 
Abdulai 2020). This could present a situation where subsistence or surplus-oriented households 
tend to have higher food and calorie intake than commercially-oriented households.  
 
Finally, when there is considerable seasonal variation in household food availability and food 
prices, which is often due to climatic shocks and inadequate infrastructure, this can lead to 
farmers who grow more cash or high valued crops benefiting more in terms of food and 
nutrients consumption (WFP and GSS 2012; Kuma et al. 2018; Issahaku and Abdulai 2020). In 
sum, the effects of crop commercialization on household food and nutrients consumption will 
be higher for commercial and perhaps surplus than subsistence households, if market conditions 
are favorable and additional incomes from crop sales are spent on food consumption, and lower 
if otherwise. In addition, commercially-oriented households may benefit more if seasonality of 
food supply tends to increase households’ reliance on purchased food in times of household 
food deficits. Finally, the magnitude of the effects of commercialization will be much higher 
for the consumption of food items that are largely purchased from the market. We examine 
these issues based on the case of smallholder farmers in the Northern region of Ghana.   
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5.3.2 Study Area 
Despite the importance of agriculture as a source of livelihood of the majority of the population 
in Ghana, the incidence of poverty was highest among households engaged in the agriculture 
sector (42.7%) in 2016-2017. Also, the incidence of poverty in the northern regions have been 
higher than the rest of the country since 2006 (GSS 2018). Food insecurity and malnutrition 
have also been the highest in these regions, compared to the rest of the country, with an average 
of 18% of households being severely food insecure. Farm households in these regions are faced 
with inadequate rains, structural constraints and poor soils, which have often led to low 
agricultural output, fluctuation in food prices, and food insecurity (WFP and GSS 2012). In 
spite of efforts made to promote commercialization of agriculture and smallholders in the 
northern regions, the average marketed crop surplus across the three regions remains low, 
ranging from 15% in the Upper East region to 34% in the Northern region (IFAD-IFPRI 2011). 
The high incidence of poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition in the Northern region amid 
slightly higher proportion of marketed crops than the national average of 33%, presents an 
apparent paradox that provides an appropriate context for the investigation of the impact of 
households’ crop commercialization on food and nutrients consumption.     
5.3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
We conducted a survey of 500 farm households in the Northern region of Ghana between July 
and September 2017. Five districts were purposively selected based on their intensity of 
cultivation of both staple and cash food crops, and then 25 villages were randomly selected 
across these districts, with the allocation of villages done in proportion to the total households 
in each district. These villages are remote and small, with less than 150 households in each. 
Given this, we randomly selected 20 household heads in each village, and then used structured 
questionnaires to interview the primary decision-makers in the households. In addition, a 
detailed discussion using an interview guide was administered in each village to a focus group 
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of village leaders and representatives to obtain information on village characteristics. The 
survey combined modules of household characteristics, agricultural production and marketing 
to collect household data for the 2015-2016 cropping season.   
 
Given our interest in measuring commercialization from the output market participation side, 
and in terms of sales of all crops cultivated by the household in the 2015-2016 season, we use 
the Household crop commercialization index (HCCI) suggested by Strasberg et al. (1999). The 
index is expressed as: 
 𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐼 =
∑ ?̅?𝑣,𝑐𝑀𝑖,𝑐
?̅?
𝑐=1
∑ ?̅?𝑣,𝑐,𝑄𝑖,𝑐
?̅?
𝑐=1
× 100          [1] 
where ?̅?𝑣,𝑐 is the average village level crop 𝑐 price in village 𝑣, 𝑀𝑖,𝑐 is the quantity of crop 𝑐 
marketed by household 𝑖, 𝑄𝑖,𝑐 is total quantity of crop 𝑐 produced by the household 𝑖, and 𝑐 is 
an index of crops produced, with 𝑐 =1,…, 𝑐̅. On the basis of this measure, a household’s degree 
of commercialization can be expressed in a continuum that ranges from pure subsistence of 
HCCI = 0 to completely commercialized production of HCCI = 100. In order to characterize 
households’ market orientation, we use the categorization by FAO (1989), which categorizes 
households into three orientations, based on the proportion of crop output sold (see also Pingali 
and Rosegrant 1995). Thus, we classify our farmers into subsistence-oriented, if the farmer sells 
less than 25% of the output; surplus-oriented, if the farmer sells at least 25%, but less than 50% 
of the output; and commercial-oriented if the farmer sells more than 50% of the output.    
 
The outcomes of interest in this study are food consumption score (food) and food consumption 
scores-nutrition. Given that these outcomes measure the frequency of consumption of food and 
nutrient rich foods, we asked households the question “How many days in the last 7 days your 
household ate the following foods?” (refer to notes under table 5.1 for details). We next sum all 
the consumption frequencies of the food and nutrient rich food items of the same group. For the 
food consumption score, we multiply the value obtained for each food group by the group 
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weight to obtain weighted food group scores, and then add the weighted food groups to generate 
the food consumption score for a household. With regards to the nutrient consumption, we sum 
the number of days that foods belonging to each nutrient sub-group (i.e., vitamin A, protein and 
hem iron) were consumed in the household to obtain the food consumption score-nutrition for 
the household (WFP 2015).    
 
In order to explore how food and nutrients consumption vary by household market orientation, 
we present the mean differences in food and nutrient rich foods consumption by household 
market orientation in table 5.1. We first present the means for the whole sample in column (1). 
In columns (2) to (4), we compare the mean differences of households who did not report any 
sales and those who reported sales of 0 < HCCI < 25%. The table suggests that households who 
did not sell any of their harvest have slightly lower food and nutrient rich food consumption 
than those who sold at most 25% of the harvest, albeit not statistically significant across all 
outcomes. This justifying our classification of households with less than 25% HCCI as 
subsistence-oriented.     
 
Columns (5) to (7) present the means and the mean differences between subsistence and 
surplus-oriented households, while columns (8) to (10) report the comparison between 
commercial on the one hand and surplus and subsistence households, on the other hand. The 
comparison shows that both surplus and commercial-oriented households have significantly (at 
the 1% level) higher income, food and nutrient rich foods consumption than subsistence-
oriented households. At the same time, commercial-oriented farm households appear to have 
significantly higher income, food and nutrients consumption than surplus-oriented households. 
These suggest the possibility of significant differences in the returns to household crop 
commercialization across market orientations.  
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Table 5.1. Means and differences in means of food and nutrient rich food consumption outcomes across market orientation   
 All sample  Sell 
none 
Sell < 
25% 
Difference  Subsistence-
oriented 
Surplus-
oriented 
Difference Commercial-
oriented 
Difference Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) = (3-2) (5) (6) (7) = (6-5) (8) (9) = (8-5) (10) = (8-6) 
Food consumption score 33.55 
(8.23) 
 27.95 
(1.03) 
30.08 
(0.67) 
2.13 
(1.85) 
 29.83 
(0.61) 
33.73 
(0.52) 
  3.90*** 
 (0.79) 
39.11 
(0.59) 
  9.28*** 
 (0.89) 
  5.38*** 
 (0.83) 
Vitamin A 12.43 
(3.83) 
 10.18 
(0.69) 
10.56 
(0.34) 
0.38 
(0.94) 
 10.52 
(0.31) 
12.55 
(0.24) 
  2.03*** 
 (0.38) 
15.23 
(0.18) 
  4.71*** 
 (0.41) 
  2.68*** 
 (0.34) 
Protein 6.18 
(3.46) 
 3.13 
(0.57) 
4.26 
(0.24) 
1.12 
(0.69) 
 4.13 
(0.23) 
6.14 
(0.22) 
  2.01*** 
 (0.31) 
9.52 
(0.15) 
  5.39*** 
 (0.31) 
  3.38*** 
 (0.31) 
Hem iron 3.77 
(2.26) 
 1.91 
(0.37) 
2.48 
(0.16) 
       0.57 
(0.45) 
 2.41 
(0.15) 
3.75 
(0.14) 
  1.34*** 
 (0.21) 
5.96 
(0.09) 
  3.55*** 
 (0.19) 
  2.21*** 
 (0.20) 
Log income 8.39 
(0.71) 
 7.93 
(0.14) 
8.23 
(0.04) 
      0.30*** 
(0.12) 
 8.19 
(0.04) 
8.33 
(0.04) 
  0.14** 
 (0.06) 
8.83 
(0.09) 
  0.64*** 
 (0.09) 
  0.49*** 
 (0.08) 
Notes: the table shows the descriptive statistics and the differences in means across household market orientation for the food and nutrient rich foods consumption outcomes and household annual income. 
Column (1) presents the means of household consumption of food and nutrients, and household income for the entire sample. Columns (2) and (3) depict the means for households who did not sell any of 
the output and those who sold less than 25% of the output, respectively, while column (4) shows the differences in these means. Columns (5), (6) and (8) present the means for subsistence-oriented, surplus-
oriented and commercial-oriented households. Column (7) reports the differences in means between subsistence and surplus-oriented households, whiles column (9) presents the differences in means between 
subsistence and commercial-oriented households. Column (10) shows the differences in means between surplus and commercial-oriented households. Values in parenthesis are standard deviations in column 
(1) and standard errors in columns (2) to (10). The asterisks *** and ** are significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
We calculated the food consumption score by first grouping all food items consumed by households into main staple, pulses, vegetables, fruits, meat and fish, milk, sugar, oils and condiments and 
the food consumption score-nutrition by grouping food items into 15 food groups under vitamin A rich foods (i.e., dairy, organ meat, eggs, orange and green vegetables; and orange fruits), protein rich 
foods (pulses, dairy, flesh meat, organ meat, fish and eggs) and iron rich foods (flesh meat, organ meat and fish) (WFP 2015). 
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Table 5.2. Variable definition, measurement and descriptive statistics 
Variables Definition and measurement Mean S.D. 
Panel A: Commercialization   
HCCI Household crop commercialization index (in percentage) 36.76 19.02 
Subsistence-oriented 1 if household sells less than 25% of harvest; 0 otherwise 0.36 0.48 
Surplus-oriented 1 if household sells between 25% & 49.99% of harvest; 0 otherwise 0.41 0.49 
Commercial-oriented  1 if household sells at least 50% of harvest; 0 otherwise 0.23 0.41 
Panel B: Household characteristics    
HHAge Age of household head (years) 44.03 12.04 
HHSex 1 if household head is male; 0 otherwise 0.59 0.49 
HHEducation Number of years in school by household head 1.27 3.27 
HHSize Household size (number of persons) 5.63 2.14 
HHLandholding  Total land size of household (in hectares) 2.56 1.56 
CB_Assoiations Number of associations the farmer is a member in the community 1.07 1.27 
Log HHIncome Log of total household annual income  8.39 0.71 
Log HHLivestock Log value of household livestock at beginning of 2015 season  7.65 2.19 
Log HHDAsset Log value of household durable assets at beginning of 2015 season 9.11 0.88 
Extension 1 if ever had extension contact; 0 otherwise 0.34 0.47 
Save money 1 if household regularly save money; 0 otherwise 0.72 0.45 
Save food 1 if household at least save some food surplus; 0 otherwise 0.06 0.23 
Panel C: Community variables and district Fes   
Town distance Distance from community to main town centre in kilometres 15.46 11.86 
Local wage  Local wage rate per day in GHS 6.22 1.34 
Gushegu 1 if household resides in Gushegu district; 0 otherwise 0.24 0.43 
Karaga 1 if household resides in Karaga district; 0 otherwise 0.15 0.36 
Savelugu-Nanton 1 if household resides in Savelugu-Nanton district; 0 otherwise 0.32 0.46 
Tolon 1 if household resides in Tolon district; 0 otherwise 0.19 0.39 
Kumbungu 1 if household resides in Kumbungu district; 0 otherwise 0.09 0.28 
Panel D: Instruments    
PreProductContract  1 if farmer has no pre-planting input contract in the past 5 years, 0 
otherwise 
0.18 0.39 
HHMobileNetwork 1 if household location has a telecommunication network coverage, 0 
otherwise 
0.72 0.45 
CMarket 1 if household resides in community with market, 0 otherwise 0.44 0.49 
Farm_shock 1 if household experience any shock in farming due to weather or 
bush/wildfires in the past 5 years, 0 otherwise 
0.59 0.49 
NonEmployTravel 1 if a household member left the community for non-employment 
reasons (such as marriage, education or religion) in the past year, 0 
otherwise 
0.23 0.42 
Panel E: Other covariates of the First-stage household income model    
Tractor Tractor cost per acre in GHS 57.28 40.85 
SeedUse Quantity of crop seeds used per acre in kilograms  67.15 207.32 
SeedPrice Average seed price in GHS 32.01 177.68 
Fertilizer Cost of fertilizer applied per acre in GHS  56.94 67.01 
Pesticides Cost of pesticides applied per acre in GHS  1.47 5.98 
Weedicides Cost of weedicides applied per acre in GHS 20.65 30.28 
Labor Number of man-days per acre 22.98 10.68 
Soil fertility 4=fertile; 3=moderately fertile; 2=less fertile; and 1=infertile 1.20 0.36 
Notes: the table depicts the definition, measurement and descriptive statistics of household crop commercialization, instruments 
and other controls.  Panel A shows the household crop commercialization index (HCCI) and the proportion of households under 
each market orientation. Panels B and C consist of household, community and district controls, while panel D contains the 
instruments used for exclusive restriction in the first-stage market orientation model as well as the first-stage household income 
regression to account for potential endogeneity of household income. Panel E consists of farm inputs and soil characteristics of 
households. GHS is Ghana cedis, which is the Ghanaian currency.     
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Table 5.2 presents the definition, measurement and descriptive statistics of all the variables used 
in the analysis for the entire sample. Panel A shows that 36% of the farm households surveyed 
are subsistence-oriented, 41% are surplus-oriented, and 23% are commercial-oriented. Also, 
the average household head is 44 years old and with 1.27 years of schooling. The average 
household size and landholding are 5.63, and 2.6 hectares, respectively (panel B). The average 
distance from the villages to the nearest town centre is about 15 kilometres, and the mean village 
wage rate is about 6 GHS. We also compare the differences in the main controls between market 
orientation in table 5.A1 in the appendix, and this shows significant differences mostly in the 
household characteristics across market orientation. 
 
5.3.4 Analytical Framework and Empirical Strategy 
Our conceptual framework shows how smallholder food and nutrients consumption tend to 
depend on household market orientation and market conditions. Given the categorization of 
smallholders’ market orientation into subsistence, surplus and commercial-oriented, based on 
the proportion of output marketed, we model household market orientation as an ordered choice 
(Heckman et al. 2006). We define the latent variable 𝐶𝑖𝑗
∗ , which denotes sorting of farm 
households 𝑖 into the 3 categories of market orientation, based on an ordered probit selection 
rule as; 
𝐶𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝛼𝑗
′𝒁𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗, 
where   
 𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝟏[𝜏𝑗(𝑤𝑗) < 𝛼𝑗
′𝒁𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝜏𝑗+1(𝑤𝑗+1)],     [2] 
  
 𝑗 = 1, 2…𝐽 ̅
 
and the cutoffs satisfy  
 
 𝜏𝑗(𝑤𝑗) ≤ 𝜏𝑗+1(𝑤𝑗+1),   𝜏0(𝑤0) = −∞, and 𝜏𝐽̅(𝑤𝐽̅) = ∞ 
  
where 𝐶𝑖𝑗 is a multivalued observed treatment variable, 𝒁𝑖 is a vector of observed controls, 
𝛼𝑗
′𝒁𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 is a latent linear index, 𝛼𝑗 is a vector of parameters to be estimated, 𝑤𝑗 is a vector of 
 
244 
 
observed regressors, 𝜏𝑗(𝑤𝑗) are threshold parameters, which are allowed to depend on the 
regressors57, and 𝜇𝑖𝑗 are error terms. To the extent that we are interested in the estimation of the 
impact of farm household market orientation (𝐶𝑖𝑗) on food and nutrients consumption, we 
denote the observed food and nutrients consumption outcomes as 𝑌𝑖𝑗 for the three market 
orientations.  We express the outcomes as linear functions of a vector of observed independent 
variables, 𝑋𝑖 as;  
 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = {
𝛽1
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖1    𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝑖 = 1 
𝛽2
′ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖2    𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝑖 = 2
𝛽3
′ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖3     𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝑖 = 3
           [3] 
 
where the vector of coefficients, 𝛽𝑗, of 𝑋𝑖 are allowed to depend on the treatment options, and  
𝜖𝑖𝑗 is assumed to have a zero mean and variance of 𝜎𝑗
2, for each 𝑗 = 1,2,3.  
Households’ market orientation in this study are non-random and implies that orientation status 
of farmers could differ systematically due to self-selection of households into categories. 
Selection bias can result from both observed factors (such as education, landholding, wealth 
etc) and unobserved factors (such as innate abilities). Such factors may simultaneously drive 
correlations in households’ market orientation and the outcomes, which will result in omitted 
variable problem (Heckman et al. 2018). As a result, estimation of equation (3) with ordinary 
least squares will generally result in biased and inconsistent estimates. We can control for the 
observed sources of selection (to the extent possible) with detailed household and contextual 
data, but the unobservable factors remain a source of concern for this analysis.  
In order to account for the threats of selection bias and omitted variable problem in the light of 
the ordered nature of the selection variable, we employ the ordered probit selection model 
                                                          
57 Such a model is referred to as the generalized ordered probit model, as opposed to the classical ordered choice model which 
assumes the distribution of 𝑤𝑗  are degenerate, and thus the thresholds 𝜏𝑗  are assumed constants (Heckman et al. 2006).  
 
245 
 
(Heckman et al. 2006). This is a parametric model that assumes joint normality of the errors in 
equations (2) and (3) (i.e., 𝜖𝑖𝑗,  𝜇𝑖𝑗), and utilizes full information maximum likelihood procedure 
to jointly estimate a first-stage ordered probit of household market orientation in equation (2), 
and a second-stage outcome models for the three regimes of market orientation (equation 3). 
The process accounts for selection bias and omitted variable problem by inserting calculated 
inverse Mills ratios from the first-stage ordered choice model into the second-stage food and 
nutrients consumption model. The coefficients of the inverse Mills ratios, which we denote as 
𝜌𝑗 = Corr(𝜖𝑖𝑗 ,  𝜇𝑖𝑗), define the correlation between the errors in equations (2) and (3).  
Significance of the correlation coefficients, 𝜌𝑗, will suggest the presence of selection bias 
indicating that households’ market orientation decisions are endogenous. The signs of the 𝜌𝑗’s 
show the pattern of correlation.  
A critical concern is that the estimation of the selection and outcome equations requires an 
exclusion restriction, or a source of variation to avoid collinearity and enhance identification. 
However, an issue that complicates the exclusion restriction in the ordered choice setting is the 
need for an instrument for each transition (Heckman et al. 2006). The three ordered choices 
give two transitions (i.e., subsistence to surplus, and surplus to commercial) which intuitively 
suggest the need for at least two instruments. In this study, we use farmers’ access to pre-
planting input contract for the past 5 years prior to the 2015 cropping season, 
telecommunication network coverage at the location of the household and the presence of at 
least periodic market in the village as instruments.  
 
Past pre-planting input contract, is correlated with farmer market orientation, because it 
contributes to minimizing market risks and transaction costs (Mishra et al. 2018). Whereas we 
do not expect past pre-planting contract to directly affect current food and nutrients 
consumption, it is possible that it may affect current consumption through past food stored for 
current consumption. Table 5.2 (panel B) shows this is not a threat, because very few (6%) 
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households reported saving food from previous season. Also, these households do not 
systematically differ across market orientation (table 5.A1, panel C) and past pre-planting 
contract status in table 5.B1 in appendix B. Access to telecommunication network coverage and 
village markets in Ghana vary substantially across villages (Zanello 2012), and are expected to 
be good predictors of household market orientation, because these can increase households’ 
access to real-time market information, and reduce transaction cost of marketing, which are key 
constraints to market engagement in these areas (MoFA 2017). However, these instruments 
should not directly affect households’ current food and nutrients consumption, other than 
through households’ market engagement. We further control for distance to the town centre, 
household income and assets to ensure that the instruments are not picking up any proximity, 
wealth and income effects.      
 
The final issue is the potential endogeneity of household income. Household income may be 
endogenous in the market orientation equation, because increased commercialization can lead 
to increased farm income through high price premiums. In the food and nutrients consumption 
equation, household income may be endogenous because of the joint production and 
consumption decisions among agricultural households in developing countries (Fafchamps 
1992). To account for the potential endogeneity, we employ the Control Function approach 
(Woodridge 2010; Abdulai and Huffman 2014), using households experience of any shock on 
the farm due to weather or wildfires in the past 5 years as instrument. Such shocks are usually 
exogenously determined by idiosyncratic factors and are expected to be good predicters of 
households’ total income, because of the association between such shocks and household crop 
output and income. Given this, we estimate a first-stage generalized linear model of household 
income on the instrument and other controls, and then insert the predicted residuals into the 
selection and the outcome equations to account for the potential endogeneity of household 
income.   
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Given the correction for sample selection and the identification issues, we estimate the average 
treatment effects for transitioning between two orientations, 𝑗 and 𝑗 + 1, on the population 
(ATE†), on everyone at the transition point between 𝑗 and 𝑗 + 1  (ATE), on the treated (ATT) 
and on the untreated (ATU).  The difference between ATE† and ATE shows the difference in 
the characteristics of farmers in the entire population and those at the transition between two 
market orientations. In addition, the difference between the ATT and ATE measures sorting on 
gains, whereas the difference between ATU and ATE measures sorting losses (Heckman et al. 
2018). Finally, the relationship among ATE, ATT and ATU shows the pattern of sorting on 
gains, such that if ATT > ATE >ATU, this will suggest positive selection on gains, and if ATU 
>ATE>ATT will indicate reverse selection on gains (Cornelissen et al. 2018).  
 
5.3.5 Results and Discussion 
This section presents and discusses the results of our estimations. We first present the results of 
the first-stage estimates of households’ market orientation and the second-stage estimates of 
food and nutrient rich foods consumption. We next report the results of the treatment effects of 
households’ market orientation.   
  
First- and Second-Stage Results   
We report the marginal effects of the first-stage ordered probit estimates of determinants of 
household market orientation in table 5.3, with subsistence-oriented as the base category. The 
estimates show that household income and wealth significantly affect market orientation. In 
particular, a percentage increase in household income decreases the probabilities of being 
subsistence and surplus-oriented by 0.14 and 0.13, respectively, and increases the probability 
of being commercial-oriented by about 0.27. The estimates show that a percentage increase in 
household livestock value significantly increases the probability of being commercial-oriented 
by about 0.04. 
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Table 5.3. First-stage determinants of market orientation 
 Subsistence-oriented 
(1) 
 Surplus-oriented 
(2) 
 Commercial-oriented 
(3) 
 Marginal 
effect 
S.E. Marginal 
effect 
S.E. Marginal 
effect 
S.E. 
         
HHAge -0.001 0.001   0.001 0.001   9.1E-5 0.001 
HHSex -0.029 0.053   0.137** 0.057  -0.108** 0.042 
HHEducation -0.009 0.008   0.005 0.008   0.003 0.005 
HHSize  0.013 0.011  -0.017 0.012   0.004 0.008 
HHLandholding  -0.014 0.017   0.007 0.018   0.006 0.012 
CB_Assoiations  0.022 0.019  -0.047** 0.020   0.025 0.015 
Log HHIncome -0.144** 0.064  -0.130** 0.064   0.274*** 0.047 
Log HHLivestock -0.016 0.011  -0.020 0.014   0.036*** 0.012 
Log HHDAsset -0.107*** 0.029   0.096*** 0.030   0.010 0.021 
Town distance -0.001 0.021   0.006** 0.003  -0.005** 0.002 
Local wage   0.041* 0.021  -0.062** 0.023   0.020 0.018 
Gushegu  0.060 0.084  -0.246** 0.108   0.186* 0.092 
Karaga  0.041 0.087  -0.352*** 0.110   0.310*** 0.094 
Savelugu-Nanton  0.140 0.085  -0.386*** 0.097   0.245*** 0.084 
PreProductContract   0.272*** 0.061  -0.220*** 0.063  -0.051 0.046 
HHMobileNetwork -0.228*** 0.054   0.100* 0.056   0.128*** 0.037 
CMarket -0.039 0.048  -0.099* 0.053   0.138*** 0.040 
HHIncomeResid  0.139 0.089   0.075 0.089  -0.214*** 0.056 
         
Log likelihood        -426.27     
LR X2(36)         217.65     
Prob X2          0.000     
X2 (3) Excluded Instruments         39.60     
Prob X2          0.000     
Number of observations       180          206        114  
Notes: First-stage generalized ordered probit estimation of equation (2). Column (1) presents the marginal effects and the 
standard errors (S.E.) of the various covariates on the likelihood of being a subsistence-oriented household. Columns (2) and 
(3) report the marginal effects and standard error of the covariates on the likelihood of being a surplus-oriented and commercial-
oriented household respectively. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Similarly, the probability of being subsistence-oriented household decreases by about 0.11, 
while that of being surplus and commercial-oriented households increase by 0.09 and 0.01 
respectively, when the value of household durable assets increases by 1%, albeit not significant 
for commercial-oriented. These estimates generally suggest that wealthy households appear to 
be more commercially inclined than less wealthy households. These results confirm the finding 
by Abdulai and CroleRees (2001) that household income and wealth play important roles in 
households’ diversification away from subsistence agriculture. Wealthy households tend to be 
less vulnerable to risks of market failures and exposure to food insecurity, because of the 
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relatively high security due to their wealth and income, compared to poorer households who 
are severely affected by market imperfections and inefficiencies (von Braun et al. 1989; Abdulai 
and Aubert 2004; Ogutu et al. 2019).  
 
Our results further show that the instruments strongly predict the probability of either being 
subsistence, surplus or commercial-oriented household. The estimates show that households 
with past pre-planting input contracts are more likely to be surplus-oriented, whereas those with 
access to telecommunication network and markets in the village are more likely to be 
commercial-oriented. We test the validity of the instrument by regressing the respective 
outcomes on our set of controls and the instruments in part B of table 5.B3, and the results show 
that all the instruments are valid, as they do not significantly explain food and nutrients 
consumption. 
 
We further check the relevance and validity of these instruments by presenting test diagnostics 
of a generalized method of moments (IV-GMM)58 estimations of the effect of 
commercialization on the outcomes in table 5.B2. The diagnostics test statistics reported at the 
bottom of table 5.B2 (col. 1) further suggest the instruments are together relevant, and as such, 
good predictors of household degree of commercialization. Specifically, the Cragg-Donald F-
statistic of 14.75, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of 45.98 and the associated Angrist 
and Pischke (2009) p-value (p=0.000) all reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
weak. Moreover, given the Hansen J test statistic of 3.452 and the p-value of 0.178, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the instruments and the error term (the 
second-stage estimates are reported in part A of table 5.B3).  
 
                                                          
58 We use the IV-GMM estimator because of its efficiency over the conventional two-stage least squares when the equation is 
over-identified (which is the case in our application as the number of instruments, three, exceed the number of endogenous 
regressors of one) and its robustness to heteroskedasticity (Kuma et al. 2018).   
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We report results of the second-stage estimates of food and nutrients consumption in tables 
5.C1 and 5.C2. The estimates show that education significantly increases the consumption of 
food, protein and hem iron rich foods for subsistence-oriented households, and the consumption 
of food and only vitamin A rich foods for surplus-oriented households. This confirms past 
findings that education is positively associated with better food and dietary diversity (Issahaku 
and Abdulai 2020). In addition, an increase in household size results in increased consumption 
of food and vitamin A rich foods, although weakly significant at the 10% level, for surplus-
oriented households. This suggests the labor effect of household size, which contributes to 
increased crop production, outweighs the dependency effect for the surplus-oriented 
households, and thus, explains the positive effect of the household size59 in this case. 
 
The results further reveal that household income significantly increases food and vitamin A 
food consumption for surplus-oriented households, and the consumption of protein and hem 
iron foods for surplus and commercial-oriented households, lending support to past studies that 
income growth tend to increase calorie intake (Abdulai and Aubert 2004; Colen et al. 2018; 
Kuma et al. 2018). However, household income generally reduces food and nutrient rich food 
consumption for subsistence-oriented households, although not statistically significant. This 
suggests that some sales of crops by subsistence-oriented households are due to distress that 
results in a trade-off between household food and nutrients consumption on one hand and the 
household income on the other hand. This incidence has been reported in the context of 
developing countries where farmers are forced to sell their harvest to meet immediate financial 
requirements (such as servicing of debts or other household needs) and later on have to buy 
food from the market, or borrow food to meet household food needs (Reardon et al. 2006; 
Jacoby and Minten 2009). 
                                                          
59 Family labour is an important part of household labor in the sample and constitutes about 74% of the total labor days used 
on households’ farms in the sample.  
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Similarly, household wealth plays an important role in enhancing food and nutrients 
consumption. In particular, an increase in the value of household livestock significantly 
increases household food and nutrient rich food consumption for subsistence, while 
significantly increasing the consumption of only nutrient rich foods for surplus-oriented 
households. Furthermore, an increase in the value of household durable assets is estimated to 
significantly increase food consumption for subsistence and surplus-oriented households, and 
increase nutrient rich foods consumption for all groups.  
 
We report the 𝜌s, which show the correlation between the errors in equations (2) and (3) at the 
bottom of tables 5.C1 and 5.C2. The estimated correlations are weakly significantly different 
from zero (p<0.1) for protein and hem iron foods consumption in the commercial-oriented 
category, indicating the presence of self-selection. This implies that transitioning into 
commercial-orientation may not have the same effect on protein and hem iron foods 
consumption for the other two market orientations if they transition (Heckman et al. 2006; 
Abdulai and Huffman 2014). The positive signs of the coefficients indicate reverse selection on 
unobserved gains, suggesting that farm households with more than average protein and iron 
rich food consumption have lower probabilities of transitioning into commercial-oriented 
category.   
 
Treatment Effects Measures 
Table 5.4 presents the treatment effects estimates of farm households’ transition between 
market orientation. Panel A presents the treatment effects between subsistence and surplus-
oriented, while panel B reports the treatment effects between surplus and commercial-oriented. 
We report the treatment effects between subsistence and commercial-oriented in panel A of 
table 5.5, although we mainly focus on table 5.4 in what follows.  
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In respect of transitioning between subsistence and surplus orientation (panel A), the ATE† 
estimates for the entire population show that moving from subsistence to surplus-oriented 
increases food consumption by 14.9%, and the consumption of vitamin A, protein and iron rich 
foods by 18%, 25% and 26%, respectively, for an average household chosen at random. This is 
higher than the other treatment effects measures (i.e., ATE, ATT and ATU) that condition on 
those making this transition. This suggests that the characteristics of those at the transition 
between subsistence and surplus are somewhat less favourable than those in the population, 
possibly due to the better characteristics of commercial-oriented households (Heckman et al., 
2018). For those transitioning from surplus to commercial orientation, the average treatment 
effects (ATE†) of a farm household chosen at random from the population is estimated as 18% 
for food consumption, and 15%, 39% and 44% for vitamin A, protein and iron rich foods 
consumption, respectively (panel B).  
 
We next focus on the specific treatment effects across the outcomes, as their relationships 
indicate the pattern of selection as stated in the analytical framework. Regarding food 
consumption in column (1), the treatment effects (i.e., ATE, ATT and ATU) are all statistically 
significant at the 1% level across the transitions (table 5.4). Recall that the ATE measures the 
average effects only for households transitioning between two market orientation. The results 
show that food consumption significantly increases by 11.6% and 14.3% for a randomly chosen 
farm household at the transition between subsistence and surplus-orientation and between 
surplus and commercial-orientation, respectively. With regards to nutrient rich foods 
consumption, the ATE suggests that going from subsistence to surplus-orientation tend to 
increase vitamin A, protein and iron rich foods consumption by about 13%, 18% and 19%, 
respectively, for an average household transitioning between subsistence and surplus-
orientation (panel A). 
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   Table 5.4. Treatment effects estimates of household market orientation on food and nutrients outcomes 
 (1) 
Food 
 (2) 
Vitamin A 
 (3) 
Protein 
 (4) 
Hem iron 
 Treatment 
effect 
% of base 
choice 
Treatment 
effect 
% of base 
choice 
Treatment 
effect 
% of base 
choice 
Treatment 
effect 
% of base 
choice 
Panel A            
Subsistence vs. Surplus            
ATE†  4.405*** 
(0.159) 
14.89  1.893*** 
 (0.087) 
17.73  1.231*** 
(0.072) 
25.27  0.780*** 
(0.049) 
26.42 
ATE  3.462*** 
(0.151) 
11.62  1.338*** 
 (0.079) 
12.51  0.825*** 
(0.065) 
17.89  0.517*** 
(0.046) 
18.66 
ATT  3.971*** 
(0.530) 
13.34  1.705*** 
 (0.254) 
15.72  1.102*** 
(0.179) 
21.89  0.668*** 
(0.117) 
21.66 
ATU  2.879*** 
(0.490) 
9.65  0.919*** 
 (0.245) 
8.73  0.509** 
(0.179) 
12.33  0.345*** 
(0.115) 
14.30 
Panel B            
Surplus vs. Commercial            
ATE†  6.107*** 
(0.206) 
17.97  1.892*** 
 (0.087) 
15.05  2.360*** 
(0.078) 
38.67  1.635*** 
(0.053) 
43.79 
ATE  4.959*** 
(0.256) 
14.29  1.639*** 
 (0.116) 
12.41  1.917*** 
(0.099) 
27.67  1.303*** 
(0.067) 
30.42 
ATT  2.664*** 
(0.619) 
7.31  0.831*** 
 (0.261) 
5.77  1.164*** 
(0.228) 
13.93  0.724*** 
(0.149) 
13.81 
ATU  6.229*** 
(0.427) 
18.46  2.087*** 
 (0.179) 
16.63  2.333*** 
(0.130) 
38.02  1.623*** 
(0.085) 
43.25 
Notes: the table shows ordered Heckman treatment effects estimates of the impact of household market orientation on households’ food, vitamin A, protein and hem iron rich 
foods consumption between subsistence and surplus in panel A, and between surplus and commercial in panel B. ATE† is the average treatment effects for the entire population; 
ATE is the average treatment effects for those at the point of deciding between two orientation, ATT is average treatment effects on the treated and ATU is average treatment 
effects on the untreated. Values in parenthesis are robust standard errors. The asterisks *** and ** are significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Similarly, going from surplus to commercial-orientation increases consumption of foods rich 
in vitamin A, protein and iron by about 12%, 28% and 30%, respectively, for an average 
household transitioning between surplus and commercial-orientation (panel B). The ATT 
estimates for food consumption indicate that for a surplus-oriented household, going from 
subsistence to surplus-orientation results in 13.3% increase in food consumption, whereas for 
a commercial-oriented household, going from surplus to commercial-orientation increases food 
consumption by 7.3%.  
 
The results of the ATT for vitamin A, protein and iron rich foods consumption suggest that for 
an average surplus-oriented household, going from subsistence to surplus-orientation increases 
the consumption of foods rich in these nutrients by 16%, 22% and 22%, respectively. At the 
same time, going from surplus to commercial-orientation increases vitamin A, protein and iron 
rich foods consumption by about 6%, 14% and 14%, respectively, for a commercial-oriented 
household. We also considered what the returns to marketing will be should subsistence-
oriented households become surplus-oriented, or surplus-oriented households become 
commercial-oriented in the estimates of the ATU. 
 
For subsistence-oriented household, going from subsistence to surplus-orientation increases 
food consumption by 9.7%, while transitioning from surplus to commercial-orientation 
increases food consumption by 18.5%. The estimates for the nutrient rich food consumption 
show that for a subsistence-oriented household, going from subsistence to surplus-orientation 
increases consumption of vitamin A, protein and iron rich foods by 8.7%, 12.3% and 14.3%, 
respectively, if they transition into surplus-orientation. Similarly, going from surplus to 
commercial-orientation increases the consumption of vitamin A, protein and iron rich foods by 
about 16.6%, 38% and 43.3%, respectively.   
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Table 5.5. Treatment effects between subsistence and commercial, and difference 
in treatment effects between subsistence to surplus for non-sellers and those 
selling less than 25% 
 Food Vitamin A Protein Hem iron 
Panel A     
Subsistence to commercial (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ATE† 10.512*** 
(0.172) 
 3.785*** 
(0.095) 
 3.592*** 
(0.076) 
 2.415*** 
(0.049) 
ATE 10.730*** 
(0.218) 
 3.781*** 
(0.120) 
 3.701*** 
(0.095) 
 2.502*** 
(0.060) 
ATT 10.263*** 
(0.576) 
 4.602*** 
(0.259) 
 3.769*** 
(0.187) 
 2.393*** 
(0.119) 
ATU 11.026*** 
(0.399) 
 3.261*** 
(0.202) 
 3.658*** 
(0.135) 
 2.571*** 
(0.087) 
Panel B     
Subsistence to surplus      
ATU for 0< sales < 25% of output  2.912  
(0.232) 
 0.986 
(0.120) 
 0.569 
(0.095) 
 0.391 
(0.068) 
ATU for 0 sales of output  2.642 
(0.721) 
 0.434 
(0.325) 
 0.078 
(0.095) 
 0.011 
(0.184) 
Difference in ATUs  0.270 
(0.675) 
 0.552 
(0.344) 
 0.490* 
(0.275) 
 0.379* 
(0.194) 
Notes: the table shows ordered Heckman treatment effects estimates of the impact of household market orientation on household 
food and nutrient rich foods consumption. In panel A, ATE† is the average treatment effects for the entire population; ATE is 
the average treatment effects for those at the point of deciding between two transition, ATT is average treatment effects on the 
treated and ATU is average treatment effects on the untreated. Panel B compares the treatment effects of subsistence farmers 
transitioning from subsistence to surplus-oriented (i.e., ATU) between non-selling farm households and those who sell less 
than 25% of the output. Values in parenthesis are robust standard errors. The asterisks *** and * are significance at 1% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
   
5.4 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Food insecurity and malnutrition remain major challenges in sub-Saharan Africa, despite many 
interventions like the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals, 
which aimed at reducing poverty and hunger in the world. Similarly, several authors have 
analyzed the policy options which have been implemented and their impacts on household 
welfare measures such as income, wages, as well as food security and nutrition. In this article, 
we presented a systematic overview of the literature on policies and strategies to improve food 
security and nutrition in Africa, as well as an empirical analysis on the impact of smallholder 
market participation as a strategy for enhancing food security and nutrition in Ghana. 
 
The survey of the literature shows that most food security and nutrition policies and 
interventions in Africa have centred around indirect measures such as improving agricultural 
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infrastructure and economic incentives, as well as providing smallholders with new agricultural 
technologies, and climate-smart practices to increase farm output and productivity. These 
indirect policy options have gained considerable attention over the past three decades. In 
addition to these, some direct interventions such as structural changes in relative prices and 
targeted food subsidies have been implemented with the aim of improving food access through 
lower market prices and the stabilization of consumption in times of high food price inflation. 
However, lack of proper targeting of the poor, removal of subsidies, as well as the lack of 
sustainability and exit mechanisms of these direct interventions have often led to the failure of 
many of these policies. These have led to governments using measures that stimulate sufficient 
levels of demand to improve food security and nutrition. These measures commonly involve 
cash transfers, income diversification strategies and increased access to markets.  
 
To this end, several studies have examined the effects of market participation on household 
productivity, income and calorie intake. However, the impacts of smallholder market 
participation, especially on food security and nutrition, varies across food and nutrition 
outcomes, and also over smallholder market orientation. The results from the empirical analysis 
on Ghana show that gains from commercialization are higher for protein and iron rich foods 
consumption compared to that of food and vitamin A rich food consumption, which are mainly 
due to increased farm and household incomes. Household income tend to increase vitamin A 
rich food consumption of surplus oriented smallholders, and protein and iron rich foods 
consumption of both surplus and commercial oriented smallholders. This is not surprising, 
given the low dietary quality in the area and the fact that most foods rich in protein and iron 
such as meat, fish and eggs are generally from cash purchases compared to staple foods, which 
are mostly from own production (WFP and GSS 2012; GSS 2018).  
 
In addition, food and nutrient rich foods consumption are generally higher for smallholders 
transitioning from surplus to commercial, compared to their counterparts transitioning between 
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subsistence and surplus. This is probably because the level of market integration, albeit 
generally low among the farmers, is comparatively higher for commercial-oriented households, 
due to the high profit and market orientation (von Braun et al. 1989; Pingali and Rosegrant 
1995). In fact, we see that there is no substantial difference in consumption between pure 
subsistence smallholders and those who sell some but not more than 25% of the output in panel 
B of table 5.5. These findings imply that smallholders will benefit more from marketing if they 
are able to sell more with the motive of making profit.  
 
Furthermore, the pattern of consumption gains differs across market orientation. There is 
positive selection on gains in transitioning from subsistence-orientation to surplus-orientation, 
suggesting that more endowed subsistence-oriented households tend to benefit more in terms 
of consumption when they move to surplus-oriented, than their less endowed counterparts.  
However, less endowed households appear to benefit more in going from surplus to 
commercial-orientation, suggesting reverse selection on gains, where disadvantaged 
households who are less likely to transition from surplus to commercial tend to benefit more if 
they move from surplus to commercial. Thus, when less endowed subsistence and surplus-
oriented households are able to overcome existing market constraints and transition into 
commercial orientation, this will substantially increase their food and nutrients consumption 
through increased income (Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; Abdulai and Huffman 2000). In effect, 
the overview of the literature and the empirical analysis suggest the following policy directions: 
 
 To the extent that ineffective targeting of the poor has been partly responsible for the 
failure of many policies in sub-Saharan Africa, public policies need to move beyond 
“broader targeting”, where sectors and subsectors that are conceived to strongly affect 
the poor are targeted. Thus, “narrow targeting”, where poor locations and segments of 
the population are earmarked and targeted for food security and nutrition interventions 
could be considered. It is also important to promote collaboration between government 
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and other development partners at national and local levels to develop workable criteria, 
and to supervise the intervention process to eschew the accrual of intervention gains to 
political actors and influential groups.   
 
 Structural reforms that were implemented by many African countries, initially 
contributed to increased output and productivity. However, the reduction or removal of 
subsidies on farm inputs in many cases led to increased input prices, reduced 
productivity, and increased food insecurity and malnutrition in the long run. 
Policymakers should put emphasis on how policies and interventions can ensure a 
balance in state efficiency and productivity, without compromising food security and 
nutrition in the long run. Governments can consider measures such as promotion of 
market access and efficient supply chains, income diversification and other productivity 
enhancing interventions that stimulate sufficient and sustained levels of production and 
demand. 
 
 Smallholder commercialization can promote household food security and nutrition 
through increased household income, as shown by the empirical analysis. Smallholder 
commercialization therefore can serve as a strategy for stimulating household demand 
for food and nutrients, although inadequate market information and access often limit 
their market participation. Thus, policies should consider providing platforms such as 
mobile agriculture services and trainings on market intelligence and promotion services 
to increase smallholder commercial orientation and market integration.  
 
 Smallholder transition from subsistence to surplus-orientation tend to favor more 
endowed households in terms of consumption. Policymakers can consider measures that 
minimize smallholders resource constraints and stimulate household crop productivity 
in order to enhance the capacity of less endowed subsistence households. Such measures 
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may include cash crop programmes that support farmers with inputs, and training to 
increase their access to improved inputs and innovations, and also to facilitate other 
spill-over benefits between food and cash crop cultivation (Govereh and Jayne 2003).  
 
 Conversely, less endowed households appear to benefit more in transitioning from 
surplus to commercial-oriented. Thus, promotion of higher smallholder 
commercialization will require in addition to output augmenting measures the 
mitigation of some of the market barriers and failure (such as, market availability, 
physical access and information, market standards, inadequate credits etc) that limit 
poor smallholders from engaging in sales for profit (see also Wiggins et al. 2011; Abdul-
Rahaman and Abdulai 2020). Interventions such as market information platforms, 
farmer cooperatives and collective actions as well as contract buying, which provides 
ready markets for farmers, will be quite rewarding (Ma et al. 2018). 
 
In addition to these policy directions, there are some potential areas future research efforts could 
consider to increase our understanding of the role of smallholder market engagement, and the 
impacts of policies and strategies to enhance food security and nutrition in developing countries. 
One of such areas will be to examine how smallholder engagement in input markets, and the 
integration into the rural cash economy impact food security and nutrition (von Braun et al. 
1989). This is because past studies in this area tend to focus on output market participation and 
drivers of diversification (Abdulai and Delgado 1999; Abdulai and ColeRess 2001). Also, 
studies that examined the impacts of non-farm work mostly neglect the nutritional aspect of 
food security, in spite of the income elasticity differences among various food and nutrient 
elements (Abdulai and Aubert 2004; Colen et al. 2018; Owusu et al. 2011).  
 
Another area related to the empirical analysis in this article is how farmers’ market orientation, 
and marketing affect intra-household production decisions and food consumption distribution, 
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since their effects could be heterogeneously distributed across individuals and various 
demographic groups of household members (Carletto et al. 2017; Ogutu et al. 2019). In 
particular, there is the need to understand the effects of smallholder marketing and 
diversification on intra-household power and decision-making, domestic violence, and poverty. 
It will be interesting to also know which demographic groups are the most affected by food and 
nutrition insecurity, and to what extent do smallholder market engagement and related policies 
contribute to intra-household distributive impacts on food and nutrition insecurity.  
 
Moreover, not much has been done on how heterogeneities in costs and returns to climate-smart 
adaptation practices affect smallholder adaptation, although there is some growing interest in 
the literature (Di Falco et al. 2011; Issahaku and Abdulai 2020). There is, therefore, the need 
for future studies to also examine heterogeneities in returns to climate change adaptation 
practices, given that such returns may be different across households and adaptation strategies. 
In particular, it will be interesting to examine how climate change, climate shocks and socio-
cultural norms impact vulnerable groups (such as the physically challenged, aged, women and 
children) who are normally disadvantaged in productive capacities, and in economic and 
geographical mobility. It is also important to understand how smallholder market and non-farm 
engagement can be used as climate change resilience strategies, particularly for vulnerable 
groups in developing countries, given the reliance of many of such groups on crop marketing, 
and the fact that agriculture is the hardest hit sector by climate change in these regions. 
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Appendix  
Appendix A: Differences in characteristics between market orientations 
Table 5.A1. Mean differences in household characteristics across market 
orientation   
 Subsistence Surplus Difference Commercial Difference Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) = (2-1) (4) (5) = (4-1) (6) = (4-2) 
Panel A: Household characteristics   
HHAge 43.73 
(0.86) 
44.45 
(0.86) 
0.73 
(1.22) 
43.74 
(1.16) 
  0.01 
 (1.42) 
  -0.72 
  (1.44) 
HHSex 0.58 
(0.04) 
0.62 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.58 
(0.05) 
  0.00 
 (0.06) 
  -0.04 
  (0.06) 
HHEducation 0.65 
(0.18) 
1.18 
(0.22) 
0.53* 
(0.28) 
2.43 
(0.40) 
  1.79*** 
 (0.39) 
   1.23*** 
  (0.42) 
HHSize 5.64 
(0.16) 
5.55 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.22) 
5.73 
(0.21) 
  0.08 
 (0.26) 
   0.17 
  (0.25) 
HHLandholding  2.20 
(0.09) 
2.57 
(0.11) 
   0.37** 
(0.15) 
3.09 
(0.16) 
  0.89*** 
 (0.18) 
   0.51** 
  (0.19) 
CB_Assoiations 1.11 
(0.10) 
1.01 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.13) 
1.13 
(0.11) 
  0.02 
 (0.15) 
   0.12 
  (0.14) 
Log HHIncome 8.19 
(0.04) 
8.33 
(0.04) 
   0.14** 
(0.05) 
8.82 
(0.08) 
  0.63*** 
 (0.08) 
   0.49*** 
  (0.08) 
Log HHLivestock 7.01 
(0.20) 
7.65 
(0.13) 
   0.64** 
(0.23) 
8.68 
(0.11) 
  1.66*** 
 (0.27) 
   1.02*** 
  (0.19) 
Log HHDAsset 8.83 
(0.05) 
9.19 
(0.06) 
     0.36*** 
(0.08) 
9.40 
(0.09) 
  0.57*** 
 (0.10) 
   0.21** 
  (0.10) 
Panel B: Community level variables and districts   
Town distance 15.33 
(0.92) 
15.78 
(0.80) 
0.44 
(1.22) 
15.09 
(1.09) 
  -0.24 
 (1.45) 
  -0.69 
  (1.35) 
Local wage  6.29 
(0.09) 
6.18 
(0.10) 
-0.11 
(0.13) 
6.19 
(0.12) 
  -0.10 
 (0.15) 
   0.01 
  (0.16) 
Gushegu 0.27 
(0.03) 
0.23 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
0.21 
(0.04) 
  -0.06 
 (0.05) 
  -0.02 
  (0.05) 
Karaga 0.11 
(0.02) 
0.14 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.24 
(0.04) 
  0.14*** 
 (0.04) 
   0.10** 
  (0.04) 
Savelugu-Nanton 0.37 
(0.04) 
0.27 
(0.03) 
  -0.10** 
(0.05) 
0.32 
(0.04) 
 -0.05 
 (0.06) 
   0.05 
  (0.05) 
Tolon 0.16 
(0.03) 
0.24 
(0.03) 
   0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.15 
(0.03) 
 -0.01 
 (0.04) 
  -0.09** 
  (0.04) 
Kumbungu 0.08 
(0.02) 
0.09 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
 -0.01 
 (0.03) 
  -0.02 
  (0.03) 
Panel C: Identification instruments   
PreProductContract  0.29 
(0.03) 
0.14 
(0.02) 
    -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.03) 
  -0.22*** 
 (0.04) 
  -0.07* 
  (0.04) 
HHMobileNetwork 0.59 
(0.04) 
0.75 
(0.03) 
     0.15*** 
(0.05) 
0.85 
(0.03) 
  0.26*** 
 (0.05) 
   0.11** 
  (0.05) 
CMarket 0.42 
(0.04) 
0.41 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.53 
(0.05) 
  0.10* 
 (0.06) 
   0.11* 
  (0.06) 
Save money 0.71 
(0.03) 
0.70 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.76 
(0.04) 
  0.06 
 (0.05) 
   0.07 
  (0.05) 
Save food 0.07 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
  0.03 
 (0.03) 
   0.02 
 (0.03) 
Notes: the table reports the means and the differences in means of the controls in panels A and B, and the instruments, in 
panel C, across household market orientation. Columns (1), (2) and (4) show the means of these variables for subsistence-
oriented, surplus-oriented and commercial-oriented households. Column (3) shows the differences in the means of subsistence 
and surplus-oriented households. Column (5) shows the mean differences in the variables for subsistence and commercial-
oriented households, while column (6) depicts the mean differences in these covariates for surplus and commercial-oriented 
households. Values in parenthesis are standard errors. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
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Appendix B: Instruments diagnostics 
         Table 5.B1. Tests of systematic difference among households based on instrument status 
 Pre-planting inputs contract between 
2001-2015 
 Telecommunication network 
coverage at household location 
 At least periodic market in village 
 No Yes Mean 
Difference 
No Yes Mean 
Difference 
No Yes Mean 
Difference 
Panel A: Endogenous targeting            
Village level characteristics            
Local wage rate in GHS  6.23 
(0.14) 
 6.22 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.16) 
  6.40 
(0.11) 
 6.15 
(0.07) 
-0.25* 
(0.13) 
  6.46 
(0.06) 
 5.91 
(0.10) 
-0.56*** 
(0.12) 
Distance to town in Km 16.07 
(1.42) 
15.32 
(0.56) 
-0.75 
(1.36) 
 19.64 
(1.23) 
13.83 
(0.54) 
 5.81*** 
(1.15) 
 15.22 
(0.65) 
15.76 
(0.86) 
 0.55 
(1.06) 
Household level characteristics            
Household income in 1000 GHS  4.90 
(0.39) 
 5.32 
(0.25) 
 0.41 
(0.56) 
  5.24 
(0.41) 
 5.24 
(0.25) 
 0.00 
(0.48) 
  5.44 
(0.29) 
 4.99 
(0.33) 
-0.45 
(0.44) 
Household non-farm income in 1000 
GHS 
 0.29 
(0.05) 
 0.60 
(0.07) 
 0.31** 
(0.14) 
  0.57 
(0.13) 
 0.54 
(0.06) 
 0.03 
(0.12) 
  0.51 
(0.06) 
 0.59 
(0.10) 
 0.07 
(0.11) 
Household durable asset value in 1000 
GHS 
13.95 
(1.75) 
14.33 
(0.81) 
 0.37 
(1.89) 
 13.57 
(1.35) 
14.53 
(0.87) 
-0.95 
(1.64) 
 15.37 
(1.03) 
12.85 
(1.02) 
 2.52* 
(1.48) 
Household livestock value in 1000 GHS  4.98 
(0.81) 
 6.08 
(0.33) 
 1.11 
(0.78) 
  5.83 
(0.57) 
 5.91 
(0.36) 
-0.08 
(0.67) 
  5.76 
(0.39) 
 6.03 
(0.48) 
 0.26 
(0.61) 
Household size  5.77 
(0.21) 
 5.59 
(0.11) 
-0.17 
(0.24) 
  5.82 
(0.18) 
 5.55 
(0.11) 
 0.27 
(0.21) 
  5.59 
(0.12) 
 5.67 
(0.15) 
 0.08 
(0.19) 
Landholding (in hectares)  2.33 
(0.14) 
 2.61 
(0.08) 
 0.27 
(0.17) 
  2.52 
(0.13) 
 2.57 
(0.08) 
 0.05 
(0.16) 
  2.50 
(0.09) 
 2.63 
(0.11) 
 0.13 
(0.14) 
Education (in years)  0.66 
(0.23) 
 1.41 
(0.17) 
 0.75 
(0.37) 
  1.11 
(0.26) 
 1.34 
(0.17) 
-0.24 
(0.32) 
  1.23 
(0.19) 
 1.34 
(0.22) 
 0.11 
(0.29) 
Save money  0.68 
(0.05) 
 0.72 
(0.02) 
 0.04 
(0.05) 
  0.74 
(0.04) 
 0.71 
(0.02) 
 0.03 
(0.05) 
  0.72 
(0.03) 
 0.72 
(0.03) 
 0.00 
(0.04) 
Save food  0.04 
(0.02) 
 0.06 
(0.01) 
 0.02 
(0.03) 
  0.07 
(0.02) 
 0.05 
(0.01) 
 0.02 
(0.02) 
  0.05 
(0.01) 
 0.06 
(0.02) 
 0.01 
(0.02) 
Panel B: Endogenous location of household           
Head Change village of birth (0,1)  0.32 
(0.05) 
 0.29 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
  0.34 
(0.04) 
 0.29 
(0.02) 
 0.05 
(0.05) 
  0.29 
(0.03) 
 0.32 
(0.03) 
 0.02 
(0.04) 
Change location in 5yrs (0,1)  0.02 
(0.02) 
 0.02 
(0.01) 
 0.00 
(0.02) 
  0.01 
(0.01) 
 0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
  0.02 
(0.01) 
 0.02 
(0.01) 
 0.00 
(0.01) 
Observations    92  408    140  360     280   220  
Notes: the table reports result of t-test of community and household level characteristics by access to past pre-planting input contract, access to telecommunication 
network coverage and whether village has market. Values in parenthesis are standard errors. The asterisks *** and * are significance at 1% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.B2. First-stage regressions of the IV-GMM and potential endogeneity of 
household income 
Notes: the table presents firsts-stage estimations of the IV-GMM regression of household HCCI on the set of controls 
and the instruments as in our first-stage market orientation model reported in table 5.3, and the first-stage household income 
regression. S.E. denotes robust standard errors, AIC denotes Akaike information criterion and BIC represents the Bayesian 
information criterion. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
 
 First-stage IV-GMM 
 
(1) 
 First-stage Household 
Income 
(2) 
 Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E. 
HHAge  5.3E-5 0.001  -3.1E-5 1.2E-4 
HHSex -0.029* 0.016   0.010** 0.005 
HHEducation  0.001 0.002   0.002** 0.001 
HHSize -0.002 0.003  -0.002** 0.001 
HHLandholding   0.004 0.005   0.002* 0.001 
CB_Assoiations  0.005 0.006    
Log HHIncome  0.125*** 0.020    
Log HHDAsset  0.009** 0.003   0.007** 0.002 
Log HHLivestock  0.015* 0.009   0.003** 0.001 
Town distance -1.6E-4 0.001   5.0E-4* 3.0E-4 
Local wage -2.9E-4 0.007   0.001 0.001 
Gushegu  0.030 0.027  -0.019** 0.009 
Karaga  0.029 0.025  -0.024*** 0.007 
Savelugu-Nanton  0.039 0.026  -0.055*** 0.008 
HHIncomeResid -0.093** 0.038    
PreProductContract  -0.083*** 0.020    
HHMobileNetwork  0.069*** 0.016    
CMarket  0.041** 0.016  -0.009* 0.004 
HHExtension     0.020*** 0.006 
Tractor    -1.2E-4* 6.9E-5 
SeedUse     6.3E-5** 2.7E-5 
SeedPrice    -3.4E-5   5.8E-5 
Fertilizer     4.9E-5* 2.8E-5 
Pesticides    -2.4E-4 3.0E-4 
Weedicides     1.1E-4 1.0E-4 
Labor     6.1E-5 4.1E-5 
Soil fertility     0.089*** 0.009 
Farm_shock    -0.033*** 0.007 
NonEmployTravel    -0.018*** 0.005 
Constant -0.961*** 0.170   1.946*** 0.031 
      
   R2    0.849     
   Weak identification tests:      
       Cragg-Donald F-statistic    14.49     
       Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic    45.17     
       P-value of Angrist-Pischke F-test    0.000     
   Over identification test:      
       Hansen J     3.452     
       p-value    0.178     
   Log likelihood      -287.46  
   AIC        1.25  
   BIC      -2859.49  
   Number of observations     500       500  
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Table 5.B3. Household crop commercialization and food and nutrients rich food consumption 
 Part A: IV-GMM    Part B:  OLS  
 Food 
(1) 
 Vitamin A 
(2) 
 Protein 
(3) 
 Hem iron 
(4) 
  Food 
(5) 
 Vitamin A 
(6) 
 Protein 
(7) 
 Hem iron 
(8) 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.  Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
HCCI 14.20** 5.37   6.05** 2.58   4.84** 2.34  3.02* 1.53  12.93*** 1.71  6.60*** 0.89   8.01*** 0.65  5.29*** 0.43 
HHAge -0.01 0.02  -0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01  -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 
HHSex  0.39 0.61   0.28 0.27   0.11 0.26  0.07 0.16   0.37 0.64  0.28 0.27   0.20 0.25  0.14 0.13 
HHEducation  0.28*** 0.09   0.11*** 0.03   0.06* 0.03  0.04* 0.02   0.30*** 0.08  0.12*** 0.04   0.06 0.04  0.04* 0.02 
HHSize  0.04 0.13   0.08 0.06   0.01 0.05  0.01 0.03   0.05 0.15  0.08 0.07   0.01 0.06  0.01 0.03 
HHLandholding   0.01 0.18   0.07 0.09   0.10 0.08  0.06 0.05   0.02 0.20  0.05 0.09   0.08 0.07  0.05 0.05 
CB_Assoiations  0.30 0.24   0.01 0.10  -0.08 0.09 -0.09 0.05   0.30 0.23  0.01 0.12  -0.09 0.08 -0.10* 0.05 
Log HHIncome  2.33** 1.03   0.67 0.45   1.05** 0.40  0.75*** 0.26   2.38** 0.84  0.53 0.39   0.62** 0.28  0.43** 0.16 
Log HHLivestock  0.28* 0.14   0.26*** 0.07   0.22*** 0.05  0.14*** 0.03   0.32** 0.15  0.26*** 0.06   0.20*** 0.05  0.12*** 0.03 
Log HHDAsset  1.60*** 0.32   0.73*** 0.14   0.68*** 0.13  0.45*** 0.08   1.64*** 0.36  0.72*** 0.16   0.62*** 0.12  0.42*** 0.07 
Town distance -0.01 0.03  -0.03** 0.01  -0.02* 0.01 -0.01* 0.01  -0.01 0.03 -0.03** 0.01  -0.02* 0.01 -0.01* 0.01 
Local wage   0.14 0.26   0.06 0.12   0.08 0.11  0.03 0.07   0.14 0.29  0.06 0.11   0.08 0.11  0.03 0.06 
Gushegu -6.79*** 1.03  -2.47*** 0.46  -0.41 0.41 -0.29 0.25  -6.29*** 1.04 -2.33*** 0.46  -0.47 0.35 -0.33 0.23 
Karaga -3.69*** 0.98  -0.28 0.40   1.43*** 0.39  0.88*** 0.25  -3.29*** 1.01 -0.20 0.36   1.35*** 0.38  0.82*** 0.22 
Savelugu-Nanton -4.54*** 1.03  -2.61*** 0.48  -0.47 0.44 -0.27 0.28  -4.36*** 1.04 -2.63*** 0.50  -0.60* 0.34 -0.38 0.29 
PreProductContract            0.51 0.72  0.30 0.31   0.30 0.38  0.17 0.20 
HHMobileNetwork           0.96 0.71  0.27 0.33  -0.11 0.26 -0.07 0.18 
CMarket          -0.50 0.52 -0.17 0.24  -0.22 0.26 -0.21 0.13 
HHIncomeResid -0.76 1.17   0.01 0.52  -0.26 0.49 -0.28 0.32  -0.68 1.33  0.14 0.47   0.07 0.39 -0.02 0.26 
Constant -5.56 7.99  -3.34 3.35 -13.40*** 3.02 -9.33*** 1.95  -6.82 7.34 -2.54 2.70 -10.16*** 1.94 -6.89*** 1.27 
                  
R2  0.48    0.50     0.47   0.47     0.48     0.50    0.50    0.50  
Wald X2          606.76   759.58  1788.07  1136.52  
p-value           0.00     0.00    0.00    0.00  
F-statistic  25.50    27.64   30.55   31.54           
p-value  0.00    0.00     0.00    0.00           
Number of 
observations 
 500    500     500    500     500     500    500    500  
Notes: the table shows the second-stage of the two-stage least squared generalized methods of moments (IV-GMM) and the ordinary least square (OLS) estimations of the impact of household crop 
commercialization on food and nutrient rich foods consumption. The coef. and S.E. are coefficient and standard errors, respectively. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix C: Second-stage estimates of the model 
 
Table 5.C1. Second stage estimates of determinants of food and vitamin A rich food consumption  
 Food       Vitamin A      
 Subsistence- oriented Surplus-oriented Commercial-oriented  Subsistence- oriented Surplus-oriented Commercial-oriented 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
HHAge -0.041 0.042 -0.043 0.029  0.022 0.048   0.001 0.021  -0.018 0.014 -0.011 0.014 
HHSex  0.631 1.174 -0.101 0.888  0.087 1.255   0.112 0.593   0.614 0.416 -0.194 0.345 
HHEducation  0.451* 0.229  0.391*** 0.116  0.171 0.164   0.196 0.124   0.221*** 0.047  0.028 0.040 
HHSize -0.221 0.239  0.442* 0.235  0.107 0.229   0.023 0.120   0.210* 0.113  0.008 0.075 
HHLandholding   0.584 0.409 -0.011 0.216 -0.618 0.409   0.299 0.223   0.001 0.118 -0.102 0.112 
CB_Assoiations  0.238 0.432  0.823* 0.411  0.023 0.420   0.050 0.208   0.213 0.147 -0.143 0.131 
Log HHIncome -1.400 2.003  4.556*** 1.358  1.811 2.134  -1.289 0.944   1.968*** 0.524  0.599 0.545 
Log HHLivestock  0.401* 0.234  0.210 0.217  0.023 0.434   0.350*** 0.115   0.186* 0.110  0.105 0.130 
Log HHDAsset  2.489*** 0.791  0.930* 0.468  0.982 0.613   1.102*** 0.311   0.517** 0.233  0.546*** 0.183 
Town distance  0.040 0.071 -0.091* 0.048  0.118 0.082   2.505** 1.123  -0.081 0.586 -0.649 0.494 
Local wage   0.130 0.592  0.341 0.382  0.091 0.471  -0.044 0.031  -0.032 0.021  0.017 0.020 
Gushegu -7.979*** 2.090 -6.090*** 1.484 -3.124* 1.785  -3.490*** 0.930  -1.512** 0.624 -1.435** 0.657 
Karaga -4.544** 2.016 -3.335** 1.458 -2.660 1.935  -0.978 0.924   0.619 0.614 -0.521 0.542 
Savelugu-Nanton -6.899*** 2.061 -2.798* 1.649 -1.961 1.933  -4.570*** 0.984  -1.363* 0.759 -1.294** 0.579 
HHIncomeResid  3.466 2.390 -0.375 1.462 -1.903 1.661   0.104 0.283   0.235 0.184 -0.167 0.151 
Constant 19.330 18.397 -14.045 11.852 14.832 26.894   9.925 8.072 -11.621** 4.919  6.202 6.318 
              
𝜌𝜖𝜇   -0.304 0.316  -0.082   0.212  -0.292  0.676   -0.225 0.229    0.101 0.235  0.192 0.470 
              
LR 𝑋2(3) (𝜌𝜖𝜇 = 0)    1.29         1.01      
Prob 𝑋2    0.732         0.798      
Log likelihood  -2029.44       -1603.46      
LR X2(18)    143.42         142.73      
Prob X2    0.000          0.000      
Number of 
observations 
      
   180      
  
     206 
      
  
 
     114 
        
    180      
  
      206 
      
  
 
      114 
 
Notes: the table shows the second-stage ordered Heckman estimations of equation (3) for food consumption score and vitamin A rich foods consumption frequencies. 𝜌𝜖𝜇 denotes the correlation between 
the unobservables in the first-stage ordered probit selection equation (2) and the second-stage outcome equations (3). S.E. denotes robust standard errors. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
272 
 
Table 5.C2. Second stage estimates of determinants of protein and iron rich food consumption  
 Protein       Hem iron      
 Subsistence- oriented Surplus-oriented Commercial-oriented  Subsistence- oriented Surplus-oriented Commercial-oriented 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
HHAge  0.011 0.017   0.014 0.014 -0.002 0.012   0.006 0.010   0.005 0.009 -0.002 0.007 
HHSex -0.195 0.512   0.599 0.467 -0.257 0.294  -0.073 0.330   0.432 0.310 -0.221 0.176 
HHEducation  0.170** 0.076   0.113 0.072 -0.024 0.029   0.117** 0.052   0.068 0.046 -0.013 0.018 
HHSize -0.049 0.072   0.036 0.110 -0.016 0.067  -0.030 0.045   0.053 0.071 -0.014 0.041 
HHLandholding   0.351** 0.171  -0.016 0.135 -0.057 0.137   0.214* 0.110  -0.009 0.087 -0.046 0.083 
CB_Assoiations -0.087 0.164  -0.100 0.156  0.105 0.123  -0.097 0.107  -0.114 0.105  0.041 0.072 
Log HHIncome -0.281 0.696   1.904*** 0.584  0.930*** 0.307  -0.248 0.443   1.330*** 0.387  0.597*** 0.187 
Log HHLivestock  0.222*** 0.074   0.257** 0.100  0.065 0.100   0.151*** 0.048   0.151** 0.065  0.035 0.061 
Log HHDAsset  1.037*** 0.232   0.627** 0.244  0.301* 0.163   0.694*** 0.146   0.411** 0.161  0.201** 0.094 
Town distance -0.038 0.027  -0.023 0.026  0.006 0.014  -0.026 0.017  -0.015 0.016  0.002 0.008 
Local wage   0.160 0.204   0.107 0.185  0.053 0.134   0.071 0.132   0.088 0.121 -0.024 0.083 
Gushegu -1.350* 0.748   0.472 0.652  0.156 0.489  -0.959** 0.465   0.369 0.421  0.004 0.303 
Karaga -0.043 0.855   2.310*** 0.663  1.491*** 0.469  -0.042 0.566   1.552*** 0.435  0.723** 0.296 
Savelugu-Nanton -2.207** 0.779  -0.046 0.756  1.018** 0.491  -1.484*** 0.493   0.109 0.487  0.475 0.301 
HHIncomeResid  0.989 0.817   0.157 0.743 -0.787** 0.337   0.642 0.516  -0.036 0.488 -0.506** 0.216 
Constant -4.447 6.017 -19.547*** 5.592 -3.222 2.608  -2.434 3.784 -13.744*** 3.694 -1.488 1.601 
              
𝜌𝜖𝜇 -0.006 0.218    0.245 0.239  0.307* 0.158   0.033 0.212    0.258 0.239  0.269* 0.153 
              
LR 𝑋2(3) (𝜌𝜖𝜇 = 0)  2.05        2.03      
Prob 𝑋2  0.562        0.566      
Log likelihood -1563.33       -1339.87      
LR X2(18)  142.76        142.65      
Prob X2   0.000           0.000      
Number of observations      180          206          114        180            206     114  
Notes: the table shows the second-stage ordered Heckman estimations of equation (3) for protein and hem iron rich foods consumption frequencies. 𝜌𝜖𝜇 denotes the correlation between the unobservables 
in the first-stage ordered pobit selection equation (2) and the second-stage outcome equations (3). S.E. denotes standard errors. The asterisks ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively
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Chapter Six 
Summary, conclusions and policy implications 
The low uptake of innovations and improved technologies, and the recent increase in food 
insecurity and malnutrition in sub-Saharan Africa, in the midst of increased availability of 
improved agricultural technologies in the continent motivated the need to investigate the role 
of social networks in technology adoption, and the implications of improved technology 
adoption and crop commercialization on household welfare. This study contributes to the 
existing literature by examining the impact of social networks, technology adoption and 
smallholder market-orientation on household welfare in developing countries. First, the study 
examined the impacts of smallholders’ peer adoption of two improved and competing soybean 
varieties on their adoption decisions of these varieties, showing the instances under which a 
given improved variety is likely to become dominant in terms of adoption in a farmer’s social 
networks and when a farmer is likely to defer adoption of any of the improved varieties.  
 
Second, the study investigated the role of learning about both production techniques and 
expected benefits of improved soybean varieties from peers on diffusion of these varieties, and 
the influence of social network structures, specifically transitivity and modularity on diffusion 
of these improved soybean varieties. Following these, the study then examined the effects of 
own and peer adoption of the improved variety on household soybean yield, food consumption, 
as well as the consumption of vitamin A, and protein rich foods. Finally, the study explored the 
impacts of smallholder market-orientation on household food consumption, and on the 
consumption of nutrient (such as vitamin A, protein and hem iron) rich foods.  
 
6.1 Summary of empirical methods 
Given the endogeneity and identifications concerns of social network effects, and the threats of 
sample selection and missing variable biases, this study utilized a number of empirical methods 
in the analysis depending the nature of the problem and the issue of being investigated. In 
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particular, the study used the spatial autoregressive multinomial approach, Bayesian estimation 
approach, Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), random-effects complementary log-log 
hazard model, graphical reconstruction of social networks, marginal treatment effects, and 
ordered-Probit selection model.  
  
Chapter two employed a spatial autoregressive multinomial probit model (SAR Probit) to 
examine how neighbors’ varietal and cross varietal adoption of improved varieties, affect a 
farmer’s adoption decision in the social network. Due to challenges of multidimensional 
integrals, correlations in the error terms and the complexity of the spatial dependence in the 
estimation of spatial models in a multinomial setting, the study used the Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) sampling, which is a Bayesian estimation framework, to estimate the SAR 
Probit model since this allows for the higher dimensional integrals to be re-specified into 
sequence of draws. This spatial autoregressive model directly accounts for contextual network 
effects in order to identify the endogenous network effect. Finally, network fixed-effects and 
the control function approach were used to account for correlated network effects due to similar 
institutional and environment conditions faced by farmers in the same network and unobserved 
determinants of link formation between individuals, respectively. 
 
In chapter three, a Random-effects complementary log-log hazard function was employed to 
estimate the conditional probability of adoption in a small-time interval for a farmer who has 
not adopted the technology up to this time. Given that adoption of the improved varieties was 
observed on annual basis, the duration to adoption was modelled in a discrete-time method to 
account for the banded nature of the survival time. In order to identify endogenous from 
exogenous, the model controlled for contextual peer characteristics. Given that the network 
structure, modularity, was measured at the network level, which makes the use of network 
dummies to control for network fixed-effects challenging due to the incidental parameter 
problem, the study accounted for correlated effects in a network by controlling for time fixed-
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effects, use of residuals of link formation model as control functions and clustering standard 
errors at the village (i.e., network) level. To investigate the extent of bias due to the use of 
sampled networks, instead of complete networks, in the construction of the network structures, 
the study used the graphical reconstruction approach to simulate complete networks, and then 
used these to calculate the network structures for estimation of the hazard model as robustness.  
 
Chapter four used spatial econometric techniques to generate instruments, and then use the 
instruments, in addition to controlling for network fixed-effects and for potential endogeneity 
of network link formation with the control function approach to identify peer adoption effects 
on own adoption and outcomes. The marginal treatment effects (MTE) approach was used to 
estimate the treatment effects heterogeneities across households. The MTE approach allows an 
identification of a substantial part of the range of individual treatment effects, and as a result 
characterize the extent and pattern of treatment effects heterogeneity from adoption due to 
observed and unobserved characteristics. It also shows the pattern of selectivity and allows for 
computation of average treatment effects (ATE), average treatment effects on the treated (TT) 
and the average treatment on the untreated (TUT). The Policy Relevant Treatment Effect 
(PRTE) was used to estimate the effects of policies that either increase affordability of soybean 
seeds through input subsidy, or increase access to soybean seeds by reducing distance to the 
nearest soybean seed source.  
 
Chapter five provides a review of food security and nutrition strategies in sub-Saharan Africa 
countries, and an empirical analysis of smallholder market participation as a food security and 
nutrition strategy. Smallholders were classified based on their market-orientation into 
subsistence-oriented, surplus-oriented and commercial-oriented. To the extent that the 
treatment of farm households in this study is non-random implies that market-orientation status 
of farmers could differ systematically due to self-selection of households into categories. In 
order to account for the threats of selection bias and omitted variable problem due to observed 
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and unobserved factors in the light of the ordered nature of the selection variable, the study 
employed the ordered-Probit selection model. This is a parametric model that utilizes full 
information maximum likelihood procedure to jointly estimate a first-stage ordered-Probit of 
smallholder market-orientation, and a second-stage outcome models for the three regimes of 
market-orientation. The process accounts for selection bias and omitted variable problem by 
inserting calculated inverse Mills ratios from the first-stage ordered choice model into the 
second-stage food and nutrients consumption model. Finally, the approach allows for the 
calculation of average treatment effects (ATE) for the entire population and for those at one of 
the transition stages, the average treatment effects on the treated (ATE) and the average 
treatment effects on the untreated (ATU). 
 
6.2 Summary of results 
The results of chapter two show that a farmer’s likelihood of adopting an improved variety is 
lower than the proportion of adopting neighbors of that variety when the proportion is below a 
threshold. However, the likelihood of adoption becomes higher than the proportion of adopting 
neighbors when the share of neighbors adopting that variety is above this threshold. The results 
also show that a farmer’s adoption decision of a given improved variety is positively influenced 
by the adopting neighbors of this variety, but negatively by the adopting neighbors of the 
competing improved variety. Furthermore, when the relative share of adopting neighbors are 
equal, farmers are more likely to wait and not to switch from the old variety. Similarly, when 
the proportion of adopters of both improved varieties in a farmer’s neighborhood are less than 
25% or greater than 25%, then the farmer is more likely to defer adoption of improved varieties.   
 
In chapter three, the results reveal a positive and significant effect of past share of adopting 
peers on the conditional probability of adoption across all specifications. Similarly, there is a 
positive and significant effect of peer experience in the cultivation of the improved varieties on 
the speed of adoption. These suggest that both learning about benefits and production process 
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are important in accelerating adoption, although the effects of experience are higher when 
sufficient peers adopt the improved varieties. The interaction effects between the past adopting 
peers and peer experience with the improved varieties appear to be complementary on the 
conditional probability of adoption up to an average peer experience of 5 years, after which it 
begins to exhibit decreasing probability of adoption with increasing peer experience. The results 
of the network structures show the role of transitivity in the learning and diffusion processes to 
be stronger, compared to centrality. However, modularity tends to slow down the diffusion 
process, and limits the significance of both transitivity and centrality.   
 
The results of chapter four show that own adoption tend to significantly increase yield, food 
and nutrients consumption of the household, albeit the effects of adoption on nutrients rich food 
consumption are stronger and higher in magnitudes than the effect on food consumption.  The 
results reveal positive selection on gains due to unobserved characteristics, mainly driven by 
worse outcomes, of households with less resistance to adopt, in the non-adoption state. 
However, adoption tends to make the potential outcomes of households quite homogenous, 
irrespective of their level of resistance to adoption. The results show that peer adoption tends 
to strongly affect own yield, only when the household is also adopting, which is in line with the 
notion of social learning or contagion effects. In terms of food and nutrients consumption, the 
results show that peer adoption tends to increase own food and nutrients consumption when not 
adopting, and attenuating peer adoption effects when adopting, which are suggestive of stronger 
private transfers received from peers in the form of cash or food safety nets when the household 
is not adopting.  
 
The impact of commercialization on food and nutrients rich food consumption is generally 
shown to be positive across transitions of smallholder market-orientation in Chapter five, which 
is mainly due to increased farm and household income. Specifically, transitioning from 
subsistence to surplus orientation increases household consumption across all food and nutrient 
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items. Also, transitioning from surplus to commercial orientation substantially increases 
household food and nutrients consumption. However, the magnitudes of the treatment effects 
for protein and iron rich food consumption are higher compared to that of food and vitamin A 
food consumption. The results also show substantial heterogeneities in gains (i.e., sorting gains 
and losses), where positive selection on gains is shown, in transitioning between subsistence 
and surplus orientations, while reverse selection on gains is revealed in transitioning between 
surplus and commercial orientations. These suggest that less (more) endowed and constrained 
households who are less (more) likely to transition from surplus (subsistence) to commercial 
(surplus) orientation tend to gain more in food and nutrients consumption if they go from 
surplus (subsistence) to commercial (surplus)-oriented. 
 
6.3 Policy implications 
The findings of this study show that social networks are important in promoting technology 
adoption, diffusion, and household welfare. These have some implications for policy. The 
findings of the differential adoption rates of competing technologies and the ultimate 
dominance of varieties in networks suggest the need to do a stepwise introduction of improved 
varieties before a full-scale promotion in the villages. It will be rewarding to first expose some 
farmers in the network (i.e., village) to the improved varieties, observe the extent of adoption 
and then following-up with a wide-scale introduction and promotion of the variety that leads in 
adoption in the network. This will reduce the prohibitive costs associated with promotion of 
several varieties at the same time. The finding that information about benefits and production 
process matter in the diffusion process, and that farmers are likely not to adopt the improved 
varieties when the proportion of adopting neighbors of the improved varieties are equal suggest 
the need for policymakers to focus promotion efforts on demonstrating the relative benefits and 
production process of improved varieties introduced to farmers, since these would motivate 
farmers to adopt.  
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The finding on the role of transitivity in promoting adoption and that of modularity in restricting 
diffusion, and the influence of the other network characteristics suggest that the common 
extension strategy of targeting initial and influential adopters in a network for disseminating 
information may not be appropriate in enabling diffusion at the network level. Given that 
networks can be important means of increasing yield, and promoting welfare of vulnerable 
households, interventions, such as self-help groups and/or farmer field-days, aimed at 
promoting interactions among farm households, and enhancing exchange can increase the 
effectiveness of social networks in these respects. Also, training workshops, where people are 
specifically invited from different segments of the village at the early stages of adoption, can 
promote bridges between network components and diffusion. The policy simulation suggests 
that interventions to minimize production and structural constraints to adoption could be an 
important strategy in mitigating the cost associated with technology adoption. Hence, 
government and development partners can consider increasing access through availability of 
the improved seeds at the local levels, such as empowering village level shops or community-
based groups to engage in input marketing. 
 
Finally, the findings show substantial heterogeneity in consumption gains across market-
orientations and suggest the need for transition-sensitive policies in promoting smallholder food 
security and nutrition through crop commercialization.  Thus, promoting food security and 
nutrition among subsistence-oriented households need to consider productivity enhancing 
measures such as cash crop programmes that support farmers with inputs to facilitate spill-over 
benefits between food and cash crop cultivation, and promotion of policies to increase their 
access to improved inputs and innovations. Also, the promotion of higher smallholder 
commercialization will require in addition to output augmenting measures the mitigation of 
some of the market barriers and failures (such as, markets availability, physical access and 
information) that limit poor smallholders from engaging in sales for profit. Interventions such 
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as promotion of market information platforms, farmer cooperatives and collective actions as 
well as contract buying, which provides ready markets for farmers, will be more rewarding.
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Household survey questionnaire 
                                                                                                                        
 
Social Networks, Technology Adoption and Agriculture Commercialization on Smallholder Welfare in the Northern Region of Ghana 
Introduction 
Good day Sir/Madam and thank you for talking to me. We are conducting a survey of smallholder farmers to examine the impacts of farmer individual social and 
economic networks, adoption of technologies and agricultural commercialization on their welfare. The specific purposes of this survey are to assess the impacts of 
farmers’ perceptions about technology features and social networks on technology adoption; roles of social networks and technology adoption on household 
agriculture commercialization processes and to examine the impacts of agriculture commercialization on household welfare. The information gathered will provide 
significant input into the write-up of a PhD thesis in Agriculture and Food Economics at the University of Kiel, Germany. The interview will take about 1 hour 30 
minutes and your participation is entirely by choice.  Your name, identity and individual responses will be kept confidential. 
Do you wish to participate in this survey? 0 =No 1 =Yes 
 
Survey identification 
Questionnaire number: ___________   Name of enumerator: _____________________________   Enumerator’s ID: ____________      
Date of interview:   |_____|_____|_______|  Start time (24hr Clock): |___:____|     End time (24hr Clock): |___:____|  
Location 
1. District name: ____________________________________________   2. District code: __________________________________ 
3. Name of community: ______________________________________  4. Community ID: ________________________________ 
5. Head of Household (name): _________________________________   6. Household ID: _________________________________ 
 
Note on soybean varieties:  Afayak: (a bit yellowish compared to jenguma & matures in 85 to 90 days)   Jenguma: (Short, whitish & matures in 90 days)   
Suong-Pungun: (More yellowish at maturity and matures in 75 days)  Salintuya: (tall, can be intercropped and matures in 120 days) 
 
Put “99” for “Not Applicable” and “Don’t know”  
Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel, Germany 
Institute of Food Economics and Consumption Studies 
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Section A: General information 
A1 A2 A3 A4 
What is/are the main languages spoken at 
home? 
 Codes A 
What is the ethnicity of the household 
head 
Codes B 
What is the family type of the 
household?  
Codes D 
What type of marriage is the household head 
practicing?  
Codes E 
 
 
   
 
Section B: Socio-demographic characteristics 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 
What is the 
farmer’s 
relationship 
with the 
household 
head? 
Codes F 
 
Sex of 
farmer?
 
0=F 
1=M 
How 
old is 
the 
farmer? 
What is 
farmer’s 
educational 
level? (In 
completed 
years of 
schooling) 
What is 
farmer’s 
religion? 
Codes C 
 
What is 
farmer’s 
marital 
status? 
Codes G 
 
What is 
farmer’s 
main 
occupation? 
Codes H 
Number 
of years 
farmer is 
living in 
the 
village 
 
 
Farmer’s 
experience 
(years) in 
own 
farming 
activities 
 
Farmer’s 
experience 
(years) in 
cultivating 
maize 
Does the 
household 
head hold 
any of the 
following 
authorities 
at the 
community 
level? 
Codes I 
Does the 
household 
head’s spouse 
hold any of the 
following 
authorities at 
the community 
level? 
Codes I 
Household 
size (number 
of persons 
who share 
cooking 
arrangement/
under your 
care) 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Codes A 
1. Likpakpaln (Konkomba) 10. Sissali    
2. Chekosi  11. Gruni 
3. Mampruli  12. Kasem 
4. Dagbali (Dagbani) 13. Nankan 
5. Nanunli  14. Kusaal 
6. Gonja   15. Twi  
7. Hausa   16. Ewe 
8. Bimoba  17. Ga  
9. Dagaare/Wali  18. Other (specify) 
Codes B 
1. Konkombas  10. Sissalas                
2. Chekosi  11. Grunsi 
3. Mamprusi  12. Kassenas 
4. Dagombas  13. Nankan 
5. Nanumbas  14. Kusasi 
6. Gonjas   15. Akans  
7. Hausas   16. Ewes  
8. Bimobas  17. Gas  
9. Dagaabas/Walas  18. Other (specify) 
Codes C 
0 No religion  
1 Muslim   
2 Christian  
3 Traditional    
4 Other (specify) 
 __________________ 
 
Codes E 
1 Polygynous  
2 Monogamous  
3 Other (specify)  
___________________ 
 
Codes G 
0 Never married   
1 Married   
2 Consensual union  
3 Separated   
4 Divorced   
5 Widowed 
Codes I 
0 None  
1 Chief/community leader 
2 Chief council member 
3 Assembly/unit committee 
    member 
4 Religious leader 
5 Youth leader 
6 Women leader 
7 Political party leader 
 
Codes D 
1 Nuclear   
2 Extended    
3 Other (specify)  
   ______________ 
 
Codes F  
1 Head   6 Son/Daughter-in-law 
2 Spouse   7 Other relative 
3 Child    8 Adopted/Foster/Stepchild 
4 Grandchild  9 House help 
5 Parent/Parent-in-law  10 Non-relative   
Codes H 
1 Farming (crop and/or livestock) 
2 Housekeeping   
3 Casual labour on another farm  
4 Non-farm business (shops, trade, etc) 
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Please complete the table below on the age composition and non-farm work of the household members  
B14 B15 B16 B17 B18 B19 
(less than 16 years) (16 - 30 years) (31 - 60 years) (above 60 years) Family non- farm workers  
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
 
Female 
                  
  
 
 
Please complete the table on the household and household head’s social issues 
# Question  I # Question   II # Question   III 
B20 What is household head’s settlement status in the 
community?       
                       0 =Settler       1 =Native 
B28 If no, how long has the household head been 
in this community? 
                          _______ (Years) 
B36 Did any member of the household experience any court, police or 
major theft incidence in last 5 years?               
                                                0 =No        1 =Yes 
B21 Has the household head a royal lineage?  
                                              0 =No       1 =Yes 
B29 How many times has the household head 
travelled outside the village in last 12 
months?          _______ (times) 
B37 Did you or any member of the household undertake any lumpy 
expenditure (such as construction of house and/or room) in last 5 
years?             0 =No        1 =Yes  
B22 Has any of the parents of the household head or spouse 
any important position or representation in the traditional 
political or authority system?  
                                              0 =No      1 =Yes 
B30 Has the household change location in the 
past….  
      5 years?                 0 =No          1 =Yes 
    10 years?                 0 =No          1 =Yes 
B38 Did you experience any shock or loss in your farming activities in 
last 5 years?  
                                                0 =No >>B41        1 =Yes 
B23 Has any member of the household been away from the 
community for more than 6 months in the last 12 months? 
                                       0 =No  >>B26     1 =Yes 
B31 Did you have a wedding ceremony in the 
household in the past 2 years? 
 
                0 =No  >>B33         1 =Yes 
B39 If yes, which of the following did you experience? 
          1 =Weather shocks      2 =bush/wildfires  
          3 =Other (specify)______________________ 
B24  If yes, how many people?      
                                          _________ 
 
B32 If yes, how many times? 
                                        _______ (times) 
B40 If yes, how regular is the incidence of these shocks/losses? 
          1 =Very regular     2 =Regular      3 =Occasional 
B25 For what reason did the person move away? 
Codes A 
B33 Did you have an outdooring ceremony in 
the household in the past 2 years?  
                0 =No >>B35       1 =Yes 
B41 Did you experience a sudden death of any household/family 
member in last 5 years?  
                        0 =No >>B43      1 =Yes 
B26 Was the household head born in this community? 
                                  0 =No        1 =Yes 
B34 If yes, how many times? 
                                        _______ (times) 
B42 If yes, how many times did you experience this in the past 5 years?  
_________ (times) 
 
B27 Did the household head grow-up in this community? 
                     
                                  0 =No         1 =Yes  >>B29 
B35 Did any household member fall sick in the 
in last 12 months?  
                        0 =No        1 =Yes 
B43 Did you experience a long period of sickness of a household 
member which led to his/her death in last 5 years? 
                           0 =No        1 =Yes 
 
Codes A 
1. Job transfer   2. Seeking employment   3. Spouse’s employment  
4. Marriage   5. Other family reason   6. Education 
7. Political/religious 8. Ethnic/chieftaincy conflict  9. Other (specify)____      
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Section CI: Social networks 
Contact Name/ID CI1 CI2 Have any of you ever sought or exchanged (S/E) any of the following from each other?            
Do you 
know (X) 
 
0=No >> 
next contact 
1=Yes 
How 
long 
have 
you 
known 
(X)? 
Information on improved soybean 
variety (Jenguma) 
Seeds of Jenguma 
variety 
Information on other soybean 
varieties  Codes A 
Seeds of other 
soybean varietie/s 
CI3 CI4 CI5 CI6 CI7 CI8 CI9 CII08 
S/E 
0=No 
1=Yes 
No. of times 
in the past 
12 months 
Type of 
information 
Codes C 
S/E 
0=No 
1=Yes 
S/E 
0=No 
1=Yes 
No. of times 
in the past 
12 months 
Variety 
Codes A 
S/E 
0=No 
1=Yes 
1           
2           
3           
4           
5           
 
 
Contact 
ID 
Have any of you ever sought or exchanged (S/E) any of the following from each other?           CI18 CI19 
Information on other crops (specify) Seeds of other crop 
varieties 
Information on 
soybean marketing 
Information on other 
crop  marketing 
If yes, type 
of 
information 
exchanged? 
Codes D 
In the past 12 
months, how 
many times did 
you have such 
exchanges? 
 
CI11 CI12 CI13 CI14 CI15 CI16 CI17 
S/E 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Crop 
(Codes B) 
No. of times 
in the past 
12 months 
Type of 
information 
Codes C 
S/E 
0=No 
1=Yes 
S/E 
0=No 
1=Yes 
S/E 
0=No 
1=Yes 
1          
2          
3          
4          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crops B 
1 Rice         5 Cassava 9 Cotton 
2 Maize        6 Soya bean 10 Yam 
3 Millet        7 Cowpea  11 Vegetables 
4 Sorghum       8 Groundnut  12 Fruits  
13 Other (specify): _________________________ 
     
Codes C 
1 Crop choice   5 Harvesting 
2 Agronomic practices  6 Pesticides 
3 Fertilizer application  7 Storage 
4 Weedicides   8 Other(specify)_________ 
 
Codes D 
1 Prices 
2 Demand situation 
3 Buyers 
4 Inputs availability 
5 Other (specify)____ 
Code A 
1 Jenguma  6 Salintuya-I (medium) 
2 Quarshie  7 Salintuya-II (late) 
3 Afayak  8 Songda 
4 Suong-Pungun 9 Local variety 
5 Anidaso 10 Other (specify) ____ 
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Contact 
ID 
Have any of you ever sought or exchanged (S/E) any of the following from each other?            
Labor for soybean activities Credit and/or gift transactions Land exchange/transaction 
CI20 CI21 CI22 CI23 CI24 CI25 CI26 CI27 CI28 CI29 
S/E 
0=No 
1=Yes 
No. of times 
in the past 12 
months 
No. of man-
days per 
exchange 
S/E 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Nature of 
exchange 
Codes A 
No. of times 
in the past 
12 months 
Amount received 
GHS______ and/or given 
GHS______ 
S/E 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Nature of the 
exchange 
Codes B 
If rented, how 
much was 
paid? (GHS) 
1           
2           
3           
4           
5           
 
Section CII Social learning 
Please tell me about contact (X) soybean farming activities during the 2015/16 season  
(NOTE: Ask if respondent at least know contact even if nothing was sought or no exchange between respondent and contact). Put “99” for “Don’t know” 
Contact 
ID 
CII1 If yes, i.e. (X) cultivated soybean 
Did (X) 
cultivate 
soybean 
 
0 =No >> 
next contact 
1=Yes 
CII2 CII3 CII4 CII5 CII6 CII7 CII8 CII9 CII10 CII11 
When did (X) 
started 
cultivating 
soybean? 
Codes C 
Soybean 
varieties 
cultivated 
Codes D 
 
Where did 
(X) get seeds 
of soybean 
varieties? 
Codes E 
 
Did (X) use 
fertilizer on 
soybean 
plot? 
0= No 
1= Yes 
Did (X) use 
manure on 
soybean plot? 
0= No 
1= Yes 
 
Did (X) use 
pesticides 
on soybean 
plot? 
0= No 
1.=Yes 
Did (X) use 
weedicides 
on soybean 
plot? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
How 
much 
soybean 
did (X) 
harvest 
(100kg)? 
Did (X) 
sell the 
soybean 
harvest? 
0= No 
1= Yes 
If yes, at 
what price 
(GHS/kg)? 
 
1            
2            
3            
4            
5            
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Codes A 
1 Credit  
2 Gift 
3 Both 
Codes B 
1 Purchased            4 Allocated free of charge  
2 Tenant rented (for cash or kind)  5 Begged 
3 Sharecropped                  6 Borrowed 
6 Other (specify)______________________________________ 
 
Codes C 
1 Not yet  3 At the same time as me 
2 Before me 4 After me 
Code D 
1 Jenguma  6 Salintuya-I (medium) 
2 Quarshie  7 Salintuya-II (late) 
3 Afayak  8 Songda 
4 Suong-Pungun 9 Local variety 
5 Anidaso 10 Other (specify) ____ 
 
Codes E 
0 Own storage  6 Local seed producers 
1 Agro-input dealer  7 Extension officer (MoFA) 
2 Purchased from market 8 NGO 
3 Exchange (farmer) 9 Gift 
4 Private aggregator 10 SARI/CSI 
5 FBO (cooperative)  
11 Other (specify) ___________ 
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Contact 
ID 
CII12 CII14 CII15 CII16 CII17 CII18 CII19 CII20 CII21 CII22 
I will now ask you information about contacts’ maize cultivation 
Did X 
cultivate 
maize? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Was crop 
of modern 
variety? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Where did 
(X) get seeds 
of crop 
varieties? 
 Codes A 
Did (X) use 
fertilizer on 
crop plot? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Did (X) use 
manure on crop 
plot? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Did (X) use 
pesticides on crop 
plot? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Did (X) use 
weedicides 
on crop plot? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
How much 
maize did 
(X) harvest 
(100kg)? 
 
Did (X) sell 
the maize 
harvest? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
If yes, at 
what price 
(GHS/kg)? 
 
1           
2           
3           
4           
5           
 
         I will like to ask you about the social and physical proximity issues between you and the matched contacts  
Contact 
ID 
CII23 CII24 CII25 CII26 CII27 CII28 CII29 CII30 
How is (X) 
related to 
you? 
Codes B 
Have same 
family name 
0=No 
1=Yes 
 
Do you and contact 
families trace your origin 
to same region? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Have you ever visited 
the home of (X)? 
0=No >> CII28 
1=Yes 
If yes, number 
of visits per 
month to (X) 
home? 
Where does 
this person 
live? 
Codes C 
Approximately how 
far does this person 
live from you (in 
minutes of walking)? 
Is (X)’s field/ plot 
adjacent to yours? 
 0=No 
1=Yes 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Codes B  
1 Parent   8 Friend  
2 Child   9 Same family lineage; 
3 Sibling  10 Neighbor; 
4 Grandparent  11 Attend same church/ mosque 
5 Grandchild  12 belong to same association 
6 In-law   13 Professional/business colleague  
7 Other relative  14 Other (specify)____________ 
 
Codes C 
1 Next house/neighbor 
2 Neighbor of my neighbor  
3 Not neighbor of me  
   or of my neighbor  
 
Codes A 
0 Own storage  6 Local seed producers 
1 Agro-input dealer  7 Extension officer (MoFA) 
2 Purchased from market 8 NGO 
3 Exchange (farmer) 9 Gift 
4 Private aggregator 10 SARI/CSI 
5 FBO (cooperative)  
11 Other (specify) ___________ 
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Contact 
ID 
CII31 CII32 CII33 CII34 CII35 How frequent do you attend… 
Do you pass by X's 
field when going to 
field? 
0=No 
1=Yes >> CII33 
If no, have you ever 
passed by the field of 
(X)? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Do you perceive the soil 
conditions of your farm(s) 
as similar with (X)? 
 0=No 
1=Yes 
How many of 
these contacts 
know one 
another? 
Generally speaking, 
would you say that 
most people can be 
trusted? 
Codes A  
CII36 CII37 
…social events 
(such as weddings, 
funerals and 
festivals)? 
Codes E 
…religious events 
(such as visiting 
mosque, church or 
shrine)? 
Codes E 
1        
2        
3        
4         
5        
 
       Section CIII: Famers networks of family and friends/acquaintances  
         I will like to ask you about your network of close relatives and friends your share farming information and resources with, in the community.  
Network members CIII1 CIII2 CIII3 CII
I4 
CII
I5 
CII
I6 
CII
I7 
CII
I8 
CII
I9 
CII
I10 
CII
I11 
CII
I12 
CII
I13 
CIII14 CIII15 
How many people do 
you consider relevant 
for exchanging 
information about 
agronomic issues 
with? 
How 
many of 
them 
know each 
other? 
How many 
of them 
cultivate 
soybean? 
How many of them cultivate soybean variety?  
(varieties codes B) 
In general, how 
many cultivators 
of soybean do 
you know in the 
community? 
How 
many of 
them 
cultivate 
maize? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Family                
Friends/acquaintances                 
Family & Friends                
 
Network members CIII17 CIII18 CIII19 CIII20 CIII21 CIII22 CIII23 CIII24 CIII25 CIII26 
How many of them implement the following agronomic practices on the soybean 
farm? (Practice codes C) 
How many of them uses the following in threshing 
soybean? (Threshing code D) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 
Family           
Friends/acquaintances           
 
 
 
Code B 
1 Jenguma  6 Salintuya-I (medium) 
2 Quarshie  7 Salintuya-II (late) 
3 Afayak  8 Songda 
4 Suong-Pungun 9 Local variety 
5 Anidaso 10 Other (specify) ____ 
 
Codes D 
0 Manual with sticks 
1 Tractor  
2 Thresher  
3 Other (specify) _____ 
 
Codes A scale of 1 to 6 
1 = Cannot be too careful  
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 = Most can be trusted 
Codes C 
1 Recommended depth of planting 
2 Row planting 
3 Inoculant use 
4 Crop rotation 
5 No burn of crop residue 
6 Other (specify) _____________ 
Codes E 
1 Daily 
2 Biweekly 
3 Weekly 
4 Fortnightly  
5 Monthly 
6 Yearly 
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Source of information CIII27 CIII28 CIII29 CIII30 CIII31 CIII32 CIII33 CIII34 CIII35 
Do you 
know any 
external 
officer from 
the 
following…? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
How 
long (in 
years) 
have you 
known 
officer? 
Have you ever 
sought or received 
soybean 
information from 
any of the 
following in the 
past? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
If yes to CIII29, 
How many 
of them do 
you discuss 
with? 
In a normal 
month, how 
many times 
do you talk 
with…? 
 
In a normal 
month, how 
many times 
do you 
discuss 
soybean 
varieties 
with…? 
In a normal 
month, how 
many times do 
you discuss 
soybean 
agronomic 
practices 
with…? 
In a normal 
month, how 
many times do 
you general 
farming issues 
with…? 
 
In a normal 
month, how 
many times do 
you discuss 
marketing 
with…? 
Neighbours          
Family          
Friends/acquaintances          
External officer          
Agric. Ext Officer (MoFA)          
Research organization          
NGOs          
Other farmer organizations          
 
 
Network member CIII37 CIII38 CIII39 CIII40 CIII41 CIII42 CIII43 CIII44 
Have you ever sought or received any of the following from any of the following in the past?                    
Soy seeds Labour Credit Land 
0/1 No. of contacts 0/1 No. of contacts 0/1 No. of contacts 0/1 No. of contacts 
Family         
Friends/acquaintances         
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Agricultural Production 
         Section DI: Soybean varieties 
          I will like to ask you about your farming activities now starting with issues of soybean cultivation 
DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4 DI5 DI6 DI7 DI8 DI9 DI10 DI11 DI12 DI13 DI14 
Which 
soybean 
varieties 
do you 
know? 
Codes A 
When 
(year) 
did you 
first hear 
about the 
variety? 
From 
whom did 
you first 
hear about 
it?, rank up 
to three 
Code F 
Have 
you ever 
planted 
the 
variety? 
0=No  
>> next 
variety 
1=Yes 
How 
many 
times 
have 
you 
planted 
it in the 
past? 
Years cultivated soybean and acreage  Did you 
cultivate 
variety in the 
2015/2016 
cropping 
season? 
0=No      
1=Yes 
Did you 
use 
certified 
seed? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Acres 
under 
certified 
seeds 
If No, to 
DI11 
why 
not? 
Codes 
G, rank 
3 
 
Yr1 Acre Yr2 Acre Yr3 Acre Yr4 Acre Yr5 Acre 
                   
                   
                   
 
DI15 DI16 DI17 DI18 DI19 DI20 DI21 DI22 DI23 DI24 
Hypothetical 
question, what is 
the minimum 
addition to net 
benefit that made 
you adopt for sure? 
(%) 
If No to DI4, 
hypothetical question, 
please estimate the 
average yield of 
soybean varieties if you 
had adopted last year? 
(%) 
Which of the following agronomic practices do you implement 
and what proportion of the field is under this? 
Codes B 
If the farmer 
rotated soybean 
with another 
crop, which 
crop(s)? 
Codes D 
Before adopting 
did you see the 
variety in the 
field? 
0=No >> DI24       
1=Yes 
If yes, 
where 
was this 
plot 
located? 
Codes C 
Have you 
ever 
attended any 
training on 
soybean 
cultivation? 
Prac. 
code 
Acres Prac. 
code 
Acres Prac. 
code 
Acres Prac. 
code 
Acres 
              
              
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Codes F 
1 Telephone/cell phone    7 Extension officer   
2 Friends or relatives        8 Demonstrations/Field days 
3 Neighbor                    9 Agro-input dealer 
4 Radio/TV       10 GOs/NGOs          
5 Traders                 11 FBO      
6 Newspaper          12 ICT platform (e.g  ESOKO) 
13 Neighboring community  14 Other, specify _______ 
Codes G 
1 Cannot get seed at all   8 Low yielding variety  
2 Lack of cash to buy seed   9 Poor prices  
3 Susceptible to field pests/diseases  10 No market  
4 Susceptible to storage pests   11 Requires high skills  
5 Poor taste    12 Seeds are expensive  
6 Requires more rainfall   13 Cannot get credit 
7 Don’t know how to use it  14 Need for other crops 
15 Other (specify) ____                                                
 
Codes B 
1 Recommended depth of planting 
2 Row planting 
3 Inoculant use 
4 Crop rotation 
5 No burn of crop residue 
6 Other (specify) _____________ 
Codes D 
1 Rice           7 Cowpea 
2 Maize          8 Groundnut 
3 Millet          9 Cotton 
4 Sorghum         10 Yam  
5 Cassava         11 Vegetables 
6 Soya bean       12 Fruits 
13 Other (specify): _____________ 
  Codes C 
1 Next to my plot  
2 On the way to my plot  
3 Different locality area in the community 
4 Outside the community 
 
Code A 
1 Jenguma  6 Salintuya-I (medium) 
2 Quarshie  7 Salintuya-II (late) 
3 Afayak   8 Songda 
4 Suong-Pungun 9 Local variety 
5 Anidaso  10 Other (specify) ____ 
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Section DII: Farmers’ perception  
          Please I will like to ask you of your perception about characteristics of Jenguma and Afayak compared with the traditional soybean variety.  
          Which is better?  [Use Codes:                     0= Traditional  1=Afayak   2=Jenguma] 
 
Section E: Land, crops cultivated, farm operations and extension 
I will now like to ask you about your farming activities during the 2015/2016 season. 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E10 E11 
Which crops 
did you 
cultivate in the 
2015/16 
season? 
 
Codes A and B 
Farm 
location 
Codes E 
How far is 
this farm 
from your 
home? 
Codes B 
Approximate size of 
this entire farm, 
including uncultivated 
acreage or acreage 
being farmed by 
someone outside your 
household? 
Unit Codes C 
Do you keep some part of your land fallow?     
                                                                        0=No >> E10    1=Yes 
Did you 
cultivate 
other crop 
on this 
land? 
 
0=No 
1=Yes 
 
If yes, what 
portion of 
land is 
cultivated 
to this main 
crop? 
(%) 
E6 E7 E8 E9 
Size of land under 
fallow 
Unit Codes C  
How long 
(years) 
have you 
left this 
fallow? 
Could you leave the land 
fallow for several 
months without being 
worried about losing it? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
If no, how or 
why might 
you lose the 
land? 
Codes D 
Num. Unit Num. Unit 
Soybean:             
            
            
Other crops:             
            
            
 
 
         
 
# Characteristics Afayak Jenguma # Characteristics Afayak Jenguma 
 Production     Market and economics    
DII1 High grain yield     DII8 Quality grain   
DII2 Climate stress tolerance    DII9 Marketability (demand)    
DII3 Striga resistant   DII10 Good price    
DII4 Field resistant to pod shattering     Post-harvest    
DII5 Easy threshability    DII11 Longer shelf life in storage    
DII6 Less labour demand    DII12 Ease of processing     
DII7 Easier to understand and 
cultivate 
  DII13 Overall comparison    
Codes D 
1 I would lose title to the land 
2 Land would be given to somebody else 
3 Somebody else would start to use the land 
4 Other (specify)____________________ 
Codes B  
1 Meter  
2 Km  
3 Mile 
 
Codes C 
1 Acre 
2 Hector 
3 Pole 
4 Rod 
5 Other (specify)________ 
Codes B 
1 Rice           7 Groundnut 
2 Maize          8 Cotton 
3 Millet          9 Yam 
4 Sorghum         10 Vegetables 
5 Cassava         11 Fruits 
6 Cowpea            12 Other (specify): __ 
 
  
Code A 
1 Jenguma  6 Salintuya-I (medium) 
2 Quarshie  7 Salintuya-II (late) 
3 Afayak   8 Songda 
4 Suong-Pungun 9 Local variety 
5 Anidaso  10 Other (specify) ____ 
 
Codes E 
1 Within the homestead  
2 Outside the homestead, same village  
3 Outside the homestead, different village 
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Crop 
Codes 
E12 E13 E14 E15 E16 E17 E18 E19 E20 
How 
fertile is 
the soil 
on this 
farm? 
Codes A 
 
What is the 
dominant 
texture of soils 
on this farm? 
Codes B 
How wet is this land compared 
to other lands in your 
community? 
 
1…less wet 
2….same 
3…more wet 
Slope of this 
land 
 
1 = Plain 
 2 =Gentle  
3 =Hilly 
Is the land 
watered from 
a source other 
than rain? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
If yes, what is 
your primary 
source of 
watering? 
Codes C 
How did you 
obtain this plot, 
or gain the right 
to farm this plot? 
Codes D 
If tenant, what 
type of tenancy 
arrangement do 
you operate? 
Codes E 
If fixed 
rent, what 
is the 
duration 
of tenure? 
Soy:          
          
          
Other:          
          
          
 
Crop 
Codes 
E21 E22 E23 E26 E27 E28 Did you use items on plot in the 2015/16 farming season? 
If share 
cropping, what 
are the terms of 
this rent? (i.e. 
harvest shared) 
How long have 
you been 
farming this 
land? 
(Yrs) 
Do you practice 
soil and water 
conservation? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
If yes, which 
type(s) do you 
practice? 
Codes F 
Average 
size of land 
under this 
practice 
(acres) 
Does water 
log on plot? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
E29 E30 E31 E32 
Tractor  
 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Cost (give 
money value 
if in kind) 
GHS 
Drought 
animal  
0=No 
1=Yes 
Cost (give 
money value 
if in kind) 
GHS 
Soy:           
           
           
Other:           
           
           
 
 
 
 
  
Codes B 
1 Sandy 
2 Rocky/gravely 
3 Clay-filled 
4 Silty 
5 Loamy            
Codes A 
1 Fertile  
2 Moderately fertile  
3 Less fertile  
4 Infertile            
 
Codes D 
1 Owner    5 Allocated free of charge  
2 Purchased  6 Begged 
3 Inherited from deceased 7 Borrowed   
   family member                    8 Other (specify)__________ 
4 Tenant Rented (cash/kind)  
 
Codes F 
1 Crop rotation  
2 Land enriching cover crops  
3 Legumes   
4 Zero tillage 
5 Minimal tillage 
6 Composting 
7 Agroforestry 
8 Other (specify) ________  
Codes E 
1 Fixed rent  
2 Sharecropped 
Codes C 
1 Well   
2 Borehole  
3 Pond/tank    
4 Weir 
5 River/stream 
6 Other (specify)____ 
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Section F: Inputs (seeds and materials) 
Please I will like to ask you about your inputs applications during the 2015/2016 cropping season 
Crop 
Codes 
 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
What quantity of 
crop seeds did 
you use on farm? 
(Kg) 
What type or variety 
of the seed did you 
plant on farm? 
Codes D 
How did you 
obtain the crop 
seeds planted 
on this farm? 
Codes C 
If any seeds were 
purchased, what 
quantity was 
purchased? 
(kg) 
How much did 
you pay for the 
purchased seeds 
used on farm?  
(GHS) 
Did you apply 
fertilizer to 
farm? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Which 
type did 
you 
apply? 
Codes E 
What 
quantity 
was 
applied? 
(Kg) 
What 
was the 
unit 
price? 
(GHS) 
Soy:          
          
          
Other:          
          
          
 
Crops 
Codes 
F10 F14 F18 F19 F20 
Did you apply pesticides?   0=No  1=Yes Did you apply weedicides?  0=No  1=Yes Did you 
apply green 
manure? 
0=No    
1=Yes 
Did you apply 
animal 
manure? 
0=No    
1=Yes 
Did you apply 
composted 
manure? 
0=No    
1=Yes 
F11 F12 F13 F15 F16 F17 
Which types 
did you apply?  
Codes F 
Quantity 
applied on farm 
(litres/kg) 
Total expenditure 
on pesticides? 
(GHS) 
Which types 
did you apply? 
Codes F 
Quantity 
applied on 
farm (litres) 
Total expenditure 
on weedicides? 
(GHS) 
Soy:          
          
          
Other:          
          
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Codes F 
0 None 
1 Powder/Comdemn 
2 Sarosate 
3 Insecticide 
4 Fungicide 
5 Tintani 
6 Other (specify)________        
 
Codes E  
1 Fertilizer: NPK (15-15-15) 
2 Fertilizer: ammonium sulphate (SA) 
3 Fertilizer 23-10-5 (Actyva) 
4 Other compound fertilizer 
5 Fertilizer: Other (specify) 
6 Urea 
7 Commercial organic fertilizer 
    (including Fertisoil, Cocopeat) 
8 Phosphorus  
9 Sulfan 
10 Inoculant 
10 Other (specify) ___________ 
Code A 
1 Jenguma  6 Salintuya-I (medium) 
2 Quarshie  7 Salintuya-II (late) 
3 Afayak  8 Songda 
4 Suong-Pungun 9 Local variety 
5 Anidaso 10 Other (specify) ____ 
 
Codes C 
0 Own storage  6 Local seed producers 
1 Agro-input dealer  7 Extension officer (MoFA) 
2 Purchased from market 8 NGO 
3 Exchange (farmer) 9 Gift 
4 Private aggregator 10 SARI/CSI 
5 FBO (cooperative)  
11 Other (specify) ___________ 
 
Codes D  0 Local  1 Improved 
Codes E 
1 Rice           7 Groundnut 
2 Maize          8 Cotton 
3 Millet          9 Yam 
4 Sorghum         10 Vegetables 
5 Cassava         11 Fruits 
6 Cowpea           12 Other (specify): __ 
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Section G: Labour and credit  
Please I will like to ask about your labour use in farming during the 2015/2016 farming season 
Crop 
Codes 
G1 
Family 
G2 G3 
Hired Communal 
Did you use hired labour?   0=No   1=Yes Did you use communal labour?  
0=No   1=Yes 
Males Females Children Males Females Males Females 
Num. Days Num. Days Num. Days Num. Days Rate(GHS)/ 
Codes A 
Num. Days Rate(GHS)/ 
Codes A 
Num. Days Num. Days 
Soybean:                 
                 
                 
Other crops:                 
                 
                 
 
   
Please I will now like to ask about your credit needs and access during the 2015/2016 cropping season 
G4 During the cropping season, did you have liquidity constraints in financing production 
(inputs)?                    0=No          1=Yes 
G10 If no, how much were you given?     ___________(GHS) 
G5 If yes, did you apply/ask for any loan to finance production?      0=No  >>  H        1=Yes G11 Was collateral required in getting the loan facility? 0=No       1=Yes 
G6 If yes, were you granted?                                                                   0=No          1=Yes G12 What did you use as collateral?       Codes C 
G7 Where did you access the credit?   Codes D 
 
G13 What was the interest you paid on the credit facility? 
                                                                                     _________GHS 
G8 How much did you apply for?  ______(GHS) 
 
  
G9 Were you given all you applied for?                            0=No        1=Yes 
 
 
 
 
  
Activity codes:   
1 Clearing   
2 Ploughing   
3 Planting   
4 Chemical application 
5 Weeding  
6 Harvesting  
Codes A 
1 Day 
2 Acre 
Codes D 
1 Friends or relatives    
2 Local moneylenders     
3 Banks     
4 NGOs (specify) ________     
5 Nonbank financial institution (including MFI) 
6 Private aggregator  
7 Input dealer 
8 Outgrower 
9 FBO 
10 Others (specify)_________ 
 
Codes C 
1 Land   4 Building 
2 Livestock  5 Household asset 
3 Farm produce  6 Other (specify) 
__ 
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Section H: Harvest, storage and marketing 
Crop 
Codes 
 
H1 H2 H3 For soybean H9 H10 
What quantity of 
crop was harvested 
from plot over the 
2015/2016 farming 
season? 
Was any crop 
lost during 
harvesting on 
field?  
0=No 
1=Yes 
How much 
of crop did 
you lose in 
total? (%) 
How did 
you store 
crop? 
Codes H 
Do you treat 
harvest under 
storage with 
chemicals? 
0=No    
1=Yes 
H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 
How was 
it 
harvested? 
Codes E 
 
How was 
it 
threshed? 
Codes F 
On what 
was it 
threshed? 
Codes G  
Was any crop 
lost during 
threshing? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
How much 
of crop did 
you lose in 
total? (%) 
Soybean:           
           
           
Other crops:           
           
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
Codes F 
0 Manual with sticks 
1 Tractor  
2 Thresher  
3 Other (specify) _____ 
 
Codes E 
0 Hand   
1 Combine harvester 
2 Other(specify) ___ 
 
Code A 
1 Jenguma  6 Salintuya-I (medium) 
2 Quarshie  7 Salintuya-II (late) 
3 Afayak   8 Songda 
4 Suong-Pungun 9 Local variety 
5 Anidaso  10 Other (specify) ____ 
 
Codes G 
0 On the floor 
1 Fertilizer sacks 
2 Tapolin          
Codes B 
1 Rice           7 Groundnut 
2 Maize          8 Cotton 
3 Millet          9 Yam 
4 Sorghum         10 Vegetables 
5 Cassava         11 Fruits 
6 Cowpea            12 Other (specify): __ 
 
  
Codes H  
0 Not stored   3 With private aggregator 
1 Local silo at home/farm  4 Cooperative/FBO facility 
2 In bags at home/farm  5 Communal storage unit 
6 Other (specify)     
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Crop  
Codes 
H11 H12 H13 H14 H15 H16 H17 H18 H19 H20 H21 H22 H23 
Did 
you 
sell 
crop? 
0=No 
>>crop 
1=Yes 
Did you find 
out about 
market 
conditions 
before sale? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
If yes, 
what was 
the infor. 
source? 
 
Codes A 
 
Quantity 
sold 
during and 
since 
harvest(s) 
in 
2015/16? 
What 
unit 
price 
did you 
sell 
most of 
crop? 
Where 
did you 
sell most 
of the 
crop? 
 
Codes B 
Distance to 
market for 
crops 
transported to 
the market for 
sale? 
(Km) 
What 
was the 
transport 
cost to 
the 
market? 
GHS 
What 
other 
marketing 
costs did 
you incur? 
 
Codes C 
Who did 
you sell 
most of 
your 
harvest to? 
 
Codes E 
What 
proportion 
was sold 
to this 
buyer? 
(Kg) 
 
Did buyer 
provide 
you with 
any 
services? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
If yes, 
which 
services 
were you 
provided 
with? 
Codes F 
Soy:              
              
              
Other:              
              
              
 
Crop  
code 
H24 H25 H26 H27 
When did 
you sell 
most of 
the 
harvest? 
Codes G 
What was 
the 
principal 
reason for 
these sales? 
Codes H 
Is the crop 
considered 
primarily as a 
cash or staple 
food crop? 
Codes D 
Did you buy any crop for household consumption?          0=No  >> next crop       1=Yes 
H28 H29 H30 H31 H32 H33 H34 
If yes, quantity 
of crop 
purchased in 
2015/16? 
What unit price 
did you sell 
most of crop? 
(GHS) 
Did you find out about 
market before buying? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
If yes, what 
was the source 
of infor.? 
Codes A 
Where did 
you buy most 
of these? 
Codes B 
If in the market, 
distance to 
purchase point? 
(Km) 
Transport 
cost from 
the market? 
GHS 
Soy:           
           
           
Other:           
           
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Codes D 
0 =Staple food crop 
1 =Cash crop 
 
Codes A 
1 Telephone/cell phone         
2 Friends or relatives             
3 Radio/TV  
4 Traders             
5 Newspaper     
6 Extension officer   
7 GOs/NGOs          
8 Farmer based organisation (FBO)      
9 ICT platform (ESOKO, e AGRI)      
10 Other (specify) _______________ 
Codes E  
1 Consumer within c’ty 6 Outgrower 
2 Consumer elsewhere 7 Pre harvest contractors 
3 Market traders  8 Input dealer 
4 Private aggregator 9 Other,specify_______ 
5 =Cooperative/FBO   
Codes G 
1 Immediately after harvest or before cultivation 
2 When household is cash constraint   
3 When I noticed I had enough food for consumption 
4 Noticed output price increases/anticipate a decrease  
   in the near future 
Codes H 
1 Meeting household basic needs/necessities       
2 Had some surplus left   
3 Profit or take advantage of favorable market conditions 
 
Codes B 
1 On the farm 
2 Market in the community  
3 Market outside the com’ty 
 
Codes C 
1 Market toll 
2 Loading/offloading 
3 Other (specify) ___________ 
 
Codes F 
1 Plough/tractor    6 Fertilizers/chemical 
2 Seeds    7 Organic fertilizer  
3 Weedicides/herbicides   8 Extension 
4 Post-harvest chemicals  9 Transportation 
5 Post-harvest processing   10 Other, specify _____ 
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H35 Do you have a mobile phone in the household?   0=No     1=Yes H43 If yes, how many agricultural associations are you involved in? 
H36 Is there a mobile phone reception at the location of the household? 
                                                                              0=No     1=Yes 
H44 Do you attend association meetings?    
                                                                                            0=No    1=Yes 
H37 Have you ever used mobile phone (either yours/someone’s) to call for market 
information?                                                         0=No >> H39    1=Yes 
H45 How many times did you attend meetings during the 2015/16 season? 
H38 If yes, how many times in the 2015/16 copping season?                                                                         H46 Have you ever had contract with an entity/individual in your farming in the past 5 years 
prior to the 2015-2016 farming season?         0=No >> Section I    1=Yes 
H39 
 
 
H40 
When you sold most output, did you negotiate and/or bargain with buyer(s)?                                                                            
                                                                                         0=No    1=Yes 
 
Did you sell crop to any official source?                         0=No    1=Yes 
H47 If yes, which crops,
quantity and unit 
price did you sell to 
contractors? 
Crop code Quantity (Kg) Unit price (GHS) 
   
   
   
   
   
 
H41 Did you purchase crop from an official source?              0=No    1=Yes H48 When were prices determined between you and the contractor(s)?  
                   0 =Before cultivation   1 =After harvest 
H42 Do you belong to an agricultural association?                 0=No    1=Yes H49 Which services did the contractor provide you? Codes A 
Section I: Income, financing and expenditure 
Please indicate the annual income you earn from the following sources:  
 Source of income  Amount/GHS 
I1 Annual income from sale of farm produce/crops  
I2 Annual income from sale of livestock  
I3 Annual income from non-farm activities  
I4 Gifts and remittances  
I5 Aid (from NGO/Gov’t)  
I6 Other not classified  
 
Please indicate which of the following apply to you:   
 Finance Response 
I7 Does the household often save food for household consumption in the next year?    0=No    1=Yes  
I8 Does the household head regularly save money?                                                        0=No    1=Yes  
I9 Do you hold a bank account?                                                                                       0=No    1=Yes  
I10 Do you hold other financial assets?                                                                             0=No    1=Yes  
I11 Do you often borrow money to meet regular expenditure requirements?                   0=No    1=Yes  
    
Please indicate the household expenditure on the under listed items: 
I12 Expenditure item Expenditure (GHS) 
I13 How much did you spend on food in a regular month?  [GHS]  
I14 How much did you spend on other regular non-food items (e.g.) in a regular month?  [GHS]  
I15 Other expenditures (e.g. funerals, remittance, gifts, weddings e.t.c) over the past year? [GHS]  
Codes A  
0 None    
1 Plough/tractor    
2 Fertilizer/other chemicals  
3 Seeds In bags at home/farm  
6 Extension 
3 Harvest and post-harvest services 
5 Transportation 
6 Other (specify) __________      
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Section J: Household food and nutritional status  
Please answer the following questions in your capacity as the person responsible for food provision/preparation in the household in the past 4 weeks/one month. 
              J1. Could you please tell me how many days in the last 7 days your household has eaten the following foods? 
 Food item Days eaten in last week (0-7 days) 
1 Maize |____________| 
2 Millet/Sorghum |____________| 
3 Rice |____________| 
4 Bread/Wheat |____________| 
5 Tubers (yam, cassava, plantain, other) |____________| 
6 Groundnuts and Pulses (beans, other nuts) |____________| 
7 Fish (eating as a main food) |____________| 
8 Fish powder, small fish (used for flavor only, Maggi) |____________| 
9 Red meat (sheep/goat/beef/etc) |____________| 
10 White meat (poultry) |____________| 
11 Vegetable oil, butter, shea butter, fats |____________| 
12 Eggs |____________| 
13 Milk and dairy products (main food) |____________| 
14 Milk in tea in small amounts |____________| 
15 Vegetables (including green leaves) |____________| 
16 Fruits |____________| 
17 Sweets, sugar, honey |____________| 
 
 J2. In the last 7 days, how many hot meals did you have on average per day? ____________ (number of meals) 
 J3. In the last 3months, was there an instance where the household took less preferred food? 0=No 1=Yes 
 I will like to ask about your household food situation for the last 12 months 
J4 J5 J6 J7 J8 J9 J10 J11 J12 J13 
In the last 12 months, 
since (current month) of 
last year, did you ever 
reduce the quantity or 
quality of (entire 
household) meals 
because there wasn't 
enough money for 
food? 
Codes A 
How many 
months did 
you 
experience 
this 
situation? 
In the last 12 months, 
since (current month) of 
last year, did you ever 
reduce the quantity or 
quality of (your 
child’s/any of the 
children’s) meals 
because there wasn’t 
enough money for food 
Codes A 
How many 
months did 
you 
experience 
this 
situation? 
In the last 12 months, 
was there ever no food 
to eat of any kind in 
your household because 
of lack of resources to 
get food? 
0=No  1=Yes 
How many 
months did 
you 
experience 
this 
situation? 
In the past 12 
months, did you or 
any household 
member go to sleep 
at night hungry 
because there was 
not enough food? 
0=No   1=Yes 
How many 
months did you 
experience this 
situation? 
Do you 
currently 
receive food 
aid from 
government 
or an NGO? 
 
0=No 
1=Yes 
If yes, how 
many years 
have you 
been 
receiving 
the aid? 
 
 
         
  
 Codes A:   1=Yes quantity was reduced 2=Yes quality was reduced 3=Yes both quantity and quality was reduced 4= No 
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     Section K: Livestock and other assets  
      Please I will like to ask about your livestock and other assets of the household. 
 
K1 
 
Do you own any of these animals in the household? 
Cattle Sheep Goat Pigs Poultry Others_____ Others_____ 
0=No 
1=Yes 
0=No 
1=Yes 
0=No 
1=Yes 
0=No 
1=Yes 
0=No 
1=Yes 
0=No 
1=Yes 
0=No 
1=Yes 
K2 If yes, how many does the household own?          
K3 How many did you sell in the 2015/16 season?        
K4 At what price did you sell most of this? (GHS)        
K5 How many did you buy in the 2015/16 season?        
K6 At what price did you buy most of this? (GHS)        
K7 Do you seek for veterinary services for them?  
                                                            0=No 1=Yes 
       
K8 If yes, how much did it cost you to vaccinate them in 
the last 12 months? GHS 
       
 
Please complete the table below on the asset owned by your household 
# Asset/Item Do you have 
item? 
0=No     1=Yes 
If yes, how many 
in all? 
If yes, how many as at 
the beginning of 2015? 
How much did you 
purchase the most current 
item? GHS 
Price if you were to 
sell it now GHS 
1 Cutlass      
2 Hoe      
3 Knapsack      
4 Irrigation pump/kit      
5 Radio      
6 Television      
7 Bicycle      
8 Motorcycle      
9 Car/Moto-King/kia      
10 Bullock/ Donkey      
11 Thresher      
12 Tractor      
13 Mechanized sheller      
14 House       
15 Other (specify)……      
16 Other (specify)……      
 
End of interview and thank you for participating
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Appendix 2: Focus group interview guide                                                                                         
            
 
 
Main ethnicity and religion 
1. What is/are the main languages spoken in the community? 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Which ethnic group is the dominant?  
 
 
 
 
3. Which religion is the dominant? 
 
 
 
Farm labour wage rate   
4. What was the wage rate per day during 2015/2016 season? _____________ GHS  
5. Was the wage rate same for male and female?  0=No 1=Yes  
6. If no, what was the wage rate for a female worker during 2015/2016 growing season?  
___________ GHS 
 
Transactions costs 
7. What is the distance to the nearest tared road?    ______________ Km  
8. What is the most used means of transport to the nearest road? 
 
9. How many minutes does it take you from the community to the nearest tared road using this 
most common means?  ____________________Mins 
 
 
 
Codes  
1. Likpakpaln (Konkomba) 7. Hausa   13. Nankan 
2. Chekosi  8. Bimoba  14. Kusaal 
3. Mampruli  9. Dagaare/Wali  15. Twi 
4. Dagbali (Dagbani) 10. Sissali    16. Ewe 
5. Nanunli  11. Gruni  17. Ga 
6. Gonja   12. Kasem 18. Other (specify) ________ 
   
    
   
Codes  
1. Konkombas 7. Hausas   13. Nankan               
2. Chekosi 8. Bimobas   14. Kusasi 
3. Mamprusi 9. Dagaabas/Walas  15. Akans 
4. Dagombas 10. Sissalas   16. Ewes 
5. Nanumbas 11. Grunsi   17. Gas  
6. Gonjas  12. Kassenas  18. Other (specify)________  
    
   
   
Codes C 
0 No religion  
1 Muslim  3 Traditional 
2 Christian 6 Other (specify) __________________ 
 
   
 
 
Codes 
0 Foot  2 Bicycle  4 Motor King 6 Truck  
1 Animal  3 Motor bike 5 Tractor  7 Other (specify) ______________
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10. What is the distance to the district capital?          ______________ Km 
11. What is the distance to the nearest agriculture office?          ______________ Km 
12. What is the distance to the nearest agriculture extension officer?          ______________ 
Km 
13. What is the distance to the nearest NGO or Research organization? ________________Km 
Market 
14. Do you have at least periodic market in the community?    0=No  1=Yes 
15. What was the average soybean price in the community last year ____ GHS 
16. What is the distance to the nearest market center?          ______________ Km 
17. What is the distance to the nearest financial institution? _________________Km 
18. How many days per week a car/vehicle plies the community? ______________Days 
19. Does the entire community has mobile phone service?  0=No  1=Yes 
20. If no to 19, do you have mobile phone service in some sections of the community? 
0=No  1=Yes 
21. If yes to 19, how many of such spots do you know of in the community? 
____________ 
 
 
 
